



World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986

Foreword, Highlights, Charts, Statistical Notes

Essays on:

- Third World Arms Production and Exports
 - Economic Effects of Military Spending on Growth
 - Arms Trends in China
 - Force Ratios, Militarism, and Marxism
-

Tables of Military and Economic Variables
for 145 Countries, 1974-1985

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Introduction

This report, the seventeenth in a series by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, provides a ready reference on military expenditure, arms transfer and related data for 145 countries. We have continued our effort to provide comprehensive, up-to-date, and accurate data and to include more extensive analyses. New features in this issue include four essays, a new Table IV, which covers both arms deliveries and arms agreements through 1985, and a section, following the Highlights, giving the world rank of all countries for 17 variables.

Acknowledgements

This edition was prepared by the staff of the Defense Program and Analysis Division.

Comments and questions regarding this publication are welcome. They may be directed to:

Defense Program and Analysis Division
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D.C. 20451
ATTN: Daniel Gallik
Telephone (202) 647-1300

World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

This issue is dedicated
to the memory of

Henry Schaefer

a longtime
friend and colleague
who has contributed so much
to WMEAT and to arms control

Foreword

Military openness on the part of states is a key ingredient of successful arms control and disarmament.

It is fitting to make that statement here, since *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT)* was founded seventeen issues ago on the principle of encouraging military openness. This series of reports, part of ACDA's effort to inform the public on arms control matters, has pioneered in the compilation of worldwide data on military expenditures, armed forces, and the arms trade.

But many countries, including key countries from the arms control standpoint, disclose virtually nothing about their armed forces and their military programs, or disclose only token and ambiguous information that obscures more than it illuminates. The *WMEAT* compilations clearly demonstrate this paucity of hard data. Worldwide totals can only be compiled by making estimates for many important countries, including the Soviet Union, the world's largest military spender, arms exporter, and armer of men. Making these estimates is difficult and subject to considerable uncertainty. A case in point is the major upward revision made several years ago in the CIA's estimates of Soviet military spending in rubles. Even now, an ongoing review of our estimates of the value (though not the quantity) of Soviet arms exports is pointing to the need for a substantial upward revision.

The lack of openness in military matters on the part of some countries has two very unfortunate consequences. For one, it obstructs the rest of the world's ability to discern at least the general magnitude and direction of such countries' military activity. The result is an unnecessary fostering of suspicion, mistrust, and possible overreaction. Every nation's ability to analyze and understand security issues in the world is constrained.


The other important negative consequence of excessive military secrecy is obvious; it obstructs effective arms control and disarmament. Such agreements cannot rest on tenuous estimates. In the face of extreme secrecy, it is necessary to resort to intrusive inspection arrangements and expensive technical means of obtaining information. Further, elaborate and carefully defined treaty verification provisions are required to reach agreements that truly enhance security rather than undermine it.

For instance, only now, 10 years after the start of negotiations on a chemical weapons treaty, has the Soviet Union conceded that it possesses chemical weapons. Even that kind of minimal concession has yet to be reached in regard to research and development for strategic defenses. We know that Soviet efforts in this area predate those of the United States.

The United States has long called for greater military openness on the part of all nations. In 1982 the United Nations General Assembly adopted our resolution emphasizing the connection between progress in disarmament and openness, free discussion and free dissemination of information in all nations. The response has not been encouraging.

A sensible approach to arms control, however, must contain large elements of patience. The optimism regarding worldwide military openness which is exemplified by seventeen issues of *WMEAT* and similar efforts elsewhere may yet be justified. Along with the fanfare surrounding the current *glasnost* campaign in the Soviet Union, there may be some elements of meaningful change. We hope so. As Dr. Sakharov told Prime Minister Thatcher recently, "The process of democratization in the Soviet Union [is] very important for our country . . . ; it is also important for the world. A more democratic, more open country is safer for the world as a whole."

We hope that future *WMEAT* reports will have the benefit of greater military openness and, thus, less need for careful, laborious, and error-susceptible estimation. More important, greater openness will improve the prospects for heightened security for all countries aided by effective arms control.


Director

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Highlights

Military Expenditures

Worldwide trends

World military spending continues to rise, and is estimated at nearly \$900 billion in 1985. (Figure 1) After inflation is taken into account, "real" world military spending accelerated from a 2.1% average annual growth rate during 1974-1979 to a 3.5% rate in 1980-1984 (Table 1). The rate for the decade as a whole was 2.9%.

Despite world economic problems, the rise in real world military spending has not abated in the most recent years, having increased 2.4% in 1984 and an estimated 3.7% in 1985. These real increases combined

with a dollar inflation rate of about 3.3% in each of the two years to produce current dollar increases of 5.9% in 1984 and 7.2% in 1985.

(World and group estimates for 1985 are based on incomplete data and are shown in the Statistical Notes rather than main statistical Table I.)

Developed countries' real military spending grew by 3.6% annually in the second half of the decade, up from 1.4% in the first half. The low rate in the earlier years reflected the decline and levelling of U.S. spending until 1978.

The developing countries' rate slowed in the later period, from 4.8% in 1974-1979 to 2.8% in 1980-1984. In fact, developing-country spending actually dropped by an average 0.2% from 1982 to 1984. However, the preliminary 1985 estimate shows a slight upturn.

The developing countries accounted for 20% of the world total in 1984.




Figure 1

Table 1
Military Expenditures
(In percent)

	World Share		Real Growth Rate* for Decade		
			1st Half	2nd Half	Total
	1974	1984	74-80	80-84	74-84
World:	100.0	100.0	2.3	3.5	2.9
Developed	82.2	79.6	1.9	3.6	2.8
Developing	17.8	20.4	4.1	2.8	3.5
Region:					
Africa	1.5	1.9	9.0	-1.4	3.7
East Asia	6.4	7.1	4.9	2.6	3.6
Europe, all	54.6	49.6	2.0	1.8	1.9
NATO Europe	12.6	11.6	2.1	2.1	2.2
Warsaw Pact	40.1	36.5	2.0	1.8	1.9
Other Europe	1.9	1.6	0.0	1.7	0.7
Latin America	1.3	1.5	4.6	4.4	4.3
Middle East	7.2	8.7	3.7	3.3	3.8
North America	27.7	29.3	1.1	7.0	4.1
Oceania	0.5	0.6	4.6	5.6	5.9
South Asia	0.8	1.2	6.0	7.4	5.9
Organization:					
NATO, all	40.3	40.8	1.4	5.5	3.5
Warsaw Pact	40.1	36.5	2.0	1.8	1.9
OPEC	5.9	7.6	5.5	1.9	4.2
OECD	43.4	44.3	1.5	5.4	3.5

* Average annual growth, calculated as a compound rate.
(See Statistical Notes.)

Regional and National Trends

South Asia and North America had the most rapid rates of growth in military spending in 1980-1984, followed by Oceania and Latin America. (Table 1) However, South Asia has levelled off since 1983, as can be seen in Figure 2.

Africa was the only region that had a declining rate in 1980-1984, although Latin America and the Middle East have been declining since 1982 and 1983, respectively.

NATO had a military spending growth rate of 5.5% in 1980-1984, compared to 1.8% for the Warsaw Pact. NATO's growth rate was a low 0.6% in the first part of the decade, while the Warsaw Pact had a 2.0% rate.

The NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances together accounted for 77.3% of world military spending in 1984, slightly lower than their 80.4% share a decade earlier (Table 1). In 1984, NATO's share was 40.8% while the Warsaw Pact's was 36.5%. They had been nearly even a decade earlier, but the Warsaw Pact share was larger in the middle of the decade, as can be seen in Figure 2.

OPEC countries' rate of military spending slowed considerably to 1.9% in 1980-1984 from a rapid 6.6% in 1974-1979.

The Soviet Union and the United States continue to dominate world military spending, accounting together for 59.5% of the total in 1984 (Figure 3). The United Kingdom, in third place, was spending roughly one-tenth as much as the leaders. China has dropped from third place in *WMEAT 1985* to fourth, due mainly to a change in the yuan/dollar conversion rate used (Statistical Notes).

Military Expenditures by Region, 1974-1985




Figure 2

Shares of World Military Expenditures, 1984




Figure 3

Two developing countries, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, ranked seventh and eighth in military spending. The listing of the top 20 countries in terms of military spending in Figure 4 shows five developing countries in

the second ten — Iran, Israel, India, North Korea, and Egypt. (The rankings of all 144 countries of the world in terms of military spending and 16 other variables are shown in a new section following these Highlights.)




Figure 4

Armed Forces

The growth of the world's armed forces accelerated in the second half of the decade, from 0.9% to 1.2% annually. (Table 2) Acceleration occurred primarily in the developed grouping, although developing countries maintained a higher and steady growth rate of about 1.5%.

Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America had the highest rates for the decade as a whole, and although all three regions slowed their growth somewhat in the second half, their rates remained high. Higher growth in the second half-decade occurred in Europe, particularly in its NATO and Other subregions, and in North America.

The 1984 world increase of 3.3% was especially large, due primarily to the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq accounted for 38% of the 1984 world increase and Iran, for 10%. India and Pakistan also increased their men under arms substantially in 1984 and together accounted for 20% of the world increase. (From Main Statistical Table I.)

Armed forces in East Asia declined in the second half of the decade. East Asia was the only region with a declining rate. The absolute reductions began in 1982, primarily in China.

The Soviet Union and China clearly lead the world in the number of men under arms, the Soviet Union with 4.5 million and China with 4.1 million in 1984. (See Figure 4.) The US with 2.2 million was at about one-half their level.

China is substantially reducing its armed forces, which peaked in 1981 at about 4.75 million. (See the essay by Dr. Henry Kenny for a discussion of China's evolving military posture.)

Developing countries are high among the top countries in numbers of armed forces. Three of the top five in 1984 were China, India, and Vietnam. Developing

Table 2
Armed Forces
(In percent)

	World Share		Real Growth Rate* for Decade		
			1st Half	2nd Half	Total
	1974	1984	74-79	79-84	74-84
World:	100.0	100.0	0.9	1.2	1.1
Developed	40.8	37.7	-0.1	1.0	0.6
Developing	59.2	62.3	1.6	1.4	1.5
Region:					
Africa	3.7	5.4	7.0	3.8	4.7
East Asia	30.9	28.9	1.2	-0.5	1.0
Europe, all	37.1	34.8	0.2	1.0	0.7
NATO Europe	12.7	11.4	-0.2	1.0	0.5
Warsaw Pact	20.9	20.4	0.8	0.9	0.9
Other Europe	3.5	3.1	-2.0	1.0	-0.3
Latin America	4.8	6.2	4.0	3.8	3.7
Middle East	5.5	8.8	5.7	4.0	4.2
North America	8.6	8.0	-0.9	1.8	0.7
Oceania	0.3	0.3	1.6	0.6	1.0
South Asia	9.1	7.7	-3.2	2.5	-2.0
Organization:					
NATO, all	21.3	19.4	-0.5	1.3	0.5
Warsaw Pact	20.9	20.4	0.8	0.9	0.9
OPEC	4.9	7.2	4.0	3.7	2.8
OECD	24.8	22.5	-0.7	1.3	0.5

*Average annual growth, calculated as a compound rate.
(See Statistical Notes.)

countries also make up the second five — Turkey, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Korea — exceeding such traditional military powers as France, Italy, and West Germany. Of the top 20 countries, 13 were developing. (Figure 4)

Relative Burden

The usual measure of military "burden" for the world has remained steady since 1982. This measure, the ratio of military spending to GNP, has stood at 6.0% for the world since 1982, except for a small dip to 5.9% in 1984. The ratio for the developed countries also varied between 5.9 and 6.0% in 1982-1985. (Main Statistical Table I and, for 1985 estimates, Statistical Notes)

The burden ratio for the developing countries dropped after peaking in 1982-1983. The ratio dropped from 6.2% in those years to 6.0% in 1984 and an estimated 5.9% in 1985. The drop reflects the slight decline of their military spending compared to an

average GNP growth of 2.0% in 1982-85. Declining ratios occurred mainly in Africa, East Asia, and Latin America.

In 1984, the Middle East, Warsaw Pact, and North America had the highest burdens in terms of ME/GNP, which stood at 15.6%, 10.7%, and 6.0%, respectively.

The burden ratio varies widely among countries, irrespective of income. This can be seen in Figure 5, which shows all countries ranked simultaneously in terms of both the burden ratio and GNP per capita in 1984. A trend toward a lower average burden ratio among countries is suggested by a comparison of the

similar chart for 1983 in *WMEAT 1985* with Figure 5, which shows fewer countries in the top two ME/GNP classes in 1984.

Another measure of burden, the ratio of military expenditures to central government expenditures, increased during the 1980s. The increase occurred in the world at large as well as in the developed and developing groupings. (Table I) This increase may be due to an increase in the ratio of CGE to GNP, which in turn may be related to the slowdown in GNP growth. (Figure 11 shows the CGE/GNP ratio for a variety of country groupings in 1984.)

A third indicator of burden, the ratio of armed forces to population, showed little movement over the decade for the major groups. (Table I) This measure is advocated in the essay by James Payne, where it is termed the "force ratio." He also presents an adjusted version there.

Iraq and Israel had the highest ratios in 1984. (See Country Rankings.) Iraq's ratio increased sharply by 76% in that year. (Table I)

An interesting survey of recent research on the economic impact of military programs may be found in the essay by Steve Chan.

Relative Burden of Military Expenditures — 1984

ME/GNP* (%)	GNP PER CAPITA (1983 dollars)					
	Under \$200	\$200-499	\$500-999	\$1,000-2,999	\$3,000-9,999	\$10,000 and over
10% and over	Cambodia† Laos		Yemen (Aden) Egypt Yemen (Sanaa)	Iraq Korea, North Syria Jordan Nicaragua Mongolia†	Oman Israel Saudi Arabia Libya Soviet Union	Qatar
5-9.99%	Ethiopia	Cape Verde† China Vietnam† Zambia Somalia	Angola Lesotho Zimbabwe El Salvador	Lebanon† Peru Taiwan	Bulgaria Greece Iran Germany, E.	United Arab Emirates United States
2-4.99%	Burma Burkina Faso Equatorial Guinea† Guinea-Bissau† Mali	Pakistan Afghanistan† Mauritania† Mozambique† India Burundi Kenya Tanzania Guinea† Senegal Madagascar Indonesia Benin Togo Liberia Rwanda† Sudan	Morocco Guyana Honduras Thailand Botswana† Bolivia	Cuba Korea, South Turkey Albania† South Africa Chile Malaysia Argentina Yugoslavia Portugal Tunisia Uruguay Algeria Congo Suriname Panama	Czechoslovakia Poland Singapore United Kingdom Romania France Hungary Bahrain Netherlands Belgium Australia Italy Trinidad and Tobago Spain Gabon	Kuwait Germany, West Sweden Norway Denmark Canada Switzerland
1-1.99%	Bangladesh Malawi Chad Nepal	Central African Republic† Haiti Sri Lanka Sao Tome & Principe† Zaire Uganda	Cameroon Papua New Guinea Nigeria Swaziland Ivory Coast Philippines	Guatemala Paraguay Ecuador Colombia Fiji Dominican Republic Costa Rica	New Zealand Ireland Venezuela Cyprus Austria	Finland
Under 1%		Niger Sierra Leone The Gambia†		Brazil Jamaica Mexico Mauritius	Barbados Malta Ghana	Japan Luxembourg Iceland

Source: Table I

* Countries are listed within blocks in descending order of ME/GNP

† Ranking is based on a rough approximation of one or more variables for which 1984 data or reliable estimates are not available.

Figure 5

Arms Transfers

Total World Trade

World arms deliveries in constant dollars dropped sharply in 1985 after a small drop in 1983-1984 from the peak level in 1981-1982. (Figure 6) The drop was mainly in the imports of the developing countries, though developed-country imports also declined.

The decline in 1985 may be smaller than presently estimated, due to a tendency for arms transfer delivery data on the most recent year to undergo subsequent upward revision as improved information becomes available. However, the initial 1985 total of \$29 billion current dollars given in the main statistical tables (Table II) will probably increase less in the next edition than the \$7 billion increase in the 1984 world total that occurred between *WMEAT 1985* and this edition.

Data on arms transfer agreements also suggest the continuation of a relatively high level of world demand for arms. Total agreements in 1985 remained near the 1982-1985 annual average of \$46 billion, though they

were down considerably from the 1982 peak, as can be seen from the following (in billions of current dollars):

1982	52.6	1984	46.7
1983	41.6	1985	43.2

These figures further suggest that the sharp 1985 drop in arms deliveries should be treated with some caution. (Agreements data are published in *WMEAT* for the second time and are shown together with arms deliveries by supplier and recipient region in a new main statistical table, Table IV.)

In future editions, the world level in all years will probably be revised upward significantly. Estimates of the value of the arms exports of the Soviet Union are currently under review. This review will probably result in upward revisions on the order of 40-50% in the Soviet series in subsequent editions. The relative importance of recipients of Soviet arms transfers probably will also change, as these upward revisions, which involve values of support materiel transfers rather than major weapons, will affect various recipients differently. (Statistical Notes)




Figure 6

Arms Import Trends

Arms imports of developing countries declined drastically in 1985, by over 40% in real terms from the peak in 1982 and 37% from the previous year. The 1985 level of \$22 billion in current dollars represents a return to the 1976 level in constant dollar terms. (Figure 6 and Table II)

This sharp decline should be treated with some caution. The burgeoning rise in developing country arms imports in the first half of the decade, which averaged 16% annually, could not be sustained, but the 1979-1984 period can be seen as a plateau with a moderate growth rate of 1.5% (Table 3). Although the drop in 1985 will undoubtedly remain, its extent will probably be reduced by revised estimates in future editions.

The sharp 1985 drop occurred primarily in the Middle East. Arms imports there, which accounted for 43% of the world total in 1984 (Figure 7), had been on a generally rising trend that had sustained the world total. Future trends in the Middle East will heavily influence the world trends.

Shares of World's Arms Imports, 1984




Figure 7

Table 3
Arms Imports
(In percent)

	World Share		Real Growth Rate* for Decade		
	1975	1984	1st Half 75-79	2nd Half 79-84	Total 75-84
World:	100.0	100.0	12.5	1.9	5.9
Developed	27.3	19.9	0.1	3.3	2.5
Developing	72.7	80.1	16.4	1.5	7.0
Region:					
Africa	11.7	13.8	29.5	-5.4	5.0
East Asia	16.8	9.3	6.9	-7.2	5.5
Europe, all	31.1	17.3	-2.7	0.0	-0.3
NATO Europe	12.1	8.8	-4.4	5.8	3.7
Warsaw Pact	15.6	7.0	-2.1	-4.1	-4.3
Other Europe	3.4	1.5	0.5	-7.1	-0.3
Latin America	4.4	8.2	24.3	6.1	11.5
Middle East	30.0	43.3	16.8	8.1	9.5
North America	2.3	1.8	0.7	8.0	6.2
Oceania	1.0	1.6	17.2	7.8	11.0
South Asia	2.5	4.1	21.2	-2.6	10.2
Organization:					
NATO, all	14.4	10.6	-3.1	6.6	4.5
Warsaw Pact	15.6	7.0	-2.1	-4.1	-4.3
OPEC	25.3	40.2	19.5	8.1	8.7
OECD	17.5	15.8	0.5	6.3	5.9

*Average annual growth, calculated as a compound rate.
(See Statistical Notes.)

Arms imports elsewhere were already declining broadly prior to 1985. Imports were declining in the 1979-1984 period in Africa, East Asia, and South Asia, as well as the Warsaw Pact and Other Europe regions (Table 3). Total developing-country arms imports exclusive of the Middle East peaked in 1979 and began a general decline from that point.

The decline in the arms imports of the developing countries is no doubt related to economic stringencies. Total real GNP growth in the developing countries was only 0.7% on the average in 1981-1983, although this rate improved to an estimated 2.9% in 1984-1985.

Five of the top six arms importing countries in 1984 are in the Middle East, with Iraq in first place and Iran in third. (Figure 8) The sixth, Libya, is also involved politically in the Middle East, though considered part of Africa here. Expected revisions in the value of Soviet arms transfers, as noted above, may change the relative position of the leading importers in subsequent editions.

The Middle East was the dominant market in 1981-1985 for nearly all major supplier countries and groups, as is graphically demonstrated in Figure 11. Exceptions, by only small margins, were the U.S. and the non-Soviet-Warsaw-Pact group, for whom the main market was Europe (mainly NATO and the Soviet Union, respectively). Some of the wide diversity of suppliers to the Middle East countries is evident from Table III, which presents the cumulative 1981-1985 imports of each country in the Middle East (and the rest of the world) from each of the 9 main supplier countries.

The Soviet Union is the eighth-ranked importer of arms. This may be surprising, in that the Soviet Union is the largest arms exporter in the world and the primary supplier to five of the top ten arms importing countries.




Figure 8




Figure 9

Arms Export Trends

The sharp decline in 1985 in the world arms market was shared by all supplier groups and major supplier countries. Exceptionally large relative declines in their arms exports were experienced by the developed and developing countries other than those in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The developing group of countries as a whole experienced a drop in exports of 72% from 1984. The United States, France, and the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact group suffered the smallest relative declines. (Tables II and IV) As noted above, future upward revisions in estimates for 1985 may reduce many of these declines.

The arms exports of the developing country suppliers grew dramatically by 32% annually during 1979-1984. The developing countries increased their share of world arms exports from 6% in 1975 to 17% in 1984. These new exports came largely from East Asia, (mainly China, North and South Korea), which grew 38% annually and accounted for almost 7% of the world market in 1984, and developing Europe (mainly Spain, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia), with 6% in 1984. Latin American (mainly Brazilian) and South Asian exports also grew rapidly in the second half of the decade. Pakistan had an average growth rate of about 50% in 1979-1984, starting from a very small base.

The severe drop in 1985 returned the developing countries' share to 7% of the world total. (Figure 9 and Table 4)

An analysis of the limitations and prospects facing the Third World arms suppliers is contained in the essay by Joseph Clare.

Among the major supplier groups, arms exports by the Warsaw Pact exporters declined at an average 6.7% rate in 1979-1984. (Table 4) The decline was mainly by the Soviet Union; other Warsaw Pact exporters remained on a rough plateau since 1978. (Tables II and IV) Estimates of Soviet arms exports in value terms (though not in physical terms) for a series of years are under review; upward revisions in the future may change the level of these estimates, though probably not their trend. (Statistical Notes)

Table 4
Arms Exports
(In percent)

	World Share		Real Growth Rate* for Decade		
	1974	1984	1st Half 74-80	2nd Half 80-84	Total 74-84
World:	100.0	100.0	12.4	1.8	5.9
Developed	94.1	83.3	12.5	-0.7	4.5
Developing	5.9	16.6	7.7	31.8	20.5
Region:					
Africa	0.0	0.1	92.0	-6.1	21.4
East Asia	1.0	7.5	13.6	37.7	30.0
Europe, all	57.9	63.5	19.1	-2.0	6.5
NATO Europe	16.8	23.5	14.3	5.1	9.3
Warsaw Pact	36.9	34.1	22.2	-6.7	4.7
Other Europe	4.2	5.9	7.1	12.7	8.3
Latin America	0.9	1.5	-7.2	23.8	9.6
Middle East	1.1	1.2	16.7	1.9	9.1
North America	37.5	25.1	-1.2	6.5	1.6
Oceania	0.8	0.1	-23.7	-2.4	-13.3
South Asia	0.2	0.9	20.5	49.8	22.8
Organization:					
NATO, all	54.3	48.6	4.4	5.8	4.7
Warsaw Pact	36.9	34.2	22.2	-6.7	4.7
OPEC	0.5	0.2	18.7	-10.9	7.4
OECD	58.0	53.9	4.5	6.4	5.1

*Average annual growth, calculated as a compound rate.
(See Statistical Notes.)

Arms exports by NATO countries increased steadily in 1979-1984, at a 5.8% rate. The United States' rate was 6.5%. Non-U.S. NATO peaked in 1981 and the U.S. in 1983, with subsequent declines. (Tables 4 and II)




Figure 10

The world market shares of the two major alliances and the two leading exporting countries in 1985 returned to approximately their 1975 positions, though with large movements in the interim. Non-alliance suppliers and France gained larger shares of the world market over the decade, until the decline of the non-alliance countries in 1985. (Figure 9)

The USSR is the main arms exporter to developing countries. The Soviet Union supplied 32% of developing world receipts of arms in 1982-1985 and nearly 35% in 1985, while the US supplied about 20% and 25% in the respective periods. (Table IV) Similar shares resulted in 1981-1985, when the Soviet Union surpassed the United States as a supplier to all regions except Europe and East Asia. The United States was the only source for which the Middle East was not the primary market region in 1981-1985. (Figure 11 and Table III)

Soviet preeminence as a supplier of arms to the developing world is also evident in terms of physical quantities of weapons exports. In every weapon type exported in 1981-1985, with the exception of subsonic combat aircraft, the Soviet Union is the clear leader over the US, other major NATO suppliers, China, and other exporter groups. (Table V)

Value of Arms Transfers, Cumulative 1981-1985 by Major Supplier and Recipient Region (billion current dollars)




Figure 11

Relative Indicators

To facilitate comparisons, a graphic presentation of 10 relative indicators is shown in Figure 12. These indicators, taken or derived from the main statistical tables, can be compared vertically, to show how various groups or regions differ for a given indicator, or horizontally, to give a "profile" of a particular region or group of countries. A further basis of analysis is afforded by comparing the chart for 1984 in this edition

with the similar chart for 1983 in *WMEAT 1985*.

In addition to the usual regional and organizational groupings found in most of the main statistical tables, this chart shows an additional "communist" and "other" breakdown within the "developed" and "developing" groups and also distinguishes the United States and the Soviet Union from the other countries of their respective alliances.

Relative Indicators—1984

(all value figures in constant 1983 dollars)

Relative Military Indicators




Figure 12

Some observations:

- There is a remarkably high degree of uniformity among regions and groups in the indicator, “Central government expenditures in percent of GNP.” Also, this indicator is almost universally lower for all groups in 1984 than in 1983.
- Indicators of “militarization,” such as “Armed forces per 1000 population” and “Military expenditures in percent of GNP,” are unusually high for the Middle


East and Warsaw Pact groupings. On the other hand, “Military expenditures per military member” is exceptionally high in the U.S., (as well as the Middle East).

- “Arms imports in percent of total imports” is exceptionally high for developing regions, notably Africa and South Asia, and increased in 1984 over 1983.

Relative Indicators — 1984

(all value figures in constant 1983 dollars)

Relative Arms Trade and Economic Indicators



Country Rankings by Variable 1984

As a statistical aid to readers interested in country rankings, the following pages show all countries of the world listed in descending order of their 1984 value for each of 7 absolute variables and 10 relative variables or ratios. The variable values are taken or derived from Tables I and II of the main statistical tables, below. The rankings are printed in small type so as to show all countries of the world in a single column. (The countries number 144 here due to the absence of South Vietnam after 1975.)

Where 1984 data for particular countries are not available (NA), the ranks are based on very rough estimates, which are also used to fill gaps in Tables I and II so as to make world and group totals more consistent with other years.

The variables, their abbreviations, and their data units are as follows: (Dollars are in current 1984 prices, except CGE, which is in 1983 dollars as in Table I.)

Military Expenditures (ME)	Millions of dollars
Armed Forces (AF)	Thousands
Arms imports (AI)	Millions of dollars
Arms exports (AE)	Millions of dollars
Gross national product (GNP)	Millions of dollars
Central government expenditures (CGE)	Millions of dollars
Population (POP)	Thousands
ME/GNP	Percent
ME/CGE	Percent
ME per capita (ME/POP)	Dollars
ME per soldier (ME/AF)	Dollars
Armed forces per 1,000 people (AF/POP)	Soldiers
Arms imports / total imports (AI/II)	Percent
Arms imports / total exports (AE/TE)	Percent
GNP per capita (GNP/POP)	Dollars
CGE per capita (CGE/POP)	Dollars
CGE/GNP	Percent

On the final page of this section is an "index" listing the countries alphabetically and showing each country's rank number for each variable. The symbol "+" indicates that the country's value for that variable is zero and the rank is actually a tie for last place.

Rank	ME	AF	AI	AE	GNP	CGE	Rank						
1	Soviet Union	260000	Soviet Union	4500	Iraq	7700	Soviet Union	11100	United States	3765000	United States	866000	1
2	United States	237100	China	4100	Saudi Arabia	2600	United States	10200	Soviet Union	2067000	Soviet Union	528000	2
3	United Kingdom	25410	United States	2244	Iran	2200	France	10200	Japan	1202000	France	241000	3
4	China	13400	Libya	1380	Libya	1800	China, West	2800	Japan	697200	Japan	624700	4
5	Germany, West	22780	Vietnam	1000	Egypt	1600	China	1900	France, West	537500	Germany, West	210000	5
6	France	22350	Turkey	815	Syria	1500	United Kingdom	1500	United Kingdom	482500	Italy	209000	6
7	Saudi Arabia	22220	Iraq	788	Angola	1100	Italy	1000	Italy	373100	United Kingdom	193000	7
8	Iraq	14640	Korea, North	784	Soviet Union	1000	Spain	1000	Canada	340800	Canada	89840	8
9	Poland	13400	Japan	467	Pakistan	925	Poland	775	Poland	321100	Germany, East	89010	9
10	Japan	12700	Korea, South	602	India	800	Czechoslovakia	725	Poland	235200	Netherlands	80450	10
11	Iran	11360	France	571	United Kingdom	800	Bulgaria	700	Brazil	212300	Saudi Arabia	74000	11
12	Germany, East	10680	Italy	508	Vietnam	800	Yugoslavia	575	India	200500	China	71910	12
13	Italy	10110	Germany, West	487	Cuba	700	Korea, South	525	Germany, East	168600	Brazil	60570	13
14	Czechoslovakia	7642	Taiwan	470	Colombia	675	Brazil	500	Spain	164400	Poland	58000	14
15	Canada	7603	Egypt	466	Israel	675	Germany, East	380	Australia	159800	Australia	68420	15
16	Israel	7206	Brazil	459	Australia	600	Korea, North	380	Iran	158800	Belgium	62610	16
17	India	7141	Poland	430	Ethiopia	575	Belgium	330	Mexico	144200	Spain	45900	17
18	Romania	5350	Spain	411	Netherlands	550	Finland	320	Netherlands	139500	Sweden	44430	18
19	Korea, North	5200	Syria	402	Pakistan	550	Pakistan	300	Czechoslovakia	132700	India	44240	19
20	Egypt	5122	United Kingdom	336	Algeria	525	Japan	290	Romania	120600	Hungary	41790	20
21	Libya	5101	Iran	335	Germany, West	525	Romania	270	Switzerland	108100	Czechoslovakia	40950	21
22	Australia	4657	Cuba	297	Germany, East	500	Israel	240	Saudi Arabia	104400	Iran	36660	22
23	Korea, South	4589	Indonesia	281	Bulgaria	480	Switzerland	240	Sweden	95250	Mexico	35370	23
24	Bulgaria	4532	Yugoslavia	259	Nigeria	480	Algeria	200	Belgium	85340	Austria	27160	24
25	Netherlands	4509	Thailand	250	Turkey	480	Egypt	200	Korea, South	85300	Israel	26650	25
26	Syria	4255	Romania	244	United States	480	Hungary	200	Indonesia	84800	Romania	26520	26
27	Taiwan	3866	Japan	241	Canada	450	Canada	190	South Africa	83700	South Africa	25980	27
28	Spain	3532	Germany, East	240	Czechoslovakia	450	Turkey	160	Hungary	80280	Denmark	25440	28
29	South Africa	3540	Czechoslovakia	215	Taiwan	420	Netherlands	140	Nigeria	72440	NA	NA	29
30	Hungary	3286	Burma	210	Malaysia	410	Portugal	110	Austria	69460	Bulgaria	23080	30
31	Sweden	2928	Israel	205	Belgium	400	Greece	100	Venezuela	66620	Norway	22670	31
32	Belgium	2669	Greece	197	Korea, South	390	Sweden	100	Argentina	63300	Switzerland	21240	32
33	Greece	2664	Ethiopia	190	Kuwait	390	Argentina	80	Ghana	61200	Algeria	20780	33
34	Turkey	2467	Bulgaria	180	Venezuela	380	Australia	80	Chile	58540	Egypt	19760	34
35	Argentina	2327	Argentina	174	Afghanistan	320	Bangladesh	40	Denmark	58080	Venezuela	18170	35
36	Indonesia	2211	Algeria	170	Oman	310	Saudi Arabia	40	Bulgaria	57740	Indonesia	17210	36
37	Switzerland	2203	Philippines	157	Greece	280	Libya	30	Norway	57580	Korea, South	16690	37
38	Oman	2110	Morocco	149	Greece	270	Algeria	20	Turkey	54330	Greece	15340	38
39	Pakistan	1989	Venezuela	145	Norway	260	Algeria	20	Algeria	51990	Finland	15180	39
40	Un. Arab Emir.	1932	Peru	135	Poland	260	India	20	Finland	51260	Turkey	13550	40
41	Brazil	1790	Mexico	129	Yugoslavia	250	Lebanon	10	Yugoslavia	49190	Argentina	13050	41
42	Thailand	1778	Chile	123	Nicaragua	250	Norway	10	Thailand	42640	Cuba	NA	42
43	Norway	1682	Bolivia	107	Norway	240	Singapore	10	Colombia	39980	Nigeria	13040	43
44	Cuba	1609	Thailand	105	Hungary	240	Singapore	10	Colombia	38000	Libya	12330	44
45	Peru	1450	Malaysia	105	Switzerland	220	Syria	10	Greece	36950	Kuwait	11880	45
46	Kuwait	1438	Netherlands	103	Jordan	210	Taiwan	10	Iraq	34470	Korea, North	NA	46
47	Algeria	1403	Portugal	100	Peru	210	Un. Arab Emir.	5	Pakistan	33790	Malaysia	11210	47
48	Denmark	1395	South Africa	97	Italy	200	Afghanistan	0	Philippines	32860	Ireland	10390	48
49	Vietnam	1300	Saudi Arabia	95	Qatar	190	Albania	0	Malaysia	31120	New Zealand	10120	49
50	Nigeria	1210	Libya	90	Morocco	190	Angola	0	Libya	28620	Chile	9875	50
51	Malaysia	1193	Canada	82	Un. Arab Emir.	190	Bahrain	0	Kuwait	27030	Norway	8357	51
52	Venezuela	1067	Chile	78	Ecuador	160	Barbados	0	Cuba	26920	Thailand	8205	52
53	Singapore	1015	Australia	75	Bolivia	160	Benin	0	Israel	26570	Pakistan	7126	53
54	Mexico	966	Colombia	70	Singapore	150	Botsuana	0	Un. Arab Emir.	26150	Portugal	6979	54
55	Austria	921	Sweden	69	Spain	150	Burkina Faso	0	Korea, North	23000	Ghana	5975	55
56	Chile	817	Nicaragua	67	Brazil	140	Burundi	0	Peru	20280	Colombia	5569	56
57	Finland	790	Sudan	65	Indonesia	140	Burundi	0	Portugal	19580	Singapore	4693	57
58	Tunisia	749	Venezuela	64	Tunisia	130	Cambodia	0	Chile	19520	Un. Arab Emir.	4651	58
59	Qatar	NA	Afghanistan	60	Sudan	110	Cambodia	0	Singapore	19240	Chile	4374	59
60	Portugal	680	Zaire	60	China	100	Cape Verde	0	Syria	19030	Morocco	4332	60
61	Angola	NA	Singapore	59	France	100	Ken. Afr. Rep.	0	Vietnam	18100	Philippines	4031	61
62	Morocco	666	Angola	54	Sweden	100	Chad	0	Ireland	17780	Ireland	3850	62
63	Colombia	674	Yemen (Aden)	46	Laos	100	Colombia	200	Morocco	13370	Tunisia	3542	63
64	Yemen (Sanaa)	572	Zimbabwe	45	Congo	90	Congo	0	Yugoslavia	13050	Yugoslavia	3478	64
65	Lebanon	NA	El Salvador	46	El Salvador	90	Costa Rica	0	Ecuador	12580	Trinidad & Tob.	3047	65
66	Nicaragua	473	Un. Arab Emir.	44	Honduras	90	Cyprus	0	Guatemala	9214	Peru	2962	66
67	New Zealand	469	Somalia	43	Korea, North	80	Denmark	0	Tunisia	8543	Nicaragua	2666	67
68	Ethiopia	428	Yemen (Sanaa)	43	Yemen (Sanaa)	80	Dominican Rep.	0	Dominican Rep.	7896	Angola	NA	68
69	Philippines	396	Albania	42	Cambodia	70	Ecuador	0	Yugoslavia	7628	Vietnam	2515	69
70	Zimbabwe	382	Austria	40	Cambodia	70	El Salvador	0	Uganda	7271	Bangladesh	2479	70
71	Ghana	361	Finland	40	Finland	70	Equat. Guinea	0	Cameroon	7121	Panama	2475	71
72	Ireland	318	Guatemala	40	Romania	70	Ethiopia	0	Zaire	7073	Zimbabwe	2465	72
73	Tunisia	273	Ecuador	39	Somalia	70	Fiji	0	Trinidad & Tob.	7050	Lebanon	NA	73
74	El Salvador	251	Laos	35	Yugoslavia	60	Gabon	0	Paraguay	6822	Bolivia	2183	74
75	Bangladesh	247	Mongolia	38	Yugoslavia	60	Gambia, The	0	Angola	6822	Jordan	1953	75
76	Mongolia	NA	Tunisia	38	Zimbabwe	60	Ghana	0	Lebanon	NA	Yemen (Sanaa)	1908	76
77	Mozambique	NA	Mozambique	54	Denmark	50	Guatemala	0	Burma	6645	Mongolia	NA	77
78	Afghanistan	NA	Denmark	31	New Zealand	50	Guinea	0	Tanzania	6529	Luxembourg	1772	78
79	Tanzania	215	Bahrain	30	Cambodia	40	Guinea-Bissau	0	Rwanda	6519	Sri Lanka	1753	79
80	Zambia	208	Uruguay	30	Chad	40	Guyana	0	Zimbabwe	6130	Ecuador	1736	80
81	Ecuador	203	Bolivia	28	Guatemala	40	Haiti	0	Ivory Coast	5923	Ivory Coast	1696	81
82	Yemen (Aden)	198	Guinea	28	Philippines	40	Honduras	0	Kenya	5751	Cameroon	1696	82
83	Kenya	196	Madagascar	28	Portugal	40	Iceland	0	Qatar	5650	Ethiopia	1645	83
84	Burma	195	Yemen (Sanaa)	28	Austria	28	Somalia	0	Tanzania	5579	Tanzania	1525	84
85	Trinidad & Tob.	189	Yemen (Aden)	27	Mexico	30	Iran	0	Sri Lanka	5530	Zaire	1596	85
86	Guatemala	179	Nepal	25	Mongolia	30	Iraq	0	Mozambique	5522	Kenya	1511	86
87	Bahrein	147	Oman	25	Pap. New Guin.	30	Ireland	0	Uruguay	5033	Bahrain	1403	87
88	Uruguay	144	Switzerland	25	Paraguay	30	Ivory Coast	0	Luxembourg	4932	Gabon	1403	88
89	Albania	143	Burkina Faso	22	Burkina Faso	20	Jamaica	0	Uruguay	4932	Uruguay	1279	89
90	Cameroon	138	Ivory Coast	21	Burundi	20	Kenya	0	Yemen (Sanaa)	4504	Albania	1256	90
91	Sudan	133	Sri Lanka	21	Burundi	20	Kenya	0	Bahrain	4153	Jamaica	1207	91
92	Honduras	124	Honduras	20	Cyprus	20	Kuwait	0	Panama	4146	Guatemala	1158	92
93	Bolivia	120	Australia	20	Gabon	20	Laos	0	El Salvador	4110	Sudan	948	93
94	Paraguay	118	Kenya	19	Guinea-Bissau	20	Lebanon	0	Jordan	4042	Dominican Rep.	1090	94
95	Somalia	106	Lebanon	19	Ivory Coast	20	Lesotho	0	Afghanistan	NA	Congo	1020	95
96	Panama	98	Senegal	17	Mali	20	Liberia	0	Nicaragua	3519	Yemen (Aden)	NA	96
97	Dominican Rep.	94	Paraguay	17	Mauritania	20	Luxembourg	0	Gabon	3439	Burma	987	97
98	Sri Lanka	86	Sri Lanka	16	Chad	20	Suriname	0	Madagascar	66	Zambia	965	98
99	Zaire	85	Zambia	16	Tanzania	20	Malawi	0	Jamaica	3210	Pap. New Guin.	833	99
100	Uganda	78	Cameroon	15	Bangladesh	10	Malaysia	0	Zambia	3173	Iceland	805	100
101	Ivory Coast	78	Congo	15	Bolivia	10	Mali	0	Costa Rica	3150	El Salvador	793	101
102	Madagascar	72	Ghana	15	Dominican Rep.	10	Haiti	0	Honduras	2980	Costa Rica	792	102
103	Gabon	71	Ghana	15	Kuwait	10	Haiti	0	Nepal	2728	Paraguay	703	103
104	Cambodia	NA	Uganda	15	Ireland	10	Mauritius	0	Madagascar	2727	Honduras	733	104
105	Senegal	63	Liberia	13	Iceland	10	Mexico	0	Cyprus	2541	Cyprus	732	105
106	Lesotho	57	New Zealand	13	Madagascar	10	Mongolia	0	Paraguay	2386	Senegal	732	106
107	Congo	55	Guinea-Bissau	11	Sri Lanka	10	Morocco	0	Pap. New Guin.	2371	Guinea	NA	107
108	Laos	55	Mali	11	Zaire	10	Mozambique	0	Singapore	2297	Madagascar	674	108
109	Guinea	NA	Panama	11	Zambia	10	Nepal	0	Mongolia	2200	Mozambique	NA	109
110	Luxembourg	42	Cyprus	10	Benin	5	New Zealand	0	Congo	2105	Nepal	495	110
111	Pap. New Guin.	40	Burkina Faso	9	Costa Rica	5	Nicaragua	0	Guinea	1837	Botsuana	NA	111
112	Mauritania	NA	Costa Rica	8	Guinea	5	Niger	0					

Rank	POP	ME		ME		ME		ME		AF		Rank	
		GNP		CGE		POP		AF		POP			
1	China	1030000	Iraq	42.47	Afghanistan	NA	Qatar	NA	Saudi Arabia	226100	Iraq	52.53	1
2	India	752000	Oman	27.67	Iraq	NA	Saudi Arabia	1989	Qatar	NA	Israel	50.65	2
3	Soviet Union	275000	Israel	27.12	Vietnam	50.00	Oman	1727	United States	102100	Korea, North	39.94	3
4	United States	237000	Korea, North	22.61	Yugoslavia	49.77	Israel	1721	Kuwait	92700	Syria	39.59	4
5	Indonesia	169000	Syria	22.36	Soviet Union	47.43	Un. Arab Emir.	1499	Un. Arab Emir. & Tob.	21510	Un. Arab Emir.	38.25	5
6	Brazil	135000	Saudi Arabia	21.27	Peru	47.32	Libya	3560	Canada	89640	Jordan	30.25	6
7	Japan	120000	Jordan	18.52	Oman	46.64	United States	968	Switzerland	85190	Cuba	29.72	7
8	Nigeria	99900	Libya	17.82	Taiwan	44.73	Iraq	943	Oman	81620	Libya	24.82	8
9	Bangladesh	96600	Yemen (Aden)	17.04	Korea, North	NA	Soviet Union	913	United Kingdom	73110	Taiwan	24.66	9
10	Pakistan	924000	Yemen (Aden)	16.58	Syria	41.47	Syria	435	Belgium	63610	Singapore	24.33	10
11	Netherlands	77700	Nicaragua	15.43	Un. Arab Emir.	40.15	Germany, East	619	Soviet Union	55850	Qatar	21.49	11
12	Germany, West	61200	Yemen (Sanaa)	12.70	Libya	40.00	Bulgaria	489	Libya	54790	Nicaragua	21.39	12
13	Vietnam	59000	Soviet Union	12.58	Jordan	36.49	Czechoslovakia	477	Japan	50960	Oman	21.17	13
14	Italy	57000	Qatar	NA	Cambodia	NA	United Kingdom	477	Bahrain	47640	Mongolia	20.61	14
15	United Kingdom	54500	Cambodia	NA	Mozambique	NA	Germany, West	405	Germany, West	42310	Greece	19.93	15
16	Philippines	55500	Mongolia	NA	China	32.32	France	393	Denmark	43510	Bulgaria	19.76	16
17	France	54800	Laos	10.48	El Salvador	30.60	Norway	391	Germany, East	43030	Cape Verde	19.58	17
18	Thailand	50600	Angola	NA	Iran	29.95	Singapore	388	Un. Arab Emir.	42450	Sao Tome & P.	19.36	18
19	Turkey	49500	Ethiopia	8.86	Saudi Arabia	29.00	Germany, West	359	Netherlands	42330	Vietnam	18.94	19
20	Egypt	47800	Cape Verde	NA	Yemen (Sanaa)	28.98	Poland	351	Norway	41610	Turkey	18.46	20
21	Iran	43800	Lebanon	NA	Lesotho	28.53	Bahrain	347	Sweden	41030	Soviet Union	16.36	21
22	Ethiopia	42100	Bulgaria	7.85	Somalia	27.51	Sweden	339	Luxembourg	40970	Cyprus	15.22	22
23	Korea, South	42000	China	7.49	Pakistan	26.99	Switzerland	330	France	37840	Albania	14.48	23
24	Spain	38600	Un. Arab Emir.	7.39	Korea, South	26.58	Lebanon	302	Lebanon	36460	Germany, East	14.39	24
25	Poland	36900	Greece	7.21	United States	26.43	Netherlands	297	South Africa	35280	Korea, South	14.33	25
26	Burma	36200	Vietnam	7.18	Israel	26.14	Canada	292	New Zealand	34910	Czechoslovakia	13.78	26
27	South Africa	31700	Iran	7.15	Ethiopia	25.13	Australia	291	Czechoslovakia	34680	Guinea-Bissau	13.06	27
28	Argentina	30200	Peru	7.15	Egypt	25.04	Jordan	280	Israel	33980	Laos	12.98	28
29	Zaire	29700	Taiwan	6.61	Angola	24.35	Denmark	263	Yemen (Aden)	32780	Yemen (Aden)	12.58	29
30	Colombia	28700	Zambia	6.58	Lebanon	NA	Belgium	261	Hungary	30250	Mauritania	12.32	30
31	Canada	25200	Somalia	6.54	Poland	22.37	Greece	260	Poland	30220	Poland	11.65	31
32	Yugoslavia	23000	Lesotho	6.49	Chad	22.00	Korea, North	256	Lebanon	NA	Yugoslavia	11.28	32
33	Morocco	22600	Germany, East	6.34	Laos	21.32	Iran	250	Bulgaria	24750	Belgium	10.86	33
34	Romania	22600	United States	6.30	Zambia	21.92	Kenya	242	Romania	24120	Romania	10.78	34
35	Sudan	21500	Zimbabwe	6.23	Singapore	20.92	Lebanon	NA	Ireland	23700	Spain	10.68	35
36	Algeria	21400	El Salvador	6.10	Thailand	19.82	Taiwan	196	Ghana	23260	France	10.41	36
37	Tanzania	21000	Cuba	5.94	Romania	19.50	Italy	171	Austria	22260	Chile	10.41	37
38	Korea, North	19600	Afghanistan	5.89	Burma	19.13	Trinidad & Tob.	156	Romania	21200	Uruguay	10.25	38
39	Kenya	19100	Czechoslovakia	5.76	Yemen (Aden)	18.99	Finland	150	Yemen (Sanaa)	19750	Poland	10.00	39
40	Taiwan	19100	Poland	5.71	Czechoslovakia	18.04	Cuba	154	Italy	19230	Hungary	9.65	40
41	Venezuela	16900	Korea, South	5.38	Turkey	17.60	Nicaragua	145	Finland	19100	Egypt	9.76	41
42	Germany, East	16700	Kuwait	5.32	Burkina Faso	17.58	New Zealand	145	Iraq	17960	United States	9.48	42
43	Wepi	16600	Singapore	5.28	Mauritania	16.92	Mongolia	NA	Singapore	16640	Morocco	9.42	43
44	Sri Lanka	16000	United Kingdom	5.27	Argentina	17.24	Venezuela	16100	Malawi	16100	El Salvador	9.23	44
45	Australia	15500	Qatar	NA	Qatar	NA	Luxembourg	111	Greece	13070	Kuwait	9.17	45
46	Czechoslovakia	15500	Morocco	4.98	Nicaragua	17.14	South Africa	107	Pap. New Guin.	12980	Guyana	9.13	46
47	Malaysia	15100	Guyana	4.84	Greece	16.79	Korea, South	105	Argentina	12930	Italy	8.92	47
48	Turkey	15000	Turkey	4.84	Yemen (Aden)	16.59	Egypt	103	Jamaica	12910	Saudi Arabia	8.80	48
49	Afghanistan	14700	Romania	4.44	Honduras	16.40	Yemen (Sanaa)	92	Angola	NA	Equat. Guinea	8.78	49
50	Netherlands	14400	Albania	4.23	Cape Verde	15.61	Spain	91	Suriname	11810	Sweden	8.60	50
51	Uganda	14200	South Africa	4.23	Chad	15.61	Yemen (Aden)	89	Malta	11310	Finland	8.19	51
52	Mozambique	13200	Chile	4.18	Zimbabwe	14.98	Ireland	87	Malaysia	10990	Germany, West	7.96	52
53	Ghana	12600	Mozambique	4.17	Guatemala	14.93	Angola	87	Egypt	10630	Algeria	7.94	53
54	Chile	11800	France	4.14	Morocco	14.85	Barbados	76	Barbados	10390	Iran	7.64	54
55	Saudi Arabia	10800	Hungary	4.09	Rwanda	NA	Yugoslavia	75	Peru	10380	Gabon	7.31	55
56	Hungary	10700	Mozambique	NA	Equat. Guinea	NA	Argentina	74	Syria	10230	Lebanon	7.30	56
57	Syria	10200	Thailand	3.94	Paraguay	14.47	Peru	75	Kenya	10010	Bahrain	7.20	57
58	Puerto Rico	10000	Yemen (Aden)	3.83	Burundi	14.16	Gabon	72	Gabon	10010	Netherlands	7.14	58
59	Cuba	9990	Argentina	3.68	South Africa	13.18	Jordan	67	Jordan	9277	Wepi	7.03	59
60	Greece	9890	Yugoslavia	3.64	Tanzania	12.79	Portugal	66	Cameroon	8938	Angola	6.97	60
61	Belgium	9850	India	3.56	United Kingdom	12.72	Suriname	64	Botswana	NA	Malaysia	6.95	61
62	Ivory Coast	9690	Bahrain	3.56	Kenya	12.58	Algeria	63	Panama	8609	Pakistan	6.69	62
63	Madagascar	9470	Portugal	3.47	Indonesia	12.42	Venezuela	63	Spain	8544	Paraguay	6.60	63
64	Cameroon	9470	Burundi	3.46	Mongolia	NA	Cyprus	53	Nicaragua	8124	Nicaragua	6.07	64
65	Ecuador	9110	Kenya	3.42	Chile	11.86	El Salvador	50	Zimbabwe	8030	United Kingdom	5.96	65
66	Bulgaria	8960	Tanzania	3.29	Cuba	NA	Turkey	48	Algeria	7980	Somalia	5.83	66
67	Zimbabwe	8460	Germany, West	3.27	Kuwait	11.71	Albania	48	Taiwan	7953	Burundi	5.80	67
68	Sweden	8340	Netherlands	3.24	Germany, East	11.60	Uruguay	48	Colombia	7953	Argentina	5.76	68
69	Guinea	8100	Tunisia	3.21	Tunisia	11.35	Uruguay	46	Indonesia	7607	Zimbabwe	5.76	69
70	Angola	7740	Belgium	3.13	Sudan	11.17	Zimbabwe	44	Korea, South	7370	Suriname	5.42	70
71	Mali	7560	Sweden	3.07	Albania	11.00	Barbados	41	Mexico	7241	Tunisia	5.36	71
72	Austria	7550	Guinea	NA	Uruguay	10.88	Cape Verde	NA	Yemen (Aden)	7093	Guinea	5.30	72
73	Somalia	7370	Burma	2.94	Germany, West	10.49	Tunisia	37	Tunisia	6969	Austria	5.30	73
74	Tunisia	7100	Malaysia	2.91	Malaysia	10.29	Nicaragua	37	Panama	6822	Panama	5.16	74
75	Malawi	6830	Madagascar	2.91	Madagascar	10.26	Thailand	32	Paraguay	6733	Guatemala	4.94	75
76	Burkina Faso	6730	Uruguay	2.86	Benin	10.22	Malta	32	Yugoslavia	6684	Thailand	4.94	76
77	Zambia	6620	Botswana	NA	Bahrain	10.18	Congo	31	Rwanda	NA	Cambodia	4.90	77
78	Senegal	6540	Senegal	2.74	Switzerland	10.03	Guyana	31	Portugal	6577	Yemen (Sanaa)	4.67	78
79	Dominican Rep.	6450	Italy	2.74	Chad	9.27	Chad	31	Thailand	6506	Bolivia	4.61	79
80	Switzerland	6440	Burkina Faso	2.71	Bangladesh	9.66	Paraguay	30	Chile	6420	Switzerland	4.61	80
81	Niger	6270	Algeria	2.70	Philippines	9.49	Morocco	29	Korea, North	6411	Honduras	4.60	81
82	Cambodia	6120	Equat. Guinea	NA	Portugal	9.43	Ghana	28	Mozambique	NA	Australia	4.59	82
83	Bolivia	6040	Trinidad & Tob.	2.69	Australia	9.30	Honduras	28	Mongolia	6012	Algeria	4.51	83
84	Burkina Faso	6020	France	2.62	Wepi	9.27	Kenya	28	Kenya	6012	Paraguay	4.50	84
85	Yemen (Sanaa)	5990	Madagascar	2.61	France	8.97	Fiji	24	China	5667	Fiji	4.37	85
86	Haiti	5650	Indonesia	2.61	Gen. Afr. Rep.	NA	China	23	Fiji	5402	Ecuador	4.28	86
87	Guinea	5280	Guinea-Bissau	NA	Haiti	8.87	Mauritania	NA	El Salvador	5394	Afghanistan	4.08	87
88	Denmark	5110	Benin	2.56	Guinea-Bissau	NA	Ecuador	22	Cuba	5207	New Zealand	4.02	88
89	Chad	5060	Togo	2.52	Guinea	8.52	Burkina Faso	21	Barbados	5197	Barbados	3.98	89
90	El Salvador	4880	Denmark	2.40	Senegal	8.30	Vietnam	21	Ecuador	5046	China	3.98	90
91	Finland	4880	Suriname	2.38	Canada	8.18	Pakistan	20	Uganda	5012	Switzerland	3.88	91
92	Burundi	4540	Panama	2.36	Cameroon	7.93	Colombia	19	India	5002	Guinea	3.80	92
93	Honduras	4350	Liberia	2.31	Guinea	NA	Bolivia	19	Tanzania	4834	Ireland	3.66	93
94	Korea, South	4140	Canada	2.25	Spain	7.65	Uganda	16	Mozambique	4663	Dominican Rep.	3.66	94
95	Israel	4050	Spain	2.21	Hungary	7.60	Swaziland	16	Haiti	4424	Brazil	3.37	95
96	Benin	3890	Bolivia	2.16	Mali	NA	Laos	15	Guatemala	4326	Canada	3.26	96
97	Paraguay	3860	Mali	2.12	Tunisia	7.47	Afghanistan	NA	Morocco	4318	Chad	3.16	97
98	Sierra Leone	3780	Gabon	2.08	Norway	7.10	Cameroon	14	Benin	4255	Costa Rica	3.11	98
99	Libya	3630	Liberia	7.05	Liberia	7.05	Dominican Rep.	14	Bolivia	4255	South Africa	3.11	99
100	Ireland	3550	Sudan	2.05	Guyana	NA	Somalia	14	Dominican Rep.	4121	Sudan	3.00	100
101	Laos	3550	Switzerland	2.04	Algeria	6.53	Indonesia	13	Costa Rica	3990	Botswana	2.90	101
102	Pap. New Guin.	3260	Germany	1.95	Sweden	6.37	Brazil	13	Sri Lanka	3944	Madagascar	2.90	102
103	New Zealand	3230	Guatemala	1.94	Nepal	6.33	Costa Rica	12	Philippines	3745	Philippines	2.83	103
104	Nicaragua	3130	New Zealand	1.92	Togo	6.20	Costa Rica	12	Malta	3590	Malta	2.81	104
105	Togo	2930	Bangladesh	1.90	Trinidad & Tob.	6.00	Pap. New Guin.	12	Ivory Coast	3578	Liberia	2	

Rank	AI		AE		GNP		CGE		CGE		Rank
	TI	TE	TE	POP	POP	POP	POP	GNP			
1	Laos	NA	Korea, North	25.33	Un. Arab Emir.	20300	Qatar	13790	Israel	103.76	1
2	Cambodia	NA	Soviet Union	12.13	Qatar	19570	Kuwait	7260	Yemen (Aden)	NA	2
3	Angola	NA	Pakistan	11.275	Pakistan	14230	Saudi Arabia	6840	Yemen (Sanaa)	NA	3
4	Iraq	69.51	China	6.87	Kuwait	15580	Israel	6584	Nicaragua	78.36	4
5	Somalia	64.81	Egypt	6.37	United States	15380	Netherlands	5579	Guyana	NA	5
6	Ethiopia	61.96	Yugoslavia	5.61	Norway	13400	Norway	5523	Saudi Arabia	73.36	6
7	Zambia	48.24	Bulgaria	5.58	Canada	13100	Germany, East	5335	Iraq	NA	7
8	Vietnam	43.68	United States	4.68	Luxembourg	13020	Sweden	5136	Togo	70.48	8
9	Syria	36.44	Poland	4.49	Sweden	11050	Denmark	4978	Panama	61.76	9
10	Afghanistan	36.04	Bangladesh	4.30	Germany, West	11020	Luxembourg	4843	Ireland	60.44	10
11	Guinea-Bissau	NA	Spain	4.24	Denmark	10990	Belgium	4729	Netherlands	59.75	11
12	Nicaragua	30.94	Czechoslovakia	4.16	Japan	10410	France	4393	Oman	59.32	12
13	Libya	26.47	Israel	4.13	Finland	10270	Hungary	3915	Italy	57.94	13
14	Chad	23.39	France	3.49	Iceland	10150	Un. Arab Emir.	3735	Cape Verde	NA	14
15	Qatar	17.44	Portugal	2.39	Australia	9989	Oman	3704	Belgium	56.49	15
16	Colombia	15.01	Finland	2.28	Bahrain	9774	Italy	3667	SaotomePrinc.	NA	16
17	Egypt	14.86	Turkey	2.34	Germany, East	9769	United States	3662	Germany, East	54.61	17
18	Iran	14.31	Romania	2.14	France	9509	Austria	3602	Burundi	53.85	18
19	Congo	13.37	Greece	2.08	Saudi Arabia	9353	Canada	3572	Egypt	53.83	19
20	Honduras	NA	Brazil	1.85	Netherlands	9337	Germany, West	3431	Syria	53.67	20
21	Oman	11.28	Korea, South	1.80	Austria	8891	United Kingdom	3422	Korea, North	NA	21
22	Burundi	10.70	Germany, West	1.63	Belgium	8371	Bahrain	3416	Botswana	NA	22
23	Mauritania	10.58	United Kingdom	1.60	Czechoslovakia	8207	Libya	3400	Jordan	50.75	23
24	Argentina	9.81	Hungary, East	1.55	United Kingdom	8269	Iceland	3365	Cuba	NA	24
25	Sudan	9.59	Hungary	1.51	Libya	7631	Switzerland	3297	Congo	50.12	25
26	Peru	9.49	Italy	1.36	Singapore	7354	Australia	3131	Laos	49.14	26
27	Burkina Faso	9.48	Austria	1.27	New Zealand	7298	New Zealand	3129	Sweden	48.25	27
28	Pakistan	9.40	Argentina	0.99	Hungary	7276	Finland	3109	France	46.20	28
29	Ecuador	9.24	Czechoslovakia	0.99	Soviet Union	7249	Ireland	3094	France	45.25	29
30	El Salvador	9.21	Belgium	0.67	Israel	6345	Czechoslovakia	2648	Denmark	44.32	30
31	Cuba	8.59	Chile	0.55	Italy	6330	Trinidad & Tob.	2611	Trinidad & Tob.	44.72	31
32	Lebanon	8.48	Syria	0.54	Oman	6244	Bulgaria	2575	Libya	44.56	32
33	Burma	8.37	Sweden	0.34	Bulgaria	6230	Soviet Union	1922	Suriname	44.43	33
34	Saudi Arabia	7.82	Libya	0.32	Poland	6159	Japan	1888	Yemen (Sanaa)	43.82	34
35	Jordan	7.54	Australia	0.26	Trinidad & Tob.	5839	Singapore	1855	Greece	42.85	35
36	Israel	6.89	Netherlands	0.21	Romania	5149	Iraq	NA	Tunisia	42.80	36
37	Yemen (Aden)	6.48	India	0.21	Ireland	4841	Poland	1573	New Zealand	42.87	37
38	Cameroon	6.29	Canada	0.21	Ghana	4692	Greece	1551	Gabon	42.20	38
39	Korea, North	5.81	Belgium	0.21	Bruidas	4247	Switzerland	1417	Zimbabwe	42.15	39
40	Suriname	5.78	Cuba	0.16	Spain	4118	Barbados	1412	United Kingdom	41.39	40
41	Yemen (Sanaa)	5.71	Algeria	0.16	Venezuela	3821	Cuba	NA	Algeria	41.35	41
42	Kuwait	5.56	Saudi Arabia	0.11	Greece	3613	Malta	1260	Bulgaria	41.34	42
43	Mal	5.43	South Africa	0.06	Cyprus	3511	Suriname	1199	Norway	41.22	43
44	India	5.31	Norway	0.05	Spain	3503	Suriname	1199	Togo	41.09	44
45	Zimbabwe	5.30	Singapore	0.04	Gabon	3471	Romania	1171	Kuwait	40.45	45
46	Nigeria	5.13	Un. Arab Emir.	0.04	Malta	3278	Panama	1160	Bolivia	40.02	46
47	Algeria	5.10	Taiwan	0.03	Taiwan	2968	Cyprus	1115	Albania	NA	47
48	Chile	5.01	Afghanistan	0.00	Suriname	2693	Venezuela	1078	Jamaica	38.90	48
49	Venezuela	4.88	Albania	0.00	Angola	2648	Monrovia	108	Angola	38.48	49
50	Morocco	4.86	Angola	0.00	South Africa	2552	Syria	972	Guinea	NA	50
51	Mongolia	4.82	Bahrain	0.00	Lebanon	NA	Algeria	970	Malta	37.84	51
52	Turkey	4.47	Barbados	0.00	Algeria	2346	Lebanon	NA	Malaysia	37.27	52
53	Paraguay	4.44	Benin	0.00	Iraq	2221	Nicaragua	851	Luxembourg	37.17	53
54	Tunisia	4.41	Bolivia	0.00	Yugoslavia	2070	Algeria	836	Portugal	36.94	54
55	Bulgaria	3.89	Un. Arab Emir.	0.00	Argentina	2024	South Africa	815	Pap. New Guin.	36.34	55
56	Guatemala	3.13	Burkina Faso	0.00	Malaysia	1989	Jordan	768	Chile	35.28	56
57	Greece	2.97	Burma	0.00	Korea, South	1963	Malaysia	741	Ethiopia	35.25	57
58	Malaysia	2.92	Burundi	0.00	Portugal	1893	Portugal	698	Bahrain	34.96	58
59	Liberia	2.73	Cambodia	0.00	Panama	1878	Korea, North	581	Gabon	NA	59
60	Madagascar	2.70	Cameroon	0.00	Syria	1709	Congo	581	Laos	40.81	60
61	Pap. New Guin.	2.69	Cape Verde	0.00	Mexico	1795	Chile	563	Morocco	33.52	61
62	Czechoslovakia	2.59	Cent. Afr. Rep.	0.00	Paraguay	1753	Jamaica	537	Barbados	33.26	62
63	Un. Arab Emir.	2.49	Chad	0.00	Fiji	1711	Fiji	514	Senegal	32.98	63
64	Tanzania	2.36	Colombia	0.00	Uruguay	1663	Tunisia	499	Liberia	32.81	64
65	Australia	2.30	Thailand	0.00	Chad	1571	Botswana	473	Sierra Leone	32.81	65
66	Thailand	2.31	Costa Rica	0.00	Jordan	1514	Ghana	473	Iceland	32.78	66
67	Germany, East	2.28	Cyprus	0.00	Brazil	1505	Guyana	NA	Cambodia	NA	67
68	Gabon	2.25	Denmark	0.00	Jamaica	1382	Yemen (Aden)	NA	South Africa	32.10	68
69	Bolivia	2.11	Dominican Rep.	0.00	Colombia	1344	Mexico	455	Czechoslovakia	31.92	69
70	Taiwan	1.94	Ecuador	0.00	Ecuador	1313	Brazil	443	Cyprus	31.77	70
71	Swand	1.80	El Salvador	0.00	Costa Rica	1185	Taiwan	438	Zambia	31.47	71
72	Norway	1.73	Equat. Guinea	0.00	Dominican Rep.	1184	Uruguay	437	Australia	31.34	72
73	Ghana	1.73	Ethiopia	0.00	Congo	1166	Albania	433	Germany, West	31.15	73
74	Poland	1.57	Fiji	0.00	Tunisia	1164	Argentina	431	Finland	30.63	74
75	Zaire	1.48	Gabon	0.00	Mongolia	1153	Egypt	416	Ivory Coast	29.63	75
76	Cyprus	1.47	Gabon, the	0.00	Korea, North	1132	Korea, South	397	Burkina Faso	29.63	76
77	Zambia	1.37	Ghana	0.00	Albania	NA	Bolivia	357	Guinea-Bissau	NA	77
78	Uganda	1.35	Guatemala	0.00	Guatemala	1099	Angola	NA	Fiji	29.38	78
79	Ivory Coast	1.34	Guinea	0.00	Mauritius	1090	Yemen (Sanaa)	318	Mauritania	NA	79
80	Korea, South	1.27	Guinea-Bissau	0.00	Micraguay	1080	Mauritius	316	Malawi	29.19	80
81	Soviet Union	1.24	Turkey	0.00	Turkey	1060	Costa Rica	308	Mauritius	29.00	81
82	Guinea	1.24	Mal	0.00	Peru	1021	Zimbabwe	291	Spain	28.89	82
83	Hungary	1.16	Honduras	0.00	Swaziland	990	Swaziland	281	Swaziland	28.82	83
84	Bahrain	1.14	Iceland	0.00	Botswana	940	Turkey	273	Venezuela	28.21	84
85	Benin	NA	Indonesia	0.00	Bolivia	892	Pap. New Guin.	255	Mal	NA	85
86	Indonesia	1.01	Angola	0.00	Angola	869	Cape Verde	204	Canada	27.87	86
87	Brazil	0.92	Iraq	0.00	El Salvador	816	Paraguay	204	Kenya	27.19	87
88	Netherlands	0.88	Ireland	0.00	Thailand	814	Colombia	193	Soviet Union	26.46	88
89	New Zealand	0.81	Ivory Coast	0.00	Egypt	769	Morocco	191	Uruguay	26.30	89
90	United Kingdom	0.78	Jamaica	0.00	Yemen (Sanaa)	721	Ecuador	190	Costa Rica	26.01	90
91	Belgium	0.76	Jordan	0.00	Cameroon	724	Cameroon	178	SaotomePrinc.	25.76	91
92	Switzerland	0.75	Kenya	0.00	Pap. New Guin.	703	Cameroon	178	Tanzania	25.76	92
93	Dominican Rep.	0.69	Kuwait	0.00	Zimbabwe	700	Ivory Coast	175	Madagascar	25.57	93
94	Japan	0.68	Laos	0.00	Honduras	697	Dominican Rep.	169	Poland	25.54	94
95	Ethiopia	0.67	Lebanon	0.00	Guinea	662	Honduras	168	Bonobas	25.44	95
96	Philippines	0.62	Lesotho	0.00	Guyana	632	Mal	162	Singapore	25.37	96
97	Finland	0.56	Liberia	0.00	Ivory Coast	590	Thailand	162	Singapore	25.23	97
98	Sri Lanka	0.54	Luxembourg	0.00	Morocco	572	Peru	154	Benin	25.03	98
99	Singapore	0.52	Madagascar	0.00	Philippines	572	Yugoslavia	151	Cameroon	24.56	99
100	Spain	0.52	Malawi	0.00	Lesotho	571	Zambia	145	Burundi	24.44	100
101	Portugal	0.50	Malaysia	0.00	Yemen (Aden)	523	Guatemala	143	Iran	23.88	101
102	Yugoslavia	0.50	Mal	0.00	Uganda	493	Liberia	141	United States	23.82	102
103	Costa Rica	0.46	Malta	0.00	Indonesia	483	Nigeria	131	Somalia	23.78	103
104	China	0.39	Mauritania	0.00	Zambia	463	Lesotho	130	Zaire	23.34	104
105	Sweden	0.38	Mauritius	0.00	Mauritania	441	Mauritania	NA	China	23.16	105
106	Bangladesh	0.35	Mexico	0.00	Cape Verde	437	Guinea	104	India	22.83	106
107	Panama	0.35	Mongolia	0.00	Liberia	431	Senegal	111	Lesotho	22.75	107
108	Canada	0.34	Morocco	0.00	Mozambique	403	Sri Lanka	109	Romania	22.74	108
109	Germany, West	0.34	Mozambique	0.00	Senegal	359	Indonesia	101	Pakistan	21.82	109
110	Denmark	0.34	Kuwait	0.00	Pakistan	359	Guinea	100	Argentina	21.37	110
111	Kenya	0.33	New Zealand	0.00	Guinea	336	Gambia, The	98	Indonesia	21.00	111
112	Mexico	0.29	Nicaragua	0.00	SaotomePrinc.	335	Kenya	78	Switzerland	20.33	112
113	Italy	0.29	Niger	0.00	Sri Lanka	333	Tanzania	77	Korea, South	20.25	113
114	Luxembourg	0.14	Nigeria	0.00	China	301	Pakistan	74	El Salvador	19.92	114
115	Austria	0.15	Oman	0.00	Tanzania	300	Philippines	73	Thailand	19.91	115
116	United States	0.14	Pap. New Guin.	0.00	Vietnam	293	Laos	70	Cent. Afr. Rep.	19.76	116
117	Ireland	0.10	Mal	0.00	Haiti	293	China	70	Bangladesh	19.65	117
118	France	0.10	Paraguay	0.00	Sudan	291	Madagascar	70	Nepal	18.78	118
119	South Africa	0.03	Peru	0.00	Sierra Leone	288	Benin	64	Nigeria	18.72	119
120	Albania	0.00	Philippines	0.00	Kenya	287	India	59	Equat. Guinea	NA	120
121	Barbados	0.00	Burundi	0.00	Madagascar	272	Madagascar	57	Burundi	18.61	121
122	Botswana	0.00	Rwanda	0.00	Cent. Afr. Rep.	269	Guinea-Bissau	NA	Sudan	18.38	122
123	Cape Verde	0.00	SaotomePrinc.	0.00	Rwanda	269	Zaire	54	Japan	18.16	123
124	Cent. Afr. Rep.	0.00	Senegal	0.00	India	257	Cent. Afr. Rep.	NA	Haiti	18.03	124
125	Equat. Guinea	0.00	Sierra Leone	0.00	Benin	256	Sudan	54	Niger	17.89	125

Country								ME	ME	ME	ME	AF	AI	AE	GNP	CGE	CGE	Country
	ME	AF	AI	AE	GNP	CGE	POP	GNP	CGE	POP	AF	POP	TI	TE	POP	POP	GNP	
Afghanistan	79	60	35	+	96	121	50	39	1	98	108	88	10	+	127	143	141	Afghanistan
Albania	90	70	+	+	99	91	108	51	72	68	114	23	+	+	77	73	47	Albania
Algeria	36	36	20	38	36	32	36	43	67	51	61	47	41	+	62	51	61	Algeria
Angola	42	63	7	+	76	69	71	18	29	54	50	61	3	+	86	78	49	Angola
Argentina	35	35	27	33	32	41	28	60	45	57	47	69	24	28	55	74	110	Argentina
Australia	22	54	16	34	15	15	46	76	84	27	10	83	65	35	15	26	72	Australia
Austria	56	71	85	24	30	24	73	133	44	37	74	115	27	21	18	45	58	Austria
Bahrain	128	80	+	+	92	88	135	63	78	21	14	78	16	16	16	16	16	Bahrain
Bangladesh	76	50	101	35	65	71	9	106	81	138	119	139	106	10	141	141	117	Bangladesh
Barbados	133	139	+	+	125	118	142	133	135	72	55	90	+	+	39	40	62	Barbados
Belgium	32	43	31	17	24	16	62	71	11	30	34	33	91	30	22	11	15	Belgium
Benin	123	119	111	+	127	129	97	89	77	121	99	124	85	+	125	119	98	Benin
Bolivia	82	85	102	+	85	75	84	77	115	94	100	80	69	+	85	77	46	Bolivia
Botswana	120	129	+	+	129	112	126	78	114	85	62	102	+	+	84	65	22	Botswana
Brazil	42	16	57	14	11	13	6	136	136	103	104	96	87	20	67	70	76	Brazil
Bulgaria	24	34	23	11	36	30	67	22	40	12	33	16	55	7	33	32	42	Bulgaria
Burkina Faso	119	112	90	+	123	137	77	81	43	132	114	129	27	+	137	142	127	Burkina Faso
Burma	85	30	91	+	78	98	26	74	38	126	138	68	33	+	134	140	128	Burma
Burundi	114	115	92	+	126	128	93	65	59	117	90	123	22	+	129	121	100	Burundi
Cambodia	105	80	70	+	136	134	83	15	14	109	125	78	2	+	144	138	67	Cambodia
Cameroon	91	101	71	+	72	83	65	103	93	99	61	122	38	+	91	92	99	Cameroon
Canada	15	52	36	27	8	8	31	95	92	6	9	19	108	38	+	19	86	Canada
Cape Verde	132	120	+	+	142	139	140	20	52	73	129	17	+	+	106	86	14	Cape Verde
Cent. Afr. Rep.	131	125	+	+	133	138	110	108	87	129	122	117	+	+	122	124	116	Cent. Afr. Rep.
Chad	137	99	81	+	137	142	90	117	32	142	139	98	14	+	143	144	143	Chad
Chile	57	42	52	39	59	55	55	53	66	81	37	48	31	65	81	66	58	Chile
China	4	2	61	5	9	1	23	16	87	66	91	117	104	114	117	105	105	China
Colombia	64	5	14	+	43	57	30	121	80	93	69	110	16	+	69	85	132	Colombia
Congo	108	102	65	+	111	96	119	85	118	78	107	50	19	+	73	60	25	Congo
Costa Rica	117	113	112	+	102	103	112	131	131	104	102	99	103	+	71	81	90	Costa Rica
Cuba	45	22	13	41	52	42	60	37	67	40	89	7	31	40	49	41	24	Cuba
Cyprus	115	111	93	+	107	106	133	120	122	65	109	22	76	+	43	47	70	Cyprus
Czechoslovakia	119	29	28	10	19	21	47	41	13	27	26	62	12	23	30	69	Czechoslovakia	
Denmark	49	79	78	+	35	28	89	91	117	29	16	65	110	+	11	9	30	Denmark
Dominican Rep.	98	90	103	+	69	95	80	128	90	100	101	95	93	+	72	94	134	Dominican Rep.
Ecuador	82	74	53	+	66	81	66	113	70	89	91	87	29	+	70	90	131	Ecuador
Egypt	20	15	5	25	44	34	20	10	28	48	94	41	17	5	89	75	19	Egypt
El Salvador	66	66	+	+	102	102	102	92	36	76	88	44	30	+	136	137	120	El Salvador
Equat. Guinea	141	130	+	+	143	144	139	83	57	131	140	49	+	+	136	137	120	Equat. Guinea
Ethiopia	69	33	17	+	90	84	22	19	27	114	126	84	6	+	142	134	57	Ethiopia
Fiji	130	131	+	+	118	119	132	122	126	86	87	86	+	+	63	63	78	Fiji
Finland	58	72	72	18	40	39	91	119	120	39	41	52	97	16	14	28	74	Finland
France	6	11	62	3	5	3	17	55	86	16	36	16	118	14	18	12	28	France
Gabon	104	116	94	+	98	80	128	99	121	59	59	56	68	+	45	39	38	Gabon
Gambia, The	143	140	+	+	140	140	131	143	143	143	143	128	+	+	125	111	59	Gambia, The
Germany, East	12	28	22	15	12	9	43	33	69	11	17	24	67	24	17	7	17	Germany, East
Germany, West	5	13	21	4	4	5	12	68	74	19	15	53	109	22	10	20	73	Germany, West
Ghana	72	103	104	+	33	54	61	141	107	83	36	132	73	+	38	64	140	Ghana
Greece	33	32	37	31	45	38	61	25	48	31	45	15	57	19	42	38	35	Greece
Guatemala	87	73	82	+	67	93	70	104	54	90	97	76	56	+	78	101	136	Guatemala
Guinea	110	83	113	+	112	108	88	73	94	111	130	73	82	+	111	106	50	Guinea
Guinea-Bissau	139	108	95	+	141	141	129	88	89	128	141	27	11	+	133	122	77	Guinea-Bissau
Guyana	121	117	+	+	117	130	79	130	130	113	64	79	11	+	99	79	4	Guyana
Haiti	121	121	+	+	113	125	87	115	88	130	96	133	+	+	117	124	124	Haiti
Honduras	93	93	67	+	103	105	94	54	50	84	85	82	20	+	95	95	95	Honduras
Hungary	30	44	54	26	28	20	57	56	96	25	30	40	83	25	28	13	18	Hungary
Iceland	144	144	+	+	106	101	143	144	144	144	144	144	+	+	13	24	66	Iceland
India	17	12	4	10	12	19	2	87	64	102	70	121	86	+	123	109	111	India
Indonesia	36	23	58	+	26	36	5	87	64	102	70	121	86	+	103	109	111	Indonesia
Iran	11	21	3	+	16	22	21	27	18	33	29	55	18	+	44	54	101	Iran
Iraq	8	7	1	+	46	29	49	1	2	8	42	1	4	+	53	56	7	Iraq
Ireland	73	106	105	+	63	48	101	107	134	53	35	94	117	+	37	29	1	Ireland
Israel	16	15	23	22	53	25	96	5	26	37	28	0	36	13	4	10	13	Israel
Italy	13	12	48	7	7	6	80	124	47	113	26	31	16	+	13	16	13	Italy
Ivory Coast	102	91	96	+	82	82	63	124	128	118	106	113	79	+	97	93	75	Ivory Coast
Jamaica	122	134	+	+	100	92	114	137	141	108	48	141	+	+	68	62	48	Jamaica
Japan	10	27	9	20	3	4	7	132	113	49	13	116	94	39	12	34	123	Japan
Jordan	59	53	44	+	95	76	111	7	13	28	66	115	66	+	56	56	27	Jordan
Kenya	84	95	114	+	83	87	39	66	63	113	58	138	111	+	120	112	87	Kenya
Korea, North	19	8	68	16	56	46	38	4	9	32	82	3	39	1	76	59	21	Korea, North
Korea, South	23	10	32	13	25	37	23	42	24	47	71	25	80	21	57	76	113	Korea, South
Kuwait	47	104	33	+	51	45	120	43	68	10	4	45	42	+	4	2	29	Kuwait
Laos	104	109	64	75	+	138	130	75	137	97	102	72	1	+	140	116	26	Laos
Lebanon	66	96	41	+	77	74	102	21	30	35	32	57	32	+	51	52	60	Lebanon
Lesotho	107	138	132	+	131	133	122	32	21	79	24	136	+	+	100	104	107	Lesotho
Liberia	127	122	106	+	130	123	115	94	100	110	105	106	59	+	107	102	64	Liberia
Libya	111	51	4	37	50	44	100	8	12	6	12	8	13	34	25	23	32	Libya
Luxembourg	21	141	115	+	89	79	137	137	137	137	137	137	137	+	137	137	137	Luxembourg
Madagascar	103	84	107	+	105	109	64	86	76	119	121	103	60	+	121	118	93	Madagascar
Malawi	128	123	+	+	117	120	76	112	108	135	111	142	+	+	135	127	80	Malawi
Malaysia	52	45	30	+	49	47	48	59	75	53	53	62	58	+	56	57	52	Malaysia
Mali	126	109	97	+	124	124	72	98	97	134	127	126	43	+	139	133	85	Mali
Malta	133	142	+	+	119	142	138	142	138	142	138	142	138	+	138	142	138	Malta
Mauritania	113	143	98	+	132	121	46	44	88	132	30	23	+	+	105	105	79	Mauritania
Mauritius	140	94	+	+	121	122	127	142	142	136	118	137	+	+	79	80	81	Mauritius
Mexico	55	41	86	+	17	23	11	140	137	105	72	120	112	+	61	69	96	Mexico
Mongolia	77	76	87	+	110	78	118	16	65	43	84	14	51	+	75	49	3	Mongolia
Morocco	63	50																

Essays

It is hoped that readers of the four essays in this edition of WMEAT will find that they address important current aspects of global security in a useful manner.

The first essay examines an aspect of the arms trade that has recently received much attention: namely, the supposedly burgeoning growth of new arms suppliers, especially in the Third World. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Clare's essay places these new arms producers and exporters in a global perspective and assesses their achievements to date and their future prospects.

The topic of the second essay, the effects of military spending on nations' economic performance, is one about which much has recently been written — so much, in fact, that a rather confusing picture faces even the serious student of the subject. Professor Steve Chan surveys and evaluates this recent literature and suggests some possible directions for future research. A valuable list of references accompanies the essay.

The essay of Dr. Henry Kenny analyzes recent changes in China's military posture and their effects on U.S. arms sales. Dr. Kenny examines the history and prospects for these sales against the background of China's evolving military modernization program.

The last essay is particularly appropriate to WMEAT. Professor James Payne critiques commonly used measures of the "burden" of the military on a society. He urges the validity of an alternative measure, the ratio of armed forces to population, and calculates an adjustment to this measure using WMEAT data. He then uses the data to examine levels of "militarisation" in self-proclaimed Marxist states.

The views and judgments expressed in these essays are those of the contributing authors and are not necessarily those of the WMEAT editorial staff, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, or any other U.S. Government Agency.

Whither the Third World Arms Producers?

Joseph F. Clare, Jr.

The increased prominence of secondary suppliers in the international arms market—including the growing role of some Third World producers—has been among the most discussed trends in worldwide arms transfers in recent years. By 1984, countries outside the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances accounted for 17 percent of

the world arms market and 20 percent of the Third World¹ market. The share of Third World arms exporters in 1984 reached almost 15 percent of the world market and about 18 percent of the Third World market.² The present article examines these trends and some of their implications in greater detail.

Trends

Figure 1 shows the range of arms exporting countries and puts into perspective the Third World suppliers to be highlighted in the present article. All of the countries selected are “developing” in accordance with the *World*

The author is a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army currently serving as a politico-military officer in the Arms Transfer Division of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has previously served in intelligence assignments in Washington, D.C. and abroad and has authored a number of studies and articles on the Soviet armed forces.

Figure 1: Arms Suppliers in 1981-1985, by Group and Scale of Exports




Figure 1

Table 1
Annual Arms Exports of Selected Arms Exporters
(in millions of 1983 dollars)

	Argen- tina	Brazil	China	Egypt	India	Israel	North Korea	Paki- stan	Singa- pore	South Korea	Yugo- slavia
1985	0	56	327	28	5	196	196	28	9	47	290
1984	77	483	1,837	193	19	232	367	290	10	508	556
1983	20	130	1,600	50	0	170	290	300	20	370	330
1982	0	335	1,151	356	10	408	680	21	10	994	314
1981	11	190	470	34	22	392	644	45	45	291	325
1980	6	169	327	0	36	169	230	12	0	303	303
1979	13	145	185	13	40	343	119	13	26	238	224
1978	0	143	242	114	29	185	128	43	29	100	585
1977	8	123	170	77	77	93	31	8	15	170	370
1976	0	114	229	0	16	245	131	0	33	8	278

Table 2
World Rankings of Selected Arms Exporters, 1976-1985

	Argen- tina	Brazil	China	Egypt	India	Israel	North Korea	Paki- stan	Singa- pore	South Korea	Yugo- slavia
1985	—	25	9	31	37	15	16	32	34	28	12
1984	33	14	5	25	40	22	16	19	43	13	12
1983	37	26	6	31	—	25	20	18	39	10	14
1982	—	18	5	17	41	14	11	36	44	8	19
1981	40	21	12	35	37	13	9	30	31	19	17
1980	39	17	10	—	30	18	13	36	—	11	12
1979	36	17	14	37	33	10	20	38	35	12	13
1978	—	17	12	20	32	15	19	31	35	25	19
1977	40	16	13	23	24	20	30	43	38	14	10
1976	—	19	13	—	33	12	18	—	31	38	10

Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) definition of this term.

Tables 1 and 2 summarize arms export statistics for these selected suppliers over the past ten years. These data support the following observations:

- Most of these suppliers were able to increase their exports in the period 1982-84, even as worldwide arms transfers were leveling off and starting to decrease. However, many now appear to be feeling the impact of the recent downturn of the global arms market.³
- Despite increased exports in recent years, most countries did not dramatically improve their relative position vis-à-vis other exporters. South Korea, for example, ranked twelfth in 1979 and thirteenth in 1984, despite a doubling of exports. Brazil was seventeenth in 1979 and fourteenth in 1984, even though exports had tripled in this period.
- Apart from China, the countries listed in Tables 1 and 2 are all suppliers of decidedly second rank. Even the larger exporters (North Korea, South Korea, and Yugoslavia) export less than half the volume of arms that China and other major countries do.

- Market competition is intense and susceptible to large year-to-year fluctuations. Of interest are Israel's general decline in the ranking since 1979, significant drops (over fifty percent) in transfers between 1982 and 1983 for such countries as North and South Korea, Brazil, and Egypt, and major reductions practically across the board in 1985.

- Interesting patterns within regions also emerge. Brazil maintains a clear lead over Argentina, the only other significant Latin American arms supplier. Pakistan's edge in exports over India is perhaps surprising, given the much greater size and diversification of India's defense industry. However, this edge is primarily due to troop support costs for Pakistani manpower, which is prominent in many Middle East military establishments, particularly Saudi Arabia.

The graphs in Figure 2 provide a perspective on the regional pattern of exports by these suppliers over the past five years. Two significant conclusions flow from these data:

- Most of these countries depend heavily for their markets on the Middle East. This is understandable

Figure 2: Arms Export Patterns of Selected Suppliers, 1981-1985




Figure 2

since a greater proportion of world arms transfers goes to this region than to any other (approximately 49 percent in recent years). However, the dependence of many Third World suppliers on Middle East markets is much higher, and it has been increasing over the past five years.

- Most of these countries do not have a regionally balanced arms transfer pattern. Apart from a general dependence on the Middle East, none of these suppliers approaches a market distribution resembling the worldwide pattern of arms transfers represented in Figure 3. For example, Brazil, Argentina, and Israel all have a major dependence on Latin American markets.

The accompanying box lists some of the major weapons produced by selected Third World suppliers. Most of these systems are low to medium technology, based on licensed production or copies of older weapons, and have not been exported in large numbers. For example, with the exception of the Israeli Merkava, other producers' tanks do not have the sophisticated fire control systems and optics of modern tanks built by the major suppliers. Moreover, according to ACDA data, Third World suppliers to date have not exported a significant portion of the tanks, artillery, warships, or aircraft involved in the world arms trade, probably deriving more business from the supply of infantry support weapons and munitions of various types. Two cross-cutting trends — recognition of the battlefield value of high technology "smart" weapons, demonstrated in Lebanon and the Falklands in 1982, and the enduring demand for simple, rugged weapons and enormous quantities of ammunition, exemplified in the Iran-Iraq war — suggest that Third World suppliers could theoretically pursue either end of the

Figure 3: Regional Shares of World Arms Imports, 1981-1985




Figure 3

Producers and Products

Argentina . . . TAM medium tank . . . IA-58 Pucara counterinsurgency aircraft . . . IA-63 Pampa trainer/attack aircraft . . . Hughes 500/300 helicopters . . . utility aircraft including Piper and Cessna . . . 105mm rocket launchers.

Brazil . . . EE-T1 (Osorio) and MB-3 (Tamoyo) tanks . . . Urutu and Cascavel armored personnel carriers . . . Astros-II multiple rocket launcher . . . EMB-312 Tucano trainer aircraft . . . EMB 110 Bandeirante and EMB 120 Brasilia transport aircraft . . . Gaviao and Esquilo helicopters.

China . . . Type 69 tank . . . various artillery including 152mm self-propelled howitzers . . . multiple rocket launchers (107mm-103mm) . . . F-7 and F-8 fighters . . . B-6 bomber . . . range of naval vessels.

Egypt . . . artillery including 122mm howitzers and 130mm gun . . . Swingfire anti-tank guided missile . . . ZSU-23 air defense gun . . . Alpha Jet trainer/attack aircraft . . . Gazelle helicopter . . . Hawkeye man-portable surface-to-air missile.

India . . . Vijayanta and Arjun tanks . . . Vijayanta 130mm self-propelled gun . . . Godavari-class frigate . . . MIG 21/23/27 fighter . . . S-315 Cheetah helicopter . . . Atoll air-to-air missile.

Israel . . . Merkava tank . . . Mar 290mm rocket launcher . . . Kfir fighter . . . Arva transport . . . Gabriel anti-ship missile . . . Shafrir and Python air-to-air missiles.

North Korea . . . T-62 tank . . . Type 303 armored personnel carrier . . . artillery including 122mm/130mm/152mm self-propelled weapons . . . various classes of coastal patrol boats . . . MI-2 Hoplite helicopter . . . SA-7 surface-to-air missile and AT-3 anti-tank guided missiles.

South Korea . . . Daewoo infantry fighting vehicle . . . 105mm/155mm howitzers . . . Vulcan air defense gun . . . coastal patrol boats . . . F-5E fighter . . . Hughes 500 helicopter.

Pakistan . . . 120mm mortar . . . Muschak trainer aircraft . . . various infantry weapons and munitions including RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launcher and 106mm recoilless rifle.

Singapore . . . 120mm mortar . . . coastal patrol boats . . . various infantry weapons including Ultimex 100 light machine gun and SAR-80 rifle.

Yugoslavia . . . T-72 tank . . . various infantry combat vehicles . . . field and air defense artillery guns . . . Galeb and Utva trainer aircraft . . . Gazelle helicopter . . . AT-3 anti-tank guided missile.

market. In reality, however, few Third World suppliers will be able to compete in the high end of the market.

Limitations

While the increased role of Third World arms suppliers in the international arms trade can be demonstrated, projections are complicated by a number of potential financial, technical, economic, and political constraints. Whether the trend will revolutionize the global arms trade and have a major impact on world politics will depend to a large extent on whether Third World suppliers can overcome these serious limitations.

The financial issue boils down to whether, in a world of substantial debt servicing burdens, falling commodity prices, and shrinking foreign aid resources, Third World countries can afford to import the technology and training required to produce modern weapons systems. For example, the US has underwritten the one billion dollar development cost for the Israeli Lavi combat aircraft — funding which has been crucial to sustain the Lavi program. Few countries, however, will be able to build an aircraft that costs \$15 to \$22 million a copy. US assistance for the Korean indigenous tank has been substantial, and US help for the expansion of Egyptian and Pakistani defense industries will be essential for the development of military production in these countries over the next 5-10 years. The US and other major suppliers are now under pressure to support weapons sales through co-production or other offset arrangements that ultimately will lead to increased Third World capabilities and competition. However, the continued willingness of these suppliers to provide such support hangs as a question mark over the future development of Third World arms industries.

Technical constraints are closely related in the sense that technology transfer is also a developmental necessity not guaranteed and not fully within the control of would-be suppliers. To use the Lavi as an example again, more than 100 US companies are involved in providing components for this "indigenous" aircraft. From the engine to the wings to the flight control computer and heads-up display, US technology is broadly incorporated in the Lavi. A similar range of foreign technology will be required for India to produce its Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). Whether most of this technology will come from the US or from Western Europe is not yet clear. However, if the Indians insist on producing a high-tech "indigenous" aircraft, the technology will have to come mainly from abroad. Foreign equipment inputs to the Brazilian EE-T1 (Osorio) light tank are also instructive in this regard. The tank incorporates a West German engine, transmission, and tracks, a British suspension system, and British or French main gun and fire control system.

In a broader sense, the financial and technical constraints discussed above can be viewed as aspects of the political limitations facing Third World arms suppliers. Financial assistance and technology transfer are political decisions by major arms producers, which

are based on a dynamic calculus of strategic, political, and economic self-interest. The extent to which such decisions create new problems — increased competition, loss of control, new centers of power — is likely to serve as a growing restraint on additional transfers. Furthermore, these transfers of assistance and technology provide a measure of political control in that the supplier has at least the theoretical possibility of influencing the Third World producer's international marketing efforts. US law, for example, prohibits the retransfer to a third party of any US equipment or system containing US components without the prior approval of the US Government. Although Israel undoubtedly hopes to market the Lavi and its Merkava main battle tank abroad, it needs specific authorization from the US to do so. If such approval is given, these Israeli systems could be competing directly with US tanks and fighter aircraft for foreign sales.

The choices are likely to be even more stark for major West European suppliers, whose arms industries are more dependent upon arms exports than is the defense industry in the United States. Failure to control the marketing of licensed production by Third World suppliers could have a serious impact on British and French arms industries, for example, and make it even more expensive for these countries to equip their own forces. The crunch is likely to come because most Third World producers will probably find themselves in a situation even more acute than that of the British and French in being faced with a relatively small internal market and a consequent need to export to maintain their defense industrial base.

Moreover, political constraints could be imposed by Third World producers on their own efforts. The desire to secure political influence in certain countries, to coordinate policies with important allies, or to limit the impact of foreign sales on a country's own armed forces can influence decisions to sell arms abroad even in the case of secondary suppliers. Even Brazil, for example, whose arms export policy is almost totally driven by commercial factors, has recently been supportive of US efforts to restrict arms sales to Libya. India is another case in point. Although India possesses the largest arms industry in the Third World, the volume of India's arms exports is small, owing to the large demands of its own forces, its dependence on restrictive licensed production, and its desire to maintain political standing in non-aligned fora. None of these considerations lends itself to an effort to maximize international sales. Finally, Israel, reacting to recurrent "scandals" involving Israeli arms dealers, recently announced measures to insure stricter administration of arms exports. It is even possible that some sort of Knesset review of the Israeli arms sales process could evolve over the next few years. More dramatically, in response to the recent US report to the Congress on the South African arms embargo, Tel Aviv has announced a ban on future defense agreements with South Africa and is considering other ways of downgrading its military ties to Pretoria.

And then there are the economic limitations. Al-

though some secondary suppliers have thus far not been substantially affected by overall reduced demand in the world arms market, this trend, if it should continue, could eventually have a serious impact on Third World suppliers. Reduced funds, completion of procurement cycles, and programs to extend the service life of old equipment rather than purchasing new are all likely to undercut the smaller producers' ability to sell. Financing arrangements for major weapons purchases are likely to be difficult for Third World suppliers to support, and the very proliferation of suppliers will make the market more competitive and survival more problematic.

Finally, the extent to which the markets for Third World producers are dependent upon transitory conditions needs to be considered. The heavy orientation of some suppliers toward the Middle East market has been previously noted. Much of this trade has resulted directly from the Iran-Iraq War and from US efforts to restrict the flow of arms from major suppliers to the belligerents. A resolution of the conflict, rescission of the US embargo, or policy choices on the part of major suppliers could substantially reduce this important market. The over-dependence of secondary suppliers on the Middle East market is a basic weakness, and most Third World suppliers have yet to demonstrate a capability to diversify markets for long-term stability and growth.

Prospects

Notwithstanding such limitations, there are certain factors stimulating the growth of arms industries in the Third World that are unlikely to change in the near term. Whether for primarily economic motives (e.g., Brazil, Argentina), security considerations (e.g., Israel, North and South Korea), or desires for self-sufficiency in arms supply (e.g., Egypt, India), Third World producers are likely to continue to play an important role in the world arms market.

The proliferation of Third World producers has been paralleled by a widespread desire for diversification among arms recipients in an effort to gain leverage on their major or sole suppliers. The goal of diversification has perhaps been most intense in countries with longstanding arms relationships to Moscow such as India, Algeria, North Yemen, and even Syria. Dissatisfaction with the performance of Soviet military equipment, with the standards of Soviet military training and support, with Soviet arrogance and unwillingness to provide technology transfer and assistance programs that would lead to military independence have all been responsible for this trend. This situation, coupled with what could be a less ambitious Soviet Third World policy under Mikhail Gorbachev, should help to open markets for Third World producers.

One aspect of the arms market that could provide momentum for Third World producers is the potential for refurbishment and upgrade of existing equipment. If (as seems probable) the near-term global economic situation tends to restrict the purchase of expensive new weapons, many countries may turn to upgrades to

prolong the life of equipment already in service. Some Third World producers have or are developing capabilities to provide this kind of service, including Singapore, Brazil, Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and India. Israeli-developed reactive armor, for example, provides a simple and relatively inexpensive way to enhance armor protection for tanks and armored personnel carriers. This type of upgrade is likely to be attractive to cash-strapped armed forces in many countries.

Another favorable development for some Third World producers is the extent to which they are currently receiving foreign support in expanding their defense industries. US assistance to Israel in this regard is widely known and highlighted by the extent of technological and financial assistance provided for the Lavi program. Brazil and Italy are collaborating on the AMX fighter, and the Argentines have an agreement with the Italians to co-produce a remotely piloted vehicle. A 1984 US-Pakistani agreement on defense industrial cooperation is intended to facilitate the flow of technological and industrial information to Pakistan. Specific areas for cooperation include ammunition production, tank upgrade and rebuild, development of aircraft and shipyard overhaul capabilities, and production and maintenance of electro-optics and electronics. Egypt has received industrial base assistance through assembly and licensed production arrangements for British, French, and US weapons, while India has made similar arrangements and is seeking additional ones from these and other countries, including the Soviet Union.

On another level, the pooling of resources may provide a partial solution for the problems facing Third World producers. Just as production consortia have become common in Europe (the British-French Jaguar, British-German-Italian Tornado, French-German Euromissile corporation, are examples), cooperative bilateral and multilateral arrangements among Third World arms manufacturers could also be developed. For example:

- A revitalization of the Arab Organization for Industrialization, originally formed in 1975 but which became a victim of the Camp David Accords, could enhance the defense industrial potential of Egypt and other Arab states.
- Other Arab capabilities could eventually develop through the creation of a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) arms industry as envisaged under a 1979 agreement which predates the founding of the GCC itself. Recent indications that the Saudis are planning to purchase a munitions manufacturing capability from West Germany, an anti-tank missile production facility from the US, and the likelihood of some kind of licensed-manufacture or assembly arrangement for Brazilian tanks (if the Saudis buy Brazilian) suggest some of the possibilities. Moreover, in the fall of 1986, GCC defense ministers adopted a resolution dealing with the expansion of arms production in member countries, suggesting that the GCC is indeed serious about this program.

- Brazil's recent political rapprochement with Argentina and trends in economic cooperation between the two countries suggest the possibility of a fledgling Latin American arms consortium. In fact, Brazil and Argentina have signed an agreement to build a replacement for the Brazilian Bandeirante civil-military transport aircraft. This arrangement marks the first co-production agreement to date between the two largest arms manufacturers in Latin America and may be a harbinger of future arms cooperation.

Conclusion

Even with some pooling of resources, none of the Third World arms producers would appear to have the capability to escape the ranks of the secondary suppliers. Despite the diversification of arms manufacturers and the significance of this development for certain producers and recipients, the international arms trade will continue to be dominated by the major suppliers. Indeed, the Third World exporters' share of the world arms market dropped to 7% in 1985 — barely above the level of a decade ago.

Some Third World producers, however, may be able to influence the international arms market in another way. By increasing their own self sufficiency in arms, they may reduce the total world demand for arms imports. The following percentage shares of total Third World arms imports in 1981-1985 show that eight countries accounted for over half the total.

Iraq	15.9	Iran	4.2
Saudi Arabia	9.8	India	4.0
Libya	6.9	Israel	2.7
Syria	5.9	All Others	45.9
Egypt	4.7		

At least four of these countries — Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and Israel — have the potential for and are actively pursuing policies geared toward expanding indigenous arms production. Such production in the largest market countries could have an important impact on both the size and pattern of the international arms market. The longer term significance of producer proliferation, therefore, may not be in the direction of stimulating greater arms transfers, but of promoting local and regional arms autarky.

NOTES

¹ "Third World" as used herein refers to the non-NATO and non-Warsaw Pact developing countries.

² These estimates are based on revised data for 1984, as shown in this edition of *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (WMEAT). The previous edition (*WMEAT 1985*) had indicated that the non-NATO and Pact share of the world market had reached 19 percent in 1984 and that the combined US-Soviet share had declined from 78 percent in 1973 to under 50 percent in 1984. Current estimates place the US-and-Soviet share above 50 percent in 1984 and higher in 1985, according to preliminary data. A current review of estimates of Soviet arms transfers in value terms may raise this share even higher in future editions. (See Statistical Notes.)

³ Available 1985 data, however, are preliminary and are likely to be revised upward when more complete information becomes available.

Military Expenditures and Economic Performance

Steve Chan

This essay reports some major conclusions of extant research on the impact of military (or defense) spending on economic performance. The essay also suggests an agenda for future investigations that can contribute to improving our knowledge in this area. As the pertinent literature is rather vast, I shall only attempt to summarize and address some key substantive and methodological issues. My main concern will be with the economic consequences of military spending, and not with the motivations for this spending or with its numerous other effects, such as those on other types of government expenditures or on international arms races. The latter concerns are in themselves important and complex topics on which there exist substantial bodies of research literature.¹ The reference section provides a selective list of studies on the impact of military spending on economic performance for readers interested in pursuing the topic further.²

What Have We Learned?

Generalizations about the relationship between military spending and economic performance are difficult to make and must be tentative, as the search for answers continues. It seems relatively safe, however, to conclude from the research to date that the phenomena in question are sufficiently complex as to preclude simple universal statements ostensibly applicable to all countries at all times. As Smith and Georgiou (1983: 15) observed, "If there can be any single conclusion about the effects of military expenditure on the economy, it must be that it depends on the nature of the expenditure, the prevailing circumstances, and the concurrent government policies." Accordingly, it would seem appropriate to disaggregate the general research problem and to discuss previous research findings in terms of several more specific and manageable analytic aspects of these effects: "On whom?", "How much?", "In what manner?", and "Under what circumstances?"

On Whom and How Much? Ever since Emile Benoit's (1973) pathbreaking (though much criticized) study, a distinction between "developing" and "developed" countries has been recognized by the researchers in this field. Benoit's analysis focused on 44 developing countries during the 1950-1965 period (the so-called A series) and the 1960-1965 period (the so-called C series). His shorter C series showed a statistically significant positive correlation between average military spending as a percentage of GNP (gross national product) and the growth rate of the civilian GNP, after the effects of foreign investment and bilateral economic aid had been controlled for. His conclusion that "heavy defense

expenditure does not . . . appear to have been associated with *lower* growth rates" (Benoit, 1973: 4) has engendered a series of critical exchanges and attempts to replicate or validate his results (e.g., Benoit, 1978, 1972a, 1972b; Dorfman, 1972; Hagan, 1972; Kaldor, 1976; Brzoska and Wulf, 1979; Faini *et al.*, 1984; Smith and Smith, 1980; Ball, 1983; Huiskens, 1983; Lim, 1983; Deger and Smith, 1983).

On balance, the subsequent analyses did not support Benoit's conclusion. Smith and Smith (1980) failed to find any strong and systematic relationship between defense spending and economic growth among the developing countries. Three other studies (Lim, 1983; Deger and Smith, 1983; Frederiksen and Looney, 1983) discovered a significant negative relationship between these variables either for all the developing countries in their sample or at least for some subsets of these countries. These more recent analyses do not report mutually consistent results, and some of them are not without their own methodological problems (e.g., small samples, short observation periods). On the whole, however, their results appear more credible than Benoit's. As noted above, the latter's study has been subjected to a variety of substantive and methodological criticisms. One particularly pertinent criticism has been that Benoit gave too much emphasis to the positive effects of military spending in mobilizing the available national resources and in instilling modern skills and attitudes in the developing world while he did not give enough emphasis to the negative effects of military spending on savings and investment. As Deger and Smith (1983) argued, the former positive effects on the developing economies tend to be more than offset by the latter negative effects. Consequently, the net effect of military spending on the rate of economic growth tends to be negative for most developing countries.

It is important to recognize, however, that the trade-off between guns and growth is apt to differ substantially among individual countries in the developing world. Frederiksen and Looney (1983) found that military spending and economic growth were negatively correlated for those developing countries with serious financial difficulties, whereas they were positively correlated for other developing countries that were less constrained financially. In a similar vein, Lim (1983) discovered that the detrimental effects of military spending on economic growth were most pronounced among the poorer countries located in Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Yet a third study (Brzoska and Wulf, 1979) reported that except for the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries) members and Oman, military spending did not have a positive impact on the expansion of the civilian economies of developing countries and that, in some

The author is Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado (Boulder).

cases, there was a significant negative impact. And, as a final example, Deger and Smith (1983) estimated that the multiplier effect of military spending on economic growth was the greatest for the high-income developing countries (-0.274), less burdensome but still substantial for the low-income developing countries (-0.195), and the least detrimental for the middle-income developing countries (-0.108).

The research just cited has two collective implications. First, there are clearly some important discrepancies among the various studies. Indeed, as will be seen shortly, even the research results for the developed countries often tend to contradict one another. Therefore, analysts need to be especially sensitive to how the differences in their data bases, country samples, and research designs can contribute to inconsistent and confusing research findings, a topic that will be discussed later in this essay. Second, the research results cited so far suggest strongly the need to develop sensitive and valid indicators for categorizing different classes of countries. The general categories of "developing" and "developed" economies seem too broad to capture the substantial variations in the guns versus growth trade-off that exist cross-nationally. Encompassing generalizations that do not discriminate among divergent national conditions are more likely to mislead than to inform. Some of these conditions will be discussed subsequently regarding the circumstantial factors that affect the impact of military spending on economic performance.

With regard to the research evidence on the more developed economies, several recent studies (e.g., Cappelen *et al.*, 1984; Chan, 1984) showed that defense burden (especially when it is measured in terms of the annual rate of change in arms expenditures) was apt to be positively correlated with economic growth for some Mediterranean countries (e.g., Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Italy). However, it would be unwarranted to interpret this correlation as evidence of causation. This correlation does not clarify whether higher or accelerating military spending tends to produce more rapid economic growth or whether more rapid economic growth tends to lead to higher or accelerating military spending, as seems more likely. As for the more mature developed economies (especially the United States) of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), the available evidence is not entirely consistent but generally it does not support the view that military spending promotes economic growth. For instance, Cappelen *et al.* (1984) reported that although military expenditures had a positive effect on manufacturing output, this positive effect was more than offset by the negative effect that these expenditures had on the investment rate. They concluded that except for its Mediterranean members, the net impact of military spending on economic growth was negative for the OECD.

To be sure, the substitution effects between military spending and economic growth tend to fluctuate over time for a country. Nardinelli and Ackerman (1976), for example, calculated that the coefficients measuring the

effect of U.S. military expenditures on the rate of U.S. GNP growth were -0.381 for the 1905-1916 period, -0.008 for the 1920-1939 period, and -0.082 for the 1946-1973 period. Analyzing an even more extended span of history, Rasler and Thompson (1984) also showed that the defense-growth trade-off had hardly been stable over time for the U.S. They estimated the following coefficients for the impact of military spending on the GNP growth rate of the U.S.: -0.029 for the 1793-1860 period, -0.400 for the 1866-1916 period, -0.028 for the 1919-1940 period, and -0.605 for the 1946-1980 period. Their estimates indicated that the costs of military expenditures to the U.S. economy had been the greatest during the most recent years. Rasler and Thompson (1984) also performed similar estimations for the U.K. (United Kingdom), France, Japan, and the F.R.G. (Federal Republic of Germany). They found that none of them suffered statistically significant substitution effects between defense and growth since the end of World War II, although these effects were evident for the U.K. before 1945 and for France and Germany before 1914. Another study by these same authors (Rasler and Thompson, 1985a) found that the impact on economic growth of wars — which usually involve high armament expenditures and the destruction or interruption of economic production — has been primarily temporary, at least for the Western major powers (i.e., the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, Japan). These countries have been generally able to rebound from war-related setbacks, and to resume their prewar pattern of growth after the restoration of peace.

These results for the developed economies remind us again the existence of some important discrepancies among various findings that were also noticed earlier with regard to the results for the developing countries. For example, the presence and, if so, the extent of trade-off between military spending and economic growth for some countries such as the U.K., the F.R.G., and Japan still need to be clarified. Moreover, these results indicate that in addition to the previously-mentioned need to develop appropriate country categories, analysts should concern themselves with developing appropriate periodizations for tracking the fluctuating impact of military spending on a country's economy, and with designing appropriate methodologies for separating the temporary effects from the more enduring effects.

In What Manner? Military spending can affect economic growth both directly and indirectly. Its effects can be felt not only on the rate of GNP expansion, but also on other indicators of economic performance such as the rates of inflation, unemployment, investment, and technological innovation, which in turn can affect the direction and speed of GNP change. Therefore, we need to be sensitive to not only the first-order or direct effects of defense spending on economic growth, but also to their second-order or indirect effects. Several recent studies, employing sophisticated methodologies for longitudinal analysis,³ have helped us to understand better the interactions

among the pertinent variables for several developed countries (especially the U.S.).

Whereas defense spending may have a temporary stimulative effect on a country's employment and production levels, it appears that this short-term positive impact is more than offset by its long-term negative impact on capital formation. In addition to the analysis by Cappelen *et al.* (1984) cited earlier, several studies by Ron Smith (1980, 1978, 1977; Smith and Georgiou, 1983) have shown that there tends to be a roughly one-to-one trade-off relationship between the developed Western economies' military expenditures and their total investment. According to these studies, a country's ability to save and to channel resources to creating future productive capacities is reduced by an amount that roughly corresponds to the rise in its military expenditures. Because this propensity to save and to invest is a critical determinant of future economic growth, military spending has a significant, albeit indirect, negative impact on GNP expansion. Incidentally, this indirect effect seems also to be present among the developing countries, for which the positive contributions of defense expenditure to resource mobilization and to instilling modern skills tend to be overwhelmed by the negative feedback from its dampening effect on capital formation and investment (Deger and Smith, 1983). However, according to Rasler and Thompson (1984) the substitution effects between arms and investment tend to vary substantially for different countries and time periods. They reported that such effects did not exist at a statistically significant level for the U.K., Japan, France, and the F.R.G. during the post-World War II era, whereas they were present for the U.K. before 1945 and for the U.S. both before and after that year.

The studies just mentioned do not indicate whether there is a temporal lag between heavy military spending and its subsequent effect on declining investment. Nor do these studies indicate whether there is a threshold effect in this relationship; that is, whether the one-to-one trade-off between guns and investment suggested by Smith will come to pass only after military spending attains a particular threshold level. These are worthy topics for future research. As Smith and Georgiou (1983: 13) noted about their own study, "the effect of military expenditure on growth through investment and capital formation is likely to be a long run one and so not picked up by the short lags used in [our] time series analysis."

It would seem that military spending can also indirectly affect a country's economic growth by influencing its competitiveness in international trade. Rothschild (1973) argued convincingly that exports have been a powerful engine for the recent economic expansion of many countries and that export-oriented industries tend to be the most dynamic sectors of the civilian economy. These industries (e.g., transport, machinery, electronics) are most likely to suffer from heavy military spending, as capital expenditures by the modern military are apt to be concentrated in these industries. A sustained and serious diversion of capital

and human resources away from the export sectors to the defense sectors would thus lead to slower export growth, which would in turn result in slower national economic growth. In the long run, it would also exacerbate or produce domestic inflation, structural unemployment, currency devaluation, and increasingly unfavorable balance of payments, all due to the economy's deteriorating ability to compete effectively in international trade.

The relationship between military spending and unemployment has also been the subject of analysis by several researchers. Szymanski's analysis of 18 OECD countries during 1950-1968 led him to conclude that "apparently military spending absorbs the unemployed but somehow hinders real economic growth" (Szymanski, 1973: 6). This conclusion has evoked reactions from several other analysts (e.g., Friedman, 1974; Stevenson, 1974; Zeitlin, 1974; Szymanski, 1974). It is based on a rather small sample with some significant "deviant" cases (especially Japan with its low military spending and low unemployment rate). Subsequent reviews of the available evidence (e.g., Chester, 1978; Lindgren, 1984; Smith, 1978, 1977) generally failed to uncover any support for the view that military spending promotes higher employment levels in the long run. If anything, the evidence seems to suggest that it tends to create more serious structural unemployment through the effects of slower economic growth, lower investment, weaker consumer demand, and declining export competitiveness.

The above discussion reinforces my earlier suggestion that future research should try to separate the short-term effects of military spending (which could very well be positive on employment) from its long-term effects (which could be quite negative on employment). Implicit in this discussion is also the need for more research to compare the ability of alternative government spending programs to reduce unemployment or to achieve other goals such as stimulating technological innovation, promoting export competitiveness, and encouraging economic growth. Some have estimated that military expenditures are much less effective in creating jobs than civilian expenditures by the government (e.g., Center for Defense Information, cited in Nincic and Cusack, 1979: 111).

Finally, it has been suggested that military spending is especially apt to be a source of cost-push inflation. The consequences of inflation for economic growth, however, are sometimes debated. Benoit (1973), for example, alleged that the moderate price rises brought about by military spending tend to encourage fuller utilization of the existing production capacities of the developing countries, thus inducing faster economic expansion for them. On the other hand, entrenched inflation is likely to encourage people to consume and borrow at the expense of savings and investment, a phenomenon that would in turn slow economic growth. The one recent contribution to the question of the inflationary impact of military spending showed that different processes characterized several advanced Western economies. Starr *et al.* (1984) found no

statistically significant relationship between military spending and inflation for the U.S. and the U.K. during the 1950-1979 period, but a reciprocal (i.e., mutually influencing) relationship between these two variables for France and the F.R.G. The authors speculated that the dominant positions of the dollar and of the pound in international trade and finance might have contributed to lessening the inflationary impact of U.S. and British military spending. These countries could in effect export some of their domestic inflation by running huge balance of payment deficits and by manipulating the currency exchange rates.

Under What Circumstances? The impact of military spending on economic performance is apt to be mitigated or exacerbated by circumstantial factors. Several studies have hinted at or alleged the importance of these circumstantial factors without subjecting them to systematic or rigorous analysis. It seems that the following factors are especially worthy of consideration in future research on the relationship between military spending and economic performance.

First, we need to take into explicit account (that is, to statistically control for) the rate of capacity utilization for a country's production facilities and human resources. Whether military spending will stimulate economic growth or inflation would depend in part on the extent to which a country's productive capacity is already stretched to the limits or, conversely, the extent to which it has substantial surplus capacity to absorb increases in military expenditures. The validity of Benoit's previously-mentioned suggestion that moderate inflation will encourage fuller capacity utilization by the developing countries depends critically on whether these countries' economies are already "overheated." To the extent that their productive capacity is already being fully utilized, additional military spending is likely to exacerbate industrial bottlenecks and divert scarce resources away from civilian production. In other words, military expenditures would then compete with and dampen civilian economic activities, instead of stimulating them as Benoit suggested.

Second, a country's total foreign receipts should be incorporated explicitly into future research. A substantial inflow of foreign resources (e.g., foreign aid, foreign investment) can enable a country to reallocate its scarce domestic resources, so that its defense burden may be lightened and so that the negative economic consequences of this spending (e.g., on capital formation) can be ameliorated. Foreign receipts seem especially important to Third World developing countries whose economies are usually handicapped by a lack of capital. The case for considering the inflow of foreign resources is even more compelling for those countries that face the challenging tasks of deterring foreign threat and/or of maintaining high rates of domestic growth (e.g., Israel, Taiwan, South Korea). The infusion of foreign resources makes it possible for these countries to bear a heavy rather than crushing defense burden. As suggested previously by some analysts (e.g., Ball, 1983b), all resources from foreign sources should

be taken into account as a mediating influence in affecting the relationship between military spending and economic performance.⁴

The concept of world position suggests itself as a third pertinent factor. This concept is somewhat amorphous and is certainly much more difficult to make operational than the previous two control variables. It is used here to refer to the inherent advantages or disadvantages that a country's international status confers upon it in managing its economy. Because of their size, influence, or inherited privileges or assets, some countries are better situated than others to protect themselves against the negative consequences of military spending on their economies. For example, they are better able to shift some of these costs onto others by exporting not only weapons, but also unemployment and inflation. As suggested earlier in connection with the study by Starr *et al.* (1984), the dominant positions of the U.S. dollar and British pound in international trade and finance might have helped to lessen the inflationary impact of their respective defense programs. Naturally, a country's world position can facilitate or impede its attempts to recruit foreign resources that contribute to its national defense and economic growth. Thus, some advantageously-positioned small countries are able to "free ride" on collective-defense arrangements (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966), or to attract substantial foreign aid or investment. On the other hand, aspiring hegemony or great powers may discover that they have to pay a disproportionately large share of defense and non-defense costs as a price for maintaining their international status and influence (e.g., Stein, 1984). The analysis of the concept of world position and its likely impact on defense posture and costs is in itself a major research undertaking and challenge.

Finally, a government's fiscal, monetary, and tax policies obviously play an important role in shaping the economic impact of defense programs, and should be considered in future research. Whether military spending is financed by budgetary deficits or by higher taxes would naturally influence the rate of inflation and the propensity to save. Presumably, the nature of tax codes and welfare programs would also have an effect on people's incentives to consume, invest, or work. The extent to which government policies can ameliorate or exacerbate the economically detrimental effects of military spending deserves much more research work.

What More Should We Do?

I have just mentioned several substantive factors that merit future research attention. I now turn to several issues relating to data and methodology. These issues certainly are not without substantive import.⁵ Indeed, if not treated properly, they can pose serious threats to the validity or informativeness of our research findings.

Data Validity, Comparability, and Sensitivity. As seen earlier, the extant research results are not always consistent. The discrepancies in these results are related to the analysts' different data bases, country samples, and research designs or methods. As all who

have engaged in the research on military expenditures are aware, the quality of data is sometimes not as high as one would hope. Good data on the developing countries are especially difficult to come by, although this state of affairs is gradually improving (e.g., Ball, 1983a). Relatedly, the conversion of the military expenditures of different economies into comparable units remains a significant challenge, even though substantial efforts have been made to improve this data aspect (USACDA, 1980, 1978).

It remains the case, however, that because the developers of popular data sets on military expenditures use different definitions, criteria, estimation procedures, and reporting sources, one can obtain very divergent analytic results from these sets. For instance, Deger and Smith (1983) found that the military outlays estimated by USACDA (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) and by SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) can produce significantly discrepant findings. For African countries, the negative impact of military spending on GNP growth was about four times greater according to the USACDA data than according to the SIPRI data. Similarly, whereas the USACDA data showed that military spending had a negative impact on the GNP growth of Latin American countries, the SIPRI data indicated a positive impact. Other researchers (e.g., Brzoska, 1981; Cusack and Ward, 1981) have also found similar kinds of divergent results from these and other popular data sets on military expenditures.

Data sensitivity suggests another area of concern. Beyond a certain point, the aggregate budgets of military establishments are not particularly useful for the purpose of investigating the impact of military spending on economic performance. For one thing, it is not clear how one can distinguish between the authorization or appropriation of defense funds on the one hand, and the actual disbursement or utilization of these funds on the other hand. There is often a significant lag between these events. In the case of the U.S., the Congressional Budget Office (1983: 36) noted that "on average, \$1 appropriated for defense procurement produces only about 12 cents of actual outlays in the first year. Outlays grow to 37 cents in the second year, 30 cents in the third year, and then tail off." The announcement of intention to spend a particular amount on defense programs and to finance these programs in a particular way can itself have an intangible, but hardly insignificant, impact of future economic performance. It can affect people's expectations of future economic performance and, hence, their incentives to consume, save, invest, or borrow. This impact is quite independent of the impact of actual military outlays. And, as the quote from the Congressional Budget Office report just indicated, the actual outlays can be spread across several years, and can thus produce effects that are delayed and spread across a number of years.

Another issue of data sensitivity relates to distinctions about how military monies are actually spent (e.g., on personnel, operation, maintenance, research

and development, procurement). The military's personnel costs are similar in nature to the government's civilian programs of income transfer. Some attributions of a negative impact of military expenditures on the economy emphasize the detrimental effects of military research and development (R & D) programs or of military procurement programs. They argue that defense-related R & D depletes the pool of scientific and engineering talent available for innovating the civilian industries, and thus hurts the nation's long-term economic progress and trade competitiveness in the world. Alternatively, they argue that military procurement creates a parasitic sector (the so-called military-industrial complex), and increases the money in circulation without raising the supply of civilian goods. Economic inefficiency and inflation are the alleged results of heavy military procurement. Indeed, if these particular types of military spending—and not the overall defense budget—have the purported consequences, then analysts would need to have a much more specific breakdown of different kinds of military spending. In the case of the U.S., about half of the defense budget is devoted to personnel costs, and would presumably not be relevant for investigating these hypotheses. Relatedly, much of the defense budget is "fixed" or "uncontrollable" in the sense that these expenditures have been mandated by prior legislation. Again, this "uncontrollable" portion of the defense budget should be explicitly recognized, as it may or may not be directly pertinent to the analyst's hypothesis. In short, just as we need more appropriate categories for grouping different countries, we need more appropriate categories for separating different types of military expenditures.

Yet a third need for disaggregating the data on military expenditures relates to where the monies are actually spent. Many countries spend a considerable portion of their military budgets on weapons imports. Therefore, these countries tend to deny themselves whatever R & D spin-off and short-term employment-boosting benefits (if such do exist) that this procurement might have brought to their economies. The proportion of defense monies that stays in the domestic economy varies substantially across countries. Heisler (1982) estimated it to be about 95% for the U.S., compared with about 80% for the smaller NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) members. He calculated that in 1978, a 3% increase in the defense budgets of the U.S., Norway, Belgium, and Denmark would have resulted in an actual increase of economic burden of 3.2%, 3.8%, 4.0%, and 4.4% for them respectively. The smaller countries are less able to recapture some of the costs of their military spending through weapons exports, and are more likely to face the problems of foreign debt and trade deficits.

Measurement Strategy. The issue of appropriate measurement of military spending poses another issue of concern. So far, most analysts have operationalized the concept of defense burden by dividing a country's total military spending by its GNP. There is, however, no shortage of alternative measures, such as military

spending per capita, military spending as a percentage of the government's total budget, the rate of change or the amount of change of military spending, and the cumulative stock of military spending over a number of years. Naturally, the impact of military spending on the economy is quite different, depending on which of these measures is used in an analysis. For instance, Chan (1984) found that the per capita level of military expenditures tended to be negatively correlated with various measures of economic performance for the OECD countries, whereas the rate of change in these expenditures tended to be positively correlated. These patterns reflect the fact that the high but steady military spenders (e.g., the U.S., the U.K.) generally have had worse economic performance than the low but rapidly increasing military spenders (e.g., Greece, Turkey, Portugal).

Whereas theoretical arguments about the impact of military spending on the economy have generally focused on or alluded to the long-term effects of chronically high levels of military expenditure, empirical studies designed to verify these effects have usually not used any cumulative measure of this expenditure. Instead, the common tendency is to correlate annual observations of defense burden and of economic performance with each other, sometimes without any provision for the possibility of a temporal lag for these effects to manifest themselves and sometimes with only provision for a lag of one year. It is difficult to imagine how such annual measures are able to reveal much about the long-term economic impact of persistently high levels of defense spending that is emphasized in the literature. It would be naive to assume that the complex interactions in question are neatly packaged into annual units for the convenience of the analyst.

The reality of the situation is closer to the opposite case. That is, much of the costs of military spending tends to be deferred to the future generations. This deferment can take visible forms, such as deficit spending and the accumulation of public debt, as well as less visible forms, such as the costs of pension and welfare subsidies to veterans and their dependents (e.g., for their medical care, education, housing loans). Moreover, the economic costs of military spending are cumulative. Bruce Russett's (1970) classic study on this question offers a revealing example. He estimated that for the 1939-1968 period, every dollar of increase in U.S. military outlay decreased personal consumption by 42 cents and capital investment by 29 cents. Of the cutback in capital investment, 11 cents would have gone to the purchase of new industrial equipment. Russett cited an estimate that every dollar of investment could produce 20-25 cents in additional production for the U.S. economy *in perpetuity*. Using this estimate, the 1980 U.S. defense budget would imply a permanent loss of \$8-10 billion in additional economic output for each and every subsequent year. The accuracy of these estimates is less important for my present purpose than the idea behind them; namely, the economic costs of military spending tend to add up,

that they are mostly postponed for some time, that they tend to mount and accelerate over time (the lost productive capacity could itself be used to create more productive capacity, and so on and so forth), and that they are not likely to be captured by the current practice of correlating annual observation points with short or no time lags. The opportunity costs of foregone economic benefits can only be dimly appreciated from the current research.

Research Design. Until recently, most quantitative analyses of the relationship between military spending and economic performance were based on the so-called cross-sectional research design. That is, these analyses correlate measures of defense burden for a sample of countries at a particular time point (or period) with measures of economic performance for the same countries at the same time point (or period). Missing in this design is the critical temporal sequence that is necessary for inferring cause-and-effect relationship. Consequently, cross-sectional analyses are only able to point to the co-occurrence of two phenomena, but cannot help establish whether one phenomenon causes the other. Also, as mentioned earlier, this approach to research is unable to determine the possible indirect or lagged effects of military spending on the economy.

In some applications of the cross-sectional design (e.g., Benoit, 1973), a static measure (e.g., average defense spending as a percentage of GNP over several years) is correlated with a dynamic measure (e.g., GNP growth rate). Again, in the absence of a clear delineation of the temporal order between the introduction of the supposed cause and the subsequent observation of effect, it is difficult to infer a causal relationship from such analysis. In still other cross-sectional studies, the results are often quite unstable due to the small sample size on which they are based. As suggested earlier with regard to previous research on the effects of military spending on unemployment levels, the small size of samples means that the addition or deletion of a few cases can alter a study's results dramatically. To compound the problem, the relationships among the pertinent variables in such small samples are sometimes influenced significantly by a few outlying cases. In the case of the OECD countries, these outliers tend to be the U.S. and the U.K. at one extreme (relatively high defense burden, and relatively low economic growth and high unemployment), and Japan at the other extreme (relatively low defense burden, and relatively high economic growth and low unemployment).

As a consequence of the limitations just mentioned, several analysts (e.g., Rasler and Thompson, 1985a, 1984; Starr *et al.*, 1984) have recently begun to employ sophisticated methodologies of longitudinal analysis. In this research design, the fluctuations in a country's levels of defense burden and economic performance are studied over an extended period of time. This approach is much better suited than the cross-sectional one for establishing causal relationships among the variables, for tracing their overtime interactions, and

for investigating the indirect and lagged effects of military spending on economic performance.

Conclusion

Previous research on the impact of military spending on the economy has often produced disparate, inconsistent, and unstable results. Despite some definite signs of knowledge accumulation on this topic, divergent data sets, country samples, and research designs still present a major obstacle to the consolidation of analysts' collective research efforts. Thus, even though we understand the processes through which military spending can affect economic performance much better now than a decade ago, there remains much that we do not know or that we disagree about.

The accomplishments as well as the disappointments of past research provide a basis for developing a research agenda for the future. This essay has argued that three "lessons" particularly deserve our attention. First, the search for universal generalizations about the relationship between military spending and economic performance has not been very rewarding, and has usually resulted in compromising the validity and sensitivity of the research results. Instead, it would be more fruitful for analysts to decompose the general research problem and to seek more discriminating answers regarding the extent, timing, nature, and circumstances of possible trade-offs between military spending and economic performance. Second, there are definite limits in the extent to which cross-sectional analyses of aggregate data can inform us about the complex causal interactions that characterize the relationship between military spending and economic performance. As several recent studies (e.g., Rasler and Thompson, 1985a, 1984; Starr *et al.*, 1984) have demonstrated, longitudinal research is much more appropriate for investigating direct and indirect causes, lagged effects, and feedback processes. Third and finally, we need to develop more sensitive categories or indicators for dealing with different types of countries, military expenditures, and policy circumstances. At the same time, our data measurement and concept operationalization can be improved in the several areas discussed earlier so that they can be brought into closer correspondence with the pertinent theoretical or substantive arguments. In short, then, much more research needs to be done to clarify the relationship between military spending and economic performance.

NOTES

¹ For instance, there are numerous studies on the possible domestic motivations for military spending. Some examples are Baran and Sweezy (1966); Melman (1974, 1972, 1970); Kidron (1970); Griffin *et al.* (1982); Nincic (1980); Nincic and Cusack (1979); Cobb (1973, 1969); Moyer (1973); Rosen (1973); and Russett (1970). Similarly, there is a body of literature analyzing the possible trade-offs between a government's military spending and its other spending such as on welfare, education, and health; see Eichenberg (1984); Domke *et al.* (1983); Russett (1982, 1971, 1970); Peroff and Podolak-Warren (1979); Dabelko and McCormick (1977); Caputo (1975); Hollenhorst and Ault (1971); and Pryor (1968). Finally, the extant studies on arms races are too numerous to cite here.

² For two recent reviews of the literature, see Chan (1985) and Lindgren (1984). Ball (1981) provides a rather comprehensive set of references for publications before 1980.

³ As will be explained later, a study employing a longitudinal research design attempts to investigate the overtime interactions among the pertinent variables, often for a limited sample size. It is differentiated from a study using a cross-sectional design, which simply examines the co-occurrence of variables at the same time point (or period), usually for a broader sample.

⁴ There is a school of thought (the so-called dependency school) which argues that foreign receipts are apt to retard or distort national economic development. Therefore, the actual effect of foreign investment and foreign aid, for example, on a recipient developing country's economic performance is a matter of debate and has yet to be empirically settled. Bornschier *et al.* (1978) offer one attempt at evaluating and summarizing the pertinent data in the context of the dependency literature.

⁵ Therefore, the labelling of these issues as "substantive," "date-related," or "methodological" is somewhat arbitrary and oversimplified. They are all integral to contributing to a study's validity.

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Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to China

Henry J. Kenny

We are now in the seventh year of American military exports to China — exports which began in 1981 as a result of an overall liberalization of U.S. trade policy toward Beijing and continued in 1986 with the signing of a multi-million dollar avionics package to upgrade the Chinese F-8 air defense interceptor. The purpose of this essay is to describe the patterns of trade that emerged during these years, analyze the reasons for these patterns, and forecast insofar as possible the likelihood of their persistence for the remainder of this century.

Background

Until the 1980s China was proscribed by U.S. policy from receiving any military items whatsoever. Americans had spilled blood in combat against Chinese forces in Korea, had fought in part to contain China in a long and bitter war in Vietnam, and were not about to assist militarily a real or potential enemy. By the late 1970s, however, what had begun years earlier with the Sino-Soviet split and the subsequent opening to China under the Nixon Administration, crystallized into a major strategic realignment of China. Beijing not only normalized relations with the United States and other western nations, but also further distanced itself from Moscow in wide areas of human endeavor — political, economic and military.

These sweeping changes soon impacted strongly on American arms transfer policy. In March 1980, the Department of State issued Munitions Control Newsletter No. 81 (MC 81), opening the People's Republic of China for the first time to exports of combat support equipment such as trucks, recovery vehicles, certain cargo/personnel-type aircraft and helicopters, some training and communications equipment, and airborne cameras. The following month, the licensing of civilian goods with possible military use (so-called dual-use items) was facilitated by the creation of a new and unique category, P, for China under commodity control export regulations administered by the Department of Commerce. The new policy permitted exports at a significantly higher level of technology than those for most other communist countries, although certain important restrictions were established:

Approval is not likely when the potential military application is so significant that the export would present an unacceptable risk regardless of the stated end-use. Of particular concern are technologies that would make a direct and significant

contribution to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, electronic and anti-submarine warfare, and intelligence gathering.¹

In subsequent years, the liberalization process continued, highlighted by the removal of China in 1981 from the list of those countries for which it is U.S. policy to deny approval for munitions list exports, and the movement of China in 1983 to Category V on the export commodity control list, the same category as for other friendly countries to which the U.S. exports. The former measure permitted, for the first time, actual weapons exports to China, while the latter clarified and further liberalized dual-use exports of items at higher levels of technology. In all cases, the exports would remain subject to case-by-case review in accordance with appropriate national security, foreign policy and arms control criteria.²

Throughout this period of liberalization, a prime consideration was the position of China vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. From an American perspective, arms transfers were a natural consequence of developing Sino-American cooperation. Moreover, although China was characterized as a "friend" and not an "ally," the global advantage of China's tying down a significant proportion of Soviet military power could not be overlooked.

From a Chinese perspective, the Soviet threat was also a force leading to cooperation with the United States, including arms and technology purchases. China feared that it could never take its rightful place in the world in the face of Soviet encirclement. To the north lay over fifty tank-heavy Soviet divisions backed by modern fighter aircraft and tactical nuclear weapons, which could wreak havoc on China's antiquated and insufficiently defended military forces. Soviet armored and mechanized forces were far superior to anything the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could field, and were generally positioned close to the Chinese border — a few divisions even in Mongolia. To the west, Soviet forces in Afghanistan were ruthlessly suppressing native freedom fighters. To the south, the Soviets were not only continuing to expand their military supply relationship with India, but also were establishing a base at Cam Ranh Bay and supporting Vietnamese expansion into Cambodia. Finally, to the east, the Chinese saw in the Pacific a dramatic rise in the flow of ships and planes paralleling the Chinese coast between Vladivostok and Cam Ranh Bay. The arrival in 1979 of the first Soviet aircraft carrier in Asia, the *Minsk*, and the large amphibious assault ship, the *Ivan Rogov*, only increased Chinese concerns. The encirclement appeared complete.

In the face of this military build-up, China turned to the United States and other Western nations for assistance, a move which gave rise in some quarters to

Dr. Kenny is a Foreign Affairs Officer in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has served in East Asia with both the U.S. Army and the Foreign Service, and is the author of *The American Role in Vietnam and East Asia: Between Two Revolutions*.

rather grandiose expectations of massive U.S. arms transfers to its new friend in Asia. This view was nourished by frequent statements of Chinese officials to visiting American delegations that China resolutely opposed Soviet expansionism and efforts to seek hegemony in Asia. It was further reinforced by the aforementioned liberalization of U.S. export controls and, as the Chinese modernization program crystallized, by expectations of a rapid Chinese economic takeoff, which could facilitate purchases of high-priced and high quality American arms. Indeed, the euphoria of the early 1980s regarding prospects for increased US-PRC trade in general seemed to strengthen perceptions that significant and substantial arms transfers could soon occur. The old cliché of the China market was resurrected — what a sales opportunity if you lowered the hem on every pair of Chinese trousers just one inch!

Expectations of massive arms transfers gradually subsided as the reality of actual U.S. arms transfers became better known. While U.S. arms transfers to China have fluctuated somewhat from year to year, it has become clear that there are important factors militating against, as well as in favor of, a rapid expansion of United States arms sales to China.

Patterns of Military Trade

The most striking characteristic of US arms transfers to China is that the overall volume of the trade has been quite small, with no major upsurge in value indicated. As shown in Table 1, the value of U.S. arms delivered to China during the period 1982-1986 totaled a mere \$89 million, less than a quarter of one percent of worldwide U.S. military exports during the same period.

Table 1

U.S. Arms Deliveries to China (in thousands of current dollars)

FY	Commercial	FMS	Total
1982	0	0	0
1983	588	0	588
1984	26,035	6	26,041
1985	42,581	425	43,006
1986	18,735	547	19,252
Total	87,939	978	88,887

A second pattern indicated by Table 1 is that while the overall trend is upward, the data do not indicate an imminent surge in military deliveries. Indeed, the peak sales figures for 1985 can be largely attributed to one sale—that of 24 Sikorsky S-70C transport helicopters. It is possible that additional big-ticket items could add significantly to future annual totals. For example, the FMS sale of avionics for the Chinese F-8 air defense interceptor, signed in the fall of 1986, is worth about \$501 million. However, such items, even if exported completely according to plan, will take years to deliver.

A third pattern of the arms trade with China is that, while U.S. sales to date have been overwhelmingly

commercial, sales under the government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program are on the rise. China was not authorized for FMS until 1984, and then only on a cash basis. The FMS share of total military deliveries in 1985, the first full year for such sales, amounted to only one percent, rose to three percent in 1986, and may be expected to rise even further in the future. The rise in FMS reflects both increased military-to-military contacts and the high level of attention given significant arms sales by the U.S. Government. Nevertheless, the Chinese generally prefer commercial rather than FMS transactions, so that in the vast majority of cases American defense industries are found attempting to match their capabilities with Chinese needs within the limits established by U.S. policy. While numerous export license applications have been properly denied, those approved have enabled many companies to demonstrate equipment, provide technical data, discuss perceived requirements and sell hardware, thereby gaining insights critical to a realistic assessment of the China market.

A fourth pattern which emerges from examination of the data is the clear Chinese preference for acquiring technology rather than military end-items in quantity. As shown in Table 2, some 500 licenses have been issued for commercial exports, with a total value at over \$500 million. The majority of these transactions involve the transfer of technical data, components of combat or combat support equipment, a single item or a handful of items. Large-quantity purchases are few and far between, while the level of technology requested tends to be relatively sophisticated. This “window shopping” approach, in which the PRC seeks to examine or otherwise utilize only a few of the items in which it expresses interest, is illustrated by the fact that from 1982-1986 less than 17 percent of the value of licensed items was actually purchased. While some difference in these numbers is to be expected, the size of the gap for China clearly shows that Beijing continues to seek technology rather than large arms purchases.

Table 2

Licenses and License Value of U.S. Commercial Arms Transfers to China

	Licenses Issued (number)	License Value (thousand dollars)
FY 1982	28	185
FY 1983	47	71,459
FY 1984	109	82,994
FY 1985	154	286,418
FY 1986	163	79,527
TOTAL	501	520,583

The fifth identifiable pattern of Chinese purchases is related to the fourth. That is, Chinese purchases have largely consisted of high-technology items for future integration into Chinese systems, rather than standard equipment of immediate need but of declining value in the face of sophisticated weaponry in the 1990s and

beyond. Most commonly sought are computers, electronics, communications equipment, avionics, engines, navigation equipment, night vision devices, fire control systems, and airborne reconnaissance systems. Few of these items have direct military application without integration into a complete weapons system either already in the Chinese inventory or under development. Most have direct application to air and naval systems, with application to ground forces an important but less significant part of total arms imports as seen by China.

Finally, the most striking characteristic of Chinese military development is the struggle between the drive for self-reliance and the understanding that strong ties with the West will assist them developing new military technologies. The traditional wisdom that "it is better to buy one hen than to buy eggs every day" is alive and well in modern China. Chinese leaders want their nation to build its own weapons and wherever possible avoid dependence on foreigners for national security. They take a long view of history and, in that perspective, the huge technological lead of the West is but a passing phenomenon. They continue to believe that the country which invented gunpowder will reassert the genius of its people, now over a billion strong, so as to enable China to stand up to the military forces of outside powers.

The continuing belief in self-reliance not only militates against massive arms purchases, but means that China will invest fairly heavily in training and technology, even when the immediate results may be negligible. In the 1970s, for example, China undertook a major effort to produce the British Spey aircraft engine only to abandon the project after numerous failures and hundreds of millions of dollars had been spent. From the Chinese viewpoint, however, the money may have been worthwhile if it facilitated future indigenous engine development programs. The commitment to self-reliance persists not only in the face of immediate economic disadvantage but also under conditions of sharply limited Chinese ability to absorb foreign technology. It will take many years for Deng and his successors to overcome the legacy of the Cultural Revolution — thirteen years in which universities were closed, scientific literature discontinued, and technological experts sent to do farmwork. It is no wonder that in the early 1980s U.S. intelligence specialists testified before Congress that China was having major problems absorbing Western military technology. The Central Intelligence Agency pointed to weaknesses in China's electronics industry that prevent large-scale introduction of new radars, sonars, and other electronic equipment, while the Defense Intelligence Agency noted PLA inability to produce an engine for an advanced fighter despite a ten-year effort to do so.³ Despite such problems, China's space and nuclear successes, its investment in education, to include 15,000 mostly engineering students in the United States, and its persistent efforts to become self-reliant in conventional weapons production, all attest to the depth of the leadership's confidence in long-term

Chinese capabilities.

Whether these six patterns of U.S. arms sales to China — low total volume, modest increases in sales, largely commercial methods of sale, a preponderance of technology over arms transfers, high-technology subsystem integration, and a heavy Chinese emphasis on self-reliance — will persist in future years depends to a large extent on whether the reasons which initially led to U.S.-Chinese arms trade will continue to be predominant. Chinese and American motivations for the trade are of paramount concern in this regard, and, as the record shows, are subject to varying influences both internal and external.

Table 3⁴

Soviet Military Power in East Asia

Far East Theater	
Divisions	53
Tanks	14,900
Armored vehicles	17,300
Artillery	13,400
Tactical surface-to-surface missiles	375
Tactical aircraft	1,730
Pacific Fleet	
Aircraft carriers	2
Principal surface combatants	83
Other combatant ships	120
Auxiliaries	90
Submarines (less ballistic nuclear)	90
Naval aviation	510
Naval infantry division	1

External Factors

The greatest external determinant of Chinese arms purchases continues to be overall Soviet military power. Although quantitative increases in Soviet *conventional* forces have been quite modest during the 1980s, current strength, depicted in Table 3, remains significant and has been modernized at an accelerated pace. For example, a second VSTOL aircraft carrier joined the Soviet Pacific Fleet in 1984, along with an additional Ivan Rogov-class amphibious ship. In 1985 a second Kirov-class battle cruiser as well as modern guided missile destroyers were added. Other fleet additions include cruise missile combatants, modern attack submarines, and air-cushioned landing vehicles. Ground forces have an increasing share of T-72 tanks, BMP armored infantry fighting vehicles, and 152mm self-propelled artillery, along with sophisticated helicopter gunships and troop carriers.⁵ Perhaps most impressive, however, is the increase in Soviet theater nuclear weapons. The number of SS-20 mobile IRBMs, first deployed in the late 1970s, had by 1986 increased to 441 launchers, with over a third of the missiles in Asia. Armed with a 5000km MIRV'd warhead with three reentry vehicles each, the SS-20

threatens not only all of China, but other U.S. friends and allies throughout Asia and Europe as well. In addition, the nuclear capable Backfire bomber continues to be deployed well within range of China, while front-line aircraft, many of which are nuclear capable, have continued to arrive in theater.

If the high quality and firepower of Soviet forces did not serve to disquiet the Chinese, then Soviet activity in support of Vietnam gave the leadership in Beijing further cause for concern. From 1978 to 1985 the Soviet Union provided Vietnam over \$5 billion in military aid and \$7 billion in economic aid.⁶ This support enabled Vietnam not only to continue its occupation of Cambodia, considered by Beijing a special sphere of Chinese influence, but also to confront the PLA in sometimes intense skirmishes along the Sino-Vietnamese border. Moreover, Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay continued to increase, with 20-25 Soviet ships routinely deployed from that base, together with eight BEAR D/F aircraft and a squadron of FLOGGER C/G fighters. This impressive collection of military assets adds to the already cited Chinese feeling of encirclement and hence need for appropriate defensive armaments.⁷

Increased Soviet military activity in nearby North Korea must also be of concern to Chinese authorities. According to the Defense Department's 1986 report, "Soviet Military Power," there are already over 20 MIG-23s in North Korea with a total of 35 to 45 such aircraft expected to be delivered. The initiation of Soviet military reconnaissance overflights of North Korea, and the first port calls in North Korea by Soviet naval combatants in 1985 and 1986, are all disquieting Soviet activities adjacent to China.⁸

Of course, these strictly military considerations do have political consequences, such as the highly publicized Chinese objections to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet support for Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and the high level of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia. Known collectively as the "three obstacles" to normalized Sino-Soviet relations, they have long been a thorn in the side of the Chinese leadership and effectively preclude rapprochement with the USSR.

However, despite the aforementioned Soviet build-up, China does not appear to be overly anxious about the threat, does not perceive it to be as imminent as the increased Soviet capabilities would lead one to expect, and has not initiated a crash program of military modernization in response. Explanations for this anomaly vary, but for one, China weighs military intentions quite heavily and it experienced only a mild Soviet reaction to its attacks on northern Vietnam in 1979. Secondly, China may believe that its limited nuclear capability deters much of the Soviet threat. Thirdly, China may perceive advantages in countering increased Soviet strength not so much by increases of its own as by the threat of a greater military arms relationship with the United States. Finally, Beijing may see Moscow as too concerned with the problems of the Soviet economy and of overextension in the Third

World, as in Afghanistan, to risk a costly cross-border attack. In any case, the Chinese, who certainly do not take the Soviet build-up lightly, apparently view the Soviets as a long-term threat rather than an imminent one and have orchestrated their planned military purchases accordingly. This conclusion is supported by China's weak foreign exchange position and its relegation of the military to the least important of its four modernizations.

China's perception of the threat and reaction to it may have become manifest as early as the 1970s, when Chinese arms shopping patterns in Western Europe also demonstrated a lack of urgency. In the 1980s, it is becoming even clearer as China defers major military purchases and concentrates instead on economic modernization and slightly improved ties with Moscow in non-political areas. The latter relationship has been marked by a long term agreement to increase trade, by efforts to reduce tension along the border and, finally, by a cautious interest in the 1986 Gorbachev initiative to improve Moscow's position in Asia.⁹

Finally, as regards Soviet behavior, the fact that Soviet military power has failed to be translated into effective political influence elsewhere in East Asia, cannot have been lost on the Chinese. Whether or not the U.S. counterbuildup in the late 1970s and early 1980s entered into Chinese calculations on this issue, the implications for Chinese arms purchases are enormous — the USSR is seen as a long-term national threat with a significant and probably growing lead in military strength vis-à-vis China; therefore, only a long-term solution making the best of a difficult relationship with the USSR, while simultaneously building the domestic economy and long-term military strength, will assure the security of China into the 21st Century.

Internal Factors

This conclusion regarding the external threat has been conveniently reinforced by internal military, economic and political considerations. Needed first was a restructuring of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA was already under considerable pressure to modernize when, in attempting to teach Vietnam a lesson for its 1978 invasion of Cambodia, it suffered heavy losses in a poorly executed operation to occupy temporarily Vietnam's five northern provinces. Poorly trained, ill-equipped and insufficiently supported, the PLA learned that, if it could not do better against Vietnam, what could be expected against the infinitely better equipped and far more mobile and dangerous Soviet forces across their northern border. This consideration was rendered all the more cogent by questions raised concerning the traditional PLA strategy of people's war. The PLA had long been considered an outstanding guerrilla force, whose effectiveness against invading Soviet forces could well be enhanced by a "lure 'em deep" strategy in which invading Soviet troops would pay an extremely high price to take and/or hold Chinese territory. The lessons of Afghanistan, in which the Soviets have failed to subdue even a

primitive guerrilla force, seemed to support this fundamental strategy.

At the same time, the increasing sophistication and mobility of Soviet forces close to vulnerable Chinese positions in the northeast, in which Chinese industry and mineral production are heavily concentrated, may be seen to threaten China with another type of danger—the destruction of large parts of the Chinese economy and infrastructure in a punitive Soviet raid. Such a raid would be designed not to take and hold territory but to punish China for political misdeeds, much as China sought to punish Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia. Under these circumstances, the Soviets might be deterred less by traditional PLA armaments and tactics than by a modernized people's war, in which PLA main force units would utilize increased firepower, mobility, and shock action to delay and disorganize any invader from the outset, then join with regional and local forces to isolate and attack in areas of penetration. While still dependent upon popular support and defense in depth, the PLA would also need restructuring to utilize modern weapons, technology and tactics.

This restructuring involves difficult decisions to reduce the size of the force, replace its leadership and reorganize its units to fight a people's war under modern conditions—all to be accomplished within the present decade. Beginning in 1982, therefore, China began to reduce the size of its armed forces from an all-time high of 4.75 million in 1981.¹⁰ As shown in Table 4, estimated PLA force levels have dropped over a million men since 1981 and, according to Chinese sources, will drop even further in 1987.¹¹

Table 4
Military Expenditures
(millions)

	Current dollars	Constant 1983 dol.	Armed Forces (thousands)
1981	20,100	22,600	4,750
1982	21,700	22,700	4,350
1983	22,700	22,700	4,100
1984	24,000	23,200	4,100
1985	24,800	23,200	3,900
1986	—	—	3,500

Of particular significance for Chinese defense purchases is the fact that Chinese military expenditures have not dropped at the rate of PLA force levels, thereby making room for necessary budgetary allocations for modernization purposes. Moreover, the PLA has undertaken several roles in economic production, to include converting some military facilities into civilian use, transferring military technology to civilian projects, and assisting Chinese civilian aircraft and commercial rocket and satellite production.¹² With major additional PLA cuts still scheduled and reorganization still far from complete, it may well be that major new acquisitions must be deferred till the 1990s, although the modernization of weaponry already

begun as part of the overall reorganization is likely to increase somewhat in tempo for the remainder of this decade, assuming that financing is available.

Economic considerations substantiate this judgment. The Seventh Five-Year Plan announced in 1986 calls for an annual real growth rate of 7 percent over the next five years. Private U.S. forecasts hold this high growth rate to be attainable.¹³ Chinese total trade, which grew at a phenomenal rate of 9.4 percent during the sixth five year plan, is expected to rise at an even greater rate in the 1986-1990 period. Thus, there is substantial overall potential for growth of the economy, including its international component.

There are, however, at least three inhibiting factors as far as arms purchases are concerned. The first and most significant factor to date has been the lower priority of military modernization when compared to other segments of the Chinese economy. In the late 1970s Deng proclaimed the Four Modernizations of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense as the crucial sectors of his plan for revamping the economy. Top priority was given to agriculture and as the plan unfolded it became clear that military modernization was not of the highest priority. Secondly, there is the aforementioned technology problem. Ironically, the very need for military modernization which initially enticed and encouraged arms transfers to China also served to limit them, since the Chinese quickly recognized the enormous challenges posed in absorbing modern technology. A third significant inhibitor of future Chinese arms purchases is the fact that Chinese imports have recently been growing at a much brisker rate than exports, leading to a deterioration of the current account and a depletion of foreign exchange reserves. Therefore, the Chinese government had indicated its intention to hold down the growth of imports generally. Indeed, 1986 may have been the first time in more than ten years that Chinese imports actually declined. The prospect for a resumption of substantial import growth will improve by the late 1980s and will continue to improve in the next decade.¹⁴

One of the ways Beijing has apparently decided to satisfy its conflicting needs for arms and foreign exchange is through its own military exports. As seen in Table 5, Chinese arms exports have grown dramatically during the past five years and, beginning in 1980,

Table 5
China's Arms Trade
(in millions of current dollars)

	Exports	Imports
1979	130	180
1980	270	170
1981	420	130
1982	1100	40
1983	1600	5
1984	1900	80
1985	450	100
TOTAL	5770	355

its military exports have consistently exceeded imports. While 1985 exports (as presently estimated) were appreciably less than in the previous year, it is likely that this figure will be adjusted upward as more complete data for this most recent year become available. In any case, the trend is clearly upward, as indicated by the fact that Chinese exports of military goods during the period 1981-1985 totaled \$5.4 billion, compared to \$810 million in the preceding five year period — a more than sixfold increase in less than a decade.

Implications for the U.S.

It is clearly not in the US interest to see the large gap in relative Sino-Soviet conventional military power in Asia become a chasm. However, as indicated earlier, that is precisely what was happening along the Sino-Soviet border until the 1980s. While arms transfers to China by themselves cannot be expected to close the gap, they have had some effect in slowing the rate at which this gap grows, so that a semblance of a military balance may be restored at some point. This is an extremely important element in Sino-Soviet relations, for it not only serves to deter unlikely but possible Soviet adventurism, but also helps to prevent political intimidation and provides an atmosphere more conducive to an independent Chinese foreign policy. While China remains a friend and not an ally of the United States, it also remains a friend who happens to tie down roughly one-fourth of Soviet ground combat power and significant portions of Soviet air and naval forces. Moreover, China is a friend whose confidence, based in part on some level of capability for self-defense has enabled it to demand in the strongest possible terms the termination of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and of Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, and the reduction of excessive Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border.

U.S. interests are also served by a stable and modernizing China oriented to the West which does not have to react to Soviet power by a crash program of militarization. The fact that American and other Western arms sales are available to upgrade and modernize the PLA certainly facilitates Chinese research, development, and training, and may well enable China to attain a modicum of self-sufficiency in modern weapons production considerably sooner than otherwise would be the case. The very fact that China is able to progress at a measured pace in military matters has helped it to concentrate resources in fulfillment of civilian modernization goals, further promoting the stability of the region and solidifying its ties with the West, from which its major source of modernization assistance is derived.

The slow and measured pace of Chinese arms acquisitions also meshes well with American concern for stability in the rest of Asia. If Chinese purchases were to entail a rapid and quantum leap in capability—for example, through a hypothetical surprise announcement of licensed manufacturing of an advanced fighter aircraft—the reaction elsewhere in Asia would

assuredly be immediate and negative. American concern for regional stability, including the effect of its sales to China on Taiwan, is thus well served by the Chinese predilection for careful window shopping and self-reliance. Indeed, initial Chinese window shopping was so broad and its actual purchases were so small that a major effort was undertaken to identify conventional Chinese defensive mission requirements and American weapons and equipment that could realistically meet those needs within releasability standards for technology transfers. One result of this effort was an understanding in 1983 that the United States would focus on a mission-oriented approach, in which American arms initially would be in the air defense, anti-tank and artillery defense mission areas. Another result was the increasing purchase by China of single items and technical literature for examination, thereby enhancing China's future ability to absorb high-tech Western arms.

Still another American interest served by the developing patterns of arms transfers to China is the improvement in bilateral relations resulting from greater military understanding. As U.S. policy on arms and technology transfers to China gradually was clarified and defined and as China began to establish clear lines of authority to request, develop, test, purchase, and produce foreign military arms, not only did many of the misunderstandings between American and Chinese officials and weapons producers decline, but also both sides gained a more realistic appreciation of exactly what type of exports were possible and how they would enhance China's defensive needs. A direct military-to-military relationship evolved, highlighted by the visits to China of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1983 and 1986 and of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Navy, and other top Pentagon officials in the intervening years. As noted earlier, China became eligible for government-to-government sales in 1984 on a cash basis through the FMS program. This step, in turn, facilitated the exchange of military delegations and permitted still greater understanding of China's military needs and U.S. capabilities of meeting those needs. Together with the aforementioned high-level military visits, FMS eligibility also provides China with the opportunity for greater procurement of American rather than third country weapons systems.

While the advantages to the United States and China in the current arms transfer relationship are considerable, certain problems have yet to be fully resolved. In the early 1980s, for example, Beijing was concerned that its anticipated arms imports not be interpreted as its condoning American arms transfers to Taiwan. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited China in June 1981, he also invited General Liu Huaqing, Chief of PLA research and development, to bring a delegation to the United States to discuss possible arms purchases.¹⁵ The Liu visit never occurred. The issue of U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan took on increasingly contentious overtones and it was only after the United States agreed to limit its arms sales to Taiwan, based on

a continuation of the PRC's peaceful approach to the Taiwan issue, that momentum was slowly restored to the US-PRC arms transfer relationship.¹⁶ Since that time the Taiwan question has not been so major a determinant of China's arms purchases, which have developed their own modest momentum for reasons having nothing to do with Taiwan.¹⁷

Conclusions

Chinese interest in American arms, as in other international transactions, is primarily a function of supply and demand. Chinese demand for modern weapons, in turn, is a function of many factors. Although Moscow has been circumspect in not directly threatening Beijing in a military sense, the increasing size and sophistication of its armed camp in the East is such that there is no way Beijing can feel secure about its present military capabilities without Western assistance. The fact that this threat does not appear imminent, that the PLA is undergoing a major reorganization and force level drawdown, that foreign exchange is scarce, and that China takes the long view of history, all support the judgment that growing yet moderate arms transfers can be expected to characterize the Chinese-American relationship for at least the remainder of the decade.

The United States remains the nation most capable of supplying Chinese defense needs. U.S. technological expertise, production skills, systems management and weapons support programs all excel. China does have other alternatives, particularly in Western Europe, for assistance in many of its military programs. Nevertheless, U.S. arms transfers are seen to mesh well with Chinese needs now and in the near future. Moderate and gradually increasing purchases, marked by continued window shopping, great concern for self-reliance, and a preference for technology rather than massive quantities of arms, all support U.S. interests in a modernizing but non-threatening Chinese military force in the 1990s.

Where all this may lead in the 21st Century becomes quite speculative. As Chinese ability to absorb modern technology increases, as the modernization already underway produces anticipated success, and as Sino-American military relations develop further momentum, there is every possibility that Sino-American arms transfers could expand. If, on the other hand, Soviet forces opposite China were to decline dramatically, Soviet meddling in Afghanistan and Indochina to cease, and no other threats to Chinese national security to arise, then there is a likelihood that Chinese demand for U.S. arms would decline. Any erratic or power projection activities on the part of the Middle Kingdom would be likely to tighten U.S. export

restraints, if not lead to the cessation of exports altogether. But again, such hypothetical situations are mere speculation at this point.

As far as the eye can see in 1986, it appears that China is attempting to modernize its military forces in a moderate and measured fashion, in order to meet very real national security needs. Under these circumstances it is particularly important not only that China succeed, but also that it succeed with American assistance.

NOTES

¹ Paragraph 385.3 of U.S. Department of Commerce, "US Export Administration Regulations," October 1, 1982. The categorization took effect April 25, 1980. The reference to anti-submarine warfare is to subsurface capabilities.

² Such constraints, for example, take into account the effect of arms transfers on Taiwan and neighboring states.

³ Henry J. Kenny, *The American Role in Vietnam and East Asia*, (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 144.

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 1986, p. 13.

⁵ Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Admiral Crowe, CINCPAC, as cited in the *Congressional Quarterly*, July 5, 1986; John M. Collins, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985*, p. 141; and Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, "Posture Statement," *FY 1987 Report to the Congress*, pp. 5-6.

⁶ *Soviet Military Power*, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁹ During a speech in Vladivostok on the Soviet position in Asia, the Soviet General Secretary promised to consider withdrawing some Soviet forces from Mongolia and to accede to the Chinese position that their common border along the Amur River runs in the center of the channel and not on the Chinese side as previously held by Moscow. He also stated that the USSR was prepared to negotiate further withdrawals of troops along their mutual border areas. Gorbachev made no promise, however, to do anything to pressure the Vietnamese to end their occupation of Cambodia — a particularly sore point from the Chinese perspective.

¹⁰ See Table II in this and previous editions of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Worldwide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*.

¹¹ *Beijing Review*, July 28, 1986.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ "Forecast to 1990," in Data Resources, Inc., *Asian Review*, Fall, 1986, pp. 210-223.

¹⁴ "China Taking Off on a Flying Tiger," in *Asian Review*, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-193.

¹⁵ Liu did visit the United States in 1980, but that was prior to authorization for Chinese arms purchases.

¹⁶ According to the United States-China Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982, China reiterated its "fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question," while the United States declared its intention "to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution."

¹⁷ Constraints do remain, of course, on arms transfers which might pose a threat to Taiwan as well as to neighboring states in the region.

Militarism, Force Ratios, and Marxism

James L. Payne

In the past, when scholars undertook to examine militarism and the related problem of national military preparations, they were handicapped both in the number of cases they had to work with and by the incomplete data about these cases. Even as late as 1950, there were only 77 independent countries in the world according to the *Stateman's Yearbook*. In recent decades, that number has grown to about 145 (or more, if one counts mini-countries). And, thanks to the efforts of numerous national and international bodies, the information on the military forces of these countries had grown impressively. It is the aim of this article to examine "defense burden" measures currently in use, to explain an alternative approach to the new data based on the "force ratio" variable, and to report some major findings that emerge from its use, particularly the apparent tendency of Marxist states to have high levels of military effort.

I. Measuring National Military Effort

One impediment to the study of militarism has been the problem of operationally defining it and related concepts. For example, how can we tell if one nation or another is making strenuous military preparations?

Notice that our question concerns military effort, not necessarily military power. A nation may put a great deal of effort into military activities and still not be powerful in a military sense. For example, the country might be small, so that its effort is only relatively large, or it might be technologically backward, so that its effort is relatively ineffective. Therefore, a nation that is "trying hard" in its military preparations does not automatically acquire forces that can accomplish much on the international scene.

Although a nation's military effort does not in itself amount to power, this effort is nevertheless important in its own right. A nation reveals its broad intentions through its relative level of effort. It tells other states something about its disposition to engage in military conflict and about its national will in the event of a confrontation. A nation is feared not only for its military forces, but also for the degree to which these forces exceed a presumed "normal" military effort.

It is easy to describe, in broad terms, the kind of information we would like to have in order to learn how hard a nation is working to arm itself. We need a measure of the resources devoted to military activities, and a measure of the total resources available for

military purposes. Then we can see what fraction of these resources goes to the military.

The numbers for making such calculations would seem to be available. For most countries, there exist data on military expenditures and numbers summarizing the value of national production, or gross national product (GNP). By expressing military expenditures as a per cent of GNP, we obtain a statistic that estimates the national military effort, called the "defense burden." To take the example of the United States, in 1985 U.S. military spending was 253 billion dollars and the GNP was 3,937 billion. Hence, the defense burden was 6.4%.

While the concept of defense burden is sound, its actual application is beset with practical difficulties. For most countries of the world, serious problems of meaning and measurement afflict both the numerator (military spending) and the denominator (GNP) of this fraction, so that the resulting statistic is not reliable for comparative purposes.

Flaws in the Measurement of Military Expenditures

In order to obtain the value of a nation's military expenditures, prices must be assigned to the articles purchased. Meaningful prices of military resources, it turns out, are not directly available for most nations around the world.

Broadly speaking, there are two ways a nation may command the resources used for defense: it may purchase the resources through voluntary exchange, or it may command them through the application of force. For example, suppose a government wished to acquire 20 tanks. Following the market approach, it would announce that it would like to buy tanks, accept bids, and then purchase them from the lowest bidder. In the process, a market price for the tanks would be established, and that price would be reflected in the budget as a military expenditure.

If the government relied on coercion, it would not need to pay anything for the tanks. The threat of force would be used instead of money and the government would have no military expenditures at all. If we were to calculate its defense burden, it would turn out to be zero! This would obviously be an invalid result; the country is certainly expending resources and making an effort to raise military forces. This extreme case points up the general problem: *to the extent that coercion is used to command resources for military purposes, the defense burden statistic will understate the true effort.*

Correcting for this bias is not at all easy. In the absence of a market transaction, there is no direct measure of the value of the resources being commanded. Indirectly, one can attempt to estimate the value of the resources that went into making the tanks. These

The author is Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University (on leave) and Visiting Scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University. He is the author of books on political and social science analysis, foreign policy, and Latin American politics and is currently working on a study of force ratios worldwide entitled *Why Nations Arm*.

calculations, difficult to begin with, assume that the prices of the factors of production have themselves been established through voluntary exchange.

A major source of variability among countries is the degree of coercion in recruiting military personnel. Some nations rely on conscription, others depend on voluntary enlistment — along with the expensive salaries and benefits needed to attract and retain personnel. Nations with a draft therefore have an artificially depressed defense burden statistic: they are paying less for military personnel than they would have to if the soldiers were recruited voluntarily.

These kinds of problems are severe enough in attempting to compare defense burdens of countries with market economies. For centrally planned economies, applying the defense burden construct becomes still more problematical. Almost by definition, a planned economy does not have processes of voluntary exchange that establish the value of things. Prices and production are set by political and bureaucratic process, and the force of the state is used to implement these decisions. For example, the government of a centrally planned economy can set prices for military goods lower than for comparable civilian goods or below costs and can balance its books by some sort of direct or indirect subsidy or tax. Or, alternatively, the government can compensate the costs of the state-owned enterprise producing the tanks via channels that bypass the formal budget or its military portion. In either case, the announced defense expenditure total would understate the true amount and its use in calculating the defense burden would yield an invalid result. In general, to the extent that prices for military goods are set artificially low or expenditures on them are excluded from announced military expenditures, these expenditures and burden measures deriving from them will also be understated.

These underlying ambiguities make the estimation of value in a socialist economy a major challenge for economists — a field laden with disputes and conflicting approaches.¹ The estimation of the defense budget is especially difficult, shrouded as it is in secrecy and ambiguity. Estimates of the actual Soviet defense budget have varied by as much as 100% — and this is the one socialist country that has received greatest attention.² When we turn to countries of less interest — Laos, Guinea-Bissau, Albania, and so on — the numbers on defense spending (when they exist at all) can be hardly more than guesses.

Flaws in the Measurement of Gross National Product

To compute the defense burden for a country, obtaining a valid measure of its defense spending is only the first step. This figure, in turn, must be divided by a valid measure of its gross national product to arrive at the proportion of national output devoted to the military.

The figure that purports to state the value of all final goods and services produced yearly in a nation, the gross national product, is an unusually complicated statistic. In effect, GNP amounts to a total census of the

economy, since the objective is to include all transactions that represent a component of national income.

This objective is never realized in practice. There are many kinds of exchange that elude the economic census-takers so that the resulting GNP understates the total value of the final goods and services being produced. Sources of this distortion include the incomplete records of production data in backward countries, the existence of subsistence agriculture and barter transactions not recorded in national accounts, unrecorded household labor, and underground economic activities.³

As a result of these problems, the gross national product figures for certain countries, especially underdeveloped ones, tend to be artificially low.⁴ These countries appear to have smaller economies than they actually do have and as a result their defense burden statistic is artificially high.

In addition to these issues, there is the problem of obtaining meaningful GNP data for countries with centrally planned economies, which, as already noted, lack market pricing systems.

Although there are problems with the defense burden figures now available, it is important that every effort be made to collect these figures and to improve their quality as time goes on. In the final analysis, valid defense burden information is the most direct and convincing measure of the national military effort. In the future, we can expect to be able to rely on it; but for the present, some other measure is needed if we wish to make comprehensive, world-wide comparisons.

The Force Ratio

A simpler measure of the intensity of military preparations is the "force ratio." This is the number of active military personnel per 1000 population. For example, in 1985 the United States had 2.2 million active duty military personnel and a population of 239 million. Therefore, its force ration was 9.2.

The force ratio reports the fraction of national population directly involved in military service.⁵ In a sense, it is a defense burden statistic that focuses on people. This shift in emphasis overcomes many of the problems that beset the defense burden idea.

In the first place, the force ration is based on the most easily measured unit in social analysis — people. The denominator of this statistic is national population, a datum known with at least fair reliability for all nations, even backward ones. The numerator is the total number of full-time, active military personnel. This figure, being the foundation number for "order of battle" reports made by intelligence services, is collected with far greater care than the military spending estimates.

Another advantage of the force ratio is that it avoids all of the problematical issues of estimating the value of things where exchanges are not voluntary. The force ration bypasses the problem of factoring in conscription. Whether the troops were recruited by money payments or by threats of force or by appeals to patriotism has no effect on the force ratio statistic. It

measures the military manpower sacrifice being made by the nation, however that sacrifice is induced.

This is not to deny the fact that problems also exist in measuring and comparing military personnel or population. For example, alternative estimates of China's total population still differ by hundreds of millions. For a particular country, questions may arise as to which paramilitary forces should be included, how completely military formations are actually staffed, how well forces are trained in comparison with others, whether some forces are enrolled primarily for military purposes or to ease unemployment, and so on. However, such problems appear to be less severe for the force ratio than for the usual defense burden ratio.

In addition to being a measure of military effort in its own right, the force ratio is also an indirect measure of the true defense burden. That some connection between the two concepts must exist is obvious. If a nation recruits military personnel, then it expends the resources to equip and sustain that personnel. Conversely, a nation would not expend resources to acquire military equipment and supplies without also recruiting the military personnel to man this equipment and to consume these supplies. Either way, a relationship tends to exist between the force ratio and the true defense burden.

Is this relationship constant both across countries and over time? The possible distortion that comes most readily to mind involves the capital/labor ratios in the military forces being compared. The force ratio reflects only the labor component of military forces; therefore, the capital components of military activities — the tanks, the planes, and the ships — go unrecorded.

This incompleteness raises two possible ways in which the force ratio figure might misrepresent the defense burden. One of these problems is real, but minor; the other, to which we turn first, seems serious but is based on a misconception.

At first glance, it seems that one could not use the force ratio to compare developed and undeveloped countries, because the armed forces of the former are so much more capital intensive. In counting only personnel, we are seemingly understating the true defense burden of the technologically advanced country.

The flaw in this line of thinking is that it neglects to consider the capital/labor ratio in the society as a whole. Broadly speaking, the capital/labor ratio of the armed forces tends to parallel that of the general economy, because military planners face the same factor costs as everyone else. As a result, the force ratio tends to bear a constant relationship to the defense burden with little dependence on the level of development.

Consider a primitive society where the army has little capital equipment — let us say each soldier carries a pike. But if we look at the economy in general, we find that the same ratio obtains — the farmer has a pitchfork. Several hundred years later, we find that the soldier now handles a computer-controlled anti-tank missile system. But out in the economy, the farmer now operates an air-conditioned, computer-controlled trac-

tor. There has been no change in the defense burden; the capital/labor ratio in the armed forces has merely kept pace with that in the society.

Whenever the armed forces exhibit a *normal* capital/labor ratio, meaning a ratio that parallels the capital/labor ratio in the general economy, the force ratio will accurately estimate the defense burden. It makes no difference what that capital/labor ratio is. If, for example, the France of Louis XIV in 1700 had a force ratio of 9.0 and the United States in 1985 had a force ratio 9.0, then it would be reasonable to estimate that both societies had the same defense burden. The U.S. forces would be more powerful, of course, being more capital-intensive. But that is a different issue. Both societies would be devoting a similar portion of their total production to military purposes.

It seems, then, that the overall effect of economic development is not to cause a major distortion in the relationship between the defense burden and the force ratio. However, particular distortions would occur whenever the military forces depart markedly from the societal norm in their capital/labor ratio. For example, the medieval knights with their armor and armored horses represented an unusually capital-intensive form of warfare *for the economies of the time*. Hence, for these military forces, the force ratio would have understated the defense burden.

One modern-day feature that can cause a certain departure from the normal capital/labor ratio is the service mix. Naval forces and air forces, given their reliance on ships and planes, are relatively more capital-intensive than land forces. Therefore, in using the force ratio to estimate the defense burden of countries far apart in their service mix, a certain distortion is introduced. The defense burden of the country with more naval and air forces is understated. Calculations of the magnitude of this distortion indicate that it is so slight it can be ignored in most comparative analyses.⁶

The validity of the force ratio as an indirect measure of the defense burden is supported by indications of a close relationship between these statistics, at least for the wealthier economies where both are reliably known. Chronological data for the United States over the period 1940 to 1986 exhibits a correlation of +.97 between the force ratio and the defense burden. For the twenty wealthiest countries with market economies in 1982, a correlation of +.97 exists between the force ratio and the defense burden.⁷

II. The Income Effect

In most applications, measures of the intensity of national military preparations such as the force ratio or the defense burden are used to reflect the sacrifice a nation is making to arm itself — that is, to reflect what we have called military effort. It is assumed that if a nation puts a larger fraction of its population in uniform than its neighbors do, then it is making a greater military sacrifice.

This assumption, though roughly serviceable, is not entirely justified. What has been overlooked is that

nations vary in respect of the fraction of their total resources that is available for the military. Defense is a function that can be supported only by the resources remaining after the needs of subsistence are fulfilled. In this respect, defense resembles scientific research, medical care, or education. As the productivity of the community grows, more wealth is "left over" for spending on these discretionary activities.

This income effect is clearly apparent in our data; wealthier countries tend to have higher force ratios. The simple correlation between the force ratio and GNP per capita is +.24; using the log of GNP per capita, it is +.29; and using an estimate of discretionary resources based on the GNP per capita (discussed below), it is +.31.⁸

The income effect, incidentally, is obscured if one uses existing defense burden data—since, as explained above, poorer countries have artificially inflated defense burden figures due to the underestimation of their GNP.

To properly assess a nation's military effort, therefore, some means of control must be applied to take account of its income level. In a very poor community, where virtually all resources are devoted to raising food for survival at a subsistence level, even a small fraction of production or manpower devoted to the military represents a great sacrifice. In a wealthier community, the same fraction does not represent so great a sacrifice.

Account can be taken of a country's income level in assessing its military effort by conceptually dividing a country's resources into that portion needed to provide the population with subsistence and the remainder, or the discretionary portion. The subsistence and discretionary fractions (here designated as "s" and "d," respectively, with $s + d = 1$) can be applied to GNP or to the working population and, for the sake of simplicity, to the total population (POP). Thus, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{GNP} &= \text{GNP}_{\text{subs}} + \text{GNP}_{\text{discr}} \text{ and} \\ \text{POP} &= \text{POP}_{\text{subs}} + \text{POP}_{\text{discr}} \end{aligned}$$

Further, we introduce the concept of a minimal level of resources needed for subsistence per capita (S). This minimal subsistence per capita times the total population yields the country's subsistence resources. The subsistence fraction then becomes:

$$s = \frac{\text{GNP}_{\text{subs}}}{\text{GNP}_{\text{total}}} = \frac{S \cdot \text{POP}}{\text{GNP}} = \frac{S}{\text{GNP}/\text{POP}}$$

The latter expression is simply the minimal subsistence per capita (S) divided by GNP per capita.

The two portions of the population (and the GNP they produce), that needed to sustain population and that available for discretionary uses, can now be stated as:

$$\text{POP}_{\text{subs}} = \text{POP} \left(\frac{S}{\text{GNP}/\text{POP}} \right),$$

and since $d = 1 - s$,

$$\text{POP}_{\text{discr}} = \text{POP} \left(1 - \frac{S}{\text{GNP}/\text{POP}} \right).$$

As noted above, however, GNP as usually estimated for poor countries generally understates the true value (or GNP'). Since it is the subsistence resources of poor countries that generally escape the GNP accounts, our value for the subsistence resources, S·POP, can be taken as an approximate allowance for the understatement of GNP. That is,

$$\text{GNP}' = \text{GNP} + S \cdot \text{POP}.$$

We then have

$$\begin{aligned} s &= \frac{\text{GNP}_{\text{subs}}}{\text{GNP}'} = \frac{S \cdot \text{POP}}{\text{GNP} + S \cdot \text{POP}} \\ &= \frac{S}{\text{GNP}/\text{POP} + S}, \end{aligned}$$

$$d = 1 - \frac{S}{\text{GNP}/\text{POP} + S}, \text{ and}$$

$$\text{POP}_{\text{discr}} = \text{POP} \left(1 - \frac{S}{\text{GNP}/\text{POP} + S} \right).$$

It will be noted that for a very poor country with a very small nominal GNP per capita, the value of the subsistence share (s) could approach 1.0 (the maximum value without mass starvation), while for a very wealthy country, it could be a tiny fraction approaching zero. Thus, the addition of S to GNP per capita raises the discretionary share of poor countries much more sharply than of wealthy countries.

An improved measure of military effort (E) can now be stated as the ratio of military forces (M) to the discretionary population (rather than to total population):

$$E = \frac{M}{\text{POP}_{\text{discr}}/1,000}.$$

Alternatively, E can be derived as the usual force ratio FR divided by d, the discretionary share of resources. Thus,

$$E = \text{FR}/d = \frac{M}{\text{POP}/1,000} \div \left(1 - \frac{S}{\text{GNP}/\text{POP} + S} \right).$$

With the help of an empirical estimate of the value of S and available GNP per capita estimates, values of E can now be calculated.⁹ To make the resulting figures easier to interpret, each has been divided by the average value for all countries (12.2). This enables us to express, in Table 1, the military effort for each country as a multiple of the average value.

The numbers given in this table are force ratio estimates that control for the effect of the size of the discretionary resources available to the society. They indicate how hard a nation is "trying" in acquiring military forces. It is of interest to note that the United States ranks 57th; its military effort of 0.81 is below the mean of 1.0.

We need to be aware of the income effect not only to compare countries, but also to evaluate changes over time. Some writers in the arms control field point to any increases in defense burdens (when they appear) as alarming developments. This concern may be unjustified. *As the productivity of a country or region increases, a constant willingness to sacrifice for defense*

Table 1
Force Ratios and Force Ratios Adjusted for the Income Effect, 1982

Rank	Country	Force Ratio	Adjusted Force Ratio (Military Effort)	Rank	Country	Force Ratio	Adjusted Force Ratio (Military Effort)
1.	Laos	12.8	8.18	71.	Bolivia	4.6	.61
2.	Vietnam	21.4	7.52	72.	Benin	1.9	.61
3.	North Korea	41.8	5.29	73.	North Yemen	3.9	.61
4.	Israel	46.2	4.22	74.	Senegal	3.0	.61
5.	Iraq	32.1	3.50	75.	Tanzania	2.2	.60
6.	Syria	30.9	3.48	76.	Nepal	1.5	.58
7.	Ethiopia	8.2	3.46	77.	Tunisia	4.7	.58
8.	Guinea-Bissau	11.3	3.13	78.	Central African Rep.	2.1	.56
9.	United Arab Emirates	36.7	3.08	79.	Panama	5.3	.56
10.	Cape Verde	13.3	3.01	80.	Paraguay	4.7	.56
11.	Somalia	8.9	2.94	81.	Ireland	6.0	.55
12.	Jordan	26.0	2.94	82.	Honduras	3.5	.55
13.	Guinea	8.7	2.72	83.	Togo	2.1	.54
14.	Taiwan	24.7	2.50	84.	United Kingdom	6.0	.53
15.	Cuba	23.5	2.44	85.	Ecuador	4.4	.51
16.	Albania	18.9	2.43	86.	Denmark	5.9	.51
17.	Mongolia	20.0	2.42	87.	Mozambique	2.4	.50
18.	South Yemen	12.5	2.32	88.	Burkina Faso	1.4	.50
19.	Burma	6.0	2.24	89.	Dominican Republic	4.1	.50
20.	Singapore	24.0	2.17	90.	Suriname	5.0	.49
21.	Equatorial Guinea	6.7	2.06	91.	Zaire	1.3	.48
22.	Nicaragua	14.6	2.02	92.	Liberia	2.5	.47
23.	Turkey	16.0	2.01	93.	Botswana	3.0	.46
24.	Mauritania	10.0	1.94	94.	Austria	5.3	.46
25.	Greece	19.2	1.81	95.	India	1.6	.46
26.	Bulgaria	19.7	1.78	96.	Saudi Arabia	5.4	.46
27.	Qatar	20.0	1.68	97.	Swaziland	3.3	.45
28.	South Korea	14.8	1.63	98.	Philippines	3.0	.44
29.	Egypt	10.0	1.59	99.	Bahrain	5.0	.44
30.	Guyana	8.8	1.52	100.	Zambia	2.6	.43
31.	Libya	16.7	1.48	101.	Burundi	1.6	.42
32.	Soviet Union	16.3	1.46	102.	Australia	4.8	.41
33.	Pakistan	6.4	1.40	103.	Bangladesh	0.8	.39
34.	East Germany	14.0	1.22	104.	Brazil	3.6	.38
35.	Czechoslovakia	13.8	1.22	105.	Nigeria	2.7	.38
36.	Oman	13.6	1.22	106.	Haiti	1.5	.37
37.	Iran	11.4	1.15	107.	New Zealand	3.8	.34
38.	Yugoslavia	11.4	1.14	108.	Fiji	2.9	.32
39.	Peru	9.0	1.12	109.	Barbados	3.3	.32
40.	Chile	10.2	1.09	110.	Venezuela	3.4	.32
41.	Poland	11.9	1.08	111.	Switzerland	3.6	.31
42.	Romania	10.6	.98	112.	Malawi	0.9	.30
43.	Angola	7.3	.98	113.	Colombia	2.5	.29
44.	Uruguay	10.0	.97	114.	Indonesia	1.7	.29
45.	Belgium	11.1	.97	115.	Sri Lanka	1.2	.29
46.	China	4.3	.95	116.	Canada	3.3	.28
47.	Portugal	8.9	.93	117.	Guatemala	2.2	.28
48.	France	10.6	.92	118.	Lesotho	1.4	.27
49.	Hungary	10.3	.92	119.	South Africa	2.6	.27
50.	Zimbabwe	6.4	.91	120.	Kenya	1.1	.25
51.	Gabon	8.9	.87	121.	Sierra Leone	1.1	.25
52.	Morocco	5.6	.86	122.	Rwanda	0.9	.24
53.	Spain	9.3	.86	123.	Malta	2.5	.24
54.	Norway	10.0	.85	124.	Ivory Coast	1.6	.24
55.	Congo	6.9	.83	125.	Cameroon	1.6	.23
56.	Italy	9.1	.82	126.	Niger	0.8	.22
57.	United States	9.5	.81	127.	Costa Rica	1.6	.22
58.	El Salvador	5.3	.77	128.	Luxembourg	2.5	.22
59.	Madagascar	3.1	.76	129.	Japan	2.1	.18
60.	Sudan	4.3	.76	130.	Mexico	1.6	.17
61.	Thailand	5.0	.75	131.	Trinidad and Tobago	1.8	.16
62.	Sweden	8.4	.72	132.	Paupa New Guinea	1.0	.15
63.	Malaysia	6.5	.72	133.	Uganda	0.7	.15
64.	West Germany	8.0	.69	134.	Jamaica	0.9	.11
65.	Kuwait	8.1	.69	135.	Ghana	0.7	.07
66.	Finland	7.5	.65	136.	Sao Tome and Prin.	0.0	.00
67.	Argentina	6.0	.65	137.	Mauritius	0.0	.00
68.	Netherlands	7.4	.64	138.	The Gambia	0.0	.00
69.	Mali	1.5	.64	139.	Iceland	0.0	.00
70.	Algeria	6.0	.63				

will result in an increasing force ratio (and defense burden). Only those increases greater than that attributable to the income effect should be interpreted as reflecting an increased military effort.

III. The Effect of Marxism

A second finding that stands out quite clearly is the effect of ideology: regimes adhering to Marxism-Leninism have a dramatically higher force ratio.

In indentifying Marxist countries, the most useful method is to accept the official declarations made by the countries and their leaders. When national leaders publicly proclaim their adherence to "Marxism-Leninism" they are announcing that they accept the distinctive Marxist premise of an all-encompassing "class struggle."

Americans are sometimes surprised at the willingness of foreign leaders to "admit" their Marxist loyalties, supposing that they would be embarrassed to be connected with a movement so old-fashioned—and so identified with a history of brutality. Furthermore, in the eyes of non-Marxists, declarations of fealty to Marxism-Leninism lower the stature of the leader who makes them. After all, instead of seeming to be an independent, creative thinker, the national leader is announcing that he is dependent upon a foreign thought system.

Finally, public declarations of adherence to Marxism-Leninism often cause serious and seemingly needless foreign policy complications. It would seem that leaders of Nicaragua, for example, would have everything to gain by keeping their Marxist loyalties to themselves. They could privately tell the Russians and Cubans they were Marxists, if they wished. But advertising the fact could only cause further American hostility—a hostility possibly fatal to the regime itself. Nevertheless, they have not been able to keep their sympathies private. For example, the Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega felt impelled to tell *The New York Times* (in 1981) that "Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doctrine that guides our revolution."¹⁰

The explanation for these declarations of adherence to Marxism-Leninism would appear to be that the leaders themselves actually *believe* in Marxism. They have embraced it as a kind of religious faith and have a psychological need to proclaim their commitment. In other words, they are not leaders who have decided merely that certain left-wing policies are desirable, policies like land redistribution, or nationalization of industry, or relocation of minorities. They are leaders who have accepted the Marxist belief in the primacy of class struggle.

It is from this premise of class struggle that all the other aspects of Marxist policy derive. For example, the struggle justifies the creation of a highly centralized, dictatorial regime that intrudes into all fields—art, religion, sports, the economy, the family: wherever the "capitalist" enemy may lurk, there must proletarians do battle against it. The assumption of perpetual "war" can also justify the unlimited use of force, even the

extermination of whole peoples alleged to be allied with the enemy "class." The preoccupation with struggle and with a relentless "capitalist" enemy also leads a Marxist regime to be paranoid in its relations with other countries, and to orient itself in terms of a presumed global alignment of "proletarian" and "capitalist" countries.

A tabulation of the countries whose rules have publicly declared themselves to be guided by Marxism-Leninism has been made by Philip G. Roeder.¹¹ This tabulation identifies the 29 countries considered Marxist in this analysis, which focuses on the year 1982.

With the Marxist countries identified, it is possible to assess the impact of this factor on the level of national military effort. As seen in Table 2, we find a dramatic difference: the Marxist regimes are considerably more militaristic. They have force ratios nearly twice as large as the non-Marxist countries. When the military effort is compared, the gap widens (since

Table 2
Marxist Regimes and Measures of Militarism, 1982

Older Marxist-Leninist Regimes	Force Ratio	Military Effort
1. Albania	18.9	2.43
2. Bulgaria	19.7	1.78
3. China	4.3	0.95
4. Cuba	23.5	2.44
5. Czechoslovakia	13.8	1.22
6. East Germany	14.0	1.22
7. Hungary	10.3	0.92
8. Laos	12.8	8.18
9. Mongolia	20.0	2.42
10. North Korea	41.8	5.29
11. Poland	11.9	1.08
12. Rumania	10.6	0.98
13. Soviet Union	16.3	1.46
14. Vietnam	21.4	7.52
15. Yugoslavia	11.4	1.14
Newer Marxist-Leninist Regimes		
16. Afghanistan	*	*
17. Angola	7.3	0.98
18. Benin	1.9	0.61
19. Cape Verde	13.3	3.01
20. Congo	6.9	0.83
21. Ethiopia	8.2	3.46
22. Guinea-Bissau	11.3	3.13
23. Guyana	8.8	1.52
24. Kampuchea	*	*
25. Madagascar	3.1	0.76
26. Mozambique	2.4	0.50
27. Nicaragua	14.6	2.02
28. Somalia	8.9	2.94
29. South Yemen	12.5	2.32
Mean, 27 Marxist regimes	13.0	2.26
Mean, 112 non-Marxist regimes	6.7	0.79

Differences, Marxist—non-Marxist, in:

Mean force ratio 6.3 ($t = 3.70$, $p < .0001$)

Mean military effort 1.47 ($t = 6.08$, $p < .0001$)

*Countries under occupation/invasion; no valid force ratio possible.

Marxist countries are, on average, poorer than non-Marxist countries).

The difference appears not only in over-all terms, but in virtually all the specific country and regional comparisons that one can make, comparisons that, to a degree, enable us to hold constant many historical, geographical, economic and cultural factors.

As shown in Table 3, in each regional comparison—Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa—the Marxist countries emerge with higher force ratios. In comparisons of divided nations, the same pattern holds. Austria and Yugoslavia are not divided nations, but provide a useful contrast between neighboring central European countries, both non-aligned in world politics. The one deviation from the pattern is that between mainland China and Taiwan, possibly owing to China's great size. When China is compared with its similarly large neighbor India, the pattern again appears.

Table 3
Force Ratio Comparisons, Marxist and Non-Marxist Areas

Country/Region	Force Ratio	Military Effort
East Germany (Marxist)	14.0	1.22
West Germany (non-Marxist)	8.0	0.69
North Korea (Marxist)	41.8	5.29
South Korea (non-Marxist)	14.8	1.63
South Yemen (Marxist)	12.5	2.32
North Yemen (non-Marxist)	3.9	0.61
China (Marxist)	4.3	0.95
Taiwan (non-Marxist)	24.7	2.50
India (non-Marxist)	1.6	0.46
Yugoslavia (Marxist)	11.4	1.14
Austria (non-Marxist)	5.3	0.46
Europe, 8 Marxist regimes ^a	13.8	1.35
Europe, 17 non-Marxist regimes ^b	8.2	0.73
Asia, 5 Marxist regimes ^c	20.0	4.87
Asia, 15 non-Marxist regimes ^d	6.9	0.86
Latin America, 3 Marxist regimes ^e	15.6	1.99
Latin America, 19 non-Marxist regimes ^f	4.7	0.55
Africa, 9 Marxist regimes ^g	7.0	1.80
Africa, 33 non-Marxist regimes ^h	2.7	0.55

^aAlbania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia

^bAustria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, West Germany.

^cChina, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam.

^dAustralia, Burma, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand.

^eCuba, Guyana, Nicaragua.

^fArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Venezuela, Uruguay.

^gAngola, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique, Somalia.

^hBotswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Another way to assess the impact of Marxism on military effort is to study changes over time, comparing the force ratio in a country before and after the advent of Marxism. In many cases, we are not able to make this comparison, there being no meaningful figure for the force ratio in the pre-Marxist period (when the country was under military occupation or a colony). But for those countries where a valid before-and-after comparison is possible, the increase in force ratios after the advent of Marxism is clear (Table 4). In making such over-time comparisons, one must control for any general regional trend during the same period. As shown in Table 4, there has been an increase in force ratios in the respective regions, but it is much smaller than the 280 per cent increase that has occurred in countries after the advent of Marxism.

There may be more than one explanation for this connection between Marxism and militarism. In order to fully assess the different possibilities, it would be valuable to have a full multiple regression model of the causes of force ratio variations. Work on such a model is only in the early stages. Preliminary indications are, however, that there are both direct and indirect factors at work.

For example, one variable that influences a nation's military effort is the existence of disputes with other countries, and especially militarized disputes involving armed clashes. The importance of this factor should not be exaggerated; some countries not involved in military disputes (such as Albania and Mongolia) have relatively large forces while others that *do* have serious disputes (Great Britain, Argentina, Ecuador) have surprisingly small forces. Nevertheless, international confrontations do play a role in expanding a nation's military forces. Since Marxist regimes are somewhat more likely than non-Marxist countries to be involved in military conflicts with other states, this circum-

Table 4
Change in Force Ratio after Transition to Marxist Rule

Country and last year of non-Marxist rule	Force ratio in last year of non-Marxist rule	Force ratio under Marxism (1982)	per cent change
Cuba (1957)	3.2 ^a	23.5	634
Benin (1971)	0.7	1.9	171
Guyana (1969)	4.3	8.8	105
Ethiopia (1973)	1.8	8.2	356
Madagascar (1971)	1.2	3.1	158
Nicaragua (1977)	2.6	14.6	462
Somalia (1968)	5.2	8.9	71
Mean change			280
Comparisons:			
Mean change 1971-82, 18 non-Marxist Latin American countries			22
Mean change 1971-82, 32 non-Marxist African countries			71

^aThe source for this figure is the *Statesman's Yearbook*. All other figures are from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1968-1977* and *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985*.

stance would indirectly explain the higher force ratios of the Marxist countries.

However, such indirect links do not appear to be the main explanation for the militarism of Marxist countries. More important is the direct impact of the ideology itself. Marxism-Leninism is a doctrine of struggle. It posits a perpetual combat between proletarians and capitalists in which the proletarians are urged to use all possible force to defeat their enemies.

Lenin never tired of declaring that the core of Marxism is a belief in this peculiar, unending conflict:

Marx was a genius because he was able before anyone else to draw from these facts and consistently elaborate the conclusion which world history teaches. This conclusion is the doctrine of the *class struggle*.¹²

Since the postulation of the battlelines is up to the Marxist leaders themselves, they can always see “capitalists” — and a need for military force to combat them — wherever they care to look. The actual reality need matter very little. For example, in Mozambique where both working class and entrepreneurs are absent, local Marxist leaders have been able to envisage these as “potential” forces and, as if nothing were amiss, call for the “intensification of the class struggle.”¹³

There is not in Marxism — as there is in most other philosophies — any ingredient of voluntarism. The idea that changes in beliefs or social practices should come about as the result of reasoning, persuasion, and freely-made individual choices is strikingly absent. Coercion — absolute, unyielding physical force — is openly embraced as the underlying method of accomplishing change. This declaration by Lenin is typical:

The revolutionary army is needed because great historical questions can be solved only by violence, and the organization of violence in the modern struggle is a military organization.¹⁴

It is easy to see how the emphasis on coercion and conflict in Marxist ideology would lead to the acquisition of excessive military forces. After all, if national leaders believe they are engaged in a perpetual war against seen and unseen adversaries, they will ever be reaching for military power. It should be pointed out that many other features of Marxist regimes confirm the great importance given to the military. Jan Sejna reports, for example, that in Soviet communist systems, the Defense Council is the “highest level decision-making body,” and that the General Staff of the Defense Ministry approves the location of civilian facilities such as gas stations and hospitals.¹⁵

Marxist leaders themselves exhibit a noticeable yen for military trappings. Many adopt military titles and bedeck themselves with military awards. Stalin was a proud “Marshal” of the Soviet Union; Brezhnev wrangled the same honor for himself as well as other military titles. Though a civilian in background, Forbes Burnham of Guyana aped comic-opera Latin American generals with the mass of medals he wore.¹⁶ Fidel Castro has a fondness for military dress long after

the revolution. Even Marxist holidays celebrate military power. The May Day parade in the Soviet Union is not known for brass bands or scantily clad maidens strewing rose petals, but for rows of rockets.

To find that Marxist regimes have elevated force ratios, therefore, would not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with their ideology. While Marxist leaders may berate “capitalist” countries for their “militarism,” these leaders are in no way apologetic about their own military forces. For them, military power has a positive value, and they are proud of the forces they have amassed.¹⁷

Needless to say, this orientation poses a serious difficulty in efforts to reach formal arms control agreements.

NOTES

¹ Abraham S. Becker, *Soviet National Income 1985-1964* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969), pp. 43ff.

² Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, *Soviet Economic Structure and Performance*, Second edition (New York, Harper and Row, 1981), p. 374; Abraham S. Becker, “Sitting on Bayonets: The Soviet Defense Burden and the Slowdown of Soviet Defense Spending” in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, eds., *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War* (Lexington, MA, D. C. Heath, 1986), pp. 174-175.

³ Alex Rubner, *Three Sacred Cows of Economics* (New York, Barnes and Noble, 1970), pp. 61ff; P. Ady, “Uses of National Accounts in Africa,” in L. H. Samuels, ed., *African Studies in Income and Wealth* (Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1967), pp. 55ff.

⁴ Bruce R. Morris, *Economic Growth and Development* (New York, Pitman, 1967), p. 9.

⁵ A related measure, the “proportion of militarily utilized individuals in the total population,” was called the “Military Participation Ratio” in Stanislaw Andrzejewski, *Military Organization and Society* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), p. 33. Since this would include all civilian workers contributing to the military effort — e.g., farmers raising grain for soldiers — it would be somewhat difficult to apply.

⁶ Multiple regression analysis for the 19 advanced countries with market economies indicates that, holding constant the force ratio, the defense burden increases .0076 for each one per cent increase in the proportion of air and naval forces. The corresponding figure from an analysis of U.S. data for 1940-1986 is .0039.

⁷ These findings are presented in detail in the author’s forthcoming study, *Why Nations Arm*.

⁸ The data on force ratios is taken from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985* (Washington, D.C., 1985). This source follows the useful practice of revising the data for past years as new information and interpretations come to light. As a result, the data for previous years is more reliable than the figures for the most recent year. To take advantage of this feature, I have employed the data for 1982 which have been corrected, not the data for the most recent year (1983). From the list of 144 countries, five are excluded from analysis because, in 1982, they were involved in foreign occupation or civil war and therefore did not have a single military force answering to a single government. The excluded countries are Afghanistan, Chad, Cyprus, Kampuchea, and Lebanon.

⁹ The present calculation employs the formula for the discretionary resources fraction:

$$d = 1 - \frac{S}{\text{GNP/POP} + S}$$

with GNP/POP being equal to the 1982 per capita GNP as given in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985*, Table I, and S being equal to \$600. A full derivation of these formulae (with

somewhat different notation) and the \$600 figure is given in the author's forthcoming book, *Why Nations Arm*. Briefly, the estimate of \$600 was established empirically by trying a range of values (between 1 and 1,000) for S and choosing the one yielding the best over-all prediction of force ratios in the expression:

$$\frac{M}{POP} = E \left(1 - \frac{S}{GNP/POP + S} \right).$$

¹⁰Quoted in Phillip G. Roeder, "CMEA and the New Marxist-Leninist States: A Socialist Dependencia?" Paper prepared for delivery at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington, D.C., 1984), p. 4.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Stefan T. Possony, ed., *Lenin Reader* (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1966), p. 6. Italics in original.

¹³David and Marina Ottaway, *Afrocommunism* (New York, Holmes, & Meier, 1981), p. 77.

¹⁴Quoted in William R. Kintner, *The Front Is Everywhere* (Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1984), p. 12.

¹⁵Jan Sejna and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., *Decision-making In Communist Countries: An Inside View* (McLean, VA, Pergamon, 1986), pp. 30, 44.

¹⁶Geoffrey Wagner, "Basket Case of the Caribbean," *National Review*, March 28, 1986, p. 47.

¹⁷Arthur J. Alexander, "Decision Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement," in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Survey* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 184.

Main Statistical Tables

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP
	Billion dollars			GNP	CGE			PER CAPITA	PER CAPITA			
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983		Millions	%	%		Constant 1983 dollars
TOTALS ^a												
WORLD												
1974	319.9	608.5	25900	5503	10470	2570.7	3991.1	5.8	23.7	152	6.5	2622
1975	362.9	630.0	25930	6091	10570	2803.1	4064.2	6.0	22.5	155	6.4	2602
1976	392.2	640.6	26160	6786	11090	2943.4	4159.3	5.8	21.8	154	6.3	2665
1977	422.1	650.8	26180	7492	11550	3136.7	4232.0	5.6	20.7	154	6.2	2729
1978	465.7	663.9	26740	8399	11970	3212.5	4304.8	5.5	20.7	154	6.2	2782
1979	514.4	679.1	27120	9389	12400	3373.1	4379.8	5.5	20.1	155	6.2	2830
1980	583.6	706.2	27280	10460	12660	3596.9	4455.3	5.6	19.6	159	6.1	2841
1981	654.6	732.9	27870	11520	12900	3763.9	4532.3	5.7	19.5	162	6.1	2847
1982	734.9	768.7	27890	12310	12880	3872.7	4612.7	6.0	19.8	167	6.0	2792
1983	789.1	789.1	28080	13110	13110	3962.4	4691.4	6.0	19.9	168	6.0	2795
1984	835.7	807.8	29020	14110	13640	4019.2	4768.6	5.9	20.1	169	6.1	2861
DEVELOPED												
1974	262.8	499.9	10570	4499	8558	2091.5	1034.8	5.8	23.9	483	10.2	8271
1975	287.3	498.7	10320	4941	8576	2234.2	1043.4	5.8	22.3	478	9.9	8220
1976	306.1	500.0	10350	5485	8961	2338.0	1051.2	5.6	21.4	476	9.8	8524
1977	332.7	513.0	10360	6031	9298	2487.5	1059.1	5.5	20.6	484	9.8	8779
1978	365.3	520.9	10340	6769	9651	2534.9	1066.9	5.4	20.5	488	9.7	9046
1979	405.3	535.1	10450	7522	9931	2658.7	1074.9	5.4	20.1	498	9.7	9239
1980	461.7	558.7	10640	8310	10060	2823.8	1083.3	5.6	19.8	516	9.8	9282
1981	515.9	577.6	10730	9151	10250	2967.5	1091.2	5.6	19.5	529	9.8	9390
1982	576.8	603.3	10900	9765	10210	3052.0	1099.0	5.9	19.8	549	9.9	9293
1983	623.8	623.8	10930	10450	10450	3132.2	1106.6	6.0	19.9	564	9.9	9444
1984	665.2	643.1	10950	11270	10900	3209.5	1113.9	5.9	20.0	577	9.8	9782
DEVELOPING												
1974	57.1	108.6	15330	1003	1908	479.1	2956.3	5.7	22.7	37	5.2	645
1975	75.6	131.3	15610	1151	1997	568.8	3020.9	6.6	23.1	43	5.2	661
1976	86.1	140.6	15810	1301	2125	605.4	3108.1	6.6	23.2	45	5.1	684
1977	89.4	137.8	15820	1461	2253	649.2	3172.9	6.1	21.2	43	5.0	710
1978	100.3	143.0	16400	1630	2324	677.6	3237.9	6.2	21.1	44	5.1	718
1979	109.1	144.0	16670	1867	2464	714.4	3304.9	5.8	20.2	44	5.0	746
1980	121.9	147.5	16640	2150	2602	773.1	3372.0	5.7	19.1	44	4.9	772
1981	138.7	155.3	17140	2371	2655	796.3	3441.1	5.9	19.5	45	5.0	772
1982	158.1	165.4	16990	2548	2665	820.7	3513.7	6.2	20.2	47	4.8	758
1983	165.3	165.3	17150	2662	2662	830.2	3584.8	6.2	19.9	46	4.8	743
1984	170.5	164.8	18070	2841	2746	809.8	3654.7	6.0	20.3	45	4.9	751

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES Thousands	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE) Billion dollars	PEOPLE Millions	ME GNP %	ME CGE %	ME PER CAPITA Constant 1983 dollars	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE Soldiers	GNP PER CAPITA Constant 1983 dollars
	Billion dollars			Billion dollars								
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983							
BY REGION ^a												
AFRICA												
1974	4.9	9.4	964	190	361	81.3	377.3	2.6	11.6	25	2.6	957
1975	7.2	12.5	1005	201	348	101.6	387.5	3.6	12.3	32	2.6	899
1976	8.7	14.1	1092	224	367	108.4	398.4	3.9	13.0	35	2.7	920
1977	10.0	15.4	1319	247	381	108.7	409.7	4.0	14.1	38	3.2	930
1978	11.5	16.4	1313	270	385	106.9	421.4	4.3	15.3	39	3.1	914
1979	12.7	16.7	1267	304	402	110.5	433.8	4.2	15.1	39	2.9	927
1980	13.7	16.5	1366	348	421	110.6	446.5	3.9	14.9	37	3.1	944
1981	14.8	16.6	1431	371	415	106.7	459.5	4.0	15.6	36	3.1	903
1982	15.9	16.6	1450	394	412	114.3	473.3	4.0	14.6	35	3.1	871
1983	15.9	15.9	1478	402	402	114.5	486.7	4.0	13.9	33	3.0	827
1984	16.2	15.7	1562	424	410	113.2	500.2	3.8	13.8	31	3.1	820
EAST ASIA												
1974	20.4	38.9	8008	612	1163	206.3	1377.0	3.3	18.8	28	5.8	845
1975	24.8	43.1	7847	696	1209	224.7	1403.2	3.6	19.2	31	5.6	861
1976	27.3	44.6	7841	779	1272	240.0	1450.6	3.5	18.6	31	5.4	877
1977	30.1	46.5	7850	876	1350	260.4	1474.2	3.4	17.8	32	5.3	916
1978	34.2	48.7	8269	1009	1439	300.2	1496.9	3.4	16.2	33	5.5	961
1979	40.5	53.4	8424	1151	1520	329.1	1519.9	3.5	16.2	35	5.5	1000
1980	42.4	51.3	8634	1316	1593	341.6	1541.6	3.2	15.0	33	5.6	1033
1981	47.4	53.0	8957	1491	1669	354.4	1563.6	3.2	15.0	34	5.7	1067
1982	52.6	55.0	8587	1661	1737	363.8	1587.4	3.2	15.1	35	5.4	1094
1983	55.8	55.8	8347	1821	1821	376.8	1609.6	3.1	14.8	35	5.2	1132
1984	59.6	57.6	8373	2019	1951	386.5	1629.9	3.0	14.9	35	5.1	1197
EUROPE, ALL												
1974	174.7	332.2	9606	2507	4768	1398.1	763.0	7.0	23.8	435	12.6	6249
1975	194.0	336.7	9418	2763	4796	1462.5	768.7	7.0	23.0	438	12.3	6240
1976	211.7	345.9	9558	3057	4994	1523.5	774.0	6.9	22.7	447	12.3	6452
1977	226.8	349.7	9612	3328	5132	1637.6	779.3	6.8	21.4	449	12.3	6585
1978	250.0	356.4	9542	3715	5297	1641.6	784.4	6.7	21.7	454	12.2	6753
1979	276.1	364.5	9640	4099	5411	1739.0	789.5	6.7	21.0	462	12.2	6854
1980	308.9	373.8	9775	4527	5479	1827.4	794.7	6.8	20.5	470	12.3	6894
1981	336.9	377.3	9831	4911	5499	1910.5	799.9	6.9	19.7	472	12.3	6874
1982	370.4	387.4	10010	5307	5551	1949.2	804.9	7.0	19.9	481	12.4	6897
1983	394.1	394.1	10040	5650	5650	1988.7	810.0	7.0	19.8	487	12.4	6975
1984	414.4	400.6	10100	5973	5774	2044.5	814.8	6.9	19.6	492	12.4	7086
— NATO EUROPE												
1974	40.3	76.7	3285	1090	2072	722.7	316.5	3.7	10.6	242	10.4	6548
1975	44.6	77.4	3039	1179	2046	790.6	318.5	3.8	9.8	243	9.5	6425
1976	48.4	79.1	3098	1317	2152	814.0	320.1	3.7	9.7	247	9.7	6724
1977	52.2	80.5	3198	1429	2204	831.7	321.6	3.7	9.7	250	9.9	6853
1978	57.9	82.5	3159	1598	2278	861.6	323.1	3.6	9.6	255	9.8	7052
1979	63.8	84.3	3139	1784	2355	903.1	324.7	3.6	9.3	260	9.7	7254
1980	71.6	86.6	3175	1968	2381	946.2	326.6	3.6	9.2	265	9.7	7293
1981	78.6	88.0	3221	2121	2374	980.1	328.4	3.7	9.0	268	9.8	7231
1982	86.3	90.2	3257	2276	2381	1016.9	330.0	3.8	8.9	273	9.9	7216
1983	92.8	92.8	3284	2412	2412	1048.1	331.5	3.8	8.9	280	9.9	7277
1984	96.8	93.5	3295	2551	2466	1066.8	332.9	3.8	8.8	281	9.9	7406

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP
	Billion dollars			Billion dollars				GNP	CGE	PER CAPITA		PER CAPITA
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers	Constant 1983 dollars
—— WARSAW PACT												
1974	128.3	244.0	5416	1173	2231	558.0	357.5	10.9	43.7	683	15.1	6239
1975	142.6	247.6	5478	1320	2290	547.3	360.6	10.8	45.2	687	15.2	6353
1976	156.2	255.1	5580	1453	2373	578.6	363.5	10.8	44.1	702	15.3	6528
1977	167.8	258.7	5599	1587	2447	669.9	366.5	10.6	38.6	706	15.3	6676
1978	184.7	263.3	5562	1773	2528	636.4	369.4	10.4	41.4	713	15.1	6843
1979	203.7	269.0	5655	1931	2549	684.2	372.2	10.6	39.3	723	15.2	6849
1980	227.8	275.6	5760	2130	2577	724.2	374.9	10.7	38.1	735	15.4	6875
1981	248.0	277.6	5767	2324	2603	765.1	377.6	10.7	36.3	735	15.3	6892
1982	272.7	285.2	5898	2531	2647	779.6	380.4	10.8	36.6	750	15.5	6957
1983	289.2	289.2	5910	2707	2707	775.0	383.4	10.7	37.3	754	15.4	7060
1984	304.9	294.8	5909	2862	2767	808.2	386.3	10.7	36.5	763	15.3	7162
—— OTHER EUROPE												
1974	6.0	11.5	905	245	465	117.4	89.0	2.5	9.8	129	10.2	5226
1975	6.8	11.8	901	265	460	124.6	89.7	2.6	9.5	132	10.0	5127
1976	7.1	11.6	880	287	469	130.9	90.4	2.5	8.9	128	9.7	5186
1977	6.8	10.5	815	312	481	136.1	91.2	2.2	7.7	116	8.9	5275
1978	7.5	10.7	822	344	491	143.6	91.9	2.2	7.4	116	8.9	5336
1979	8.5	11.3	846	384	507	151.8	92.6	2.2	7.4	122	9.1	5471
1980	9.6	11.6	840	430	520	157.0	93.3	2.2	7.4	124	9.0	5577
1981	10.3	11.6	843	466	522	165.3	93.9	2.2	7.0	123	9.0	5555
1982	11.4	11.9	855	500	524	152.7	94.5	2.3	7.8	126	9.0	5538
1983	12.1	12.1	846	530	530	165.7	95.1	2.3	7.3	128	8.9	5578
1984	12.7	12.3	900	560	541	169.5	95.6	2.3	7.3	129	9.4	5664
LATIN AMERICA												
1974	4.0	7.6	1248	264	502	109.8	311.5	1.5	7.0	25	4.0	1613
1975	4.9	8.6	1297	303	525	118.3	319.2	1.6	7.2	27	4.1	1645
1976	5.9	9.6	1328	338	552	122.8	326.9	1.7	7.8	29	4.1	1687
1977	6.7	10.3	1438	376	580	133.3	334.7	1.8	7.8	31	4.3	1734
1978	7.0	10.0	1478	424	605	139.2	342.7	1.7	7.2	29	4.3	1766
1979	7.5	9.9	1491	484	639	139.5	350.8	1.5	7.1	28	4.3	1822
1980	8.6	10.5	1561	550	666	156.5	359.1	1.6	6.7	29	4.3	1854
1981	9.5	10.6	1617	598	669	178.5	367.6	1.6	5.9	29	4.4	1820
1982	12.4	13.0	1687	623	652	193.1	376.5	2.0	6.7	35	4.5	1732
1983	11.8	11.8	1746	632	632	185.5	385.5	1.9	6.4	31	4.5	1640
1984	12.7	12.3	1798	673	650	176.8	394.8	1.9	6.9	31	4.6	1647
MIDDLE EAST												
1974	23.1	44.0	1416	162	308	119.8	110.8	14.3	36.7	397	12.8	2777
1975	33.1	57.4	1647	196	340	159.0	113.9	16.9	36.1	504	14.5	2986
1976	38.6	63.0	1738	237	387	178.5	117.3	16.3	35.3	537	14.8	3302
1977	37.3	57.5	1554	270	416	200.0	121.0	13.8	28.7	475	12.8	3437
1978	42.1	60.1	1836	276	394	194.3	124.9	15.2	30.9	481	14.7	3157
1979	43.3	57.2	1998	345	455	210.1	128.8	12.6	27.2	444	15.5	3537
1980	52.0	62.9	1944	423	512	246.0	132.8	12.3	25.6	473	14.6	3855
1981	60.1	67.3	1883	469	525	239.2	137.2	12.8	28.1	490	13.7	3826
1982	68.7	71.9	1909	488	511	251.7	141.5	14.1	28.6	508	13.5	3610
1983	73.7	73.7	2040	473	473	252.2	145.8	15.6	29.2	505	14.0	3244
1984	73.2	70.8	2546	471	455	225.3	150.3	15.6	31.4	471	16.9	3028

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP
	Billion dollars			Billion dollars				GNP	CGE			PER CAPITA
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers	Constant 1983 dollars
NORTH AMERICA												
1974	88.6	168.5	2228	1610	3063	599.0	236.2	5.5	28.1	713	9.4	12960
1975	93.9	162.9	2176	1751	3039	667.1	238.7	5.4	24.4	682	9.1	12730
1976	94.3	154.0	2153	1954	3192	695.7	241.1	4.8	22.1	639	8.9	13240
1977	104.6	161.3	2138	2175	3354	718.8	243.6	4.8	22.4	662	8.8	13770
1978	113.5	161.8	2112	2457	3503	747.3	246.1	4.6	21.6	657	8.6	14230
1979	126.5	167.1	2129	2738	3615	761.3	248.8	4.6	21.9	671	8.6	14530
1980	148.7	180.0	2183	2987	3614	824.1	251.8	5.0	21.8	715	8.7	14350
1981	175.2	196.1	2249	3337	3736	880.6	254.4	5.2	22.3	771	8.8	14680
1982	202.6	212.0	2282	3456	3615	902.0	257.0	5.9	23.5	825	8.9	14070
1983	223.7	223.7	2303	3719	3719	939.1	259.4	6.0	23.8	862	8.9	14340
1984	244.7	236.5	2326	4106	3969	956.8	261.8	6.0	24.7	903	8.9	15160
OCEANIA												
1974	1.6	3.0	81	76	145	33.1	19.7	2.0	8.9	150	4.1	7327
1975	1.8	3.0	83	84	147	40.7	20.0	2.1	7.5	152	4.1	7311
1976	1.9	3.1	87	91	149	42.9	20.3	2.1	7.2	153	4.3	7363
1977	2.2	3.4	87	99	152	44.8	20.5	2.3	7.6	167	4.2	7399
1978	2.4	3.4	87	108	153	45.0	20.8	2.2	7.5	162	4.2	7366
1979	2.6	3.4	88	121	159	44.7	21.1	2.2	7.7	163	4.2	7571
1980	3.3	4.0	89	137	166	48.9	21.4	2.4	8.2	189	4.2	7787
1981	3.9	4.3	89	153	172	51.2	21.7	2.5	8.4	199	4.1	7912
1982	4.3	4.5	90	167	174	52.7	22.0	2.6	8.6	206	4.1	7911
1983	4.8	4.8	91	174	174	56.3	22.4	2.8	8.6	216	4.1	7761
1984	5.2	5.0	90	188	182	59.7	22.6	2.8	8.4	221	4.0	8020
SOUTH ASIA												
1974	2.6	4.9	2350	82	156	23.2	795.4	3.2	21.2	6	3.0	196
1975	3.3	5.7	2452	97	169	29.2	813.0	3.4	19.5	7	3.0	208
1976	3.9	6.3	2362	106	174	31.7	830.7	3.6	19.9	8	2.8	209
1977	4.4	6.8	2182	121	186	33.1	849.0	3.6	20.5	8	2.6	219
1978	5.0	7.2	2102	140	199	38.0	867.6	3.6	18.9	8	2.4	230
1979	5.2	6.9	2082	147	194	38.7	887.2	3.5	17.7	8	2.3	218
1980	5.9	7.2	1724	171	206	42.0	907.4	3.5	17.1	8	1.9	227
1981	6.9	7.8	1817	194	217	42.9	928.4	3.6	18.1	8	2.0	234
1982	7.9	8.2	1878	215	225	45.9	950.0	3.7	17.9	9	2.0	237
1983	9.3	9.3	2034	241	241	49.2	971.9	3.8	18.9	10	2.1	248
1984	9.7	9.4	2223	259	251	56.4	994.1	3.7	16.6	9	2.2	252

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP
	Billion dollars			Billion dollars				GNP	CGE	PER CAPITA		Constant 1983 dollars
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Soldiers	Constant 1983 dollars	
BY ORGANIZATION ^a												
NATO, ALL												
1974	128.9	245.2	5513	2700	5135	1321.7	552.7	4.8	18.6	444	10.0	9290
1975	138.4	240.3	5215	2929	5085	1457.7	557.2	4.7	16.5	431	9.4	9127
1976	142.7	233.1	5251	3271	5344	1509.7	561.1	4.4	15.4	415	9.4	9523
1977	156.8	241.8	5337	3605	5558	1550.5	565.1	4.4	15.6	428	9.4	9834
1978	171.3	244.3	5271	4055	5781	1608.9	569.2	4.2	15.2	429	9.3	10160
1979	190.4	251.3	5268	4522	5970	1664.4	573.6	4.2	15.1	438	9.2	10410
1980	220.3	266.5	5358	4955	5996	1770.2	578.4	4.4	15.1	461	9.3	10370
1981	253.8	284.2	5469	5457	6110	1860.7	582.8	4.7	15.3	488	9.4	10480
1982	288.9	302.2	5539	5733	5996	1918.9	587.0	5.0	15.7	515	9.4	10220
1983	316.6	316.6	5587	6132	6132	1987.2	591.0	5.2	15.9	536	9.5	10380
1984	341.4	330.0	5621	6657	6435	2023.6	594.8	5.1	16.3	555	9.5	10820
WARSAW PACT												
1974	128.3	244.0	5416	1173	2231	558.0	357.5	10.9	43.7	683	15.1	6239
1975	142.6	247.6	5478	1320	2290	547.3	360.6	10.8	45.2	687	15.2	6353
1976	156.2	255.1	5580	1453	2373	578.6	363.5	10.8	44.1	702	15.3	6528
1977	167.8	258.7	5599	1587	2447	669.9	366.5	10.6	38.6	706	15.3	6676
1978	184.7	263.3	5562	1773	2528	636.4	369.4	10.4	41.4	713	15.1	6843
1979	203.7	269.0	5655	1931	2549	684.2	372.2	10.6	39.3	723	15.2	6849
1980	227.8	275.6	5760	2130	2577	724.2	374.9	10.7	38.1	735	15.4	6875
1981	248.0	277.6	5767	2324	2603	765.1	377.6	10.7	36.3	735	15.3	6892
1982	272.7	285.2	5898	2531	2647	779.6	380.4	10.8	36.6	750	15.5	6957
1983	289.2	289.2	5910	2707	2707	775.0	383.4	10.7	37.3	754	15.4	7060
1984	304.9	294.8	5909	2862	2767	808.2	386.3	10.7	36.5	763	15.3	7162
OPEC												
1974	18.8	35.7	1279	249	473	147.1	298.5	7.5	24.2	119	4.3	1586
1975	28.8	50.0	1379	293	509	194.8	307.0	9.8	25.7	163	4.5	1657
1976	34.3	56.0	1461	355	580	216.4	316.0	9.7	25.9	177	4.6	1835
1977	33.5	51.6	1359	402	620	240.1	325.3	8.3	21.5	159	4.2	1906
1978	40.2	57.3	1501	418	596	233.3	334.9	9.6	24.5	171	4.5	1781
1979	39.5	52.2	1627	508	670	242.9	344.7	7.8	21.5	151	4.7	1944
1980	46.8	56.6	1525	605	732	278.6	354.7	7.7	20.3	160	4.3	2065
1981	55.5	62.2	1454	656	734	273.9	364.8	8.5	22.7	170	4.0	2012
1982	61.9	64.7	1485	688	720	278.7	375.1	9.0	23.2	173	4.0	1919
1983	64.0	64.0	1541	671	671	273.8	384.4	9.5	23.4	166	4.0	1745
1984	63.5	61.4	2078	676	654	240.1	394.1	9.4	25.6	156	5.3	1659
OECD												
1974	138.9	264.2	6417	3423	6510	1577.7	744.7	4.1	16.7	355	8.6	8742
1975	150.0	260.5	6111	3732	6478	1736.9	751.2	4.0	15.0	347	8.1	8623
1976	155.3	253.7	6120	4156	6789	1808.7	757.0	3.7	14.0	335	8.1	8969
1977	170.0	262.1	6142	4579	7060	1875.8	762.8	3.7	14.0	344	8.1	9256
1978	186.1	265.3	6094	5146	7337	1961.5	768.6	3.6	13.5	345	7.9	9546
1979	207.2	273.6	6120	5754	7597	2041.6	774.5	3.6	13.4	353	7.9	9809
1980	239.5	289.8	6213	6355	7690	2168.2	780.8	3.8	13.4	371	8.0	9849
1981	275.3	308.2	6323	7015	7854	2279.0	786.8	3.9	13.5	392	8.0	9983
1982	313.2	327.6	6410	7439	7781	2332.2	792.4	4.2	14.0	413	8.1	9819
1983	343.2	343.2	6458	7962	7962	2424.8	797.8	4.3	14.2	430	8.1	9980
1984	370.0	357.7	6544	8639	8351	2473.1	802.8	4.3	14.5	446	8.2	10400

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME GNP	ME CGE	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA	
	Million dollars			Million dollars									Millions
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983								
BY COUNTRY													
Afghanistan													
1974	30	58	80	1426	2713	237	13.8	2.1	24.4	4	5.8	197	
1975	45	78	130	1637	2841	308	14.1	2.7	25.3	6	9.2	201	
1976	42	68	142	1843	3011	413	14.5	2.3	16.5	5	9.8	208	
1977	45	69	143	2026	3123	360	14.9	2.2	19.2	5	9.6	210	
1978	53	75	110	2280	3251	372	15.3	2.3	20.1	5	7.2	213	
1979	147E	194E	89	2431	3209	426E	15.6	6.1	45.7	13	5.7	206	
1980	164E	199E	43	2695	3261	618E	15.2	6.1	32.2	13	2.8	214	
1981	135E	151E	45	2633	2948	556E	14.6	5.1	27.1	10	3.1	202	
1982	141E	147E	55	2819	2948	465E	14.3	5.0	31.7	10	3.9	207	
1983	209E	209E	75	3570	3570	334E	14.3	5.9	62.7	15	5.2	249	
1984	NA	NA	60	NA	NA	NA	14.7	NA	NA	NA	4.1	NA	
Albania													
1974	NA	NA	53	1275	2426	NA	2.3	NA	NA	NA	22.6	1034	
1975	NA	NA	52	1310	2274	NA	2.4	NA	NA	NA	21.7	947	
1976	112	183	52	1335	2181	NA	2.5	8.4	NA	75	21.2	889	
1977	115	177	52	NA	NA	NA	2.5	NA	NA	71	20.7	NA	
1978	119E	170E	53	NA	NA	1590	2.6	NA	10.7	66	20.7	NA	
1979	NA	NA	52	2150	2838	NA	2.6	NA	NA	NA	19.9	1085	
1980	NA	NA	52	NA	NA	NA	2.7	NA	NA	NA	19.5	NA	
1981	134E	150E	53	NA	NA	1308	2.7	NA	11.5	55	19.4	NA	
1982	134E	140E	53	NA	NA	NA	2.8	NA	NA	50	19.0	NA	
1983	130E	130E	42	NA	NA	1250	2.8	NA	10.4	46	14.8	NA	
1984	143E	138E	42	NA	NA	1257	2.9	NA	11.0	48	14.5	NA	
Algeria													
	b	b											
1974	300	571	80	14960	28440	6441	15.7	2.0	8.9	36	5.1	1817	
1975	423E	734E	80	17170	29800	9453	16.1	2.5	7.8	45	5.0	1846	
1976	680E	1110E	85	19780	32320	9730	16.6	3.4	11.4	67	5.1	1943	
1977	677E	1043E	75	22300	34380	10410	17.2	3.0	10.0	61	4.4	2004	
1978	845E	1205E	76	26220	37380	11000	17.7	3.2	10.9	68	4.3	2112	
1979	971E	1282E	88	30080	39710	10860	18.3	3.2	11.8	70	4.8	2175	
1980	968E	1171E	101	33940	41070	11730	18.8	2.9	10.0	62	5.4	2180	
1981	1598E	1789E	101	38570	43190	13660	19.5	4.1	13.1	92	5.2	2220	
1982	1921E	2009E	120	43010	44990	16180	20.1	4.5	12.4	100	6.0	2239	
1983	1420E	1420E	130	47570	47570	20600	20.7	3.0	6.9	68	6.3	2293	
1984	1403E	1357E	170	51990	50260	20780	21.4	2.7	6.5	63	7.9	2347	
Angola													
1974	
1975	151	261	30	4159	7220	2273	6.0	3.6	11.5	44	5.0	1213	
1976	NA	NA	35	3967	6481	NA	6.0	NA	NA	NA	5.8	1073	
1977	NA	NA	47	4301	6631	NA	6.3	NA	NA	NA	7.5	1053	
1978	NA	NA	47	4849	6914	NA	6.5	NA	NA	NA	7.3	1072	
1979	NA	NA	47	5357	7072	NA	6.7	NA	NA	NA	7.1	1062	
1980	NA	NA	47	6172	7469	NA	7.0	NA	NA	NA	6.7	1068	
1981	NA	NA	53	6517	7297	NA	7.2	NA	NA	NA	7.4	1016	
1982	1640E	1716E	54	6626	6931	3432E	7.4	24.8	50.0	233	7.3	939	
1983	667E	667E	54	6731	6731	2667E	7.6	9.9	25.0	88	7.1	891	
1984	NA	NA	54	6963	6731	NA	7.7	NA	NA	NA	7.0	869	

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE							
	Current	Constant 1983						Constant 1983	Millions			
Argentina												
1974	552	1049	150	33410	63550	14440	25.6	1.7	7.3	41	5.9	2480
1975	781	1357	160	36440	63260	13570	26.1	2.1	10.0	52	6.1	2428
1976	1218	1989	155	38500	62890	12410	26.5	3.2	16.0	75	5.8	2373
1977	1398	2155	155	43390	66900	11460	26.9	3.2	18.8	80	5.8	2483
1978	1369	1952	155	45330	64630	12630	27.4	3.0	15.5	71	5.7	2359
1979	1694	2237	155	52180	68890	13560	27.9	3.2	16.5	80	5.6	2473
1980	2036	2463	155	57100	69090	14560	28.3	3.6	16.9	87	5.5	2440
1981	2120	2374	155	56130	62850	16060	28.8	3.8	14.8	82	5.4	2183
1982	3461	3620	175	55970	58540	13980	29.3	6.2	25.9	124	6.0	2001
1983	2745	2745	175	59740	59740	18360	29.7	4.6	14.9	92	5.9	2009
1984	2327	2250	174	63300	61190	13050	30.2	3.7	17.2	74	5.8	2024
Australia												
1974	1366	2599	68	63490	120800	24820	13.6	2.2	10.5	191	5.0	8880
1975	1539	2672	70	70590	122500	30990	13.8	2.2	8.6	194	5.1	8897
1976	1672	2731	71	76680	125300	34310	13.9	2.2	8.0	196	5.1	9002
1977	1971	3040	70	83450	128700	35780	14.1	2.4	8.5	216	5.0	9142
1978	2091	2981	70	90930	129600	35520	14.2	2.3	8.4	209	4.9	9098
1979	2311	3052	70	102600	135500	35710	14.4	2.3	8.5	212	4.9	9392
1980	2969	3593	71	117400	142000	39570	14.6	2.5	9.1	246	4.9	9716
1981	3410	3818	72	130700	146400	40950	14.8	2.6	9.3	257	4.8	9859
1982	3851	4028	73	142900	149400	42170	15.1	2.7	9.6	267	4.8	9897
1983	4308	4308	73	147700	147700	45120	15.3	2.9	9.5	282	4.8	9651
1984	4657	4502	71	159800	154500	48420	15.5	2.9	9.3	291	4.6	9990
Austria												
1974	281	535	60	28270	53760	17470	7.6	1.0	3.1	71	7.9	7108
1975	344	597	50	30430	52820	18820	7.6	1.1	3.2	79	6.6	6990
1976	383	626	40	34150	55790	20250	7.6	1.1	3.1	83	5.3	7388
1977	420	648	37	37700	58120	20970	7.6	1.1	3.1	86	4.9	7689
1978	487	694	40	41130	58640	22880	7.6	1.2	3.0	92	5.3	7764
1979	556	734	40	46740	61700	23840	7.6	1.2	3.1	97	5.3	8172
1980	604	731	40	52620	63680	24630	7.6	1.1	3.0	97	5.3	8432
1981	649	726	40	56890	63700	25400	7.6	1.1	2.9	96	5.3	8420
1982	773E	808E	40	61620	64450	25910	7.6	1.3	3.1	107	5.3	8510
1983	890E	890E	50	66680	66680	27350	7.6	1.3	3.3	118	6.6	8830
1984	921E	891E	40	69460	67150	27160	7.6	1.3	3.3	118	5.3	8892
Bahrain												
1974	25	47	2	714	1359E	394	0.2	3.5	11.9	189	8.1	5472
1975	15	27	2	751	1303E	570	0.3	2.1	4.7	103	7.7	5035
1976	25	40	2	1074	1755E	968	0.3	2.3	4.2	148	7.3	6413
1977	38	59	2	1464	2258E	1098	0.3	2.6	5.3	197	6.7	7591
1978	108	154	2	1839	2622E	1154	0.3	5.9	13.3	476	6.2	8129
1979	143	189	2	2228	2941E	990	0.3	6.4	19.1	563	6.0	8751
1980	157	191	2	3101	3752E	1214	0.3	5.1	15.7	548	5.8	10800
1981	215	240	2	3513	3933E	1268	0.4	6.1	19.0	661	5.5	10820
1982	281	293	2	3615	3781E	1452	0.4	7.8	20.2	775	5.3	9990
1983	166	166	2	3877	3877E	1558	0.4	4.3	10.6	420	5.1	9830
1984	148	143	3	4154	4015E	1404	0.4	3.6	10.2	348	7.3	9774

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME GNP	ME CGE	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			Million dollars								
	Current	Constant 1983		Thousands	Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers
Bangladesh												
1974	45	86	100	4325	8227	863	74.7	1.0	10.0	1	1.3	110
1975	40	69	100	4894	8495	647	76.2	0.8	10.7	1	1.3	111
1976	89	145	126	5832	9527	1359	77.9	1.5	10.7	2	1.6	122
1977	136	209	126	6242	9623	1701	80.4	2.2	12.3	3	1.6	120
1978	146	208	129	7191	10250	1606	82.9	2.0	13.0	3	1.6	124
1979	117	154	120	8133	10740	1726	85.5	1.4	8.9	2	1.4	126
1980	132	160	71	9013	10910	2072	88.1	1.5	7.7	2	0.8	124
1981	157	176	77	10370	11620	1893E	90.6	1.5	9.3	2	0.8	128
1982	191	200	77	11140	11650	1918E	93.3	1.7	10.4	2	0.8	125
1983	260	260	81	12050	12050	2011E	95.9	2.2	12.9	3	0.8	126
1984	248	239	91	13050	12620	2479E	98.6	1.9	9.7	2	0.9	128
Barbados												
1974	1	3	0	465	885	251	0.2	0.3	1.1	11	0.0	3621
1975	1	1	0	525	911	263	0.2	0.1	0.4	5	0.0	3707
1976	1	2	0	560	915	301	0.2	0.2	0.5	6	0.0	3717
1977	1	2	0	615	948	316	0.2	0.2	0.6	8	0.8	3835
1978	2	2	0	709	1011	303	0.2	0.2	0.8	10	0.8	4082
1979	3	4	2	821	1083	321	0.2	0.4	1.3	17	8.0	4360
1980	11	13	1	947	1146	365	0.2	1.1	3.6	52	4.0	4601
1981	11	13	1	983	1101	371	0.2	1.1	3.4	51	4.0	4414
1982	8	9	1	1004	1050	343	0.2	0.8	2.5	35	4.0	4205
1983	9	9	1	1035	1035	329	0.3	0.9	2.8	36	4.0	4136
1984	11	10	1	1102	1066	354	0.3	1.0	2.9	41	4.0	4247
Belgium												
1974	1053	2003	105	38350	72930	28730	9.8	2.7	7.0	205	10.8	7467
1975	1253	2175	103	41110	71360	31810	9.8	3.0	6.8	222	10.5	7285
1976	1424	2326	107	46150	75400	34480	9.8	3.1	6.7	237	10.9	7685
1977	1551	2391	107	49430	76210	36130	9.8	3.1	6.6	243	10.9	7759
1978	1796	2560	109	55150	78630	38760	9.8	3.3	6.6	260	11.1	7999
1979	1986	2622	107	60670	80100	40530	9.8	3.3	6.5	267	10.9	8142
1980	2241	2712	108	67420	81590	42010	9.8	3.3	6.5	275	10.9	8286
1981	2502	2801	110	71760	80350	45590	9.9	3.5	6.1	284	11.1	8155
1982	2629	2750	109	77660	81230	46120	9.9	3.4	6.0	279	11.0	8242
1983	2672	2672	109	81230	81230	46470	9.9	3.3	5.7	271	11.1	8242
1984	2669	2580	107	85340	82500	46610	9.9	3.1	5.5	262	10.9	8372
Benin												
1974	6	10	3	383	728	NA	2.9	1.4	NA	4	1.0	250
1975	6	10	3	400	694	NA	3.0	1.4	NA	3	1.0	232
1976	6	9	3	430	702	NA	3.1	1.3	NA	3	1.0	228
1977	7	10	NA	478	737	199	3.2	1.4	5.3	3	NA	232
1978	7	10	4	524	746	156	3.3	1.3	6.4	3	1.2	229
1979	11	14	4	602	795	181	3.4	1.8	8.0	4	1.2	237
1980	14	17	4	702	849	173	3.5	2.0	9.9	5	1.2	246
1981	25	28	6	834	934	195	3.6	3.0	14.6	8	1.7	262
1982	NA	NA	6	954	998	252	3.7	NA	NA	NA	1.6	272
1983	27	27	6	976	976	NA	3.8	2.8	NA	7	1.6	258
1984	26	26	6	1032	998	250	3.9	2.6	10.2	7	1.5	256

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE			
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983			Constant 1983	%			
Bolivia												
1974	49	92	18	2893	5502	614	4.7	1.7	15.1	20	3.8	1172
1975	70	122	20	3396	5894	691	4.8	2.1	17.6	25	4.2	1226
1976	80	131	22	3826	6250	815	4.9	2.1	16.1	27	4.5	1268
1977	82	126	20	4184	6451	854	5.1	2.0	14.7	25	4.0	1277
1978	104	148	20	4656	6637	917	5.2	2.2	16.1	28	3.9	1281
1979	114	150	20	4958	6545	903	5.3	2.3	16.6	28	3.8	1232
1980	145	176	24	5287	6398	977	5.4	2.7	18.0	32	4.4	1174
1981	188	210	26	5672	6351	927	5.6	3.3	22.7	38	4.7	1136
1982	100	105	26	5223	5463	1418	5.7	1.9	7.4	18	4.5	953
1983	74	74	27	5437	5437	694	5.9	1.4	10.7	13	4.6	924
1984	120	116	28	5576	5390	2157	6.0	2.2	5.4	19	4.6	893
Botswana												
1974	0	0	1	197	374	149	0.7	0.0	0.0	0	1.5	557
1975	0	0	1	197	342	160	0.7	0.0	0.0	0	2.0	484
1976	0	0	1	247	404	172	0.7	0.1	0.2	0	1.3	544
1977	6	9	1	273	421	174	0.8	2.2	5.2	12	1.5	538
1978	15	21	1	349	498	254	0.8	4.2	8.2	25	1.2	604
1979	19	26	2	417	551	260	0.9	4.7	9.9	30	2.3	637
1980	21	26	3	538	651	301	0.9	3.9	8.5	28	3.3	721
1981	23	26	3	582	652	325	0.9	3.9	7.9	27	3.2	696
1982	21	22	3	646	676	386	1.0	3.3	5.8	23	3.1	698
1983	25	25	3	820	820	413	1.0	3.1	6.2	25	3.0	819
1984	NA	NA	3	1005	972	NA	1.0	NA	NA	NA	2.9	940
Brazil												
1974	954	1814	435	76660	145800	27080	106.0	1.2	6.7	17	4.1	1375
1975	994	1726	455	88130	153000	31010	108.7	1.1	5.6	16	4.2	1408
1976	1222	1996	450	102700	167700	34150	111.3	1.2	5.8	18	4.0	1506
1977	1097	1692	450	114800	177000	42400	114.0	1.0	4.0	15	3.9	1552
1978	1092	1556	450	130200	185700	45100	116.9	0.8	3.5	13	3.8	1588
1979	1075	1419	450	149200	197000	44750	119.9	0.7	3.2	12	3.8	1643
1980	1191	1441	450	173600	210100	51020	123.0	0.7	2.8	12	3.7	1708
1981	1272	1424	450	183000	204900	55550	126.3	0.7	2.6	11	3.6	1623
1982	1833	1917	460	195600	204600	59650	129.6	0.9	3.2	15	3.6	1579
1983	1726	1726	460	196600	196600	61420	132.9	0.9	2.8	13	3.5	1479
1984	1778	1719	459	212300	205200	60570	136.3	0.8	2.8	13	3.4	1505
Bulgaria												
1974	2012E	3827E	174	23720	45120	17240	8.7	8.5	22.2	441	20.0	5198
1975	2181E	3786E	175	28210	48970	19200	8.7	7.7	19.7	434	20.1	5615
1976	2375E	3880E	177	30910	50490	17660	8.8	7.7	22.0	443	20.2	5765
1977	2558E	3944E	177	32650	50340	17590	8.8	7.8	22.4	448	20.1	5718
1978	2634E	3755E	164	35780	51010	19670	8.8	7.4	19.1	426	18.6	5788
1979	2842E	3752E	163	40450	53400	19940	8.8	7.0	18.8	425	18.5	6051
1980	3121E	3777E	162	42840	51840	19480	8.9	7.3	19.4	426	18.3	5850
1981	3485E	3902E	165	48240	54010	22720	8.9	7.2	17.2	439	18.6	6075
1982	4137E	4327E	175	52940	55370	23380	8.9	7.8	18.5	485	19.6	6210
1983	4310E	4310E	177	54020	54020	22430	8.9	8.0	19.2	482	19.8	6043
1984	4532E	4381E	177	57740	55820	23080	9.0	7.8	19.0	489	19.8	6231

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE			
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers	Constant 1983 dollars
Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta)												
1974	5	10	5	428	814	89	5.5	1.2	11.0	2	0.9	148
1975	13	23	5	473	821	110	5.6	2.8	21.1	4	0.9	147
1976	16	26	10	552	902	129	5.7	2.9	20.3	5	1.8	158
1977	17	27	6	584	900	128	5.8	3.0	20.8	5	1.0	155
1978	21	30	6	673	960	128	5.9	3.1	23.5	5	1.0	163
1979	20	26	4	785	1036	158	6.0	2.5	16.5	4	0.7	172
1980	22	26	5	882	1068	149	6.1	2.5	17.7	4	0.8	174
1981	26	29	8	999	1118	165	6.3	2.6	17.3	5	1.3	178
1982	29	30	9	1065	1114	169	6.4	2.7	17.8	5	1.4	174
1983	29	29	9	1096	1096	145	6.6	2.7	20.2	4	1.4	167
1984	30	29	9	1127	1089	168	6.7	2.7	17.6	4	1.3	162
Burma												
1974	73	138	202	1940	3690	500	29.6	3.7	27.6	5	6.8	125
1975	81	140	209	2219	3852	492	30.2	3.6	28.4	5	6.9	128
1976	89	145	210	2500	4083	528	30.8	3.6	27.5	5	6.8	133
1977	103	159	208	2802	4319	607	31.4	3.7	26.2	5	6.6	137
1978	113	161	212	3221	4593	696	32.1	3.5	23.1	5	6.6	143
1979	131	173	212	3652	4822	708	32.7	3.6	24.4	5	6.5	147
1980	151	183	179	4324	5232	833	33.4	3.5	21.9	5	5.4	157
1981	178	199	210	4971	5565	894	34.1	3.6	22.3	6	6.2	163
1982	180	188	210	5583	5839	976	34.8	3.2	19.3	5	6.0	168
1983	190	190	210	6078	6078	954	35.5	3.1	19.9	5	5.9	171
1984	195	189	210	6646	6425	987	36.2	2.9	19.1	5	5.8	177
Burundi												
1974	10	19	5	400	760	165	3.5	2.5	11.4	5	1.4	217
1975	10	18	7	445	773	162	3.6	2.3	11.0	5	2.0	216
1976	12	19	7	508	830	191	3.7	2.3	9.9	5	1.9	226
1977	16	25	8	605	932	205	3.8	2.7	12.4	7	2.1	248
1978	18	26	7	650	927	218	3.9	2.8	12.1	7	1.8	240
1979	21	27	7	723	954	223	4.0	2.9	12.3	7	1.8	240
1980	31	37	7	820	992	207	4.1	3.7	17.8	9	1.7	244
1981	38	42	7	973	1089	262	4.2	3.9	16.2	10	1.7	261
1982	36E	37E	7	1001	1047	259E	4.3	3.6	14.3	9	1.6	244
1983	41E	41E	7	1055	1055	254E	4.4	3.9	16.1	9	1.6	239
1984	38E	36E	7	1088	1052	257E	4.5	3.5	14.2	8	1.5	231
Cambodia												
1974	63	120	220	580	1102	NA	7.3	10.9	NA	16	30.0	150
1975	68	117	62	615	1067	NA	6.7	11.0	NA	17	9.2	159
1976	NA	NA	62	NA	NA	NA	6.2	NA	NA	NA	10.0	NA
1977	NA	NA	70	NA	NA	NA	6.0	NA	NA	NA	11.6	NA
1978	NA	NA	70	NA	NA	NA	5.9	NA	NA	NA	11.9	NA
1979	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5.8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1980	NA	NA	35	NA	NA	NA	5.7	NA	NA	NA	6.1	NA
1981	NA	NA	20	600	672	224	5.8	NA	NA	NA	3.5	116
1982	NA	NA	20	NA	NA	NA	5.9	NA	NA	NA	3.4	NA
1983	NA	NA	20	NA	NA	NA	6.0	NA	NA	NA	3.3	NA
1984	NA	NA	30	NA	NA	NA	6.1	NA	NA	NA	4.9	NA

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP	
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE			Constant 1983 dollars	Constant 1983 dollars
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983			Constant 1983	%			%	Soldiers
Cameroon													
1974	25	47	10	1655	3147	458	7.3	1.5	10.3	6	1.4	428	
1975	29	51	10	1804	3132	577	7.5	1.6	8.8	7	1.3	416	
1976	36	59	10	2006	3277	643	7.7	1.8	9.1	8	1.3	425	
1977	33	51	11	2325	3585	629	7.9	1.4	8.2	7	1.4	454	
1978	44	63	11	2807	4002	734	8.1	1.6	8.5	8	1.4	494	
1979	52	69	11	3385	4469	756	8.3	1.5	9.1	8	1.3	538	
1980	62	75	11	4225	5113	824	8.6	1.5	9.1	9	1.3	598	
1981	56	63	14	5179	5799	1247	8.8	1.1	5.0	7	1.6	660	
1982	64E	67E	14	5849	6118	1311	9.0	1.1	5.1	8	1.6	681	
1983	137	137	15	6503	6503	1674	9.2	2.1	8.2	15	1.6	705	
1984	139	134	15	7122	6885	1691	9.5	1.9	7.9	14	1.6	727	
Canada													
1974	2686	5108	82	137500	261500	59950	22.4	2.0	8.5	228	3.7	11680	
1975	2903	5039	78	152300	264400	65410	22.7	1.9	7.7	222	3.4	11630	
1976	3237	5288	78	171000	279400	64860	23.0	1.9	8.2	230	3.4	12130	
1977	3675	5667	78	184800	284900	65470	23.3	2.0	8.7	243	3.4	12220	
1978	4221	6018	79	207000	295100	69180	23.6	2.0	8.7	256	3.4	12530	
1979	4265	5630	79	230100	303800	68590	23.8	1.9	8.2	237	3.3	12770	
1980	4733	5727	82	254600	308100	71050	24.1	1.9	8.1	238	3.4	12800	
1981	5290	5922	81	284200	318200	76000	24.4	1.9	7.8	243	3.3	13060	
1982	6245	6532	81	290500	303800	80250	24.7	2.2	8.1	265	3.3	12320	
1983	6563	6563	81	313800	313800	83190	24.9	2.1	7.9	264	3.3	12600	
1984	7604	7350	82	340800	329400	89840	25.2	2.2	8.2	292	3.3	13100	
Cape Verde													
1974	
1975	
1976	2	3	3	50	82	32	0.3	3.1	7.9	9	8.9	292	
1977	2	3	2	59	92	36	0.3	3.0	7.6	10	7.1	325	
1978	2	3	4	67	96	52	0.3	2.9	5.4	10	14.1	338	
1979	2	2	4	75	99	52	0.3	2.4	4.5	8	14.0	346	
1980	12	15	4	108	130	88	0.3	11.3	16.8	51	13.8	451	
1981	13	15	4	111	124	109	0.3	11.8	13.5	50	13.6	424	
1982	NA	NA	4	122	128	NA	0.3	NA	NA	NA	13.5	430	
1983	NA	NA	4	127	127	NA	0.3	NA	NA	NA	13.3	423	
1984	NA	NA	6	139	134	NA	0.3	NA	NA	NA	19.6	437	
Central African Republic													
1974	7	14	3	345	657	159	2.0	2.2	8.9	7	1.5	331	
1975	8	13	3	380	660	149	2.0	2.0	9.0	7	1.5	325	
1976	8	13	4	422	689	121	2.1	1.9	11.0	6	1.9	331	
1977	9	14	7	465	716	133	2.1	1.9	10.3	6	3.3	335	
1978	10	14	4	515	735	134	2.2	1.9	10.4	6	1.8	335	
1979	11	14	4	543	716	132	2.3	2.0	10.9	6	1.8	318	
1980	12	14	4	570	690	124	2.3	2.0	11.3	6	1.7	298	
1981	13	15	4	605	677	124	2.4	2.2	12.0	6	1.7	284	
1982	15	15	5	662	692	147	2.4	2.2	10.4	6	2.0	283	
1983	13	13	4	650	650	139	2.5	1.9	9.0	5	1.6	258	
1984	NA	NA	5	730	706	NA	2.6	NA	NA	NA	1.9	273	

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE	PER CAPITA		PER CAPITA
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983			Constant 1983	Millions	%		%
Chad												
1974	8	15	10	150	286	60	4.0	5.4	25.5	4	2.5	71
1975	10	17	11	178	309	59	4.1	5.5	29.0	4	2.7	75
1976	10	16	11	195	318	62	4.2	5.0	25.8	4	2.6	75
1977	8	13	9	210	324	45	4.3	4.0	28.7	3	2.1	75
1978	8	11	NA	232	331	44	4.4	3.5	25.8	3	NA	75
1979	9	11	NA	175	231	40	4.5	5.0	29.0	3	NA	52
1980	NA	NA	NA	181	219	NA	4.4	NA	NA	NA	NA	49
1981	NA	NA	NA	451	505	NA	4.5	NA	NA	NA	NA	111
1982	NA	NA	NA	513	536	NA	4.8	NA	NA	NA	NA	113
1983	7	7	NA	556	556	36	4.9	1.2	18.1	1	NA	113
1984	9	9	16	564	545	39	5.1	1.6	22.0	2	3.2	108
Chile												
1974	441	838	90	9047	17210	5895	10.0	4.9	14.2	83	9.0	1713
1975	404	700	110	8427	14630	5334	10.2	4.8	13.1	69	10.8	1432
1976	380	620	111	9332	15240	4812	10.4	4.1	12.9	60	10.7	1468
1977	441	680	111	10930	16860	5699	10.5	4.0	11.9	64	10.5	1598
1978	537	766	111	12780	18220	6069	10.7	4.2	12.6	72	10.4	1703
1979	540	713	111	14870	19640	5944	10.9	3.6	12.0	66	10.2	1810
1980	625	757	116	17420	21080	6268	11.0	3.6	12.1	69	10.5	1914
1981	739	828	116	19640	21990	6977	11.2	3.8	11.9	74	10.4	1964
1982	742	776	116	17360	18160	6192	11.4	4.3	12.5	68	10.2	1594
1983	759	759	126	18120	18120	6000	11.6	4.2	12.7	65	10.9	1563
1984	817	790	123	19520	18870	6659	11.8	4.2	11.9	67	10.4	1597
China												
Mainland												
									c			
1974	11030E	20970E	4300	81330E	154700E	44820E	901.3	13.6	46.8	23	4.8	172
1975	12730E	22110E	4300	96490E	167500E	47260E	917.9	13.2	46.8	24	4.7	182
1976	13460E	21990E	4300	96990E	158400E	45290E	932.7	13.9	48.6	24	4.6	170
1977	14150E	21820E	4300	110800E	170900E	46920E	946.1	12.8	46.5	23	4.5	181
1978	15740E	22450E	4500	134900E	192300E	61010E	958.8	11.7	36.8	23	4.7	201
1979	19830E	26190E	4600	155700E	205500E	67290E	971.8	12.7	38.9	27	4.7	211
1980	19060E	23070E	4650	181000E	219000E	61860E	983.4	10.5	37.3	23	4.7	223
1981	20150E	22560E	4750	205200E	229700E	55980E	994.9	9.8	40.3	23	4.8	231
1982	21680E	22670E	4350	237000E	247900E	57840E	1008.2	9.1	39.2	22	4.3	246
1983	22670E	22670E	4100	272400E	272400E	64220E	1019.7	8.3	35.3	22	4.0	267
1984	24040E	23240E	4100	321100E	310500E	71910E	1029.2	7.5	32.3	23	4.0	302
Taiwan												
1974	895	1701	493	13210	25130	4271	15.8	6.8	39.8	108	31.2	1588
1975	1099	1908	504	15090	26200	5756	16.1	7.3	33.1	118	31.3	1625
1976	1229	2008	475	18200	29730	6403	16.5	6.8	31.4	122	28.9	1808
1977	1580	2436	460	21220	32720	7283	16.8	7.4	33.4	145	27.4	1949
1978	1962	2797	471	26140	37270	8664	17.1	7.5	32.3	163	27.5	2177
1979	2059E	2718E	468	30620	40430	9097	17.5	6.7	29.9	156	26.8	2316
1980	2353E	2847E	465	35790	43310	10170	17.8	6.6	28.0	160	26.1	2433
1981	2656	2973	461	40890	45780	NA	18.1	6.5	NA	164	25.4	2525
1982	3536	3699	457	45210	47290	NA	18.5	7.8	NA	200	24.8	2562
1983	4085	4085	454	51020	51020	7749	18.8	8.0	52.7	218	24.2	2718
1984	3867	3738	470	58540	56590	8358	19.1	6.6	44.7	196	24.7	2969

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE			Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers			Constant 1983 dollars
	Current	Constant 1983				Current	Constant 1983			Constant 1983	Millions	
Colombia												
1974	146	277	50	14400	27380	3305	23.6	1.0	8.4	12	2.1	1161
1975	195	338	50	16080	27910	3670	24.1	1.2	9.2	14	2.1	1158
1976	167	273	60	17870	29190	3261	24.6	0.9	8.4	11	2.4	1187
1977	144	223	60	19850	30610	3450	25.1	0.7	6.5	9	2.4	1221
1978	171	244	60	23320	33240	3879	25.5	0.7	6.3	10	2.4	1304
1979	258	341	60	26640	35170	4478	26.0	1.0	7.6	13	2.3	1355
1980	325	394	60	30350	36720	5119	26.5	1.1	7.7	15	2.3	1387
1981	340	380	65	33360	37350	5494	27.0	1.0	6.9	14	2.4	1383
1982	438E	458E	70	35720	37370	5746	27.6	1.2	8.0	17	2.5	1355
1983	505	505	70	37810	37810	5453	28.2	1.3	9.3	18	2.5	1343
1984	574	555	70	39980	38650	5569	28.7	1.4	10.0	19	2.4	1344
Congo												
1974	23	44	7	538	1024	350	1.3	4.3	12.5	33	5.3	779
1975	29	50	7	639	1109	455	1.3	4.5	11.1	37	5.2	822
1976	32	53	10	672	1098	367	1.4	4.8	14.4	38	7.2	792
1977	33	51	7	656	1011	339	1.4	5.0	15.0	36	4.6	710
1978	40	57	11	744	1061	429	1.5	5.4	13.3	39	7.5	724
1979	NA	NA	16	867	1145	NA	1.5	NA	NA	NA	10.6	760
1980	43	52	16	1118	1353	722	1.6	3.8	7.2	34	10.3	872
1981	52	58	14	1526	1709	615	1.6	3.4	9.4	36	8.8	1070
1982	74	78	11	1823	1907	803	1.6	4.1	9.7	47	6.7	1160
1983	71	71	11	1937	1937	958	1.7	3.7	7.4	42	6.5	1144
1984	55	53	15	2106	2036	1020	1.7	2.6	5.2	31	8.6	1167
Costa Rica												
1974	7	14	2	1307	2485	489	1.9	0.6	2.8	7	1.0	1282
1975	9	16	2	1447	2511	524	2.0	0.6	3.0	8	1.0	1259
1976	11	18	3	1615	2638	572	2.1	0.7	3.2	9	1.5	1285
1977	15	23	5	1869	2882	584	2.1	0.8	3.9	11	2.4	1364
1978	15	21	5	2131	3039	753	2.2	0.7	2.8	10	2.3	1396
1979	17	22	6	2395	3162	822	2.3	0.7	2.7	10	2.6	1371
1980	17	21	6	2599	3146	833	2.3	0.7	2.5	9	2.6	1370
1981	17	19	6	2686	3007	703	2.4	0.6	2.7	8	2.5	1273
1982	17	17	6	2557	2675	588	2.4	0.6	3.0	7	2.5	1102
1983	23	23	7	2814	2814	747	2.5	0.8	3.0	9	2.8	1126
1984	33E	32E	8	3151	3046	792	2.6	1.0	4.0	12	3.1	1185
Cuba												
1974	e	e										
1974	340	647	140	9240E	17570E	NA	9.2	3.7	NA	71	15.3	1920
1975	393	682	120	10650E	18490E	NA	9.3	3.7	NA	73	12.9	1989
1976	NA	NA	125	11700E	19110E	NA	9.4	NA	NA	NA	13.3	2028
1977	NA	NA	200	12960E	19980E	NA	9.5	NA	NA	NA	21.0	2094
1978	1040	1483	210	14830E	21140E	NA	9.6	7.0	NA	154	21.8	2194
1979	1160	1531	210	16600E	21920E	NA	9.7	7.0	NA	158	21.6	2256
1980	1140	1380	220	17630E	21330E	NA	9.7	6.5	NA	143	22.8	2209
1981	1200	1344	225	20840E	23330E	NA	9.7	5.8	NA	138	23.2	2401
1982	1330	1391	230	22750E	23800E	NA	9.8	5.8	NA	142	23.5	2431
1983	1470	1470	250	25220E	25220E	NA	9.9	5.8	NA	149	25.3	2550
1984	1600	1547	297	26920E	26020E	NA	10.0	5.9	NA	155	29.7	2604

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP	
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE			PER CAPITA	PER CAPITA
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983			Constant 1983	Millions			%	%
Cyprus													
1974	16	30	11	735	1399	349	0.6	2.1	8.6	47	17.2	2183	
1975	18	32	20	653	1133	391	0.6	2.8	8.1	51	32.4	1833	
1976	18	29	18	824	1347	407	0.6	2.2	7.2	48	29.4	2197	
1977	24	37	NA	1000	1542	422	0.6	2.4	8.7	60	NA	2516	
1978	20	28	10	1165	1660	455	0.6	1.7	6.3	46	16.2	2695	
1979	27	36	15	1384	1827	507	0.6	2.0	7.1	58	24.2	2945	
1980	22	27	16	1585	1918	560	0.6	1.4	4.8	43	25.5	3061	
1981	35	39	16	1763	1973	580	0.6	2.0	6.7	61	25.2	3113	
1982	35	36	17	1986	2077	619	0.6	1.7	5.8	56	26.5	3243	
1983	36	36	10	2140	2140	698	0.6	1.7	5.2	56	15.4	3300	
1984	36	35	10	2386	2307	733	0.7	1.5	4.7	53	15.2	3511	
Czechoslovakia													
								d	d				
1974	3305E	6286E	218	54790	104200	32870	14.7	6.0	19.1	429	14.9	7110	
1975	3715E	6449E	210	61950	107500	35900	14.8	6.0	18.0	437	14.2	7280	
1976	3819E	6239E	210	67100	109600	37610	14.9	5.7	16.6	419	14.1	7365	
1977	4090E	6306E	206	74660	115100	99630	15.0	5.5	6.3	421	13.7	7679	
1978	4468E	6370E	212	81380	116000	36540	15.1	5.5	17.4	422	14.1	7689	
1979	4747E	6267E	211	89330	117900	36640	15.2	5.3	17.1	413	13.9	7768	
1980	5386E	6518E	212	99640	120600	37400	15.3	5.4	17.4	427	13.9	7904	
1981	6012E	6731E	212	108700	121700	40820	15.3	5.5	16.5	439	13.8	7944	
1982	6885E	7202E	213	117900	123300	39260	15.4	5.8	18.3	469	13.9	8024	
1983	7271E	7271E	214	124400	124400	40280	15.4	5.8	18.1	472	13.9	8070	
1984	7642E	7388E	213	132700	128300	40950	15.5	5.8	18.0	478	13.8	8298	
Denmark													
1974	585	1112	35	25200	47920	17080	5.0	2.3	6.5	220	6.8	9498	
1975	682	1183	34	27300	47390	17390	5.1	2.5	6.8	234	6.7	9367	
1976	711	1162	31	31000	50640	17220	5.1	2.3	6.7	229	6.1	9984	
1977	773	1192	32	33370	51450	17680	5.1	2.3	6.7	234	6.2	10110	
1978	866	1235	33	36440	51950	18370	5.1	2.4	6.7	242	6.4	10180	
1979	958	1264	33	40370	53300	19690	5.1	2.4	6.4	247	6.4	10420	
1980	1091	1320	33	43610	52770	21560	5.1	2.5	6.1	258	6.4	10300	
1981	1210	1355	33	46410	51970	22760	5.1	2.6	6.0	265	6.4	10150	
1982	1319	1379	32	50730	53060	24120	5.1	2.6	5.7	269	6.2	10370	
1983	1375	1375	30	54310	54310	24900	5.1	2.5	5.5	269	5.9	10620	
1984	1395	1349	31	58080	56140	25440	5.1	2.4	5.3	264	6.1	10990	
Dominican Republic													
1974	51	97	18	2997	5700	1116	4.9	1.7	8.7	20	3.7	1157	
1975	55	95	18	3450	5989	1097	5.1	1.6	8.6	19	3.6	1182	
1976	65	106	19	3912	6390	1057	5.2	1.7	10.1	20	3.6	1226	
1977	71	109	19	4365	6729	1022	5.4	1.6	10.7	20	3.5	1256	
1978	91	129	19	4831	6887	1148	5.5	1.9	11.3	24	3.5	1251	
1979	103	136	19	5426	7163	1428	5.7	1.9	9.5	24	3.4	1267	
1980	86	104	24	5811	7031	1331	5.8	1.5	7.8	18	4.1	1211	
1981	104	116	24	6460	7233	1311	6.0	1.6	8.9	19	4.0	1213	
1982	104	109	25	7093	7419	1105	6.1	1.5	9.8	18	4.1	1212	
1983	105	105	23	7744	7744	1217	6.3	1.4	8.7	17	3.7	1233	
1984	94	91	22	7896	7633	1090	6.4	1.2	8.3	14	3.4	1184	

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME GNP	ME CGE	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			Million dollars								
	Current	Constant 1983		Thousands	Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers
Ecuador												
1974	91	173	20	4242	8069	1055	6.8	2.1	16.4	25	2.9	1181
1975	123	214	20	5107	8865	1100	7.0	2.4	19.5	30	2.8	1260
1976	144	235	24	5881	9607	1254	7.2	2.4	18.7	32	3.3	1326
1977	153	236	30	6663	10270	1412	7.5	2.3	16.7	32	4.0	1378
1978	218	310	35	7665	10930	1256	7.7	2.8	24.7	40	4.6	1425
1979	204	269	35	8594	11350	1246	7.9	2.4	21.6	34	4.4	1437
1980	219	265	35	9764	11820	1766	8.1	2.2	15.0	33	4.3	1454
1981	245	274	34	10930	12240	2080	8.4	2.2	13.2	33	4.1	1464
1982	235E	245E	36	11570	12100	2028	8.6	2.0	12.1	29	4.2	1406
1983	200	200	39	11750	11750	1683	8.9	1.7	11.9	23	4.4	1327
1984	204	197	39	12380	11960	1737	9.1	1.6	11.3	22	4.3	1313
Egypt												
1974	3397E	6461E	410	9506	18080	10160	36.2	35.7	63.6	178	11.3	499
1975	3593E	6237E	400	11250	19530	12340	37.0	31.9	50.5	169	10.8	528
1976	3258E	5323E	400	13660	22310	13900	37.7	23.9	38.3	141	10.6	591
1977	3706E	5714E	350	16270	25090	14130	38.7	22.8	40.4	148	9.0	649
1978	2940Eb	4192Eb	447	18340	26150	14160	39.8	16.0	29.6	105	11.2	658
1979	2590Eb	3420Eb	447	20650	27260	15160	40.9	12.5	22.6	84	10.9	666
1980	2322Eb	2810Eb	447	25330	30650	17850	42.2	9.2	15.7	67	10.6	726
1981	3036Eb	3399Eb	447	29270	32770	16060	43.7	10.4	21.2	78	10.2	750
1982	5476Eb	5728Eb	447	32570	34070	21350	45.1	16.8	26.8	127	9.9	755
1983	5894Eb	5894Eb	447	35820	35820	19200	46.4	16.5	30.7	127	9.6	771
1984	5122Eb	4952Eb	466	38000	36740	19780	47.8	13.5	25.0	104	9.8	769
El Salvador												
1974	27	51	8	2156	4100	539	4.0	1.2	9.4	13	2.0	1019
1975	29	51	8	2491	4323	620	4.1	1.2	8.2	12	1.9	1044
1976	33	54	8	2782	4544	667	4.3	1.2	8.0	13	1.9	1067
1977	36	56	8	3099	4778	729	4.4	1.2	7.7	13	1.8	1090
1978	58E	82E	11	3545	5055	747	4.5	1.6	11.0	18	2.3	1121
1979	82E	109E	14	3802	5020	749	4.6	2.2	14.5	23	3.0	1084
1980	101E	123E	16	3761	4551	791	4.7	2.7	15.5	26	3.4	965
1981	131E	147E	23	3720	4165	850	4.6	3.5	17.3	32	5.0	908
1982	154E	161E	28	3729	3901	788	4.7	4.1	20.4	34	6.0	835
1983	160E	160E	32	3922	3922	703	4.8	4.1	22.8	33	6.7	821
1984	251E	243E	45	4120	3982	793	4.9	6.1	30.6	50	9.2	817
Equatorial Guinea												
1974	1E	3E	5	30	57	6E	0.3	5.0	50.6	10	16.9	192
1975	1E	3E	5	32	55	4E	0.3	4.6	61.8	9	18.4	203
1976	NA	NA	5	34	56	3E	0.2	NA	NA	NA	22.0	245
1977	NA	NA	2	37	56	3E	0.2	NA	NA	NA	9.9	243
1978	NA	NA	2	40	58	4E	0.2	NA	NA	NA	8.4	242
1979	NA	NA	2	45	59	NA	0.2	NA	21.0	8	8.2	242
1980	2E	2E	2	NA	NA	11E	0.3	NA	NA	NA	6.7	NA
1981	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	0.3	NA	NA	NA	6.3	NA
1982	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	0.3	NA	NA	NA	6.2	NA
1983	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	0.3	NA	NA	NA	6.0	NA
1984	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	0.3	NA	NA	NA	8.8	NA

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE			
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983		Millions	%			%
Ethiopia												
1974	37	71	45	1945	3699	511	34.7	1.9	13.9	2	1.3	107
1975	81	141	50	2139	3714	699	35.5	3.8	20.2	4	1.4	104
1976	114	187	65	2347	3834	754	36.4	4.9	24.7	5	1.8	105
1977	145	224	225	2554	3938	767	37.3	5.7	29.2	6	6.0	106
1978	131	187	233	2759	3933	909	37.9	4.7	20.6	5	6.1	104
1979	274	362	250	3156	4166	971	38.4	8.7	37.3	9	6.5	108
1980	346	419	250	3602	4359	1102	38.6	9.6	38.0	11	6.5	113
1981	355E	397E	240	3975	4451	NA	39.2	8.9	NA	10	6.1	114
1982	382E	400E	240	4318	4516	2338	40.2	8.8	NA	10	6.0	112
1983	398	398	240	4729	4729	2599	41.3	8.4	15.3	10	5.8	114
1984	428	413	190	4828	4667	1645	42.1	8.9	25.1	10	4.5	111
Fiji												
1974	1	2	0	470	894	192	0.6	0.2	1.1	4	0.0	1582
1975	2	3	0	514	893	188	0.6	0.3	1.5	5	0.0	1550
1976	2	4	0	562	919	218	0.6	0.4	1.7	6	0.0	1570
1977	3	5	1	630	971	252	0.6	0.5	2.0	8	1.8	1629
1978	6	9	1	699	997	268	0.6	0.9	3.3	14	2.3	1637
1979	8	11	1	841	1110	289	0.6	1.0	3.7	17	1.6	1786
1980	8	10	2	901	1090	286	0.6	0.9	3.3	15	3.2	1719
1981	10	11	2	1052	1178	340	0.6	0.9	3.2	17	3.1	1822
1982	14	14	2	1074	1123	331	0.7	1.3	4.4	22	3.0	1707
1983	15	15	NA	1096	1096	332	0.7	1.4	4.6	23	NA	1632
1984	17	16	3	1243	1201	353	0.7	1.3	4.6	24	4.4	1752
Finland												
1974	252	479	40	20150	38330	10100	4.7	1.2	4.7	102	8.5	8172
1975	329	570	40	22140	38430	12030	4.7	1.5	4.7	121	8.5	8158
1976	313	511	36	23560	38480	12450	4.7	1.3	4.1	108	7.6	8144
1977	347	536	40	24970	38490	12840	4.7	1.4	4.2	113	8.4	8123
1978	391	558	40	27630	39400	12550	4.8	1.4	4.4	117	8.4	8290
1979	471	622	36	32170	42480	13320	4.8	1.5	4.7	131	7.6	8915
1980	594	719	36	37090	44890	13530	4.8	1.6	5.3	150	7.5	9392
1981	604	676	36	40670	45530	13720	4.8	1.5	4.9	141	7.5	9486
1982	707	740	36	44740	46800	14660	4.8	1.6	5.0	153	7.5	9695
1983	843	843	40	48240	48240	15530	4.9	1.7	5.4	174	8.2	9935
1984	790	764	40	51260	49550	15180	4.9	1.5	5.0	156	8.2	10150
France												
1974	8389	15950	585	224800	427600	151100	52.5	3.7	10.6	304	11.1	8145
1975	9459	16420	585	246500	427900	163200	52.8	3.8	10.1	311	11.1	8111
1976	10460	17090	585	275800	450500	171800	53.0	3.8	9.9	323	11.1	8508
1977	11750	18110	584	301300	464500	176700	53.2	3.9	10.2	341	11.0	8736
1978	13390	19090	581	338000	481900	187200	53.4	4.0	10.2	358	10.9	9027
1979	14860	19620	578	377700	498700	197300	53.6	3.9	9.9	366	10.8	9303
1980	16700	20210	575	416800	504400	201400	53.9	4.0	10.0	375	10.7	9364
1981	18750	20990	575	452300	506400	217700	54.1	4.1	9.6	388	10.6	9353
1982	20340	21280	578	491900	514500	235300	54.4	4.1	9.0	391	10.6	9452
1983	21650	21650	578	516000	516000	235600	54.6	4.2	9.2	396	10.6	9442
1984	22350	21600	571	539500	521500	241000	54.8	4.1	9.0	394	10.4	9510

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA		
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE			Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers	Constant 1983 dollars
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983			Constant 1983	%					
Gabon														
1974	11	21	2	1511	2874	853	0.6	0.7	2.5	38	3.5	5085		
1975	17	29	3	1992	3458	1622	0.6	0.8	1.8	46	4.8	5550		
1976	21	33	3	2840	4640	2365	0.7	0.7	1.4	49	4.4	6818		
1977	29	45	4	2628	4052	2422	0.7	1.1	1.9	64	5.6	5700		
1978	65	92	4	2042	2911	1367	0.7	3.2	6.8	124	5.4	3916		
1979	60	80	5	2231	2945	1283	0.8	2.7	6.2	105	6.6	3869		
1980	79	96	5	2516	3045	1190	0.8	3.1	8.0	121	6.3	3845		
1981	68	76	7	2612	2925	1369	0.8	2.6	5.6	91	8.4	3498		
1982	76	80	7	2899	3032	1266	0.9	2.6	6.3	91	8.0	3447		
1983	73	73	7	3096	3096	1475	0.9	2.4	5.0	79	7.6	3362		
1984	71	69	7	3440	3325	1403	1.0	2.1	4.9	72	7.3	3471		
Gambia, The														
1974	0	0	NA	79	151	23	0.5	0.0	0.0	0	NA	294		
1975	0	0	0	84	146	28	0.5	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	275		
1976	0	0	0	97	158	31	0.5	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	288		
1977	0	0	0	105	162	42	0.6	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	284		
1978	0	0	0	108	154	60	0.6	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	261		
1979	NA	NA	0	127	168	52	0.6	NA	NA	NA	0.0	276		
1980	NA	NA	0	142	171	52	0.6	NA	NA	NA	0.0	271		
1981	2	2	1	140	157	57	0.7	1.3	3.6	3	1.5	240		
1982	NA	NA	1	162	170	65	0.7	NA	NA	NA	1.5	251		
1983	NA	NA	1	191	191	NA	0.7	NA	NA	NA	1.4	273		
1984	NA	NA	1	183	177	NA	0.7	NA	NA	NA	1.4	244		
Germany, East														
								d	d					
1974	4095E	7789E	215	67950	129200	55770	16.9	6.0	14.0	460	12.7	7636		
1975	4687E	8136E	220	77410	134400	57610	16.9	6.1	14.1	483	13.1	7974		
1976	5067E	8277E	220	84020	137300	60650	16.8	6.0	13.6	493	13.1	8177		
1977	5427E	8367E	222	92340	142400	63000	16.8	5.9	13.3	499	13.2	8492		
1978	5958E	8494E	228	100800	143700	66010	16.8	5.9	12.9	507	13.6	8577		
1979	6547E	8643E	227	112800	148900	69600	16.7	5.8	12.4	516	13.6	8894		
1980	7265E	8791E	231	125500	151900	73050	16.7	5.8	12.0	525	13.8	9074		
1981	8214E	9197E	232	140500	157300	76790	16.7	5.8	12.0	550	13.9	9399		
1982	9293E	9720E	233	148800	155600	81420	16.7	6.2	11.9	582	14.0	9321		
1983	9966E	9966E	240	157300	157300	84690	16.7	6.3	11.8	597	14.4	9420		
1984	10680E	10330E	240	168600	163000	89010	16.7	6.3	11.6	619	14.4	9769		
Germany, West														
1974	10610	20180	475	293800	558800	151100	62.0	3.6	13.4	325	7.7	9007		
1975	11490	19940	491	316300	549000	164600	61.8	3.6	12.1	322	7.9	8879		
1976	12240	20000	493	353800	578000	171500	61.5	3.5	11.7	325	8.0	9396		
1977	12900	19900	495	385600	594500	175700	61.4	3.3	11.3	324	8.1	9682		
1978	14390	20520	491	431800	615600	180800	61.3	3.3	11.4	335	8.0	10040		
1979	15820	20880	492	486900	642800	186400	61.3	3.2	11.2	340	8.0	10480		
1980	17680	21390	490	542000	655900	199600	61.6	3.3	10.7	347	8.0	10650		
1981	19720	22080	493	585100	655100	206300	61.7	3.4	10.7	358	8.0	10620		
1982	20970	21930	495	618800	647200	206900	61.6	3.4	10.6	356	8.0	10500		
1983	22130	22130	496	655900	655900	207500	61.4	3.4	10.7	360	8.1	10680		
1984	22780	22020	487	697200	674000	210000	61.2	3.3	10.5	360	8.0	11020		

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE			Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers			
	Current	Constant 1983				Current	Constant 1983			Constant 1983	Millions	%
Ghana												
1974	449	854	35	35810	68120	11480	9.8	1.3	7.4	87	3.6	6943
1975	583	1012	20	34320	59570	13760	10.0	1.7	7.3	101	2.0	5953
1976	500	817	20	35210	57520	14260	10.2	1.4	5.7	80	2.0	5634
1977	385	594	18	38290	59030	11820	10.4	1.0	5.0	57	1.7	5674
1978	359	511	19	44970	64120	10080	10.6	0.8	5.1	48	1.8	6063
1979	319	421	15	47290	62430	9768	10.7	0.7	4.3	39	1.4	5824
1980	214	259	14	52150	63100	7038	10.8	0.4	3.7	24	1.3	5821
1981	357	400	9	54310	60810	6548	11.0	0.7	6.1	36	0.8	5535
1982	367	384	9	54630	57140	6351	11.2	0.7	6.1	34	0.8	5105
1983	188E	188E	8	55090	55090	4400	11.9	0.3	4.3	16	0.7	4614
1984	361	349	15	61200	59160	5975	12.6	0.6	5.8	28	1.2	4692
Greece												
1974	772	1467	186	14260	27120	7843	9.0	5.4	18.7	164	20.7	3026
1975	1096	1903	185	16500	28640	8538	9.0	6.6	22.3	210	20.5	3165
1976	1252	2045	186	18680	30510	9784	9.2	6.7	20.9	223	20.3	3328
1977	1399	2157	187	20530	31660	10570	9.3	6.8	20.4	232	20.0	3401
1978	1541	2196	186	23620	33680	11270	9.4	6.5	19.5	233	19.8	3571
1979	1615	2132	187	26480	34950	11490	9.5	6.1	18.6	223	19.5	3661
1980	1615	1954	186	29440	35630	12330	9.6	5.5	15.9	203	19.3	3695
1981	2147	2404	188	31640	35430	13910	9.7	6.8	17.3	247	19.3	3641
1982	2273	2377	186	33650	35200	12770E	9.8	6.8	18.6	243	19.0	3596
1983	2195	2195	177	35000	35000	14680E	9.8	6.3	15.0	223	18.0	3555
1984	2664	2575	197	36950	35720	15340E	9.9	7.2	16.8	260	19.9	3613
Guatemala												
1974	32	61	13	3689	7017	733	5.9	0.9	8.3	10	2.2	1185
1975	72	126	13	5889	10220	1023	6.1	1.2	12.3	21	2.1	1677
1976	49	80	14	4696	7671	924	6.3	1.0	8.6	13	2.2	1223
1977	68	105	14	5430	8372	986	6.5	1.2	10.6	16	2.2	1295
1978	74	106	14	6165	8789	1063	6.7	1.2	10.0	16	2.1	1316
1979	83	109	21	6974	9207	1087	6.9	1.2	10.1	16	3.0	1334
1980	109	132	21	7842	9490	1448	7.1	1.4	9.1	19	2.9	1331
1981	114	128	27	8503	9520	1605	7.4	1.3	8.0	17	3.6	1283
1982	167	175	30	8762	9165	1384	7.7	1.9	12.6	23	3.9	1198
1983	185	185	40	8937	8937	1192	7.9	2.1	15.5	23	5.1	1137
1984	179E	173E	40	9215	8908	1159E	8.1	1.9	14.9	21	4.9	1100
Guinea												
1974	15	28	17	774	1473	236	4.3	1.9	11.8	7	4.0	344
1975	16	27	7	858	1489	268	4.4	1.8	10.0	6	1.6	342
1976	NA	NA	10	1017	1661	481	4.4	NA	NA	NA	2.3	375
1977	NA	NA	10	1092	1684	397	4.5	NA	NA	NA	2.2	374
1978	NA	NA	18	1215	1733	404	4.6	NA	NA	NA	3.9	378
1979	NA	NA	18	1313	1733	852	4.7	NA	NA	NA	3.8	371
1980	NA	NA	28	1458	1765	791	4.8	NA	NA	NA	5.9	370
1981	77E	86E	28	1562	1749	840	4.9	4.9	10.2	18	5.8	360
1982	NA	NA	28	1675	1752	796E	5.0	NA	NA	NA	5.6	354
1983	57E	57E	28	1757	1757	724E	5.1	3.3	7.9	11	5.5	347
1984	NA	NA	28	1838	1777	NA	5.3	NA	NA	NA	5.3	336

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE			
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983			Constant 1983	%			
Guinea-Bissau												
1974	0	1	5	71	136	21	0.6	0.4	2.5	1	7.8	212
1975	NA	NA	5	86	150	40	0.7	NA	NA	NA	7.3	220
1976	4	6	5	88	144	46	0.7	4.4	13.8	9	6.8	196
1977	4	6	6	88	135	61	0.7	4.5	10.1	8	8.1	182
1978	4	6	6	107	153	75	0.8	3.8	7.8	8	7.9	202
1979	5	6	5	123	162	87	0.8	4.0	7.4	8	6.5	211
1980	6	8	4	114	138	102	0.8	5.6	7.6	10	5.1	176
1981	6	7	12	145	163	88	0.8	4.1	7.6	8	15.0	204
1982	7	8	9	162	170	91	0.8	4.5	8.4	9	11.1	209
1983	NA	NA	9	163	163	NA	0.8	NA	NA	NA	10.9	197
1984	NA	NA	11	167	161	NA	0.8	NA	NA	NA	13.1	192
Guyana												
1974	8	14	4	277	527	198	0.8	2.7	7.3	19	5.2	688
1975	22	39	2	340	590	296	0.8	6.6	13.2	51	2.6	768
1976	29	47	5	359	587	389	0.8	8.1	12.2	62	6.5	768
1977	22	33	7	369	569	276	0.8	5.9	12.0	44	9.2	750
1978	14	21	7	394	562	249	0.8	3.7	8.3	27	9.3	743
1979	15	19	7	416	550	313	0.8	3.5	6.2	26	9.4	726
1980	18	22	7	457	552	386	0.8	4.0	5.7	29	9.4	728
1981	21	24	7	485	543	424	0.8	4.4	5.6	31	9.2	712
1982	26	27	7	459	480	NA	0.8	5.6	NA	35	9.2	628
1983	22	22	7	456	456	380	0.8	4.9	5.9	29	9.1	596
1984	24	23	7	501	485	NA	0.8	4.8	NA	31	9.1	632
Haiti												
1974	10	18	6	701	1332	173	4.9	1.4	10.4	4	1.2	274
1975	11	19	6	752	1306	232	4.9	1.5	8.2	4	1.2	265
1976	11	18	6	868	1418	266	5.0	1.3	6.7	4	1.2	284
1977	11	17	7	920	1418	290	5.1	1.2	5.9	3	1.4	280
1978	13	19	7	1041	1484	274	5.1	1.3	6.8	4	1.4	289
1979	15	20	7	1214	1603	304	5.2	1.2	6.6	4	1.3	308
1980	23	28	7	1422	1721	302	5.3	1.6	9.3	5	1.3	326
1981	29	32	8	1489	1668	335	5.4	1.9	9.6	6	1.5	311
1982	28	29	8	1539	1609	297	5.4	1.8	9.9	5	1.5	295
1983	25	25	8	1616	1616	284	5.5	1.6	8.9	5	1.4	291
1984	27	27	6	1716	1659	299	5.7	1.6	8.9	5	1.1	293
Honduras												
1974	18	35	10	1123	2136	303	3.1	1.6	11.4	11	3.3	697
1975	23	40	12	1180	2048	349	3.2	2.0	11.5	13	3.8	646
1976	25	41	12	1334	2179	392	3.3	1.9	10.4	12	3.7	664
1977	31	48	12	1569	2418	424E	3.4	2.0	11.4	14	3.5	712
1978	43	61	14	1815	2588	544E	3.5	2.4	11.2	17	3.8	735
1979	50	65	14	2084	2751	574E	3.6	2.4	11.4	18	3.8	755
1980	51Eb	62	14	2322	2810	686E	3.8	2.2	9.1	16	3.7	744
1981	46Eb	51	17	2557	2863	657E	3.9	1.8	7.8	13	4.3	728
1982	56Eb	58	17	2641	2763	710E	4.1	2.1	8.2	14	4.2	679
1983	80Eb	80	19	2809	2809	605E	4.2	2.8	13.2	19	4.5	668
1984	124Eb	120	20	2981	2882	733E	4.4	4.2	16.4	28	4.6	662

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE			Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers			
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions			%	%	
Hungary												
								d	d			
1974	1691E	3216E	125	33500	63720	31480	10.5	5.0	10.2	307	11.9	6085
1975	1827E	3171E	118	37580	65230	36100	10.5	4.9	8.8	301	11.2	6194
1976	1779E	2906E	118	40110	65520	35020	10.6	4.4	8.3	274	11.1	6188
1977	1842E	2840E	144	45470	70100	35980	10.6	4.1	7.9	267	13.5	6591
1978	2078E	2963E	110	50000	71290	36040	10.7	4.2	8.2	278	10.3	6679
1979	2226E	2939E	110	54550	72020	36600	10.7	4.1	8.0	275	10.3	6732
1980	2640E	3195E	119	60070	72690	40040	10.7	4.4	8.0	298	11.1	6787
1981	2914E	3263E	120	66360	74300	42370	10.7	4.4	7.7	305	11.2	6936
1982	3114E	3257E	110	73200	76570	41120	10.7	4.3	7.9	304	10.3	7152
1983	3197E	3197E	105	75260	75260	42100	10.7	4.2	7.6	299	9.8	7044
1984	3286E	3177E	105	80280	77610	41790	10.7	4.1	7.6	298	9.8	7277
Iceland												
1974	0	0	0	1087	2067	709	0.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	9602
1975	0	0	0	1172	2034	749	0.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	9329
1976	0	0	0	1286	2101	665	0.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	9546
1977	0	0	0	1449	2233	728	0.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	10070
1978	0	0	0	1641	2339	759	0.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	10460
1979	0	0	0	1813	2394	799	0.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	10600
1980	0	0	0	2089	2528	717	0.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	11080
1981	0	0	0	2298	2573	756	0.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	11150
1982	0	0	0	2435	2547	843	0.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	10890
1983	0	0	0	2399	2399	785	0.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	10120
1984	0	0	0	2541	2457	805	0.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	10270
India												
1974	1939	3689	1620	63940	121600	17530	607.7	3.0	21.0	6	2.7	200
1975	2499	4338	1670	76910	133500	22880	621.0	3.2	19.0	7	2.7	215
1976	2953	4824	1440	83060	135700	24120	634.4	3.6	20.0	8	2.3	214
1977	3468	5346	1270	95210	146800	25340	647.5	3.6	21.1	8	2.0	227
1978	3960	5646	1300	109900	156700	29360	660.7	3.6	19.2	9	2.0	237
1979	3965	5235	1286	113100	149300	29180	674.5	3.5	17.9	8	1.9	221
1980	4496	5441	1104	131800	159500	31620	689.0	3.4	17.2	8	1.6	232
1981	5328	5966	1104	149600	167500	32600	704.2	3.6	18.3	8	1.6	238
1982	5948	6222	1120	166300	173900	35660	719.8	3.6	17.4	9	1.6	242
1983	6776	6776	1250	187000	187000	37990	735.6	3.6	17.8	9	1.7	254
1984	7141E	6903E	1380	200500	193800	44240	751.6	3.6	15.6	9	1.8	258
Indonesia												
1974	700	1331	270	23340	44400	8080	134.3	3.0	16.5	10	2.0	331
1975	1024	1778	260	26880	46660	9932	137.5	3.8	17.9	13	1.9	339
1976	1075	1757	257	30930	50520	11470	140.8	3.5	15.3	12	1.8	359
1977	1161	1791	260	35360	54520	11120	144.3	3.3	16.1	12	1.8	378
1978	1342	1913	250	41000	58450	12740	147.8	3.3	15.0	13	1.7	395
1979	1511	1995	250	46440	61310	14580	151.4	3.3	13.7	13	1.7	405
1980	1726	2089	250	55430	67070	16460	154.9	3.1	12.7	13	1.6	433
1981	2100	2351	265	65490	73320	19380	158.5	3.2	12.1	15	1.7	463
1982	2268	2373	280	71900	75210	17670	162.1	3.2	13.4	15	1.7	464
1983	2125	2125	280	77360	77360	19130	165.8	2.7	11.1	13	1.7	467
1984	2211	2138	281	84800	81980	17210	169.4	2.6	12.4	13	1.7	484

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE							
	Current	Constant 1983						Current	Constant 1983			
Iran												
1974	8955	17030	310	64760	123200E	50260	32.4	13.8	33.9	526	9.6	3800
1975	13210	22940	385	75150	130400E	58620	33.4	17.6	39.1	687	11.5	3908
1976	14460	23620	420	92450	151000E	63710	34.4	15.6	37.1	687	12.2	4393
1977	11620	17910	350	98000	151100E	67660	35.4	11.9	26.5	505	9.9	4264
1978	14240	20300	350	85620	122100E	54260	36.5	16.6	37.4	556	9.6	3341
1979	8839Eb	11670Eb	415	107900	142400E	46490	37.6	8.2	25.1	310	11.0	3782
1980	7538Eb	9121Eb	305	113400	137200E	46410	38.8	6.6	19.7	235	7.9	3541
1981	8197Eb	9177Eb	260	119800E	134100E	44350	40.0	6.8	20.7	230	6.5	3356
1982	9283Eb	9710Eb	240	139100E	145500E	44660	41.2	6.7	21.7	236	5.8	3531
1983	8163Eb	8163Eb	240	157600E	157600E	43980	42.5	5.2	18.6	192	5.6	3708
1984	11360Eb	10980Eb	335	158800E	153500E	36660	43.8	7.2	29.9	251	7.6	3504
Iraq	b	b							c			
1974	3037E	5775E	110	14090	26790E	12800	10.8	21.6	45.1	537	10.2	2491
1975	3058E	5308E	155	17570	30500E	17810	11.1	17.4	29.8	477	13.9	2743
1976	3604E	5888E	190	20950	34220E	15720	11.5	17.2	37.5	512	16.5	2977
1977	4374E	6744E	140	24190	37300E	16600	11.9	18.1	40.6	567	11.8	3139
1978	5718E	8152E	362	29750	42420E	29140	12.3	19.2	28.0	664	29.5	3453
1979	6434E	8495E	444	43310	57180E	34160	12.7	14.9	24.9	669	35.0	4503
1980	11230E	13590E	430	49930E	60420E	50450	13.1	22.5	26.9	1035	32.7	4601
1981	13750E	15400E	392	30490E	34130E	35070	13.6	45.1	43.9	1134	28.9	2515
1982	14090E	14740E	404	31460E	32910E	29020	14.0	44.8	50.8	1050	28.8	2345
1983	13990E	13990E	434	31560E	31560E	NA	14.5	44.3	NA	964	29.9	2175
1984	14640E	14150E	788	34470E	33320E	NA	15.0	42.5	NA	944	52.5	2222
Ireland												
1974	94	179	11	7106	13520	5880	3.1	1.3	3.0	57	3.5	4313
1975	143	249	11	7901	13710	6155	3.2	1.8	4.0	78	3.5	4303
1976	136	222	14	8525	13930	6392	3.2	1.6	3.5	69	4.3	4302
1977	153	236	13	9595	14790	6692	3.3	1.6	3.5	72	3.9	4510
1978	176	250	14	10920	15570	7419	3.3	1.6	3.4	75	4.2	4687
1979	192	253	14	12030	15880	8017	3.4	1.6	3.2	75	4.1	4701
1980	228	276	19	13770	16660	8834	3.4	1.7	3.1	81	5.6	4890
1981	241	270	19	15200	17020	9560	3.5	1.6	2.8	78	5.5	4933
1982	308	322	21	16150	16890	10300	3.5	1.9	3.1	92	6.0	4840
1983	312	312	18	16790	16790	10320	3.5	1.9	3.0	89	5.1	4781
1984	319	308	13	17780	17190	10390	3.6	1.8	3.0	87	3.7	4841
Israel												
1974	2814	5352	182	10760	20470	13660	3.3	26.1	39.2	1623	55.2	6206
1975	3546	6155	172	12130	21060	14810	3.4	29.2	41.6	1829	51.1	6257
1976	3881	6340	172	13050	21320	15920	3.4	29.7	39.8	1844	50.0	6202
1977	3876	5976	179	13950	21510	16490	3.5	27.8	36.2	1701	50.9	6122
1978	3634	5181	179	15780	22490	15570	3.6	23.0	33.3	1443	49.8	6263
1979	5243	6922	181	17990	23760	18950	3.7	29.1	36.5	1881	49.2	6458
1980	6085	7364	196	20050	24260	20000	3.8	30.4	36.8	1955	52.0	6441
1981	5560	6225	201	22760	25490	21770	3.8	24.4	28.6	1624	52.4	6648
1982	5456	5707	205	24440	25560	21400	3.9	22.3	26.7	1466	52.6	6564
1983	6308	6308	205	26130	26130	27050	4.0	24.1	23.3	1590	51.7	6585
1984	7206	6966	205	26570	25680	26650	4.0	27.1	26.1	1721	50.6	6345

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE			Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers			Constant 1983 dollars
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions			%	%	
Italy												
1974	4162	7916	534	161300	306800	121200	55.2	2.6	6.5	143	9.7	5555
1975	4224	7331	459	169900	294900	137500	55.6	2.5	5.3	132	8.3	5306
1976	4420	7221	455	191200	312300	136800	55.8	2.3	5.3	129	8.1	5593
1977	4941	7619	475	206800	318800	144100	56.1	2.4	5.3	136	8.5	5686
1978	5488	7824	489	230000	327800	143900	56.2	2.4	5.4	139	8.7	5829
1979	6213	8202	490	260100	343400	155700	56.4	2.4	5.3	146	8.7	6092
1980	7135	8635	500	295100	357100	174900	56.5	2.4	4.9	153	8.9	6326
1981	7862	8803	505	318000	356100	177600	56.5	2.5	5.0	156	8.9	6301
1982	8903	9312	517	337900	353500	183500	56.6	2.6	5.1	165	9.1	6246
1983	9481	9481	498	352100	352100	200800	56.8	2.7	4.7	167	8.8	6196
1984	10110	9771	508	373100	360700	209000	57.0	2.7	4.7	171	8.9	6330
Ivory Coast												
1974	35	66	7	2456	4671	1207	6.5	1.4	5.5	10	1.1	718
1975	37	64	7	2945	5112	1317	6.8	1.3	4.9	10	1.0	756
1976	41	67	8	3488	5699	1632	7.0	1.2	4.1	9	1.1	810
1977	78E	120E	9	3838	5918	1673	7.3	2.0	7.2	16	1.2	808
1978	96E	138E	8	4562	6504	2164	7.6	2.1	6.4	18	1.0	853
1979	109E	144E	6	5020	6627	2425	7.9	2.2	5.9	18	0.8	835
1980	97E	117E	6	5833	7058	2341	8.3	1.7	5.0	14	0.7	855
1981	100E	112E	11	5827	6525	2388E	8.6	1.7	4.7	13	1.3	759
1982	110E	115E	21	5901	6172	2288E	8.9	1.9	5.0	13	2.3	690
1983	76E	76E	21	5975	5975	1924E	9.3	1.3	4.0	8	2.3	642
1984	78E	75E	21	5923	5726	1697E	9.7	1.3	4.4	8	2.2	591
Jamaica												
1974	14	26	4	2141	4073	1383	2.0	0.6	1.9	13	2.0	1997
1975	18	31	1	2303	3997	1426	2.1	0.8	2.1	15	0.5	1935
1976	22	37	1	2210	3610	1518	2.1	1.0	2.4	18	0.5	1731
1977	22	34	1	2265	3492	1505	2.1	1.0	2.3	16	0.5	1662
1978	20	28	2	2443	3483	1597	2.1	0.8	1.8	13	0.7	1644
1979	23	30	1	2546	3362	1416	2.1	0.9	2.1	14	0.5	1575
1980	25	30	2	2597	3143	1632	2.1	0.9	1.8	14	1.0	1463
1981	35	39	2	2924	3274	1579	2.2	1.2	2.5	18	0.9	1510
1982	49	51	2	3162	3307	1761	2.2	1.5	2.9	23	0.9	1504
1983	43	43	3	3415	3415	1656	2.2	1.2	2.6	19	1.3	1537
1984	27	26	2	3210	3103	1207	2.2	0.8	2.1	12	0.9	1383
Japan												
1974	3463	6586	237	424300	807000	116700	110.2	0.8	5.6	60	2.2	7325
1975	4280	7430	237	476900	827800	125200	111.6	0.9	5.9	67	2.1	7419
1976	4864	7945	236	532900	870500	137000	112.8	0.9	5.8	70	2.1	7719
1977	5452	8405	236	594500	916600	151700	113.9	0.9	5.5	74	2.1	8050
1978	6338	9036	239	675800	963600	171000	114.9	0.9	5.3	79	2.1	8385
1979	7349	9702	239	768000	1014000	188000	115.9	1.0	5.2	84	2.1	8749
1980	8155	9868	242	877900	1062000	199000	116.8	0.9	5.0	84	2.1	9095
1981	9226	10330	241	987300	1105000	208600	117.6	0.9	5.0	88	2.0	9396
1982	10470	10950	243	1092000	1142000	214400	118.4	1.0	5.1	92	2.1	9644
1983	11600	11600	241	1181000	1181000	222100	119.3	1.0	5.2	97	2.0	9899
1984	12700	12280	241	1292000	1249000	226700	120.0	1.0	5.4	102	2.0	10410

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE							
	Current	Constant 1983				Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars
Jordan												
									C			
1974	297E	565E	70	846	1609	1192E	1.8	35.1	47.4	316	39.1	899
1975	302E	525E	60	1026	1781	1361E	1.9	29.5	38.6	282	32.2	957
1976	568E	928E	65	1334	2179	1512E	1.9	42.6	61.4	480	33.6	1126
1977	496E	765E	70	1561	2406	2005E	2.0	31.8	38.2	381	34.8	1197
1978	540E	770E	70	1932	2755	2077E	2.1	28.0	37.1	369	33.5	1320
1979	703E	928E	67	2221	2932	2266E	2.2	31.7	41.0	429	30.9	1354
1980	743E	899E	65	2674	3235	2298E	2.2	27.8	39.1	401	29.0	1441
1981	800E	896E	66	3138	3513	2359E	2.3	25.5	38.0	385	28.4	1510
1982	786E	823E	68	3611	3777	2326E	2.4	21.8	35.4	341	28.2	1567
1983	634E	634E	72	3905	3905	2066E	2.5	16.2	30.7	254	28.9	1565
1984	749E	724E	78	4042	3908	1983E	2.6	18.5	36.5	280	30.2	1514
Kenya												
1974	28	53	9	2010	3823	804	13.0	1.4	6.7	4	0.7	294
1975	37	64	9	2231	3873	955	13.5	1.7	6.7	5	0.7	287
1976	36	58	9	2395	3913	993	14.0	1.5	5.9	4	0.6	279
1977	67	103	13	2782	4289	928	14.6	2.4	11.1	7	0.9	294
1978	130	186	13	3214	4583	1286	15.2	4.1	14.4	12	0.9	302
1979	176	233	13	3649	4818	1444	15.8	4.8	16.1	15	0.8	305
1980	184	223	13	4201	5084	1458	16.4	4.4	15.3	14	0.8	309
1981	148	166	17	4820	5397	1657	17.1	3.1	10.0	10	1.0	315
1982	202	211	19	5147	5384	1707	17.8	3.9	12.4	12	1.1	302
1983	207	207	18	5560	5560	1537	18.6	3.7	13.5	11	1.0	299
1984	197	190	19	5752	5560	1512	19.4	3.4	12.6	10	1.0	287
Korea, North												
1974	1370E	2606E	470	7050E	13410E	9301	15.5	19.4	28.0	169	30.4	868
1975	2000E	3472E	470	9000E	15620E	9235	15.9	22.2	37.6	219	29.6	985
1976	2200E	3594E	500	9900E	16170E	9916	16.3	22.2	36.2	221	30.8	995
1977	2500E	3854E	520	11100E	17110E	10750	16.7	22.5	35.9	231	31.2	1027
1978	2800E	3992E	632	12400E	17680E	11750	17.1	22.6	34.0	234	37.0	1036
1979	3200E	4225E	692	14400E	19010E	13600	17.5	22.2	31.1	242	39.6	1088
1980	3500E	4235E	700	15500E	18760E	13310E	17.9	22.6	31.8	237	39.1	1048
1981	4200E	4703E	768	18600E	20830E	NA	18.3	22.6	NA	257	41.9	1137
1982	4600E	4811E	782	20500E	21440E	12340E	18.7	22.4	39.0	257	41.7	1144
1983	4900E	4900E	784	21600E	21600E	NA	19.2	22.7	NA	255	40.9	1126
1984	5200E	5027E	784	23000E	22230E	NA	19.6	22.6	NA	256	39.9	1133
Korea, South												
1974	906	1723	634	20870	39700	6458	36.0	4.3	26.7	48	17.6	1102
1975	1144	1985	630	24450	42450	7532	36.7	4.7	26.4	54	17.2	1158
1976	1670	2728	610	29660	48440	8919	37.3	5.6	30.6	73	16.4	1300
1977	2000	3083	600	35410	54600	10010	37.9	5.6	30.8	81	15.8	1442
1978	2530	3608	600	42010	59900	11060	38.4	6.0	32.6	94	15.6	1558
1979	2506	3309	638	48320	63800	12410	39.0	5.2	26.7	85	16.4	1636
1980	3069	3714	600	49970	60480	12670	39.6	6.1	29.3	94	15.2	1529
1981	3612	4044	606	57570	64460	14560	40.1	6.3	27.8	101	15.1	1606
1982	4052	4238	601	64970	67960	15590	40.7	6.2	27.2	104	14.7	1668
1983	4390	4390	602	76040	76040	15730	41.4	5.8	27.9	106	14.6	1838
1984	4590	4437	602	85300	82460	16690	42.0	5.4	26.6	106	14.3	1963

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE			Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers			
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions			%	%	
Kuwait												
1974	589	1120	15	12100	23010E	7433	0.9	4.9	15.1	1182	15.8	24260
1975	692	1201	25	12710	22060E	NA	1.0	5.4	NA	1193	24.8	21910
1976	1027	1678	25	14660	23950E	NA	1.1	7.0	NA	1566	23.3	22350
1977	849	1310	10	15670	24160E	7826	1.1	5.4	16.7	1148	8.8	21180
1978	620	884	10	17050	24300E	9355	1.2	3.6	9.4	728	8.2	20030
1979	771	1017	11	26020	34350E	8563	1.3	3.0	11.9	788	8.5	26590
1980	897	1086	12	29990	36290E	9855	1.4	3.0	11.0	793	8.8	26500
1981	863	966	12	30400	34030E	12750	1.4	2.8	7.6	675	8.4	23770
1982	1127	1179	13	26390	27610E	13300	1.5	4.3	8.9	787	8.7	18440
1983	1408	1408	13	26970	26970E	12540	1.6	5.2	11.2	900	8.3	17240
1984	1438	1391	15	27030	26130E	11880	1.6	5.3	11.7	850	9.2	15980
Laos												
1974	NA	NA	60	NA	NA	NA	3.1	NA	NA	NA	19.4	NA
1975	NA	NA	46	NA	NA	NA	3.2	NA	NA	NA	14.6	NA
1976	NA	NA	46	NA	NA	NA	3.2	NA	NA	NA	14.5	NA
1977	NA	NA	45	290E	447E	NA	3.2	NA	NA	NA	14.0	139
1978	NA	NA	47	NA	NA	NA	3.2	NA	NA	NA	14.5	NA
1979	50E	66E	46	NA	NA	227E	3.3	NA	29.1	20	14.1	NA
1980	NA	NA	55	NA	NA	NA	3.3	NA	NA	NA	16.7	NA
1981	NA	NA	46	NA	NA	NA	3.3	NA	NA	NA	13.8	NA
1982	NA	NA	46	460E	481E	NA	3.4	NA	NA	NA	13.5	142
1983	NA	NA	46	NA	NA	NA	3.5	NA	NA	NA	13.2	NA
1984	55E	53E	46	525E	508E	249E	3.5	10.5	21.3	15	13.0	143
Lebanon												
1974	201	382	20	5969	11350	1874	2.6	3.4	20.4	144	7.6	4288
1975	223	387	24	5451	9461	2461	2.7	4.1	15.7	142	8.8	3483
1976	175	286	24	2896	4731	1811	2.7	6.0	15.8	106	8.9	1748
1977	177	273	9	4909	7569	1658	2.7	3.6	16.4	101	3.3	2809
1978	240	342	9	5043	7190	1692	2.7	4.8	20.2	128	3.4	2682
1979	331	438	18	5610	7406	1840	2.7	5.9	23.8	164	6.8	2778
1980	381	460	18	6549	7925	2064	2.6	5.8	22.3	174	6.8	2992
1981	341	382	20	7007	7845	1619	2.6	4.9	23.6	145	7.6	2983
1982	317	332	21	6375	6669	2012	2.6	5.0	16.5	127	8.0	2555
1983	530	530	20	6477	6477	2650	2.6	8.2	20.0	204	7.7	2493
1984	NA	NA	19	NA	NA	NA	2.6	NA	NA	NA	7.3	NA
Lesotho												
1974	0	0	1	221	421	62	1.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.9	360
1975	0	0	1	264	458	89	1.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.8	383
1976	0	0	1	321	525	104	1.2	0.0	0.0	0	0.8	429
1977	0	0	1	379	584	129	1.3	0.0	0.0	0	0.5	467
1978	2E	2E	1	432	615	130E	1.3	0.4	1.9	2	0.8	481
1979	7E	9E	1	458	604	175E	1.3	1.5	5.2	7	0.8	462
1980	NA	NA	1	526	636	178E	1.3	NA	NA	NA	0.7	475
1981	12E	14E	2	623	698	211E	1.4	2.0	6.6	10	1.5	509
1982	NA	NA	2	778	814	NA	1.4	NA	NA	NA	1.4	580
1983	23E	23E	2	813	813	175	1.4	2.9	13.3	16	1.4	565
1984	57E	55E	2	871	842	192	1.5	6.5	28.5	37	1.0	571

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP
	Million dollars			Million dollars				Million dollars	GNP	CGE		PER CAPITA
	Current	Constant 1983		Thousands	Current	Constant 1983		Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars
Liberia												
1974	5	9	6	549	1044	187	1.6	0.9	4.9	6	3.8	663
1975	5	8	6	580	1007	180	1.6	0.8	4.3	5	3.7	620
1976	6	10	6	650	1062	252	1.7	1.0	4.0	6	3.6	634
1977	7	10	4	699	1077	256	1.7	1.0	4.0	6	2.3	623
1978	8	11	7	789	1125	306	1.8	1.0	3.7	6	3.9	631
1979	8	10	7	879	1161	403	1.8	0.9	2.5	6	3.8	631
1980	14	16	7	913	1105	317	1.9	1.5	5.2	9	3.7	582
1981	33	37	5	968	1084	356	2.0	3.4	10.3	19	2.6	553
1982	47	49	5	972	1017	383	2.0	4.8	12.7	24	2.5	503
1983	27	27	5	970	970	366	2.1	2.8	7.3	13	2.4	464
1984	22	22	6	964	932	306	2.2	2.3	7.0	10	2.8	431
Libya												
	b	b										
1974	726E	1382E	25	11640	22130E	8335	2.4	6.2	16.6	583	10.5	9333
1975	794E	1378E	25	11310	19640E	8228	2.5	7.0	16.7	555	10.1	7911
1976	1368E	2235E	25	14830	24230E	9664	2.6	9.2	23.1	870	9.7	9433
1977	1679E	2589E	30	17720	27320E	10160	2.6	9.5	25.5	991	11.5	10460
1978	2730E	3892E	50	17510	24960E	10440	2.7	15.6	37.3	1443	18.5	9256
1979	3000E	3961E	51	24210	31960E	10650	2.9	12.4	37.2	1384	17.8	11170
1980	2750E	3328E	53	32460	39280E	14220	3.0	8.5	23.4	1104	17.6	13020
1981	NA	NA	55	28180	31550E	NA	3.2	NA	NA	NA	17.4	9973
1982	3311E	3463E	55	30990	32420E	11480E	3.3	10.7	30.2	1042	16.5	9752
1983	4301E	4301E	68	28500	28500E	13440E	3.5	15.1	32.0	1234	19.5	8177
1984	5101E	4932E	90	28620	27670E	12330E	3.6	17.8	40.0	1360	24.8	7631
Luxembourg												
1974	14	26	1	2007	3817	1100	0.4	0.7	2.3	73	3.1	10750
1975	18	31	1	2193	3807	1379	0.4	0.8	2.2	86	3.1	10610
1976	20	32	1	2408	3933	1449	0.4	0.8	2.2	89	3.0	10900
1977	21	33	1	2640	4070	1596	0.4	0.8	2.1	91	3.3	11260
1978	25	35	1	2982	4251	1593	0.4	0.8	2.2	97	3.3	11740
1979	27	36	1	3414	4507	1679	0.4	0.8	2.1	98	3.3	12420
1980	34	42	1	3677	4450	1767	0.4	0.9	2.4	114	3.3	12210
1981	38	43	1	3996	4474	1818	0.4	1.0	2.4	117	3.0	12240
1982	40	42	1	4435	4639	1829	0.4	0.9	2.3	115	3.3	12690
1983	41	41	1	4571	4571	1833	0.4	0.9	2.2	113	2.7	12500
1984	42	41	1	4933	4769	1773E	0.4	0.9	2.3	112	2.7	13030
Madagascar												
1974	22	43	11	1554	2957	532	7.4	1.4	8.0	6	1.5	398
1975	29	50	13	1722	2989	514	7.6	1.7	9.7	7	1.7	393
1976	35	58	17	1779	2906	593	7.8	2.0	9.8	7	2.2	373
1977	51	79	17	1928	2972	617	8.0	2.7	12.8	10	2.1	373
1978	58	83	20	2044	2914	769	8.2	2.8	10.8	10	2.4	356
1979	103	136	20	2425	3201	954	8.4	4.3	14.3	16	2.4	381
1980	109	132	20	2643	3199	973	8.6	4.1	13.5	15	2.3	370
1981	104E	116E	28	2551	2857	1125E	8.9	4.1	10.3	13	3.2	321
1982	NA	NA	28	2638	2759	789E	9.1	NA	NA	NA	3.1	302
1983	61E	61E	29	2724	2724	596E	9.4	2.2	10.2	6	3.1	290
1984	72E	69E	28	2727	2637	674E	9.7	2.6	10.3	7	2.9	273

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE	PER CAPITA		PER CAPITA
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983			Constant 1983	%	%		Constant 1983 dollars
Malawi												
1974	5	9	5	487	926	200	4.9	0.9	4.4	2	1.0	187
1975	10	17	5	559	970	257	5.2	1.7	6.5	3	1.0	188
1976	8	13	4	597	975	222	5.4	1.4	6.0	2	0.7	182
1977	13	20	4	661	1019	247	5.5	1.9	8.0	4	0.6	185
1978	25	35	3	807	1150	352	5.7	3.0	9.9	6	0.5	203
1979	43	57	3	885	1169	421	5.8	4.9	13.5	10	0.5	200
1980	45	54	4	936	1133	433	6.0	4.8	12.5	9	0.7	188
1981	31	34	6	958	1073	412	6.2	3.2	8.4	6	1.0	173
1982	25	26	6	1058	1107	347	6.4	2.4	7.5	4	0.9	173
1983	22	22	6	1157	1157	351	6.6	1.9	6.2	3	0.9	175
1984	21	20	6	1250	1208	353	6.8	1.7	5.7	3	0.9	177
Malaysia												
1974	346	659	75	8291	15770	4144	12.0	4.2	15.9	55	6.3	1316
1975	433	752	76	9288	16120	4928	12.3	4.7	15.3	61	6.2	1314
1976	432	706	80	10930	17850	5125	12.6	4.0	13.8	56	6.4	1422
1977	601	927	79	12450	19200	6021	12.8	4.8	15.4	72	6.2	1495
1978	554	790	82	14270	20340	6276	13.1	3.9	12.6	60	6.2	1548
1979	646	853	82	16810	22200	5939	13.4	3.8	14.4	63	6.1	1651
1980	875	1059	83	20040	24250	8098	13.8	4.4	13.1	77	6.0	1762
1981	1390	1556	90	23280	26060	11400	14.1	6.0	13.7	110	6.4	1848
1982	1545	1616	95	25970	27160	13420E	14.4	5.9	12.0	112	6.6	1882
1983	1443E	1443E	105	28220	28220	12210E	14.8	5.1	11.8	98	7.1	1910
1984	1193E	1154E	105	31120	30080	11210E	15.1	3.8	10.3	76	6.9	1990
Mali												
1974	9	17	8	398	757	87	6.1	2.2	19.5	3	1.3	125
1975	12	20	8	493	857	95	6.2	2.4	21.4	3	1.3	138
1976	15	24	8	599	978	123	6.3	2.4	19.3	4	1.3	154
1977	17	27	7	682	1052	145	6.5	2.6	18.5	4	1.1	162
1978	19	27	8	725	1034	150	6.6	2.6	18.0	4	1.2	156
1979	20	27	5	867	1144	157	6.8	2.3	17.0	4	0.7	169
1980	21	26	7	934	1130	246	6.9	2.3	10.5	4	1.0	163
1981	22	25	8	973	1089	248	7.1	2.3	9.9	3	1.1	154
1982	26	27	11	1104	1154	322	7.2	2.3	8.4	4	1.5	160
1983	27	27	11	1103	1103	340	7.4	2.4	7.9	4	1.5	149
1984	24E	23E	11	1122	1085	NA	7.6	2.1	NA	3	1.5	143
Malta												
1974	3	6	4	282	536	258	0.3	1.1	2.3	18	12.4	1656
1975	6	10	3	374	649	347	0.3	1.6	3.0	31	9.2	1978
1976	6	9	4	456	745	338	0.3	1.3	2.8	28	12.1	2263
1977	6	10	7	538	829	327	0.3	1.2	3.0	29	21.1	2498
1978	6	9	7	639	911	352	0.3	1.0	2.6	26	20.6	2681
1979	NA	NA	6	753	995	NA	0.3	NA	NA	NA	17.3	2867
1980	5	6	1	904	1094	360	0.4	0.5	1.6	16	2.7	3005
1981	7	8	1	1018	1140	424	0.4	0.7	1.8	21	2.7	3134
1982	11	11	1	1125	1177	460	0.4	1.0	2.5	31	2.8	3266
1983	13	13	1	1147	1147	467	0.4	1.1	2.8	36	2.8	3202
1984	12	11	1	1209	1169	442	0.4	1.0	2.6	32	2.8	3279

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE			PER CAPITA
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers	Constant 1983 dollars
Mauritania												
1974	6	12	3	332	632	149	1.3	1.9	8.1	9	2.2	470
1975	7	12	3	339	589	213	1.4	2.1	5.8	9	2.2	430
1976	61	99	15	383	626	421	1.4	15.8	23.5	71	10.8	444
1977	76	117	17	400	617	310	1.4	19.0	37.8	83	12.0	435
1978	67	95	12	433	617	330	1.4	15.5	28.9	66	8.3	427
1979	62	82	8	490	647	283	1.5	12.7	29.0	56	5.4	439
1980	61	74	8	570	689	305	1.5	10.7	24.2	49	5.3	459
1981	51	57	12	650	728	300	1.5	7.8	19.0	37	7.8	475
1982	51	53	16	659	689	287	1.6	7.7	18.6	34	10.3	441
1983	39E	39E	16	740	740	231E	1.6	5.3	17.1	25	10.1	465
1984	NA	NA	20	742	717	NA	1.6	NA	NA	NA	12.3	442
Mauritius												
1974	0	1	0	417	793	139	0.9	0.1	0.6	1	0.0	909
1975	1	1	3	462	802	181	0.9	0.1	0.6	1	3.4	908
1976	1	2	3	544	889	243	0.9	0.2	0.6	2	3.4	993
1977	1	2	1	628	968	290	0.9	0.2	0.6	2	0.7	1065
1978	1	2	0	718	1024	321	0.9	0.1	0.5	2	0.0	1108
1979	1	2	0	815	1076	326	0.9	0.2	0.5	2	0.0	1144
1980	2	2	0	798	966	303	1.0	0.2	0.7	2	0.0	1009
1981	6	7	0	882	988	339	1.0	0.7	2.0	7	0.0	1017
1982	3	3	0	997	1043	342	1.0	0.3	0.8	3	0.0	1060
1983	3	3	1	1050	1050	340	1.0	0.3	0.8	3	1.0	1057
1984	3	3	1	1130	1093	317	1.0	0.3	0.9	3	1.0	1090
Mexico												
1974	313	595	85	50000	95110	13930	59.7	0.6	4.3	10	1.4	1592
1975	444	771	95	57840	100400	17360	61.5	0.8	4.4	13	1.5	1634
1976	434	709	100	63810	104200	18070	63.2	0.7	3.9	11	1.6	1650
1977	451	695	100	70060	108000	18030	64.9	0.6	3.9	11	1.5	1664
1978	393	561	120	82000	116900	19710	66.6	0.5	2.8	8	1.8	1754
1979	465	614	120	96280	127100	22960	68.4	0.5	2.7	9	1.8	1859
1980	471	570	120	112400	136100	26600	70.1	0.4	2.1	8	1.7	1941
1981	676	757	125	130100	145600	33230	71.9	0.5	2.3	11	1.7	2025
1982	693	725	130	133500	139700	47500	73.8	0.5	1.5	10	1.8	1893
1983	726	726	130	133100	133100	38180	75.7	0.5	1.9	10	1.7	1759
1984	966	934	129	144200	139400	35370	77.7	0.7	2.6	12	1.7	1795
Mongolia												
1974	NA	NA	47	NA	NA	NA	1.4	NA	NA	NA	33.5	NA
1975	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	NA	1.4	NA	NA	NA	24.9	NA
1976	NA	NA	25	1200E	1960E	NA	1.5	NA	NA	NA	16.8	1318
1977	135E	208E	36	NA	NA	1696E	1.5	NA	12.3	136	23.6	NA
1978	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	NA	1.6	NA	NA	NA	22.9	NA
1979	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	NA	1.6	NA	NA	NA	22.3	NA
1980	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	NA	1.7	NA	NA	NA	21.6	NA
1981	NA	NA	35	NA	NA	NA	1.7	NA	NA	NA	20.5	NA
1982	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	NA	1.8	NA	NA	NA	20.5	NA
1983	NA	NA	38	NA	NA	NA	1.8	NA	NA	NA	21.1	NA
1984	NA	NA	38	NA	NA	NA	1.8	NA	NA	NA	20.6	NA

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME GNP	ME CGE	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA	
	Million dollars			Million dollars									Million dollars
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983								Constant 1983
Morocco													
1974	145	276	65	4572	8695	2565	17.6	3.2	10.8	16	3.7	493	
1975	250	434	75	5379	9337	3333	18.1	4.6	13.0	24	4.1	516	
1976	385	630	90	6316	10320	4152	18.6	6.1	15.2	34	4.8	555	
1977	476	734	85	7068	10900	4453	19.1	6.7	16.5	39	4.5	572	
1978	464	662	85	7766	11070	3931	19.5	6.0	16.8	34	4.3	566	
1979	507	669	98	8753	11560	4183	20.0	5.8	16.0	33	4.9	576	
1980	639	773	117	9842	11910	4336	20.5	6.5	17.8	38	5.7	580	
1981	716	802	120	10360	11590	4920	21.0	6.9	16.3	38	5.7	551	
1982	803	840	125	11900	12440	5061	21.5	6.8	16.6	39	5.8	577	
1983	657	657	135	12680	12680	4528	22.1	5.2	14.5	30	6.1	575	
1984	666	643	149	13370	12930	4333	22.6	5.0	14.9	28	6.6	572	
Mozambique													
1974	
1975	28	48	20	3098	5378	640	10.4	0.9	7.5	5	1.9	515	
1976	72	117	21	3135	5121	738	10.8	2.3	15.9	11	1.9	475	
1977	68	105	26	3348	5161	676	11.1	2.0	15.6	9	2.3	464	
1978	127	182	25	3649	5203	629	11.5	3.5	28.9	16	2.2	454	
1979	123	162	30	3997	5276	NA	11.8	3.1	NA	14	2.5	446	
1980	151	182	30	4468	5406	655	12.1	3.4	27.8	15	2.5	446	
1981	172	193	30	4941	5532	648	12.4	3.5	29.7	16	2.4	447	
1982	182	190	30	5140	5377	655	12.7	3.5	29.1	15	2.4	423	
1983	NA	NA	32	5000	5000	NA	13.0	NA	NA	NA	2.5	384	
1984	NA	NA	34	5522	5338	NA	13.2	NA	NA	NA	2.6	403	
Nepal													
1974	7	12	32	1035	1969	188	13.0	0.6	6.6	1	2.5	152	
1975	7	12	32	1151	1998	182	13.3	0.6	6.4	1	2.4	151	
1976	10	16	32	1282	2094	224	13.6	0.8	7.2	1	2.4	154	
1977	13	20	37	1399	2157	281	13.9	0.9	7.2	1	2.7	155	
1978	13	19	32	1580	2252	292	14.3	0.8	6.5	1	2.2	158	
1979	15	20	25	1748	2307	301	14.6	0.9	6.6	1	1.7	158	
1980	18	21	21	1866	2258	319	15.0	0.9	6.7	1	1.4	151	
1981	21	23	24	2180	2441	353	15.4	0.9	6.5	1	1.6	159	
1982	22	23	24	2425	2536	425	15.8	0.9	5.4	1	1.5	161	
1983	28	28	25	2460	2460	494	16.2	1.2	5.8	2	1.5	152	
1984	32	31	25	2728	2637	495	16.6	1.2	6.3	2	1.5	159	
Netherlands													
1974	1919	3650	110	62970	119800	53470	13.5	3.0	6.8	270	8.1	8845	
1975	2191	3803	107	67690	117500	58600	13.7	3.2	6.5	279	7.8	8605	
1976	2301	3759	106	75950	124100	61340	13.8	3.0	6.1	273	7.7	9011	
1977	2721	4196	103	82410	127100	63810	13.9	3.3	6.6	303	7.4	9172	
1978	2814	4012	106	91270	130100	66830	13.9	3.1	6.0	288	7.6	9337	
1979	3224	4256	107	100600	132800	70500	14.0	3.2	6.0	303	7.6	9463	
1980	3450	4175	107	110600	133800	73520	14.1	3.1	5.7	295	7.6	9462	
1981	3810	4266	108	118600	132800	76150	14.2	3.2	5.6	299	7.6	9322	
1982	4059	4246	106	125100	130800	77750	14.3	3.2	5.5	297	7.4	9141	
1983	4257	4257	104	132400	132400	79910	14.4	3.2	5.3	296	7.2	9219	
1984	4510	4360	103	139300	134600	80450	14.4	3.2	5.4	302	7.1	9338	

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country – continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE	PER CAPITA		PER CAPITA
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers	Constant 1983 dollars
New Zealand												
1974	179	340	13	10950	20830	7413	3.0	1.6	4.6	113	4.3	6888
1975	204	354	13	12100	21010	8716	3.1	1.7	4.1	115	4.2	6813
1976	202	331	13	12950	21160	7660	3.1	1.6	4.3	106	4.2	6803
1977	225	348	13	13150	20280	8099	3.1	1.7	4.3	111	4.2	6500
1978	243	346	13	14260	20330	8494	3.1	1.7	4.1	111	4.0	6514
1979	257	339	13	15580	20570	7977	3.1	1.6	4.3	109	4.2	6617
1980	327	396	13	17340	20980	8249	3.1	1.9	4.8	127	4.2	6740
1981	401	449	12	19390	21710	8972	3.1	2.1	5.0	144	3.8	6947
1982	449	469	12	20630	21580	9312	3.2	2.2	5.0	149	3.8	6833
1983	466	466	13	22580	22580	9975	3.2	2.1	4.7	145	4.1	7050
1984	469	454	13	24410	23590	10120	3.2	1.9	4.5	140	4.0	7298
Nicaragua												
1974	29	56	6	1934	3679	757	2.3	1.5	7.4	24	2.6	1575
1975	39	68	5	2205	3828	768	2.4	1.8	8.9	28	2.1	1590
1976	51	83	5	2440	3985	723	2.5	2.1	11.5	34	2.0	1605
1977	66	102	6	2603	4014	863	2.6	2.5	11.9	40	2.3	1567
1978	89	126	6	2580	3679	752	2.6	3.4	16.8	48	2.3	1397
1979	69	92	6	2131	2814	629	2.6	3.3	14.6	36	2.3	1097
1980	151E	183E	24	2593	3138	977	2.8	5.8	18.8	67	8.7	1139
1981	204E	228E	39	2997	3355	1293	2.9	6.8	17.6	80	13.6	1174
1982	330E	345E	41	3132	3276	1612	3.0	10.5	21.4	117	13.9	1110
1983	348E	348E	46	3367	3367	2107	3.0	10.3	16.5	115	15.2	1110
1984	473E	457E	67	3520	3403	2666E	3.1	13.4	17.1	146	21.4	1086
Niger												
1974	2	4	4	690	1313	118E	4.6	0.3	3.8	1	0.9	285
1975	5	8	4	736	1277	154E	4.7	0.6	5.2	2	0.8	269
1976	5	8	4	806	1316	191E	4.9	0.6	4.4	2	0.8	269
1977	6	9	4	912	1406	195	5.0	0.6	4.6	2	0.7	279
1978	8	11	4	1108	1579	256	5.2	0.7	4.3	2	0.8	304
1979	10	13	3	1260	1663	287	5.3	0.8	4.5	2	0.6	311
1980	10	13	3	1477	1787	348	5.5	0.7	3.6	2	0.5	324
1981	12E	13E	6	1616	1810	334E	5.7	0.7	3.9	2	1.1	319
1982	11E	11E	5	1667	1743	390E	5.9	0.6	2.9	2	0.9	298
1983	12E	12E	5	1700	1700	281E	6.1	0.7	4.1	2	0.8	280
1984	11E	11E	8	1493	1443	258E	6.3	0.8	4.2	2	1.3	230
Nigeria												
1974	1136	2161	300	38680	73580	15830	74.8	2.9	13.7	29	4.0	984
1975	2314	4016	270	41710	72410	25580	77.1	5.5	15.7	52	3.5	939
1976	1894	3094	270	48970	79990	26680	79.5	3.9	11.6	39	3.4	1007
1977	2232	3441	300	55180	85070	27900	81.9	4.0	12.3	42	3.7	1038
1978	2020	2880	204	56670	80800	25590	84.5	3.6	11.3	34	2.4	956
1979	1807	2385	164	64680	85400	27400	87.2	2.8	8.7	27	1.9	980
1980	1960	2371	150	71760	86840	25390	90.0	2.7	9.3	26	1.7	965
1981	2028E	2271E	144	73400	82180	16590E	93.0	2.8	13.7	24	1.5	884
1982	1758E	1839E	144	75800	79290	18980E	95.9	2.3	9.7	19	1.5	827
1983	1644E	1644E	144	73770	73770	16110E	97.7	2.2	10.2	17	1.5	755
1984	1210E	1170E	144	72040	69640	13040E	99.9	1.7	9.0	12	1.4	697

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE							
	Current	Constant 1983						Thousands	Current			
Norway												
1974	636	1210	40	20660	39290	15600	4.0	3.1	7.8	304	10.0	9859
1975	767	1332	38	23610	40980	16880	4.0	3.3	7.9	332	9.6	10230
1976	840	1372	39	26410	43140	19590	4.0	3.2	7.0	341	9.7	10720
1977	919	1417	39	28920	44590	20770	4.0	3.2	6.8	350	9.6	11030
1978	1078	1537	40	32400	46190	21790	4.1	3.3	7.1	379	9.8	11380
1979	1173	1549	40	36550	48250	22700	4.1	3.2	6.8	380	9.8	11850
1980	1250	1513	40	41800	50580	22560	4.1	3.0	6.7	370	9.7	12380
1981	1362	1525	39	45620	51080	21700	4.1	3.0	7.0	372	9.4	12460
1982	1531	1602	40	48860	51110	22650	4.1	3.1	7.1	389	9.7	12420
1983	1699	1699	41	53230	53230	22540	4.1	3.2	7.5	412	9.9	12890
1984	1679	1623	39	57380	55470	22870E	4.1	2.9	7.1	392	9.4	13400
Oman												
1974	342	650	10	1207	2296	2028	0.7	28.3	32.1	877	13.5	3094
1975	699	1213	12	1708	2966	2355	0.8	40.9	51.5	1583	15.7	3872
1976	786	1283	12	2135	3487	2652	0.8	36.8	48.4	1602	15.0	4354
1977	687	1059	12	2367	3650	2315	0.8	29.0	45.8	1261	14.3	4345
1978	768	1095	12	2424	3455	2161	0.9	31.7	50.7	1239	13.6	3909
1979	780	1029	13	3340	4409	2172	0.9	23.3	47.4	1107	14.0	4741
1980	1180	1428	15	5345	6467	2877	1.0	22.1	49.6	1460	15.3	6613
1981	1513	1694	15	6579	7366	3497	1.0	23.0	48.4	1648	14.6	7165
1982	1685	1762	15	6907	7224	3711	1.1	24.4	47.5	1633	13.9	6695
1983	1944	1944	20	7041	7041	3961	1.1	27.6	49.1	1719	17.7	6226
1984	2111	2040	25	7629	7375	4375	1.2	27.7	46.6	1728	21.2	6245
Pakistan												
1974	544	1034	500	9612	18280	3659	72.9	5.7	28.3	14	6.9	251
1975	664	1153	502	10890	18910	4352	74.7	6.1	26.5	15	6.7	253
1976	730	1193	604	12170	19880	4568	76.5	6.0	26.1	16	7.9	260
1977	703	1083	588	13480	20780	4551	78.2	5.2	23.8	14	7.5	266
1978	817	1165	518	15950	22750	4762	80.1	5.1	24.5	15	6.5	284
1979	901	1189	544	18100	23900	5507	82.4	5.0	21.6	14	6.6	290
1980	1068	1292	467	21520	26040	5469	85.2	5.0	23.6	15	5.5	306
1981	1253	1403	549	24950	27940	5909	88.4	5.0	23.7	16	6.2	316
1982	1499	1568	584	27840	29120	5770	91.5	5.4	27.2	17	6.4	318
1983	1934	1934	584	31280	31280	6671	94.1	6.2	29.0	21	6.2	332
1984	1990	1923	646	33790	32660	7126	96.6	5.9	27.0	20	6.7	338
Panama												
1974	12	23	8	1461	2779	888	1.7	0.8	2.5	13	4.7	1629
1975	14	24	8	1656	2875	950	1.7	0.8	2.5	14	4.6	1645
1976	14	23	8	1768	2888	976	1.8	0.8	2.3	13	4.5	1614
1977	14	22	8	1892	2917	966	1.8	0.7	2.3	12	4.3	1586
1978	26E	38E	8	2265	3229	1017	1.9	1.2	3.7	20	4.3	1724
1979	28E	37E	8	2544	3358	1318	1.9	1.1	2.8	19	4.2	1754
1980	NA	NA	8	3062	3706	1294	2.0	NA	NA	NA	4.1	1894
1981	41E	46E	9	3474	3889	1450	2.0	1.2	3.2	23	4.5	1945
1982	58E	61E	10	3884	4062	1296E	2.0	1.5	4.7	30	4.9	1988
1983	88E	88E	10	4050	4050	1878E	2.1	2.2	4.7	42	4.8	1939
1984	98E	95E	11	4147	4009	2476E	2.1	2.4	3.8	44	5.2	1878

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP		
	Million dollars			Million dollars				Million dollars	GNP			CGE	Constant 1983 dollars	Constant 1983 dollars
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983			Constant 1983	Millions			%	%	Soldiers
Papua New Guinea														
1974		
1975		
1976	19	31	NA	1260	2058	676	2.7	1.5	4.6	12	NA	768		
1977	19	29	3	1365	2104	676	2.8	1.4	4.3	11	1.1	764		
1978	23	33	4	1613	2300	765	2.8	1.4	4.3	12	1.2	813		
1979	24	31	4	1756	2318	758	2.9	1.3	4.1	11	1.4	797		
1980	29	35	3	1831	2215	811	3.0	1.6	4.3	12	1.0	741		
1981	32	36	3	2033	2277	919	3.1	1.6	3.9	12	1.0	743		
1982	33	34	3	2135	2233	869	3.1	1.5	4.0	11	1.0	714		
1983	34	34	3	2244	2244	848	3.2	1.5	4.0	11	0.9	703		
1984	40	39	3	2372	2293	833	3.3	1.7	4.7	12	0.9	704		
Paraguay														
1974	24	46	15	1841	3502	352	2.8	1.3	13.1	17	5.4	1263		
1975	40	70	15	2154	3740	431	2.9	1.9	16.2	24	5.2	1308		
1976	44	72	15	2445	3994	492	3.0	1.8	14.7	25	5.1	1353		
1977	51	79	15	2944	4539	516	3.1	1.7	15.3	26	4.9	1487		
1978	57	81	15	3489	4974	589	3.2	1.6	13.7	26	4.8	1576		
1979	62	82	15	4225	5578	611	3.3	1.5	13.4	25	4.6	1708		
1980	74	90	15	5095	6166	674	3.4	1.5	13.3	27	4.4	1825		
1981	93	105	15	6015	6735	791	3.5	1.6	13.2	30	4.3	1928		
1982	115E	120E	16	6396	6691	749	3.6	1.8	16.0	33	4.4	1852		
1983	163E	163E	16	6482	6482	728	3.7	2.5	22.4	44	4.3	1736		
1984	118E	114E	17	7002	6769	791	3.9	1.7	14.5	30	4.4	1753		
Peru														
1974	299	569	90	9610	18280	2808	14.8	3.1	20.3	39	6.1	1239		
1975	436	757	95	10880	18890	3172	15.2	4.0	23.9	50	6.3	1246		
1976	540	882	100	11670	19070	3352	15.6	4.6	26.3	57	6.4	1224		
1977	837	1291	125	12350	19040	3282	16.0	6.8	39.3	81	7.8	1191		
1978	680	969	125	12390	17670	3026	16.4	5.5	32.0	59	7.6	1076		
1979	470	621	125	14790	19530	2903	16.8	3.2	21.4	37	7.4	1159		
1980	851E	1030E	151	17250	20870	3811	17.3	4.9	27.0	60	8.7	1207		
1981	826E	924E	157	19460	21790	3899	17.8	4.2	23.7	52	8.8	1227		
1982	970E	1015E	164	20890	21850	3363	18.2	4.6	30.2	56	9.0	1199		
1983	921E	921E	167	18850	18850	3069	18.7	4.9	30.0	49	8.9	1008		
1984	1450E	1402E	135	20280	19600	2962	19.2	7.1	47.3	73	7.0	1021		
Philippines														
1974	228	433	90	11720	22300	2614	43.3	1.9	16.6	10	2.1	515		
1975	422	732	120	13620	23650	3761	44.4	3.1	19.5	16	2.7	532		
1976	476	778	140	15510	25340	3900	45.6	3.1	19.9	17	3.1	555		
1977	493	761	155	17490	26960	4004	46.8	2.8	19.0	16	3.3	576		
1978	401	572	156	20000	28520	4218	48.0	2.0	13.6	12	3.2	594		
1979	529	699	156	23100	30490	4150	49.3	2.3	16.8	14	3.2	619		
1980	512	619	155	26450	32010	4570	50.5	1.9	13.5	12	3.1	634		
1981	538	602	156	29550	33080	5219	51.7	1.8	11.5	12	3.0	639		
1982	533	558	157	32220	33710	5267	53.0	1.7	10.6	11	3.0	636		
1983	549	549	157	34090	34090	4776	54.3	1.6	11.5	10	2.9	628		
1984	396	383	157	32860	31770	4031	55.5	1.2	9.5	7	2.8	572		

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE							
	Current	Constant 1983				Thousands	Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%
Poland												
1974	5645E	10740E	366	106600	202800	50100	33.6	5.3	21.4	319	10.9	6027
1975	6355E	11030E	435	122600	212800	61500	34.0	5.2	17.9	325	12.8	6265
1976	7012E	11450E	435	133700	218400	61320	34.3	5.2	18.7	334	12.7	6368
1977	7592E	11710E	430	145300	224000	66730	34.6	5.2	17.5	338	12.4	6471
1978	8027E	11440E	430	161400	230100	71510	34.9	5.0	16.0	328	12.3	6588
1979	8699E	11480E	425	172600	227900	78320	35.3	5.0	14.7	326	12.1	6463
1980	9559E	11570E	421	183600	222200	83670	35.6	5.2	13.8	325	11.8	6245
1981	10270E	11500E	424	190700	213500	86630	35.9	5.4	13.3	320	11.8	5947
1982	12350E	12920E	429	200800	210000	60530	36.2	6.2	21.3	357	11.8	5798
1983	12240E	12240E	430	218900	218900	52550	36.6	5.6	23.3	335	11.8	5986
1984	13440E	12990E	430	235200	227400	58080	36.9	5.7	22.4	352	11.6	6159
Portugal												
1974	627	1192	282	8565	16290	3011	9.1	7.3	39.6	131	31.0	1790
1975	468	813	104	8869	15400	3571	9.4	5.3	22.8	86	11.0	1635
1976	405	662	83	9986	16310	4300	9.6	4.1	15.4	69	8.7	1693
1977	398	614	80	11140	17180	6216	9.7	3.6	9.9	63	8.2	1774
1978	438	625	82	12370	17630	5018	9.7	3.5	12.5	64	8.4	1812
1979	500	661	81	14150	18680	4856	9.8	3.5	13.6	68	8.3	1913
1980	578	700	88	16000	19360	5404	9.8	3.6	12.9	71	9.0	1975
1981	631	707	88	17170	19220	5851	9.9	3.7	12.1	72	9.0	1951
1982	680	711	91	18670	19530	6657E	9.9	3.6	10.7	72	9.2	1974
1983	693	693	93	19590	19590	6973E	9.9	3.5	9.9	70	9.4	1970
1984	680	658	100	19580	18930	6979E	10.0	3.5	9.4	66	10.0	1894
Qatar												
1974	60	114	3	2535	4822E	1009	0.2	2.4	11.3	749	19.6	31570
1975	85	147	5	2452	4257E	2528	0.2	3.5	5.8	894	30.3	25830
1976	142	232	5	3170	5179E	2607	0.2	4.5	8.9	1315	28.4	29410
1977	211	326	5	3434	5294E	3100	0.2	6.2	10.5	1731	26.6	28130
1978	260	371	5	3709	5287E	2535	0.2	7.0	14.6	1846	24.9	26290
1979	475	627	5	5155	6806E	2999	0.2	9.2	20.9	2916	23.3	31670
1980	604	731	6	6519	7888E	3636	0.2	9.3	20.1	3184	26.1	34340
1981	NA	NA	6	7036	7878E	4535	0.2	NA	NA	NA	24.8	32620
1982	NA	NA	6	6254	6541E	3626	0.3	NA	NA	NA	23.6	25760
1983	NA	NA	6	5014	5014E	3700E	0.3	NA	NA	NA	22.5	18810
1984	NA	NA	6	5650	5462E	3851E	0.3	NA	NA	NA	21.5	19570
Romania												
1974	2549E	4848E	218	44290	84240	35260	21.0	d	d	231	10.4	4006
1975	2852E	4951E	220	50800	88180	38400	21.2	5.6	12.9	233	10.4	4151
1976	3129E	5111E	220	59890	97840	41230	21.4	5.2	12.4	238	10.3	4562
1977	3269E	5040E	220	64490	99430	44670	21.7	5.1	11.3	233	10.2	4591
1978	3486E	4970E	218	73540	104800	45880	21.9	4.7	10.8	227	10.0	4797
1979	3667E	4841E	219	82950	109500	51010	22.0	4.4	9.5	220	9.9	4967
1980	3794E	4591E	215	89050	107800	42160	22.2	4.3	10.9	207	9.7	4854
1981	4075E	4563E	214	97920	109600	36700	22.4	4.2	12.4	204	9.6	4905
1982	4914E	5140E	238	106900	111800	28670	22.5	4.6	17.9	229	10.6	4974
1983	5189E	5189E	244	111100	111100	24910	22.6	4.7	20.8	230	10.8	4926
1984	5350E	5172E	244	120600	116600	26520	22.6	4.4	19.5	228	10.8	5149

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE			
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers	Constant 1983 dollars
Rwanda												
1974	10	19	4	487	926	110	4.2	2.1	17.7	5	1.0	220
1975	10	18	4	633	1098	120	4.3	1.6	15.0	4	0.9	253
1976	11	18	4	680	1111	140	4.5	1.6	12.5	4	0.9	247
1977	16	24	4	746	1150	154	4.6	2.1	15.8	5	0.9	248
1978	13	19	4	831	1185	153	4.8	1.6	12.3	4	0.8	246
1979	17	22	4	966	1275	186	5.0	1.8	12.1	5	0.8	256
1980	21	26	5	1122	1358	199	5.2	1.9	12.9	5	1.0	263
1981	23E	25E	5	1297	1452	219E	5.4	1.7	11.6	5	0.9	271
1982	NA	NA	5	1448	1514	226E	5.6	NA	NA	NA	0.9	272
1983	33E	33E	5	1575	1575	238E	5.8	2.1	14.0	6	0.9	271
1984	NA	NA	5	1676	1621	NA	6.0	NA	NA	NA	0.8	269
Sao Tome and Principe												
1974
1975
1976	0	0	0	17	28	8	0.1	1.2	4.1	4	0.0	334
1977	1	1	0	21	32	12	0.1	2.5	6.6	9	0.0	367
1978	0	1	0	25	36	15	0.1	1.5	3.4	6	0.0	399
1979	0	1	NA	30	39	21	0.1	1.3	2.5	6	NA	426
1980	1	1	NA	37	45	29	0.1	1.6	2.5	8	NA	473
1981	NA	NA	2	29	32	24E	0.1	NA	NA	NA	20.7	334
1982	NA	NA	2	36	38	NA	0.1	NA	NA	NA	20.3	386
1983	NA	NA	2	35	35	NA	0.1	NA	NA	NA	19.8	351
1984	NA	NA	2	36	35	NA	0.1	NA	NA	NA	19.4	336
Saudi Arabia												
1974	2606	4956	75	23950	45560E	14280	7.1	10.9	34.7	701	10.6	6447
1975	6360	11040	75	36470	63310E	32330	7.3	17.4	34.1	1516	10.3	8694
1976	9196	15020	75	48110	78590E	42360	7.7	19.1	35.5	1943	9.7	10160
1977	9273	14300	75	60420	93150E	56580	8.3	15.3	25.3	1727	9.1	11250
1978	10490	14950	75	66080	94210E	51620	8.7	15.9	29.0	1711	8.6	10780
1979	13490	17810	79	74510	98370E	65210	9.1	18.1	27.3	1962	8.7	10830
1980	16330	19760	79	113600	137500E	73920	9.4	14.4	26.7	2098	8.4	14590
1981	20050	22450	79	155000	173500E	79790	9.8	12.9	28.1	2301	8.1	17780
1982	24010	25110	80	153200	160200E	90660	10.1	15.7	27.7	2486	7.9	15860
1983	27020	27020	80	115500	115500E	91160	10.4	23.4	29.6	2587	7.7	11060
1984	22220E	21480E	95	104400	101000E	74060	10.8	21.3	29.0	1990	8.8	9353
Senegal												
1974	14	27	7	949	1804	387	4.9	1.5	7.0	6	1.4	370
1975	23	40	7	1123	1950	391	5.0	2.1	10.3	8	1.4	391
1976	37	60	11	1320	2157	435	5.1	2.8	13.8	12	2.2	423
1977	47	73	13	1339	2064	445	5.3	3.5	16.4	14	2.5	393
1978	53	76	13	1347	1921	389	5.4	3.9	19.4	14	2.4	354
1979	57	76	8	1606	2120	420	5.6	3.6	18.0	14	1.4	379
1980	69	83	8	1686	2040	500	5.8	4.1	16.7	14	1.4	354
1981	57	64	14	1797	2012	547	5.9	3.2	11.6	11	2.4	338
1982	62	65	18	2220	2322	665	6.1	2.8	9.8	11	2.9	378
1983	64	64	18	2345	2345	661	6.3	2.7	9.6	10	2.8	370
1984	63E	61E	18	2297	2221E	732	6.5	2.7	8.3	9	2.8	339

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME GNP	ME CGE	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA	
	Million dollars			Million dollars									Million dollars
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983								Constant 1983
			Thousands				Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers	Constant 1983 dollars	
Sierra Leone													
1974	4	8	5	472	898	215	3.0	0.8	3.6	3	1.7	302	
1975	6	10	5	533	925	257	3.0	1.1	3.8	3	1.6	304	
1976	5	9	3	544	888	212	3.1	1.0	4.2	3	1.0	286	
1977	6	9	4	588	906	211	3.2	1.0	4.1	3	1.3	285	
1978	8	12	1	634	903	270	3.3	1.3	4.4	4	0.3	277	
1979	12	15	2	731	965	301	3.3	1.6	5.1	5	0.6	289	
1980	9	11	2	824	997	307	3.4	1.1	3.5	3	0.6	292	
1981	12	14	4	900	1007	286	3.5	1.4	4.8	4	1.1	287	
1982	12	12	4	953	997	241	3.6	1.2	5.0	3	1.1	277	
1983	9	9	6	1008	1008	234	3.7	0.9	4.0	3	1.6	273	
1984	8	7	4	1128	1090	178	3.8	0.7	4.2	2	1.1	288	
Singapore													
1974	204	389	24	4417	8401	1745	2.2	4.6	22.3	174	10.8	3768	
1975	257	446	27	5230	9079	2200	2.3	4.9	20.3	197	11.9	4013	
1976	320	523	35	5883	9611	2298	2.3	5.4	22.7	228	15.3	4191	
1977	413	637	36	6688	10310	2500	2.3	6.2	25.5	274	15.5	4435	
1978	425	606	64	7968	11360	2631	2.4	5.3	23.0	258	27.2	4826	
1979	457	604	57	9354	12350	2857	2.4	4.9	21.1	253	23.9	5181	
1980	582	704	50	10890	13170	3378	2.4	5.3	20.8	292	20.7	5458	
1981	701	785	59	12960	14510	4451	2.4	5.4	17.6	321	24.1	5939	
1982	773	809	60	14850	15540	4521	2.5	5.2	17.9	327	24.3	6285	
1983	724	724	60	16940	16940	5232	2.5	4.3	13.8	289	24.0	6772	
1984	1015	982	59	19240	18600	4693	2.5	5.3	20.9	388	23.3	7355	
Somalia													
1974	25	47	30	537	1021	223	4.0	4.6	20.9	12	7.4	253	
1975	25	44	30	761	1322	211	4.1	3.3	20.7	11	7.3	320	
1976	26	43	31	802	1310	213	4.2	3.3	20.0	10	7.3	309	
1977	30	47	53	966	1489	289	4.3	3.1	16.2	11	12.2	342	
1978	71	101	54	1121	1598	413E	4.7	6.3	24.5	22	11.5	341	
1979	71	94	54	1058	1396	551E	5.2	6.7	17.0	18	10.4	269	
1980	65	79	54	1102	1333	426E	6.1	5.9	18.4	13	8.8	218	
1981	68	76	54	1267	1419	305E	6.7	5.4	24.9	11	8.1	212	
1982	81	85	54	1433	1499	423E	7.0	5.6	20.0	12	7.7	215	
1983	82E	82E	48	1520	1520	363E	7.2	5.4	22.7	12	6.7	213	
1984	106E	103E	43	1622	1568	373E	7.4	6.5	27.5	14	5.8	213	
South Africa													
1974	1033	1964	45	34040	64750	17310	24.9	3.0	11.4	79	1.8	2606	
1975	1414	2454	50	37890	65770	18710	25.5	3.7	13.1	96	2.0	2582	
1976	2000	3268	59	40850	66730	19780	26.1	4.9	16.5	125	2.3	2556	
1977	2263	3489	67	43200	66610	19750	26.7	5.2	17.7	131	2.5	2492	
1978	2284	3257	78	48040	68500	20300	27.4	4.8	16.0	119	2.9	2503	
1979	2373	3132	70	54040	71340	20410	28.0	4.4	15.4	112	2.5	2545	
1980	3219	3896	70	62300	75390	20200	28.7	5.2	19.3	136	2.4	2625	
1981	3005E	3364E	78	70550	78990	22030E	29.4	4.3	15.3	114	2.6	2683	
1982	2779E	2907E	78	75150	78610	22960E	30.2	3.7	12.7	96	2.6	2604	
1983	3737E	3737E	77	76830	76830	23900E	30.9	4.9	15.6	121	2.5	2484	
1984	3540E	3422E	97	83700	80920	25980E	31.7	4.2	13.2	108	3.1	2553	

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE			PER CAPITA	PER CAPITA			
	Current	Constant 1983		Thousands	Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers
Soviet Union												
								d	dc			
1974	109000E	207300E	4100	842000	1601000	335300	252.1	12.9	61.8	822	16.3	6352
1975	121000E	210000E	4100	941000	1633000	298600	254.5	12.9	70.3	825	16.1	6419
1976	133000E	217300E	4200	1037000	1694000	325100	256.8	12.8	66.8	846	16.4	6598
1977	143000E	220500E	4200	1132000	1745000	342300	259.0	12.6	64.4	851	16.2	6738
1978	158000E	225300E	4200	1270000	1811000	360700	261.3	12.4	62.5	862	16.1	6931
1979	175000E	231000E	4300	1378000	1819000	392100	263.4	12.7	58.9	877	16.3	6906
1980	196000E	237200E	4400	1529000	1850000	428400	265.5	12.8	55.4	893	16.6	6968
1981	213000E	238500E	4400	1672000	1872000	459100	267.7	12.7	52.0	891	16.4	6993
1982	232000E	242700E	4500	1830000	1914000	505200	270.0	12.7	48.0	899	16.7	7088
1983	247000E	247000E	4500	1966000	1966000	508000	272.5	12.6	48.6	906	16.5	7214
1984	260000E	251300E	4500	2067000	1998000	528800	275.0	12.6	47.5	914	16.4	7266
Spain												
1974	1928	3666	375	73600	140000	29510	35.2	2.6	12.4	104	10.7	3979
1975	2192	3805	375	81290	141100	32200	35.6	2.7	11.8	107	10.5	3968
1976	2175	3553	368	88760	145000	31530	36.0	2.5	11.3	99	10.2	4028
1977	1688	2603	309	97030	149600	37460	36.4	1.7	6.9	71	8.5	4105
1978	1819	2594	321	106800	152300	39970	36.9	1.7	6.5	70	8.7	4132
1979	2096	2767	349	116000	153200	42850	37.2	1.8	6.5	74	9.4	4118
1980	2437	2949	341	128300	155300	45330	37.5	1.9	6.5	79	9.1	4141
1981	2714	3039	341	137500	154000	50460	37.8	2.0	6.0	80	9.0	4076
1982	3085	3227	353	147800	154600	34720	38.1	2.1	9.3	85	9.3	4060
1983	3335	3335	340	155800	155800	42040	38.3	2.1	7.9	87	8.9	4065
1984	3633E	3512E	411	164400	158900	45900	38.6	2.2	7.7	91	10.7	4119
Sri Lanka												
1974	23	45	18	1689	3213	733	13.4	1.4	6.1	3	1.3	239
1975	31	54	18	1964	3409	876	13.7	1.6	6.2	4	1.3	250
1976	30	50	18	2153	3518	969	13.9	1.4	5.1	4	1.3	253
1977	27	42	18	2404	3706	866	14.1	1.1	4.8	3	1.3	263
1978	35	51	13	2750	3921	1589	14.4	1.3	3.2	4	0.9	273
1979	49	64	18	3163	4176	1590	14.6	1.5	4.1	4	1.2	285
1980	54	65	18	3646	4412	1884	14.9	1.5	3.4	4	1.2	296
1981	52	58	18	4100	4591	1580	15.2	1.3	3.7	4	1.2	303
1982	58	60	18	4578	4788	1691	15.4	1.3	3.6	4	1.2	310
1983	75	75	19	5030	5030	1726	15.7	1.5	4.4	5	1.2	320
1984	86	83	21	5530	5346	1754	16.0	1.5	4.7	5	1.3	333
Sudan												
1974	76	145	35	2418	4600	754	15.6	3.2	19.2	9	2.2	295
1975	78	135	50	2978	5169	1153	16.0	2.6	11.7	8	3.1	322
1976	86	141	50	3749	6124	1197	16.6	2.3	11.7	8	3.0	370
1977	130	201	50	4583	7066	1580	17.1	2.8	12.7	12	2.9	413
1978	148	212	71	4885	6965	1350	17.7	3.0	15.7	12	4.0	394
1979	161E	212E	65	4723	6235	1319	18.4	3.4	16.1	12	3.5	340
1980	174E	211E	65	5184	6273	1270	19.0	3.4	16.6	11	3.4	329
1981	180E	201E	87	5702	6385	1365E	19.7	3.2	14.8	10	4.4	325
1982	253E	264E	86	6416	6711	1409	20.3	3.9	18.8	13	4.2	330
1983	132E	132E	86	6481	6481	1175E	21.0	2.0	11.2	6	4.1	309
1984	134E	129E	65	6520	6303	1158E	21.6	2.1	11.2	6	3.0	291

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME GNP	ME CGE	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			Million dollars								
	Current	Constant 1983		Thousands	Current	Constant 1983		Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars
Suriname												
1974
1975	NA	NA	1	514	892	348	0.4	NA	NA	NA	2.8	2463
1976	NA	NA	1	545	890	440	0.4	NA	NA	NA	2.8	2531
1977	NA	NA	1	643	992	477	0.4	NA	NA	NA	2.8	2763
1978	NA	NA	1	778	1110	444	0.4	NA	NA	NA	2.7	3050
1979	NA	NA	1	774	1021	392	0.4	NA	NA	NA	2.8	2828
1980	NA	NA	1	848	1026	382	0.4	NA	NA	NA	2.8	2915
1981	NA	NA	1	1008	1128	NA	0.3	NA	NA	NA	2.9	3226
1982	NA	NA	2	1028	1076	NA	0.4	NA	NA	NA	5.6	3015
1983	28E	28E	2	1020	1020	NA	0.4	2.7	NA	77	5.5	2813
1984	24	24	2	1028	993	441	0.4	2.4	5.4	64	5.4	2694
Swaziland												
1974	1	3	1	215	409	112	0.5	0.6	2.2	5	2.0	834
1975	1	2	1	264	458	114	0.5	0.5	1.9	4	2.6	909
1976	3	5	2	273	446	121	0.5	1.2	4.4	10	3.9	861
1977	5	8	2	294	453	156	0.5	1.9	5.4	16	3.8	851
1978	8	12	2	317	451	234	0.5	2.6	5.0	21	3.7	824
1979	9	11	2	372	491	181	0.6	2.3	6.3	20	3.6	872
1980	10	12	2	443	536	150	0.6	2.2	7.7	20	3.5	926
1981	9	10	2	517	578	191	0.6	1.8	5.5	18	3.4	970
1982	11	11	2	559	585	196	0.6	1.9	5.7	18	3.3	953
1983	11	11	3	597	597	183	0.6	1.9	6.0	17	4.7	944
1984	11	10	3	668	645	183	0.7	1.6	5.6	16	4.6	991
Sweden												
1974	1461	2779	75	43180	82130	27940	8.2	3.4	9.9	341	9.2	10060
1975	1573	2731	75	48350	83930	28270	8.2	3.3	9.7	333	9.2	10240
1976	1649	2693	66	51910	84800	31030	8.2	3.2	8.7	328	8.0	10310
1977	1660	2559	69	53740	82860	33190	8.3	3.1	7.7	310	8.3	10040
1978	1877	2676	69	58800	83840	35990	8.3	3.2	7.4	323	8.3	10130
1979	2106	2780	68	66260	87480	38250	8.3	3.2	7.3	335	8.2	10550
1980	2261	2736	70	73130	88490	39020	8.3	3.1	7.0	329	8.4	10650
1981	2482	2779	70	78100	87440	41160	8.3	3.2	6.8	334	8.4	10510
1982	2737	2863	70	83790	87640	41980	8.3	3.3	6.8	344	8.4	10530
1983	2888	2888	68	89650	89650	44770	8.3	3.2	6.4	347	8.2	10760
1984	2928	2831	69	95250	92080	44430	8.3	3.1	6.4	340	8.3	11050
Switzerland												
1974	993	1890	25	52070	99030	16130	6.5	1.9	11.7	292	3.9	15330
1975	1023	1775	25	52580	91260	16870	6.4	1.9	10.5	277	3.9	14250
1976	1219	1991	25	55340	90410	18450	6.3	2.2	10.8	314	3.9	14270
1977	1236	1905	19	60360	93060	18650	6.3	2.0	10.2	302	2.9	14730
1978	1307	1863	19	65320	93130	18720	6.3	2.0	10.0	294	2.9	14710
1979	1500	1980	23	72540	95770	19250	6.4	2.1	10.3	312	3.6	15080
1980	1648	1994	23	82730	100100	19730	6.4	2.0	10.1	312	3.6	15680
1981	1771	1983	23	91470	102400	19430	6.4	1.9	10.2	308	3.6	15930
1982	1945	2034	23	96530	101000	19820	6.5	2.0	10.3	315	3.6	15610
1983	2055	2055	28	101900	101900	20420	6.5	2.0	10.1	317	4.3	15730
1984	2203	2130	25	108100	104500	21240	6.4	2.0	10.0	331	3.9	16220

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			Million dollars	%	%						
	Current	Constant 1983						Constant 1983				
Syria												
1974	668	1271	130	5426	10320	3533	7.2	12.3	36.0	177	18.1	1439
1975	1145	1987	230	7305	12680	5861	7.4	15.7	33.9	268	31.0	1709
1976	1211	1978	240	8360	13660	6550	7.7	14.5	30.2	258	31.3	1779
1977	1229	1895	250	8679	13380	6457	7.9	14.2	29.4	239	31.5	1685
1978	1468	2093	220	10230	14580	5865	8.2	14.4	35.7	255	26.8	1775
1979	1808	2387	220	11580	15290	5877	8.5	15.6	40.6	281	25.9	1798
1980	2316	2802	250	13690	16570	7827	8.8	16.9	35.8	319	28.4	1884
1981	2311	2587	270	16590	18580	6858	9.1	13.9	37.7	284	29.7	2042
1982	2730	2855	300	18190	19030	8286	9.4	15.0	34.5	303	31.8	2017
1983	4044E	4044E	400	18940	18940	9863E	9.8	21.3	41.0	413	40.9	1935
1984	4255E	4114E	402	19030	18400	9873E	10.2	22.4	41.7	405	39.6	1812
Tanzania												
1974	85	162	20	2763	5255	1345	15.3	3.1	12.1	11	1.3	343
1975	121	209	25	3139	5449	1759	15.8	3.8	11.9	13	1.6	344
1976	103	168	25	3453	5641	1373	16.3	3.0	12.3	10	1.5	346
1977	116	179	31	3682	5676	1469	16.9	3.2	12.2	11	1.8	337
1978	170	242	63	4049	5773	1645	17.4	4.2	14.7	14	3.6	331
1979	411	543	53	4517	5964	2101	18.0	9.1	25.9	30	2.9	331
1980	136	164	53	5136	6215	1787	18.5	2.6	9.2	9	2.9	335
1981	180	202	43	5464	6118	1698	19.1	3.3	11.9	11	2.2	320
1982	235	246	43	5901	6172	1961E	19.7	4.0	12.5	12	2.2	313
1983	229	229	43	6118	6118	1731E	20.4	3.8	13.3	11	2.1	301
1984	215	208	43	6530	6312	1626E	21.0	3.3	12.8	10	2.0	300
Thailand												
1974	311	591	221	11930	22690	2939	41.2	2.6	20.1	14	5.4	551
1975	361	627	227	13920	24170	3650	42.1	2.6	17.2	15	5.4	573
1976	476	777	228	16020	26170	4418	43.1	3.0	17.6	18	5.3	607
1977	584	900	230	18160	28000	4673	44.1	3.2	19.3	20	5.2	636
1978	801	1142	250	21430	30550	5324	45.0	3.7	21.4	25	5.6	679
1979	1022	1349	250	24300	32080	5705	45.9	4.2	23.6	29	5.4	698
1980	1123	1359	234	27960	33830	6489	46.9	4.0	20.9	29	5.0	722
1981	1207	1352	250	31670	35460	6632	47.8	3.8	20.4	28	5.2	742
1982	1442	1508	250	35130	36740	7815	48.8	4.1	19.3	31	5.1	754
1983	1519	1519	250	39080	39080	7933	49.7	3.9	19.2	31	5.0	786
1984	1682	1626	250	42640	41220	8206	50.6	3.9	19.8	32	4.9	814
Togo												
1974	4	8	2	335	637	95	2.2	1.3	8.5	4	0.9	291
1975	7	11	3	376	652	173	2.3	1.8	6.6	5	1.3	289
1976	7	12	4	391	639	213	2.3	1.9	5.7	5	1.7	276
1977	28	42	4	442	681	309	2.4	6.2	13.7	18	1.7	286
1978	27	38	5	528	753	437	2.4	5.1	8.7	16	2.0	308
1979	14	18	4	544	718	335	2.5	2.5	5.4	7	1.6	285
1980	15E	18E	4	669	810	268	2.6	2.2	6.6	7	1.5	312
1981	17	19	6	683	765	264	2.7	2.5	7.1	7	2.2	286
1982	17	18	6	699	732	249	2.8	2.4	7.0	6	2.2	266
1983	16	16	6	682	682	240	2.8	2.4	6.8	6	2.1	240
1984	18	18	7	719	695	282	2.9	2.5	6.2	6	2.4	237

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			Million dollars				GNP	CGE			
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983		%	%			
Trinidad and Tobago												
1974	6	12	1	2337	4445	1135	1.0	0.3	1.1	12	1.0	4458
1975	7	13	1	2970	5156	1181	1.0	0.2	1.1	13	1.0	5110
1976	21	35	1	3612	5900	1795	1.0	0.6	2.0	34	1.0	5762
1977	22	34	1	4106	6331	1891	1.0	0.5	1.8	32	1.0	6076
1978	32	46	1	4910	7000	2303	1.1	0.7	2.0	43	0.9	6610
1979	45	59	1	5318	7021	2667	1.1	0.8	2.2	55	0.9	6519
1980	34	41	1	6527	7898	2794	1.1	0.5	1.5	37	0.9	7213
1981	45	50	2	7176	8035	3258	1.1	0.6	1.5	45	1.8	7225
1982	143E	149E	2	7783	8141	4054E	1.1	1.8	3.7	132	1.8	7211
1983	227E	227E	2	7591	7591	5000E	1.1	3.0	4.5	198	1.7	6607
1984	189E	183E	2	7051	6816	3048E	1.2	2.7	6.0	157	1.7	5839
Tunisia												
1974	36	68	20	2575	4898	1320	5.6	1.4	5.2	12	3.6	881
1975	48	84	20	3022	5246	1644	5.7	1.6	5.1	15	3.5	920
1976	50	81	21	3437	5615	1824	5.9	1.5	4.5	14	3.6	957
1977	56	86	20	3771	5813	2122	6.0	1.5	4.1	14	3.3	965
1978	67	95	22	4338	6185	2294	6.2	1.5	4.1	15	3.6	1004
1979	261	345	24	4983	6579	2550	6.3	5.2	13.5	55	3.8	1042
1980	233	282	29	5877	7112	2546	6.5	4.0	11.1	44	4.5	1096
1981	187	210	29	6664	7461	2674	6.7	2.8	7.8	32	4.4	1120
1982	298	312	32	7095	7421	3112	6.8	4.2	10.0	46	4.7	1092
1983	383	383	28	7810	7810	3407	6.9	4.9	11.3	55	4.0	1126
1984	274	265	38	8544	8259	3543	7.1	3.2	7.5	37	5.4	1164
Turkey												
1974	730	1388	574	18780	35720	6943	39.5	3.9	20.0	35	14.5	904
1975	1312	2278	584	22460	38980	8749	40.5	5.8	26.0	56	14.4	962
1976	1596	2607	674	25860	42240	10060	41.5	6.2	25.9	63	16.3	1018
1977	1662	2562	771	28600	44090	12330	42.4	5.8	20.8	60	18.2	1040
1978	1664	2373	721	31760	45280	12390	43.3	5.2	19.1	55	16.6	1045
1979	1483	1958	698	33790	44620	13300	44.2	4.4	14.7	44	15.8	1009
1980	1593	1928	717	36410	44070	11610	45.1	4.4	16.6	43	15.9	977
1981	2047	2291	741	40890	45780	11440	46.2	5.0	20.0	50	16.0	991
1982	2450	2562	769	45830	47940	11870E	47.3	5.3	21.6	54	16.3	1014
1983	2469	2469	824	49680	49680	12390	48.4	5.0	19.9	51	17.0	1027
1984	2467	2385	815	54330	52520	13550	49.5	4.5	17.6	48	16.5	1061
Uganda												
1974	130	247	25	3918	7452	1267	10.8	3.3	19.5	23	2.3	689
1975	111	192	25	4107	7130	1055	11.1	2.7	18.2	17	2.3	642
1976	114	187	25	4448	7266	1039	11.4	2.6	18.0	16	2.2	637
1977	87	134	23	4763	7344	638	11.8	1.8	21.0	11	2.0	625
1978	81	116	6	4779	6814	581	12.1	1.7	19.9	10	0.5	563
1979	46	61	6	4413	5826	320	12.5	1.0	19.1	5	0.5	467
1980	41	49	6	4579	5542	201	12.8	0.9	24.4	4	0.5	434
1981	47	52	6	5222	5847	173	13.1	0.9	30.3	4	0.5	447
1982	45	47	10	6098	6378	290	13.4	0.7	16.2	3	0.7	475
1983	51	51	13	6682	6682	355	13.8	0.8	14.3	4	0.9	483
1984	78	75	15	7272	7029	453	14.2	1.1	16.6	5	1.1	494

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			GNP	CGE							
	Current	Constant 1983				Current	Constant 1983	Constant 1983	Millions	%	%	Constant 1983 dollars
United Arab Emirates												
1974	22	41	19	7818	14870E	382	0.4	0.3	10.8	92	42.2	33050
1975	34	59	21	9620	16700E	559	0.5	0.4	10.5	113	40.4	32110
1976	85	139	27	12320	20130E	1115	0.6	0.7	12.5	233	45.3	33750
1977	525	810	25	15390	23730E	2606	0.7	3.4	31.1	1192	36.8	34940
1978	822	1172	25	14620	20850E	2908	0.8	5.6	40.3	1520	32.4	27040
1979	1197	1580	25	19700	26010E	3114	0.9	6.1	50.7	1810	28.6	29800
1980	1724	2087	44	27710	33530E	5046	1.0	6.2	41.4	2118	44.7	34030
1981	2090	2340	44	31200	34930E	6132	1.1	6.7	38.2	2163	40.7	32290
1982	1980	2071	44	29410	30760E	6342E	1.2	6.7	32.7	1794	38.1	26650
1983	1973	1973	44	26790	26790E	5135E	1.2	7.4	38.4	1636	36.5	22220
1984	1932	1868	44	26150	25280E	4652E	1.2	7.4	40.2	1500	35.3	20300
United Kingdom												
1974	10830	20590	359	217800	414200	164800	56.2	5.0	12.5	366	6.4	7366
1975	11610	20150	348	235200	408200	177600	56.2	4.9	11.3	358	6.2	7262
1976	12770	20860	337	258800	422800	175000	56.2	4.9	11.9	371	6.0	7523
1977	13180	20320	326	277400	427700	165300	56.2	4.8	12.3	362	5.8	7612
1978	14370	20490	320	310800	443000	172900	56.2	4.6	11.9	365	5.7	7888
1979	15990	21100	324	341500	450900	178100	56.2	4.7	11.9	375	5.8	8019
1980	18190	22010	330	363000	439200	178800	56.3	5.0	12.3	391	5.9	7799
1981	18550	20770	341	386900	433200	178600	56.4	4.8	11.6	368	6.0	7684
1982	21070	22040	335	420400	439800	186600	56.3	5.0	11.8	391	5.9	7806
1983	24170	24170	333	456000	456000	193700	56.4	5.3	12.5	429	5.9	8088
1984	25410	24570	336	482500	466400	193000	56.4	5.3	12.7	436	6.0	8270
United States												
1974	85910	163400	2146	1473000	2801000	539100	213.9	5.8	30.3	764	10.0	13100
1975	90950	157900	2098	1598000	2775000	601700	216.0	5.7	26.2	731	9.7	12850
1976	91010	148700	2075	1783000	2912000	630800	218.0	5.1	23.6	682	9.5	13360
1977	100900	155600	2060	1990000	3069000	653300	220.2	5.1	23.8	707	9.4	13930
1978	109200	155800	2033	2250000	3207000	678200	222.6	4.9	23.0	700	9.1	14410
1979	122300	161400	2050	2508000	3311000	692700	225.1	4.9	23.3	717	9.1	14710
1980	144000	174200	2101	2732000	3306000	753000	227.7	5.3	23.1	765	9.2	14520
1981	169900	190200	2168	3053000	3418000	804600	230.0	5.6	23.6	827	9.4	14860
1982	196400	205400	2201	3166000	3312000	821700	232.3	6.2	25.0	884	9.5	14250
1983	217200	217200	2222	3406000	3406000	856000	234.5	6.4	25.4	926	9.5	14520
1984	237100	229200	2244	3765000	3640000	866900	236.7	6.3	26.4	968	9.5	15380
Upper Volta (See Burkina Faso)												
Uruguay												
1974	69	132	25	2426	4614	1122	2.8	2.9	11.8	46	8.8	1625
1975	76	133	25	2799	4858	1144	2.8	2.7	11.6	47	8.8	1709
1976	68	112	28	3092	5051	1248	2.9	2.2	8.9	39	9.8	1772
1977	79	121	28	3323	5123	1255	2.9	2.4	9.7	43	9.8	1797
1978	86	123	28	3779	5388	1274	2.9	2.3	9.7	43	9.8	1878
1979	104	137	28	4361	5758	1228	2.9	2.4	11.2	48	9.7	2001
1980	148	180	28	5030	6087	1366	2.9	2.9	13.1	62	9.7	2108
1981	218	244	28	5569	6235	1584	2.9	3.9	15.4	84	9.7	2153
1982	218	228	29	5323	5568	1727	2.9	4.1	13.2	79	10.0	1916
1983	170	170	30	5070	5070	1373	2.9	3.4	12.4	58	10.3	1739
1984	144	139	30	5034	4866	1280	2.9	2.9	10.9	48	10.3	1663

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country – continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME GNP	ME CGE	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA			
	Million dollars			Million dollars									Constant 1983 dollars	Soldiers	Constant 1983 dollars
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983										
Venezuela															
1974	519	987	50	29300	55740	20360	12.2	1.8	4.8	81	4.1	4558			
1975	675	1172	55	34880	60550	20710	12.7	1.9	5.7	93	4.3	4781			
1976	568	928	55	40130	65560	21270	13.1	1.4	4.4	71	4.2	4997			
1977	705	1087	55	45280	69820	22330	13.6	1.6	4.9	80	4.0	5137			
1978	793	1131	55	50390	71840	21060	14.1	1.6	5.4	80	3.9	5105			
1979	785	1036	55	54830	72380	16320	14.6	1.4	6.3	71	3.8	4974			
1980	747	903	55	58280	70530	18590	15.0	1.3	4.9	60	3.7	4694			
1981	721	807	55	62490	69970	25150	15.5	1.2	3.2	52	3.6	4519			
1982	1143	1196	56	66090	69120	23470	15.9	1.7	5.1	75	3.5	4337			
1983	995	995	56	65310	65310	19150	16.4	1.5	5.2	61	3.4	3984			
1984	1067	1031	64	66620	64400	18170	16.9	1.6	5.7	61	3.8	3822			
Vietnam															
1974	NA	NA	665	1282E	2438E	NA	23.8	NA	NA	NA	27.9	102			
1975	NA	NA	643	1282E	2224E	NA	24.9	NA	NA	NA	25.8	89			
1976	NA	NA	637	7187E	11740E	NA	49.1	NA	NA	NA	13.0	239			
1977	NA	NA	615	NA	NA	NA	50.4	NA	NA	NA	12.2	NA			
1978	NA	NA	660	7600E	10840E	NA	51.5	NA	NA	NA	12.8	210			
1979	NA	NA	650	NA	NA	NA	52.5	NA	NA	NA	12.4	NA			
1980	NA	NA	900	8400E	10160E	NA	53.6	NA	NA	NA	16.8	190			
1981	NA	NA	1000	NA	NA	NA	54.9	NA	NA	NA	18.2	NA			
1982	NA	NA	1000	NA	NA	NA	56.2	NA	NA	NA	17.8	NA			
1983	NA	NA	1000	14800E	14800E	NA	57.6	NA	NA	NA	17.4	257			
1984	1300	1257	1000	18100E	17500E	NA	59.0	NA	NA	NA	16.9	296			
Vietnam, South															
1974	539	1025	980	3256	6193	NA	23.6	16.6	NA	43	41.5	262			
1975	459	797	NA	3455	5997	NA	23.7	13.3	NA	34	NA	253			
1976			
1977			
1978			
1979			
1980			
1981			
1982			
1983			
1984			
Yemen (Aden)															
1974	35	66	14	301	573	138	1.6	11.5	47.8	40	8.6	350			
1975	35	60	19	310	538	301	1.7	11.2	20.0	36	11.3	320			
1976	52	85	21	432	705	395	1.7	12.0	21.4	49	12.2	408			
1977	62	95	20	578	891	506	1.8	10.7	18.9	54	11.3	501			
1978	103	146	20	711	1014	559	1.8	14.4	26.2	80	11.0	557			
1979	115	151	20	813	1073	615	1.9	14.1	24.6	81	10.7	576			
1980	133	161	23	848	1027	NA	1.9	15.7	NA	84	12.0	536			
1981	175	196	23	979	1096	NA	2.0	17.8	NA	99	11.7	557			
1982	165	173	25	981	1026	NA	2.0	16.8	NA	85	12.3	506			
1983	186E	186E	25	1067	1067	887E	2.1	17.4	21.0	89	12.0	512			
1984	198E	192E	27	1163	1124	NA	2.1	17.0	NA	89	12.6	524			

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP	
	Million dollars			Million dollars				Million dollars	GNP			CGE	GNP
	Current	Constant 1983		Current	Constant 1983			Constant 1983	%			%	Constant 1983 dollars
Yemen (Sanaa)													
1974	52	99	35	1146	2180	293	4.7	4.5	33.8	21	7.5	467	
1975	74	128	42	1329	2307	340	4.8	5.6	37.7	27	8.8	483	
1976	94	153	42	1590	2597	410	4.9	5.9	37.4	31	8.6	530	
1977	119	183	40	1803	2779	553	5.0	6.6	33.1	36	8.0	554	
1978	150	214	40	2190	3122	807	5.1	6.9	26.6	42	7.8	607	
1979	363	479	36	2538	3351	1229	5.3	14.3	39.0	91	6.8	636	
1980	318	385	36	2944	3562	1285	5.4	10.8	30.0	71	6.7	660	
1981	443	496	30	3369	3772	1725	5.5	13.2	28.8	90	5.4	681	
1982	640	670	22	3958	4140	2074	5.7	16.2	32.3	118	3.9	729	
1983	678	678	22	4266	4266	1997	5.8	15.9	33.9	116	3.8	732	
1984	572	553	28	4504	4354	1908	6.0	12.7	29.0	92	4.7	727	
Yugoslavia													
1974	911	1733	262	18620	35420	8201	21.2	4.9	21.1	82	12.4	1675	
1975	1089	1891	270	20550	35670	8206	21.3	5.3	23.0	89	12.6	1671	
1976	1105	1804	275	22960	37510	8834	21.6	4.8	20.4	84	12.8	1740	
1977	1206	1859	270	26420	40740	4339f	21.8	4.6	42.8	85	12.4	1873	
1978	1294	1845	260	30990	44180	4137	21.9	4.2	44.6	84	11.8	2013	
1979	1496	1975	258	35170	46430	4360	22.1	4.3	45.3	89	11.7	2098	
1980	1664	2013	258	38850	47010	4147	22.3	4.3	48.5	90	11.6	2108	
1981	1734	1942	260	42310	47370	3850	22.5	4.1	50.4	86	11.6	2108	
1982	1707	1785	258	45790	47890	3558	22.6	3.7	50.2	79	11.4	2116	
1983	1665	1665	259	46780	46780	3582	22.8	3.6	46.5	73	11.4	2052	
1984	1791	1731	259	49190	47550	3478	23.0	3.6	49.8	75	11.3	2071	
Zaire													
1974	121	230	60	4161	7914	2216	22.6	2.9	10.4	10	2.7	350	
1975	109	189	55	4306	7474	1536	23.2	2.5	12.3	8	2.4	322	
1976	81	132	55	4445	7261	1657	23.9	1.8	8.0	6	2.3	304	
1977	90	139	53	4820	7431	1286	24.5	1.9	10.8	6	2.2	304	
1978	99	141	53	4948	7054	1180	25.1	2.0	11.9	6	2.1	281	
1979	97	128	23	5355	7069	1166	26.0	1.8	11.0	5	0.9	272	
1980	90	109	26	5941	7189	1277	26.7	1.5	8.5	4	1.0	269	
1981	54	60	44	6628	7421	1538	27.3	0.8	3.9	2	1.6	271	
1982	115	120	40	6807	7119	1518	28.2	1.7	7.9	4	1.4	252	
1983	93E	93E	42	7130	7130	1205	29.0	1.3	7.7	3	1.5	246	
1984	85	83	60	7074	6838	1596	29.7	1.2	5.2	3	2.0	230	
Zambia													
1974	146E	277E	16	1560	2967	992	4.8	9.3	28.0	58	3.3	617	
1975	285E	494E	16	1709	2967	1630	5.0	16.7	30.3	100	3.2	599	
1976	254E	415E	17	1914	3126	1309	5.1	13.3	31.7	81	3.3	613	
1977	279E	431E	20	2026	3123	1305	5.3	13.8	33.0	82	3.8	594	
1978	273E	389E	14	2168	3091	1318	5.4	12.6	29.5	72	2.6	570	
1979	NA	NA	14	2189	2889	1023	5.6	NA	NA	NA	2.5	517	
1980	368E	445E	15	2511	3039	1456	5.8	14.7	30.6	77	2.6	527	
1981	NA	NA	17	3034	3397	1284	6.0	NA	NA	NA	2.9	571	
1982	230E	241E	16	3073	3214	1455	6.2	7.5	16.6	39	2.6	522	
1983	NA	NA	16	3145	3145	1098	6.4	NA	NA	NA	2.5	492	
1984	209E	202E	16	3173	3068	965	6.6	6.6	20.9	31	2.4	464	

TABLE I. Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures and Population, 1974-1984, By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)		ARMED FORCES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)		CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CGE)	PEOPLE	ME	ME	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	Million dollars			Million dollars	Million dollars	GNP		CGE				
	Current	Constant 1983				%		%	Constant 1983 dollars			
Zimbabwe												
1974	54	104	15	2542	4835	1057	6.2	2.1	9.8	17	2.4	775
1975	62	107	15	2679	4650	1062	6.4	2.3	10.1	17	2.3	724
1976	115f	188f	17	2803	4579	1327	6.6	4.1	14.2	29	2.6	695
1977	165	255	17	2632	4057	1266	6.8	6.3	20.1	38	2.5	601
1978	195	278	24	2911	4150	1479	6.9	6.7	18.8	40	3.5	602
1979	218	287	38	3244	4283	1398	7.0	6.7	20.5	41	5.4	609
1980	364	440	94	4115	4980	1768	7.3	8.8	24.9	60	12.8	679
1981	314	352	74	5080	5688	1834	7.6	6.2	19.2	46	9.7	747
1982	350	366	50	5340	5585	2340	7.8	6.6	15.6	47	6.4	712
1983	376	376	46	5668	5668	2254	8.1	6.6	16.7	46	5.7	696
1984	382	369	46	6131	5927	2466	8.5	6.2	15.0	44	5.4	700

E Estimate based on partial or uncertain data. NA Not available. ...Not an independent country.
0 Nil or negligible.

^aIn order to reduce distortions in grouped data trends caused by data gaps for individual countries and years, the totals for the world regions, and organizations include rough approximations for those countries and years for which data or estimates are unavailable, and available data, estimates, or approximations for years in which countries were not independent.

^bEstimated by adding arms imports to data on military expenditures, which are believed to exclude arms purchases. However, it should be noted that the value of arms deliveries in a given year, as shown in Table II (converted at current exchange rates), may differ significantly from actual expenditures on arms imports in that year.

^cSome part of estimated total military expenditures may not be included in announced central budget expenditures. The ratio of ME to CGE therefore may be somewhat overstated.

^dThis ratio is calculated from the two variables as expressed in dollar terms. Since in this case the two variables are converted to, or estimated in, dollars in differing ways, the ratio in dollars differs from what it would be in national currency terms. See also Statistical Notes, Military Expenditures-to-GNP ratio.

^eThis series probably excludes most capital expenditures of arms acquisitions. See Table II for an indication of arms imports, although it should be kept in mind that data in Table II represent Value of deliveries or arms imports in a given year, not actual expenditures on those arms.

^fData beginning with this year are not comparable and do not form a consistent series with data for earlier years.

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Billion dollars		Billion dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
TOTALS ^c										
WORLD	d	d								
1975	13180	22890	13270	23030	890	1545	870	1510	1.5	1.5
1976	17290	28250	17310	28280	1002	1637	983	1607	1.7	1.8
1977	20270	31250	20280	31270	1146	1768	1122	1730	1.8	1.8
1978	24380	34770	24440	34840	1332	1900	1296	1847	1.8	1.9
1979	28190	37220	28200	37230	1661	2193	1633	2156	1.7	1.7
1980	30260	36620	30240	36600	2027	2453	1985	2402	1.5	1.5
1981	37460	41950	37570	42070	2008	2248	1961	2196	1.9	1.9
1982	40150	42000	39910	41740	1908	1996	1850	1935	2.1	2.2
1983	39800	39800	40040	40040	1863	1863	1810	1810	2.1	2.2
1984	41670	40290	41460	40080	1966	1900	1902	1839	2.1	2.2
1985	28850	26990	28900	27030	2012	1882	1935	1810	1.4	1.5
DEVELOPED	d	d								
1975	3595	6240	12490	21680	666	1156	645	1120	0.5	1.9
1976	4590	7498	16380	26760	763	1246	714	1167	0.6	2.3
1977	4410	6799	19410	29930	861	1327	815	1257	0.5	2.4
1978	4635	6608	23010	32810	1001	1427	970	1383	0.5	2.4
1979	5050	6667	26700	35260	1265	1670	1189	1570	0.4	2.2
1980	6300	7624	28580	34590	1514	1832	1400	1694	0.4	2.0
1981	7255	8123	34190	38290	1448	1621	1376	1540	0.5	2.5
1982	6790	7102	33840	35400	1368	1431	1322	1382	0.5	2.6
1983	8505	8505	35710	35710	1353	1353	1317	1317	0.6	2.7
1984	8310	8033	34550	33400	1463	1414	1389	1343	0.6	2.5
1985	7135	6674	26850	25120	1515	1417	1427	1335	0.5	1.9
DEVELOPING										
1975	9590	16650	780	1354	224	389	225	390	4.3	0.3
1976	12700	20750	930	1519	239	391	269	440	5.3	0.3
1977	15860	24450	865	1334	286	441	306	473	5.6	0.3
1978	19750	28160	1325	1889	332	473	325	464	6.0	0.4
1979	23140	30550	1335	1762	396	523	444	586	5.8	0.3
1980	23960	29000	1500	1815	513	621	585	708	4.7	0.3
1981	30210	33820	3160	3538	560	627	586	656	5.4	0.5
1982	33360	34890	5670	5931	540	565	528	553	6.2	1.1
1983	31290	31290	4200	4200	509	509	493	493	6.1	0.9
1984	33360	32250	6875	6646	503	487	513	496	6.6	1.3
1985	21710	20310	2010	1880	497	465	507	475	4.4	0.4

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Billion dollars		Billion dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
BY REGION^c										
AFRICA										
1975	1540	2673	5	9	43	74	43	75	3.6	0.0
1976	2705	4419	10	16	43	69	50	81	6.4	0.0
1977	3570	5504	150	231	50	77	58	89	7.1	0.3
1978	5980	8526	15	21	59	84	58	83	10.1	0.0
1979	5310	7010	150	198	62	81	85	112	8.6	0.2
1980	5435	6577	25	30	89	108	115	140	6.1	0.0
1981	6360	7121	85	95	98	110	94	106	6.5	0.1
1982	6390	6684	310	324	85	89	81	84	7.5	0.4
1983	5170	5170	75	75	75	75	76	76	6.9	0.1
1984	5750	5559	60	58	72	69	77	75	8.0	0.1
1985	3810	3564	50	47	63	59	77	72	6.0	0.1
EAST ASIA										
1975	2220	3854	235	408	104	181	95	166	2.1	0.2
1976	1315	2148	275	449	115	188	118	192	1.1	0.2
1977	1290	1989	295	455	130	201	142	219	1.0	0.2
1978	1650	2352	450	642	155	221	172	245	1.1	0.3
1979	3895	5142	490	647	209	276	200	264	1.9	0.2
1980	4325	5234	810	980	265	321	254	307	1.6	0.3
1981	3720	4165	1545	1730	280	313	285	320	1.3	0.5
1982	3870	4048	2905	3039	272	285	277	290	1.4	1.0
1983	3725	3725	2625	2625	277	277	293	293	1.3	0.9
1984	3875	3746	3115	3011	291	282	335	324	1.3	0.9
1985	3685	3447	725	678	291	272	343	320	1.3	0.2
EUROPE, ALL										
1975	4105	7126	7685	13340	484	840	445	772	0.8	1.7
1976	5295	8650	10560	17250	544	889	491	802	1.0	2.2
1977	4800	7400	12730	19630	611	942	570	878	0.8	2.2
1978	4720	6729	16770	23920	711	1014	681	971	0.7	2.5
1979	5350	7063	20560	27140	907	1197	845	1116	0.6	2.4
1980	6290	7612	22260	26940	1084	1312	977	1182	0.6	2.3
1981	6825	7642	25780	28870	984	1102	921	1031	0.7	2.8
1982	6900	7217	25450	26620	949	992	907	949	0.7	2.8
1983	7900	7900	24430	24430	923	923	901	901	0.9	2.7
1984	7220	6980	26330	25460	933	902	924	893	0.8	2.9
1985	6140	5744	18090	16920	975	912	962	900	0.6	1.9
— NATO EUROPE										
1975	1600	2777	2225	3862	320	555	307	533	0.5	0.7
1976	2210	3610	3550	5799	368	600	339	553	0.6	1.0
1977	1730	2667	4110	6337	414	638	391	603	0.4	1.1
1978	1700	2424	5315	7578	483	689	472	673	0.4	1.1
1979	2050	2706	4985	6581	627	828	590	779	0.3	0.8
1980	2740	3316	7205	8719	753	911	684	828	0.4	1.1
1981	3170	3549	10360	11600	670	750	633	708	0.5	1.6
1982	3630	3797	8400	8786	641	670	610	638	0.6	1.4
1983	3995	3995	9440	9440	613	613	594	594	0.7	1.6
1984	3670	3548	9750	9425	621	601	606	586	0.6	1.6
1985	3070	2872	5605	5243	652	610	642	601	0.5	0.9

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Billion dollars		Billion dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
— WARSAW PACT^c										
1975	2060	3576	4900	8505	88	153	79	137	2.3	6.2
1976	2460	4019	6370	10410	94	153	87	142	2.6	7.3
1977	2490	3839	7975	12300	104	160	104	160	2.4	7.7
1978	2550	3636	10390	14810	123	176	118	168	2.1	8.8
1979	2560	3380	14710	19430	141	186	142	187	1.8	10.4
1980	2670	3231	13900	16820	160	193	161	195	1.7	8.6
1981	2765	3096	14230	15930	160	179	163	182	1.7	8.7
1982	2310	2416	15490	16210	163	171	176	184	1.4	8.8
1983	2940	2940	13410	13410	171	171	186	186	1.7	7.2
1984	2910	2813	14150	13680	172	166	189	183	1.7	7.5
1985	2665	2493	11480	10740	177	166	185	173	1.5	6.2
— OTHER EUROPE										
1975	445	772	560	972	76	132	59	102	0.6	1.0
1976	625	1021	640	1045	83	136	65	107	0.8	1.0
1977	580	894	650	1002	93	144	74	115	0.6	0.9
1978	470	670	1070	1526	105	149	91	130	0.4	1.2
1979	740	977	860	1135	139	183	113	149	0.5	0.8
1980	880	1065	1160	1404	171	207	131	158	0.5	0.9
1981	890	996	1195	1338	154	173	125	140	0.6	1.0
1982	960	1004	1555	1626	145	151	121	127	0.7	1.3
1983	965	965	1580	1580	139	139	120	120	0.7	1.3
1984	640	619	2435	2354	139	135	129	124	0.5	1.9
1985	405	379	1000	935	147	137	135	126	0.3	0.7
LATIN AMERICA										
1975	585	1015	90	156	50	87	40	70	1.2	0.2
1976	960	1568	190	310	51	84	45	74	1.9	0.4
1977	1055	1627	95	146	58	89	54	83	1.8	0.2
1978	1695	2417	100	143	65	93	58	83	2.6	0.2
1979	1840	2429	120	158	80	106	76	101	2.3	0.2
1980	1790	2166	145	175	106	128	98	119	1.7	0.1
1981	2710	3034	195	218	113	127	104	117	2.4	0.2
1982	3060	3201	400	418	92	97	96	100	3.3	0.4
1983	2530	2530	190	190	72	72	96	96	3.5	0.2
1984	3435	3321	610	590	73	70	103	99	4.7	0.6
1985	1780	1665	80	75	72	68	98	92	2.5	0.1
MIDDLE EAST										
1975	3950	6856	140	243	42	72	83	144	9.5	0.2
1976	5845	9548	185	302	50	81	99	162	11.8	0.2
1977	7960	12270	150	231	66	101	107	165	12.1	0.1
1978	9040	12890	260	371	75	107	105	149	12.1	0.2
1979	9725	12840	360	475	82	109	150	197	11.8	0.2
1980	9885	11960	170	206	108	130	209	253	9.2	0.1
1981	14600	16350	955	1069	128	143	208	233	11.4	0.5
1982	16610	17380	850	889	137	143	162	170	12.2	0.5
1983	17340	17340	270	270	128	128	125	125	13.5	0.2
1984	18060	17460	495	479	117	113	110	106	15.4	0.4
1985	9390	8784	240	225	107	100	108	101	8.8	0.2

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Billion dollars		Billion dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
NORTH AMERICA										
1975	300	521	4980	8644	142	247	142	247	0.2	3.5
1976	300	490	6030	9850	173	282	156	255	0.2	3.9
1977	290	447	6770	10440	203	312	165	254	0.1	4.1
1978	360	513	6640	9467	233	332	192	274	0.2	3.5
1979	400	528	6280	8291	279	369	240	317	0.1	2.6
1980	460	557	6590	7975	320	387	289	349	0.1	2.3
1981	650	728	8700	9741	344	385	306	343	0.2	2.8
1982	680	711	9550	9989	313	328	284	297	0.2	3.4
1983	810	810	11980	11980	335	335	277	277	0.2	4.3
1984	750	725	10390	10040	420	406	308	298	0.2	3.4
1985	625	585	9590	8971	443	415	304	284	0.1	3.2
OCEANIA										
1975	130	226	110	191	15	25	15	26	0.9	0.7
1976	95	155	50	82	16	27	17	27	0.6	0.3
1977	180	278	30	46	18	27	17	27	1.0	0.2
1978	260	371	50	71	20	29	19	27	1.3	0.3
1979	245	323	40	53	24	32	25	32	1.0	0.2
1980	330	399	40	48	30	36	29	35	1.1	0.1
1981	580	649	30	34	34	38	29	32	1.7	0.1
1982	200	209	15	16	34	36	29	30	0.6	0.1
1983	430	430	40	40	28	28	27	27	1.5	0.1
1984	680	657	60	58	34	33	30	29	2.0	0.2
1985	760	711	50	47	33	31	30	28	2.3	0.2
SOUTH ASIA										
1975	335	581	25	43	11	19	7	11	3.0	0.4
1976	750	1225	10	16	10	16	8	13	7.6	0.1
1977	1075	1657	55	85	11	18	9	14	9.4	0.6
1978	630	898	50	71	14	20	10	14	4.4	0.5
1979	1345	1776	40	53	18	24	12	16	7.5	0.3
1980	1670	2021	40	48	26	31	14	17	6.5	0.3
1981	1925	2155	60	67	27	30	14	16	7.2	0.4
1982	2315	2421	30	31	26	27	14	15	9.0	0.2
1983	1640	1640	300	300	24	24	15	15	6.8	2.0
1984	1690	1634	360	348	27	26	15	15	6.3	2.4
1985	2470	2311	35	33	27	25	14	13	9.3	0.3

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Billion dollars		Billion dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
BY ORGANIZATION^c										
NATO, ALL	d	d								
1975	1920	3333	7205	12510	462	801	449	780	0.4	1.6
1976	2540	4149	9580	15650	540	883	495	808	0.5	1.9
1977	2070	3191	10880	16770	616	950	556	858	0.3	2.0
1978	2110	3008	11950	17040	716	1020	665	947	0.3	1.8
1979	2530	3340	11260	14870	907	1197	830	1096	0.3	1.4
1980	3280	3969	13790	16690	1073	1298	973	1177	0.3	1.4
1981	3910	4378	19060	21340	1014	1135	939	1052	0.4	2.0
1982	4430	4634	17950	18780	954	998	894	935	0.5	2.0
1983	5055	5055	21420	21420	948	948	871	871	0.5	2.5
1984	4630	4476	20140	19470	1041	1006	914	884	0.4	2.2
1985	3885	3634	15190	14210	1095	1024	946	885	0.4	1.6
WARSAW PACT ^e										
1975	2060	3576	4900	8505	88	153	79	137	2.3	6.2
1976	2460	4019	6370	10410	94	153	87	142	2.6	7.3
1977	2490	3839	7975	12300	104	160	104	160	2.4	7.7
1978	2550	3636	10390	14810	123	176	118	168	2.1	8.8
1979	2560	3380	14710	19430	141	186	142	187	1.8	10.4
1980	2670	3231	13900	16820	160	193	161	195	1.7	8.6
1981	2765	3096	14230	15930	160	179	163	182	1.7	8.7
1982	2310	2416	15490	16210	163	171	176	184	1.4	8.8
1983	2940	2940	13410	13410	171	171	186	186	1.7	7.2
1984	2910	2813	14150	13680	172	166	189	183	1.7	7.5
1985	2665	2493	11480	10740	177	166	185	173	1.5	6.2
OPEC										
1975	3335	5789	70	122	52	90	112	194	6.4	0.1
1976	5495	8977	30	49	64	105	136	222	8.6	0.0
1977	7740	11930	65	100	85	132	149	230	9.1	0.0
1978	9065	12920	50	71	96	137	143	204	9.4	0.0
1979	8900	11750	180	238	99	130	211	279	9.0	0.1
1980	7945	9614	40	48	133	161	296	358	6.0	0.0
1981	13280	14870	615	689	157	176	280	314	8.5	0.2
1982	14830	15510	300	314	163	170	224	234	9.1	0.1
1983	13750	13750	80	80	145	145	180	180	9.5	0.0
1984	16760	16210	95	92	126	122	165	159	13.3	0.1
1985	8290	7755	45	42	113	105	158	148	7.4	0.0
OECD										
1975	2305	4001	7705	13370	601	1044	574	996	0.4	1.3
1976	3225	5268	10120	16530	696	1137	638	1042	0.5	1.6
1977	2770	4271	11350	17500	788	1215	723	1114	0.4	1.6
1978	2855	4070	12760	18200	909	1295	866	1234	0.3	1.5
1979	3530	4660	12050	15920	1164	1537	1062	1402	0.3	1.1
1980	4540	5494	14810	17930	1397	1691	1252	1515	0.3	1.2
1981	5875	6578	20200	22620	1326	1485	1232	1379	0.4	1.6
1982	5890	6161	19380	20270	1248	1305	1170	1223	0.5	1.7
1983	6845	6845	23030	23030	1227	1227	1154	1154	0.6	2.0
1984	6575	6356	22350	21610	1336	1291	1231	1190	0.5	1.8
1985	5580	5220	16020	14990	1391	1301	1275	1193	0.4	1.3

TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
BY COUNTRY										
Afghanistan										
1975	40	69	0	0	350	608	217	377	11.4	0.0
1976	50	82	0	0	261	426	291	475	19.2	0.0
1977	110	170	0	0	328	506	306	472	33.5	0.0
1978	130	185	0	0	395	563	321	458	32.9	0.0
1979	600	792	0	0	425	561	474	626	141.2	0.0
1980	410	496	0	0	552	668	670	811	74.3	0.0
1981	575	644	0	0	622	696	694	777	92.4	0.0
1982	400	418	0	0	695	727	708	741	57.6	0.0
1983	160	160	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1984	320	309	0	0	940	909	680	657	34.0	0.0
1985	150	140	0	0	902	844	778	728	16.6	0.0
Albania										
1975	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1976	5	8	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1977	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1978	0	0	0	0	173	247	151	215	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1980	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1981	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1982	0	0	0	0	137	143	NA	NA	0.0	NA
1983	0	0	0	0	280	280	290	290	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Algeria										
1975	90	156	0	0	6008	10430	4692	8144	1.5	0.0
1976	320	523	0	0	5338	8720	5332	8710	6.0	0.0
1977	480	740	0	0	7125	10990	6115	9428	6.7	0.0
1978	725	1034	0	0	8681	12380	6315	9003	8.4	0.0
1979	450	594	0	0	8403	11090	9481	12520	5.4	0.0
1980	525	635	0	0	10830	13100	13660	16530	4.8	0.0
1981	1200	1344	0	0	11270	12620	14400	16120	10.6	0.0
1982	1300	1360	0	0	10750	11250	13140	13750	12.1	0.0
1983	575	575	0	0	10340	10340	12580	12580	5.6	0.0
1984	525	508	20	19	10290	9943	12790	12370	5.1	0.2
1985	270	253	0	0	9061	8476	NA	NA	3.0	NA
Angola										
1975	120	208	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1976	270	441	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1977	220	339	0	0	720	1110	800	1233	30.6	0.0
1978	240	342	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1979	310	409	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1980	290	351	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1981	340	381	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1982	410	429	0	0	1400	1464	1410	1475	29.3	0.0
1983	750	750	0	0	1500	1500	1600	1600	50.0	0.0
1984	1100	1063	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	440	412	0	0	1700	1590	2000	1871	25.9	0.0

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars			
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
									%	%
Argentina										
1975	30	52	0	0	3947	6851	2961	5140	0.8	0.0
1976	50	82	0	0	3033	4955	3916	6397	1.6	0.0
1977	40	62	5	8	4162	6417	5652	8714	1.0	0.1
1978	370	528	0	0	3834	5466	6400	9125	9.7	0.0
1979	500	660	10	13	6700	8845	7810	10310	7.5	0.1
1980	210	254	5	6	10540	12760	8021	9706	2.0	0.1
1981	500	560	10	11	9430	10560	9143	10240	5.3	0.1
1982	290	303	0	0	5337	5582	7625	7976	5.4	0.0
1983	975	975	20	20	4504	4504	7836	7836	21.6	0.3
1984	450	435	80	77	4585	4432	8107	7837	9.8	1.0
1985	150	140	0	0	3814	3568	8396	7854	3.9	0.0
Australia										
1975	30	52	110	191	10700	18570	11940	20730	0.3	0.9
1976	60	98	50	82	12230	19980	13150	21490	0.5	0.4
1977	140	216	30	46	13510	20830	13350	20590	1.0	0.2
1978	240	342	50	71	15570	22190	14410	20550	1.5	0.3
1979	220	290	40	53	18190	24020	18670	24640	1.2	0.2
1980	290	351	40	48	22400	27110	22030	26660	1.3	0.2
1981	550	616	30	34	26210	29350	21770	24370	2.1	0.1
1982	180	188	10	10	26670	27890	21990	23000	0.7	0.0
1983	390	390	40	40	21460	21460	20630	20630	1.8	0.2
1984	600	580	60	58	25920	25060	23530	22740	2.3	0.3
1985	700	655	50	47	25890	24220	22760	21290	2.7	0.2
Austria										
1975	5	9	40	69	9394	16310	7519	13050	0.1	0.5
1976	100	163	60	98	11520	18820	8506	13900	0.9	0.7
1977	50	77	60	93	14240	21960	9808	15120	0.4	0.6
1978	50	71	200	285	16020	22840	12170	17360	0.3	1.6
1979	40	53	100	132	20250	26740	15480	20440	0.2	0.6
1980	80	97	40	48	24440	29580	17490	21160	0.3	0.2
1981	80	90	300	336	21040	23560	15840	17740	0.4	1.9
1982	50	52	50	52	19500	20400	15640	16360	0.3	0.3
1983	60	60	180	180	19370	19370	15430	15430	0.3	1.2
1984	30	29	200	193	19630	18980	15740	15210	0.2	1.3
1985	10	9	100	94	20990	19630	17240	16130	0.0	0.6
Bahrain										
1975	0	0	0	0	1198	2080	1203	2088	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	1668	2725	1516	2477	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	2029	3128	1845	2845	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	2045	2916	1892	2697	0.0	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	2477	3270	2484	3279	0.8	0.0
1980	40	48	0	0	3483	4215	3597	4353	1.1	0.0
1981	40	45	0	0	4124	4617	4347	4867	1.0	0.0
1982	5	5	0	0	3614	3780	3791	3965	0.1	0.0
1983	30	30	0	0	3342	3342	3200	3200	0.9	0.0
1984	40	39	0	0	3524	3407	3139	3034	1.1	0.0
1985	10	9	0	0	3159	2955	2815	2633	0.3	0.0

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Bangladesh										
1975	10	17	0	0	1321	2293	327	568	0.8	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	952	1555	401	655	1.1	0.0
1977	20	31	0	0	1163	1793	476	734	1.7	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	1513	2157	548	781	0.7	0.0
1979	5	7	0	0	1908	2519	659	870	0.3	0.0
1980	30	36	0	0	2599	3145	758	917	1.2	0.0
1981	40	45	0	0	2699	3022	791	886	1.5	0.0
1982	30	31	0	0	2463	2576	769	804	1.2	0.0
1983	60	60	0	0	2165	2165	724	724	2.8	0.0
1984	10	10	40	39	2825	2731	931	900	0.4	4.3
1985	0	0	0	0	2760	2582	1000	935	0.0	0.0
Barbados										
1975	0	0	0	0	216	375	107	186	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	236	386	87	142	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	272	419	96	148	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	313	446	130	185	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	423	558	151	199	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	522	632	226	273	0.0	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	572	640	194	217	1.7	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	551	576	257	269	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	621	621	321	321	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	657	635	390	377	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	607	568	352	329	0.0	0.0
Belgium										
1975	80	139	90	156	28770	49950	26310	45660	0.3	0.3
1976	120	196	160	261	33460	54660	30170	49280	0.4	0.5
1977	80	123	140	216	38120	58780	34510	53210	0.2	0.4
1978	80	114	140	200	45780	65260	41290	58870	0.2	0.3
1979	290	383	70	92	57800	76310	53770	70990	0.5	0.1
1980	320	387	140	169	68250	82590	61650	74600	0.5	0.2
1981	340	381	290	325	59450	66570	53310	59690	0.6	0.5
1982	330	345	110	115	55500	58050	50120	52430	0.6	0.2
1983	460	460	300	300	52650	52650	49760	49760	0.9	0.6
1984	400	387	330	319	53290	51520	49260	47620	0.8	0.7
1985	240	225	180	168	54020	50530	51050	47760	0.4	0.4
Benin										
1975	0	0	0	0	197	342	32	56	0.0	0.0
1976	5	8	0	0	212	346	38	62	2.4	0.0
1977	40	62	0	0	268	413	41	63	14.9	0.0
1978	40	57	0	0	311	443	27	38	12.9	0.0
1979	40	53	0	0	320	422	46	61	12.5	0.0
1980	40	48	0	0	331	401	63	77	12.1	0.0
1981	30	34	0	0	544	609	34	38	5.5	0.0
1982	10	10	0	0	464	486	24	25	2.2	0.0
1983	20	20	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1984	5	5	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	5	5	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Bolivia										
1975	10	17	0	0	575	998	444	771	1.7	0.0
1976	5	8	0	0	594	970	568	928	0.8	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	591	911	632	974	1.7	0.0
1978	20	29	0	0	769	1096	629	897	2.6	0.0
1979	80	106	0	0	980	1294	760	1003	8.2	0.0
1980	40	48	0	0	678	820	942	1140	5.9	0.0
1981	70	78	0	0	975	1092	912	1021	7.2	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	578	605	828	866	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	545	545	755	755	0.0	0.0
1984	10	10	0	0	474	458	724	700	2.1	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	582	544	673	630	0.0	0.0
Botswana										
1975	0	0	0	0	218	378	144	250	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	209	341	176	288	0.0	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	276	426	180	278	3.6	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	353	503	223	317	2.8	0.0
1979	5	7	0	0	521	688	436	576	1.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	691	836	503	609	0.0	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	799	895	379	424	1.3	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	688	720	457	478	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	736	736	636	636	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	679	656	674	652	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	596	558	727	680	0.0	0.0
Brazil										
1975	100	174	60	104	13590	23590	8670	15050	0.7	0.7
1976	140	229	70	114	13730	22420	10130	16540	1.0	0.7
1977	90	139	80	123	13260	20440	12120	18690	0.7	0.7
1978	200	285	100	143	15050	21460	12660	18050	1.3	0.8
1979	240	317	110	145	19800	26150	15240	20130	1.2	0.7
1980	130	157	140	169	24960	30210	20130	24360	0.5	0.7
1981	60	67	170	190	24080	26960	23290	26080	0.2	0.7
1982	30	31	320	335	21070	22040	20170	21100	0.1	1.6
1983	40	40	130	130	16800	16800	21900	21900	0.2	0.6
1984	140	135	500	483	15210	14700	27000	26110	0.9	1.9
1985	20	19	60	56	13680	12800	25640	23980	0.1	0.2
Bulgaria										
1975	220	382	30	52	5528	9596	4807	8344	4.0	0.6
1976	220	359	10	16	5559	9081	5316	8684	4.0	0.2
1977	190	293	10	15	6344	9781	6303	9718	3.0	0.2
1978	260	371	70	100	7658	10920	7485	10670	3.4	0.9
1979	380	502	50	66	8580	11330	9013	11900	4.4	0.6
1980	200	242	60	73	9776	11830	10490	12690	2.0	0.6
1981	310	347	160	179	10610	11880	10490	11750	2.9	1.5
1982	250	261	340	356	11610	12140	11500	12030	2.2	3.0
1983	310	310	290	290	12370	12370	12220	12220	2.5	2.4
1984	480	464	700	677	12350	11940	12530	12120	3.9	5.6
1985	500	468	240	225	13070	12230	12830	12000	3.8	1.9

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars			
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	%	%
Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta)										
1975	5	9	0	0	151	262	44	76	3.3	0.0
1976	5	8	0	0	144	235	53	87	3.5	0.0
1977	5	8	0	0	209	322	55	85	2.4	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	227	324	42	60	0.0	0.0
1979	5	7	0	0	301	397	77	102	1.7	0.0
1980	10	12	0	0	359	434	90	109	2.8	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	338	378	74	83	3.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	347	363	56	59	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	291	291	58	58	0.0	0.0
1984	20	19	0	0	211	204	80	77	9.5	0.0
1985	5	5	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Burma										
1975	5	9	0	0	254	441	160	278	2.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	194	317	193	315	0.0	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	275	424	208	321	3.6	0.0
1978	5	7	0	0	326	465	233	332	1.5	0.0
1979	30	40	0	0	319	421	383	506	9.4	0.0
1980	20	24	0	0	353	427	472	571	5.7	0.0
1981	20	22	0	0	373	418	477	534	5.4	0.0
1982	60	63	0	0	409	428	394	412	14.7	0.0
1983	20	20	0	0	268	268	378	378	7.5	0.0
1984	20	19	0	0	239	231	295	285	8.4	0.0
1985	20	19	0	0	283	265	304	284	7.1	0.0
Burundi										
1975	10	17	0	0	62	108	32	56	16.1	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	58	95	61	100	0.0	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	74	114	89	137	13.5	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	98	140	69	98	0.0	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	152	201	104	137	6.6	0.0
1980	10	12	0	0	168	203	65	79	6.0	0.0
1981	5	6	0	0	161	180	75	84	3.1	0.0
1982	20	21	0	0	214	224	88	92	9.3	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	184	184	80	80	0.0	0.0
1984	20	19	0	0	187	181	99	96	10.7	0.0
1985	5	5	0	0	189	177	110	103	2.6	0.0
Cambodia										
1975	310	538	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1976	5	8	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1977	10	15	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1978	40	57	0	0	20	29	1	1	200.0	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1980	20	24	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1981	50	56	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1982	50	52	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1983	60	60	0	0	NA	NA	1	1	NA	0.0
1984	70	68	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	130	122	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Cameroon										
1975	5	9	0	0	599	1040	449	779	0.8	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	609	995	511	835	1.6	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	783	1207	704	1085	1.3	0.0
1978	5	7	0	0	1056	1506	802	1143	0.5	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	1275	1683	1123	1483	0.0	0.0
1980	5	6	0	0	1602	1939	1384	1675	0.3	0.0
1981	30	34	0	0	1427	1598	1105	1237	2.1	0.0
1982	20	21	0	0	1211	1267	1064	1113	1.7	0.0
1983	100	100	0	0	1224	1224	976	976	8.2	0.0
1984	70	68	0	0	1112	1075	886	856	6.3	0.0
1985	30	28	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Canada										
1975	160	278	80	139	36210	62860	34070	59150	0.4	0.2
1976	190	310	130	212	40360	65920	40600	66320	0.5	0.3
1977	170	262	70	108	42260	65150	43540	67140	0.4	0.2
1978	240	342	140	200	46550	66360	48430	69050	0.5	0.3
1979	270	356	180	238	56950	75190	58290	76960	0.5	0.3
1980	320	387	90	109	62840	76040	67730	81970	0.5	0.1
1981	440	493	100	112	70340	78760	72730	81430	0.6	0.1
1982	250	261	250	261	58360	61040	71230	74510	0.4	0.4
1983	310	310	180	180	65080	65080	76460	76460	0.5	0.2
1984	270	261	190	184	78510	75890	90290	87280	0.3	0.2
1985	50	47	190	178	81480	76220	90630	84780	0.1	0.2
Cape Verde										
1975
1976	0	0	0	0	30	49	2	3	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	38	59	2	3	0.0	0.0
1978	30	43	0	0	54	77	2	3	55.6	0.0
1979	30	40	0	0	56	74	3	4	53.6	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	68	82	4	5	0.0	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	71	79	3	3	14.1	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	72	75	4	4	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	68	68	2	2	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	10	9	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Central African Republic										
1975	0	0	0	0	69	120	47	82	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	55	90	61	100	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	63	97	82	126	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	55	78	72	103	0.0	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	70	92	80	106	14.3	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	81	98	116	140	0.0	0.0
1981	5	6	0	0	95	106	79	88	5.3	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	123	129	107	112	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	85	85	75	75	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	87	84	86	83	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Chad										
1975	0	0	0	0	133	231	48	83	0.0	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	116	189	63	103	8.6	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	189	291	107	165	5.3	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	217	309	99	141	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	85	112	88	116	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	74	90	71	86	0.0	0.0
1981	5	6	0	0	108	121	83	93	4.6	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	109	114	58	61	0.0	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	157	157	74	74	6.4	0.0
1984	40	39	0	0	171	165	113	109	23.4	0.0
1985	10	9	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Chile										
1975	20	35	0	0	1338	2323	1552	2694	1.5	0.0
1976	130	212	0	0	1643	2684	2083	3403	7.9	0.0
1977	60	93	0	0	2259	3483	2190	3376	2.7	0.0
1978	60	86	0	0	3002	4280	2478	3533	2.0	0.0
1979	190	251	0	0	4218	5569	3894	5141	4.5	0.0
1980	250	303	0	0	5124	6201	4671	5652	4.9	0.0
1981	310	347	5	6	6364	7125	3906	4373	4.9	0.1
1982	280	293	0	0	3528	3690	3710	3881	7.9	0.0
1983	90	90	0	0	2969	2969	3836	3836	3.0	0.0
1984	160	155	20	19	3191	3085	3657	3535	5.0	0.5
1985	20	19	20	19	2743	2566	3823	3576	0.7	0.5
China										
Mainland										
1975	110	191	180	312	6830	11860	7130	12380	1.6	2.5
1976	160	261	140	229	5575	9107	7265	11870	2.9	1.9
1977	100	154	110	170	6595	10170	8110	12500	1.5	1.4
1978	90	128	170	242	10350	14760	10170	14510	0.9	1.7
1979	180	238	140	185	14490	19130	13730	18130	1.2	1.0
1980	170	206	270	327	19300	23360	18920	22900	0.9	1.4
1981	130	146	420	470	17940	20090	21490	24070	0.7	2.0
1982	50	52	1100	1151	16690	17460	23430	24510	0.3	4.7
1983	10	10	1600	1600	18480	18480	23710	23710	0.1	6.7
1984	100	97	1900	1837	25490	24640	27640	26720	0.4	6.9
1985	110	103	350	327	39480	36930	31320	29300	0.3	1.1
Taiwan										
1975	160	278	0	0	5960	10350	5301	9202	2.7	0.0
1976	160	261	10	16	7609	12430	8155	13320	2.1	0.1
1977	180	278	10	15	8522	13140	9349	14410	2.1	0.1
1978	200	285	0	0	11050	15760	12680	18080	1.8	0.0
1979	200	264	0	0	14800	19540	16100	21260	1.4	0.0
1980	625	756	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1981	550	616	40	45	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1982	700	732	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1983	500	500	5	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1984	420	406	10	10	21600	20880	30400	29390	1.9	0.0
1985	575	538	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars			
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	%	%
Colombia										
1975	40	69	0	0	1495	2595	1465	2543	2.7	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	1708	2790	1745	2851	0.0	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	2028	3127	2443	3767	0.5	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	2836	4043	3003	4281	0.4	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	3233	4268	3300	4357	0.6	0.0
1980	70	85	0	0	4663	5643	3945	4774	1.5	0.0
1981	40	45	0	0	5199	5821	2956	3310	0.8	0.0
1982	130	136	0	0	5478	5730	3095	3237	2.4	0.0
1983	20	20	0	0	4968	4968	3081	3081	0.4	0.0
1984	675	653	0	0	4498	4348	3462	3347	15.0	0.0
1985	10	9	0	0	4141	3874	3552	3323	0.2	0.0
Congo										
1975	10	17	0	0	167	290	178	309	6.0	0.0
1976	5	8	0	0	176	288	186	304	2.8	0.0
1977	30	46	0	0	206	318	174	268	14.6	0.0
1978	20	29	0	0	260	371	118	168	7.7	0.0
1979	40	53	0	0	291	384	510	673	13.7	0.0
1980	20	24	0	0	429	519	911	1102	4.7	0.0
1981	70	78	0	0	454	508	1073	1201	15.4	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	807	844	1109	1160	0.0	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	806	806	1066	1066	1.2	0.0
1984	90	87	0	0	673	651	1059	1024	13.4	0.0
1985	20	19	0	0	618	578	1183	1107	3.2	0.0
Costa Rica										
1975	0	0	0	0	694	1205	493	856	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	770	1258	593	969	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	1021	1574	828	1277	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	1166	1662	865	1233	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	1397	1844	934	1233	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	1540	1864	1002	1213	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	1209	1354	1008	1129	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	889	930	870	910	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	988	988	882	882	0.0	0.0
1984	5	5	0	0	1087	1051	967	935	0.5	0.0
1985	20	19	0	0	1098	1027	962	900	1.8	0.0
Cuba										
1975	70	122	30	52	3767	6539	3572	6200	1.9	0.8
1976	130	212	120	196	3879	6337	3284	5365	3.4	3.7
1977	100	154	10	15	4362	6725	3669	5657	2.3	0.3
1978	550	784	0	0	4751	6774	4575	6523	11.6	0.0
1979	400	528	0	0	5089	6719	4829	6375	7.9	0.0
1980	330	399	0	0	6409	7756	5593	6768	5.1	0.0
1981	850	952	10	11	6546	7329	5406	6053	13.0	0.2
1982	1000	1046	20	21	6645	6951	5928	6201	15.0	0.3
1983	700	700	40	40	7219	7219	6416	6416	9.7	0.6
1984	700	677	10	10	8145	7874	6174	5968	8.6	0.2
1985	800	748	0	0	8616	8060	6521	6100	9.3	0.0

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Cyprus										
1975	5	9	0	0	308	535	152	264	1.6	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	432	706	258	421	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	623	961	318	490	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	758	1081	344	490	0.0	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	1010	1333	456	602	1.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	1202	1455	533	645	0.0	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	1166	1306	556	623	0.9	0.0
1982	20	21	0	0	1215	1271	555	581	1.6	0.0
1983	20	20	0	0	1219	1219	494	494	1.6	0.0
1984	20	19	0	0	1364	1319	575	556	1.5	0.0
1985	5	5	0	0	1251	1170	477	446	0.4	0.0
Czechoslovakia										
1975	310	538	480	833	8874	15400	8158	14160	3.5	5.9
1976	300	490	450	735	9410	15370	8745	14290	3.2	5.1
1977	250	385	675	1041	10880	16780	10010	15430	2.3	6.7
1978	120	171	950	1354	12490	17800	11670	16640	1.0	8.1
1979	340	449	975	1287	14370	18970	13310	17580	2.4	7.3
1980	190	230	700	847	15520	18780	15250	18460	1.2	4.6
1981	390	437	575	644	14960	16750	15200	17020	2.6	3.8
1982	380	397	600	628	16000	16740	16180	16920	2.4	3.7
1983	150	150	600	600	17040	17040	17120	17120	0.9	3.5
1984	450	435	725	701	17350	16770	17410	16830	2.6	4.2
1985	390	365	825	772	17940	16780	17480	16350	2.2	4.7
Denmark										
1975	30	52	0	0	10370	18000	8712	15120	0.3	0.0
1976	70	114	20	33	12430	20300	9115	14890	0.6	0.2
1977	70	108	10	15	13260	20450	10060	15520	0.5	0.1
1978	70	100	5	7	14810	21110	11880	16940	0.5	0.0
1979	30	40	0	0	18400	24290	14700	19400	0.2	0.0
1980	200	242	10	12	19430	23510	16980	20550	1.0	0.1
1981	210	235	20	22	17570	19680	16090	18020	1.2	0.1
1982	210	220	20	21	16690	17460	15380	16090	1.3	0.1
1983	140	140	5	5	16260	16260	16040	16040	0.9	0.0
1984	50	48	0	0	14610	14130	15970	15430	0.3	0.0
1985	70	65	0	0	18220	17050	17060	15960	0.4	0.0
Dominican Republic										
1975	0	0	0	0	889	1543	894	1552	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	878	1434	716	1170	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	975	1503	780	1203	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	987	1407	676	964	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	1213	1601	869	1147	0.0	0.0
1980	10	12	0	0	1640	1985	962	1164	0.6	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	1668	1868	1188	1330	0.0	0.0
1982	10	10	0	0	1444	1510	768	803	0.7	0.0
1983	5	5	0	0	1471	1471	785	785	0.3	0.0
1984	10	10	0	0	1446	1398	868	839	0.7	0.0
1985	5	5	0	0	1487	1391	735	688	0.3	0.0

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Ecuador										
1975	60	104	0	0	987	1713	974	1691	6.1	0.0
1976	90	147	0	0	958	1565	1258	2055	9.4	0.0
1977	160	247	0	0	1189	1833	1436	2214	13.5	0.0
1978	90	128	0	0	1505	2146	1558	2221	6.0	0.0
1979	180	238	0	0	1600	2112	2104	2778	11.3	0.0
1980	180	218	0	0	2253	2726	2481	3002	8.0	0.0
1981	100	112	0	0	2246	2515	2542	2846	4.5	0.0
1982	280	293	0	0	1989	2080	2140	2238	14.1	0.0
1983	180	180	0	0	1465	1465	2223	2223	12.3	0.0
1984	160	155	0	0	1716	1659	2583	2497	9.3	0.0
1985	20	19	0	0	1606	1502	2905	2717	1.2	0.0
Egypt										
1975	350	608	0	0	3934	6829	1402	2434	8.9	0.0
1976	150	245	0	0	3807	6219	1522	2486	3.9	0.0
1977	270	416	50	77	4815	7424	1708	2633	5.6	2.9
1978	400	570	80	114	6727	9591	1737	2476	5.9	4.6
1979	625	825	10	13	3837	5066	1840	2429	16.3	0.5
1980	550	666	0	0	4860	5881	3047	3687	11.3	0.0
1981	575	644	30	34	8782	9833	3233	3620	6.5	0.9
1982	2100	2197	340	356	9078	9495	3120	3263	23.1	10.9
1983	1800	1800	50	50	10270	10270	3214	3214	17.5	1.6
1984	1600	1547	200	193	10770	10410	3140	3035	14.9	6.4
1985	1100	1029	30	28	9961	9318	3714	3474	11.0	0.8
El Salvador										
1975	5	9	0	0	598	1038	531	922	0.8	0.0
1976	5	8	0	0	735	1201	743	1214	0.7	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	929	1432	972	1499	0.0	0.0
1978	5	7	0	0	1027	1464	801	1142	0.5	0.0
1979	30	40	0	0	1039	1372	1131	1493	2.9	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	962	1164	1074	1300	0.0	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	985	1103	797	892	1.0	0.0
1982	40	42	0	0	857	896	699	731	4.7	0.0
1983	50	50	0	0	891	891	735	735	5.6	0.0
1984	90	87	0	0	977	944	725	701	9.2	0.0
1985	90	84	0	0	961	899	676	632	9.4	0.0
Equatorial Guinea										
1975	10	17	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1976	0	0	0	0	12	20	37	60	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1978	10	14	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1979	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1980	10	12	0	0	37	45	13	16	27.0	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1982	10	10	0	0	42	43	17	18	24.1	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1984	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country – continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars			
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	%	%
Ethiopia										
1975	40	69	0	0	313	543	240	417	12.8	0.0
1976	50	82	0	0	352	575	280	457	14.2	0.0
1977	460	709	0	0	352	543	333	513	130.7	0.0
1978	1100	1568	0	0	455	649	306	436	241.8	0.0
1979	210	277	0	0	567	749	418	552	37.0	0.0
1980	625	756	0	0	722	874	425	514	86.6	0.0
1981	260	291	0	0	739	827	389	436	35.2	0.0
1982	300	314	0	0	786	822	404	423	38.2	0.0
1983	525	525	0	0	876	876	403	403	59.9	0.0
1984	575	556	0	0	928	897	417	403	62.0	0.0
1985	390	365	0	0	993	929	333	312	39.3	0.0
Fiji										
1975	0	0	0	0	268	465	170	295	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	264	431	135	221	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	307	473	180	278	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	355	506	198	282	0.0	0.0
1979	5	7	0	0	470	621	257	339	1.1	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	562	680	377	456	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	631	706	311	348	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	509	532	284	297	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	484	484	240	240	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	450	435	256	247	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	470	440	244	228	0.0	0.0
Finland										
1975	50	87	0	0	7626	13240	5503	9552	0.7	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	7392	12080	6342	10360	0.1	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	7608	11730	7665	11820	0.1	0.0
1978	30	43	0	0	7866	11210	8570	12220	0.4	0.0
1979	20	26	80	106	11400	15050	11170	14750	0.2	0.7
1980	160	194	5	6	15630	18920	14150	17120	1.0	0.0
1981	90	101	5	6	14190	15890	14000	15680	0.6	0.0
1982	110	115	10	10	13400	14020	13090	13690	0.8	0.1
1983	80	80	350	350	12820	12820	12540	12540	0.6	2.8
1984	70	68	320	309	12430	12020	13470	13020	0.6	2.4
1985	90	84	0	0	13240	12390	13630	12750	0.7	0.0
France										
1975	30	52	800	1389	53970	93670	53120	92210	0.1	1.5
1976	40	65	1400	2287	64400	105200	57170	93390	0.1	2.4
1977	50	77	1500	2313	70490	108700	65000	100200	0.1	2.3
1978	70	100	1900	2709	81790	116600	79370	113200	0.1	2.4
1979	110	145	1600	2112	107000	141300	100700	132900	0.1	1.6
1980	40	48	2700	3267	134900	163200	116000	140400	0.0	2.3
1981	40	45	4300	4814	121000	135400	106400	119200	0.0	4.0
1982	100	105	3700	3870	115700	121000	96690	101100	0.1	3.8
1983	210	210	4300	4300	105400	105400	94940	94940	0.2	4.5
1984	100	97	3600	3480	103700	100300	97570	94320	0.1	3.7
1985	100	94	3300	3087	107800	100800	101700	95110	0.1	3.2

TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Gabon										
1975	0	0	0	0	469	814	943	1637	0.0	0.0
1976	20	33	0	0	503	822	1135	1854	4.0	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	716	1104	1343	2071	1.4	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	617	880	1107	1578	1.6	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	532	702	1848	2440	1.9	0.0
1980	60	73	0	0	672	813	2173	2630	8.9	0.0
1981	20	22	0	0	976	1093	2200	2463	2.0	0.0
1982	10	10	0	0	860	900	2160	2259	1.2	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	878	878	2000	2000	1.1	0.0
1984	20	19	0	0	888	858	2011	1944	2.3	0.0
1985	140	131	0	0	949	888	NA	NA	14.8	NA
Gambia, The										
1975	0	0	0	0	60	104	48	83	0.0	0.0
1976	5	8	0	0	74	121	35	57	6.8	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	78	120	47	72	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	100	143	39	56	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	141	186	58	77	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	165	200	32	39	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	124	139	27	30	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	97	101	44	46	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	115	115	48	48	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	100	97	49	47	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	94	88	45	42	0.0	0.0
Germany, East										
1975	450	781	50	87	11950	20740	10680	18540	3.8	0.5
1976	575	939	60	98	13510	22080	11640	19020	4.3	0.5
1977	525	809	90	139	15050	23200	12780	19700	3.5	0.7
1978	360	513	80	114	16450	23460	14960	21330	2.2	0.5
1979	240	317	80	106	18380	24270	16610	21930	1.3	0.5
1980	330	399	150	182	20790	25160	18860	22830	1.6	0.8
1981	450	504	140	157	19970	22360	19650	22000	2.3	0.7
1982	370	387	160	167	20620	21570	22200	23220	1.8	0.7
1983	650	650	180	180	21970	21970	24290	24290	3.0	0.7
1984	500	483	380	367	21930	21200	24550	23730	2.3	1.5
1985	400	374	290	271	22250	20810	24050	22500	1.8	1.2
Germany, West										
1975	600	1041	430	746	74930	130100	90180	156500	0.8	0.5
1976	525	858	725	1184	88420	144400	102200	166900	0.6	0.7
1977	420	648	950	1465	101500	156400	118100	182000	0.4	0.8
1978	350	499	975	1390	121800	173600	142500	203100	0.3	0.7
1979	360	475	1200	1584	159600	210800	171800	226800	0.2	0.7
1980	430	520	1400	1694	188000	227500	192900	233400	0.2	0.7
1981	550	616	1500	1679	163900	183500	176100	197200	0.3	0.9
1982	550	575	950	994	155400	162500	176400	184500	0.4	0.5
1983	430	430	1800	1800	152900	152900	169400	169400	0.3	1.1
1984	525	508	2800	2707	153000	147900	171700	166000	0.3	1.6
1985	700	655	575	538	158500	148300	183900	172000	0.4	0.3

TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country – continued

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Ghana										
1975	10	17	0	0	791	1373	807	1401	1.3	0.0
1976	20	33	0	0	862	1408	827	1351	2.3	0.0
1977	20	31	0	0	1038	1600	1014	1563	1.9	0.0
1978	40	57	0	0	1005	1433	1057	1507	4.0	0.0
1979	50	66	0	0	852	1125	995	1314	5.9	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	1057	1279	1257	1521	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	1107	1239	1063	1190	0.0	0.0
1982	10	10	0	0	705	737	873	914	1.4	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	576	576	498	498	1.7	0.0
1984	10	10	0	0	579	560	559	540	1.7	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Greece										
1975	260	451	0	0	5357	9299	2294	3982	4.9	0.0
1976	525	858	5	8	6059	9898	2561	4184	8.7	0.2
1977	430	663	0	0	6853	10570	2756	4249	6.3	0.0
1978	310	442	5	7	7829	11160	3368	4802	4.0	0.1
1979	380	502	5	7	9614	12690	3885	5129	4.0	0.1
1980	240	290	0	0	10550	12760	5153	6236	2.3	0.0
1981	460	515	0	0	8810	9864	4246	4754	5.2	0.0
1982	410	429	120	126	10030	10490	4298	4496	4.1	2.8
1983	480	480	0	0	9500	9500	4413	4413	5.1	0.0
1984	280	271	100	97	9435	9121	4811	4651	3.0	2.1
1985	280	262	0	0	10230	9569	3868	3618	2.7	0.0
Guatemala										
1975	10	17	0	0	733	1272	641	1113	1.4	0.0
1976	20	33	0	0	839	1371	782	1277	2.4	0.0
1977	5	8	0	0	1053	1623	1225	1889	0.5	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	1286	1833	1113	1587	0.8	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	1504	1986	1270	1677	0.7	0.0
1980	10	12	0	0	1598	1934	1557	1884	0.6	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	1674	1874	1254	1404	0.0	0.0
1982	40	42	0	0	1388	1452	1153	1206	2.9	0.0
1983	5	5	0	0	1135	1135	1180	1180	0.4	0.0
1984	40	39	0	0	1277	1234	1127	1089	3.1	0.0
1985	10	9	0	0	1174	1098	NA	NA	0.9	NA
Guinea										
1975	20	35	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1976	10	16	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1977	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1978	20	29	0	0	272	388	334	476	7.4	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1980	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1981	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1982	5	5	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1983	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1984	5	5	0	0	403	390	537	519	1.2	0.0
1985	20	19	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Guinea-Bissau										
1975	0	0	0	0	38	66	7	12	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	37	60	6	10	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	37	57	13	20	0.0	0.0
1978	20	29	0	0	49	70	12	17	40.8	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	61	81	13	17	16.4	0.0
1980	5	6	0	0	55	67	11	13	9.1	0.0
1981	5	6	0	0	50	56	14	16	10.0	0.0
1982	10	10	0	0	50	52	12	13	20.0	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	57	57	9	9	17.5	0.0
1984	20	19	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	20	19	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Guyana										
1975	0	0	0	0	344	597	365	634	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	364	595	279	456	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	315	486	259	399	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	279	398	296	422	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	318	420	293	387	0.0	0.0
1980	5	6	0	0	396	479	389	471	1.3	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	438	490	352	394	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	280	293	241	252	0.0	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	246	246	189	189	4.1	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	222	215	201	194	0.0	0.0
1985	10	9	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Haiti										
1975	0	0	0	0	149	259	80	139	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	207	338	124	203	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	213	328	149	230	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	233	332	155	221	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	272	359	185	244	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	375	454	195	236	0.0	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	461	516	154	172	2.2	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	284	297	178	186	0.0	0.0
1983	5	5	0	0	NA	NA	166	166	NA	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	20	19	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Honduras										
1975	0	0	0	0	404	701	303	526	0.0	0.0
1976	40	65	0	0	453	740	397	649	8.8	0.0
1977	5	8	0	0	579	893	519	800	0.9	0.0
1978	5	7	0	0	699	997	613	874	0.7	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	826	1091	734	969	1.2	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	1009	1221	829	1003	0.0	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	949	1063	761	852	1.1	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	701	733	660	690	0.0	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	700	700	NA	NA	1.4	NA
1984	90	87	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	20	19	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Hungary										
1975	180	312	50	87	6795	11790	5694	9884	2.6	0.9
1976	210	343	60	98	7252	11850	6643	10850	2.9	0.9
1977	170	262	60	93	8558	13190	7959	12270	2.0	0.8
1978	270	385	70	100	10580	15090	8814	12570	2.6	0.8
1979	230	304	60	79	11920	15740	11120	14680	1.9	0.5
1980	370	448	100	121	12610	15260	11640	14090	2.9	0.9
1981	120	134	90	101	12590	14100	11830	13240	1.0	0.8
1982	190	199	120	126	12870	13460	12420	13000	1.5	1.0
1983	80	80	250	250	13370	13370	13200	13200	0.6	1.9
1984	150	145	200	193	12940	12510	13280	12840	1.2	1.5
1985	30	28	190	178	12990	12150	13490	12620	0.2	1.4
Iceland										
1975	0	0	0	0	484	840	306	531	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	467	763	401	655	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	605	933	512	789	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	675	962	641	914	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	815	1076	782	1032	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	999	1209	918	1111	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	1024	1147	895	1002	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	944	987	685	716	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	818	818	740	740	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	842	814	744	719	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	906	848	815	762	0.0	0.0
India										
1975	180	312	20	35	6381	11080	4355	7559	2.8	0.5
1976	490	800	10	16	5665	9254	5549	9065	8.6	0.2
1977	725	1118	50	77	6647	10250	6378	9833	10.9	0.8
1978	280	399	20	29	7865	11210	6671	9511	3.6	0.3
1979	490	647	30	40	9827	12970	7806	10310	5.0	0.4
1980	825	998	30	36	14860	17990	8586	10390	5.6	0.3
1981	1000	1120	20	22	15420	17260	8295	9287	6.5	0.2
1982	1400	1464	10	10	14790	15470	9358	9788	9.5	0.1
1983	975	975	0	0	13620	13620	9148	9148	7.2	0.0
1984	800	773	20	19	15070	14570	9445	9130	5.3	0.2
1985	1900	1777	5	5	14660	13720	7947	7434	13.0	0.1
Indonesia										
1975	30	52	0	0	4770	8280	7102	12330	0.6	0.0
1976	80	131	0	0	5673	9267	8547	13960	1.4	0.0
1977	50	77	0	0	6230	9605	10850	16730	0.8	0.0
1978	80	114	0	0	6690	9538	11640	16600	1.2	0.0
1979	180	238	0	0	7202	9508	15590	20580	2.5	0.0
1980	360	436	0	0	10830	13110	21910	26510	3.3	0.0
1981	450	504	0	0	13270	14860	22260	24920	3.4	0.0
1982	230	241	10	10	16860	17630	22290	23320	1.4	0.0
1983	150	150	0	0	16530	16530	21140	21140	0.9	0.0
1984	140	135	0	0	13880	13420	21900	21170	1.0	0.0
1985	60	56	5	5	10260	9597	18590	17390	0.6	0.0

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Iran										
1975	1200	2083	50	87	10340	17950	20210	35080	11.6	0.2
1976	2000	3267	30	49	12890	21060	23510	38400	15.5	0.1
1977	2600	4009	30	46	14640	22580	24260	37400	17.8	0.1
1978	2200	3137	20	29	13550	19320	22100	31510	16.2	0.1
1979	1700	2244	0	0	9738	12860	19980	26370	17.5	0.0
1980	420	508	0	0	12250	14820	14110	17070	3.4	0.0
1981	1000	1120	0	0	12500	13990	12600	14100	8.0	0.0
1982	1500	1569	0	0	14160	14820	19430	20320	10.6	0.0
1983	875	875	0	0	18330	18330	19510	19510	4.8	0.0
1984	2200	2127	0	0	15370	14860	12530	12110	14.3	0.0
1985	800	748	0	0	11660	10910	13430	12570	6.9	0.0
Iraq										
1975	750	1302	0	0	4214	7315	8297	14400	17.8	0.0
1976	1000	1634	0	0	3470	5669	9272	15150	28.8	0.0
1977	1400	2158	0	0	3899	6011	9649	14880	35.9	0.0
1978	2100	2994	0	0	4213	6007	11060	15770	49.8	0.0
1979	2300	3037	0	0	7230	9545	21430	28290	31.8	0.0
1980	1900	2299	20	24	14070	17020	26280	31800	13.5	0.1
1981	3800	4255	0	0	20730	23220	10530	11790	18.3	0.0
1982	4600	4811	0	0	21530	22520	10250	10720	21.4	0.0
1983	5800	5800	0	0	12170	12170	9785	9785	47.7	0.0
1984	7700	7444	0	0	11080	10710	10300	9957	69.5	0.0
1985	2100	1964	0	0	10530	9854	11700	10940	19.9	0.0
Ireland										
1975	0	0	0	0	3778	6558	3192	5541	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	4200	6861	3315	5415	0.0	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	5396	8319	4404	6790	0.2	0.0
1978	5	7	0	0	7121	10150	5691	8114	0.1	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	9884	13050	7143	9430	0.1	0.0
1980	30	36	10	12	11150	13500	8398	10160	0.3	0.1
1981	10	11	0	0	10610	11880	7677	8596	0.1	0.0
1982	10	10	0	0	9706	10150	8067	8438	0.1	0.0
1983	5	5	0	0	9170	9170	8599	8599	0.1	0.0
1984	10	10	0	0	9674	9352	9641	9320	0.1	0.0
1985	5	5	0	0	10020	9371	10360	9688	0.0	0.0
Israel										
1975	725	1258	50	87	6099	10590	1941	3369	11.9	2.6
1976	975	1593	150	245	5721	9346	2415	3945	17.0	6.2
1977	1100	1696	60	93	5781	8913	3082	4752	19.0	1.9
1978	900	1283	130	185	7509	10710	3921	5590	12.0	3.3
1979	490	647	260	343	8659	11430	4546	6002	5.7	5.7
1980	800	968	140	169	9705	11740	5538	6702	8.2	2.5
1981	1200	1344	350	392	10190	11410	5670	6348	11.8	6.2
1982	950	994	390	408	10300	10780	5255	5497	9.2	7.4
1983	500	500	170	170	9591	9591	5108	5108	5.2	3.3
1984	675	653	240	232	9800	9474	5807	5614	6.9	4.1
1985	750	702	210	196	10160	9507	6256	5852	7.4	3.4

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Italy										
1975	70	122	270	469	38530	66890	34820	60430	0.2	0.8
1976	180	294	380	621	43910	71720	37260	60870	0.4	1.0
1977	160	247	370	570	48090	74140	45300	69850	0.3	0.8
1978	150	214	800	1141	56500	80550	56070	79940	0.3	1.4
1979	110	145	700	924	77890	102800	72230	95360	0.1	1.0
1980	120	145	725	877	99660	120600	77670	93990	0.1	0.9
1981	100	112	1100	1232	91100	102000	75260	84270	0.1	1.5
1982	150	157	1100	1151	86220	90180	73500	76880	0.2	1.5
1983	130	130	925	925	80360	80360	72700	72700	0.2	1.3
1984	200	193	1000	967	84220	81420	73320	70880	0.2	1.4
1985	120	112	725	678	91120	85240	79020	73920	0.1	0.9
Ivory Coast										
1975	5	9	0	0	1127	1956	1181	2050	0.4	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	1296	2117	1632	2666	0.8	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	1756	2707	2157	3326	0.6	0.0
1978	60	86	0	0	2326	3316	2322	3311	2.6	0.0
1979	70	92	0	0	2492	3290	2514	3319	2.8	0.0
1980	110	133	0	0	2967	3590	3135	3794	3.7	0.0
1981	80	90	0	0	2383	2668	2533	2836	3.4	0.0
1982	20	21	0	0	2180	2280	2299	2405	0.9	0.0
1983	30	30	0	0	1839	1839	2091	2091	1.6	0.0
1984	20	19	0	0	1497	1447	2707	2617	1.3	0.0
1985	20	19	0	0	1749	1636	3198	2992	1.1	0.0
Jamaica										
1975	0	0	0	0	1124	1951	835	1449	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	913	1491	633	1034	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	860	1326	755	1164	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	904	1289	833	1188	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	994	1312	818	1080	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	1171	1417	963	1165	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	1473	1649	974	1091	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	1372	1435	726	759	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	1480	1480	713	713	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	1130	1092	714	690	0.0	0.0
1985	5	5	0	0	1124	1051	549	514	0.4	0.0
Japan										
1975	60	104	30	52	57860	100400	55820	96890	0.1	0.1
1976	180	294	20	33	64890	106000	67300	109900	0.3	0.0
1977	120	185	30	46	71340	110000	81080	125000	0.2	0.0
1978	170	242	100	143	79920	113900	98210	140000	0.2	0.1
1979	230	304	60	79	109800	145000	102300	135100	0.2	0.1
1980	340	411	70	85	141300	171000	130400	157800	0.2	0.1
1981	675	756	210	235	142900	160000	151500	169600	0.5	0.1
1982	600	628	160	167	131500	137500	138400	144700	0.5	0.1
1983	775	775	320	320	126400	126400	147000	147000	0.6	0.2
1984	925	894	290	280	136200	131600	169700	164000	0.7	0.2
1985	750	702	90	84	130500	122100	177200	165700	0.6	0.1

TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Jordan										
1975	80	139	20	35	732	1271	153	266	10.9	13.1
1976	140	229	5	8	1006	1643	207	338	13.9	2.4
1977	110	170	0	0	1381	2129	249	384	8.0	0.0
1978	170	242	10	14	1504	2144	298	425	11.3	3.4
1979	100	132	0	0	1963	2592	403	532	5.1	0.0
1980	260	315	0	0	2402	2907	574	695	10.8	0.0
1981	1100	1232	0	0	3165	3544	733	821	34.8	0.0
1982	1000	1046	0	0	3240	3389	752	787	30.9	0.0
1983	1000	1000	10	10	3036	3036	580	580	32.9	1.7
1984	210	203	0	0	2784	2691	752	727	7.5	0.0
1985	380	355	0	0	2733	2557	789	738	13.9	0.0
Kampuchea (see Cambodia)										
Kenya										
1975	5	9	0	0	987	1713	647	1123	0.5	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	973	1589	824	1346	0.0	0.0
1977	40	62	0	0	1285	1981	1195	1842	3.1	0.0
1978	50	71	0	0	1710	2438	1023	1459	2.9	0.0
1979	90	119	0	0	1658	2189	1107	1461	5.4	0.0
1980	60	73	0	0	2587	3131	1389	1681	2.3	0.0
1981	180	202	0	0	2076	2324	1183	1325	8.7	0.0
1982	70	73	0	0	1673	1750	1045	1093	4.2	0.0
1983	50	50	0	0	1357	1357	979	979	3.7	0.0
1984	5	5	0	0	1522	1471	1082	1046	0.3	0.0
1985	5	5	0	0	1462	1368	977	914	0.3	0.0
Korea, North										
1975	140	243	10	17	1090	1892	785	1363	12.8	1.3
1976	80	131	80	131	850	1389	605	988	9.4	13.2
1977	120	185	20	31	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1978	70	100	90	128	902	1286	967	1379	7.8	9.3
1979	170	224	90	119	1300	1716	1320	1743	13.1	6.8
1980	80	97	190	230	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1981	190	213	575	644	1645	1842	1410	1579	11.6	40.8
1982	300	314	650	680	1600	1674	1700	1778	18.8	38.2
1983	120	120	290	290	1500	1500	1400	1400	8.0	20.7
1984	80	77	380	367	1360	1315	1600	1547	5.9	23.8
1985	300	281	210	196	1720	1609	1400	1310	17.4	15.0
Korea, South										
1975	200	347	5	9	7274	12630	5081	8820	2.7	0.1
1976	350	572	5	8	8774	14330	7715	12600	4.0	0.1
1977	300	463	110	170	10810	16670	10050	15490	2.8	1.1
1978	525	749	70	100	14970	21350	12710	18120	3.5	0.6
1979	525	693	180	238	20340	26850	15050	19880	2.6	1.2
1980	480	581	250	303	22290	26980	17500	21180	2.2	1.4
1981	390	437	260	291	26130	29260	21250	23800	1.5	1.2
1982	370	387	950	994	24250	25370	21850	22860	1.5	4.3
1983	390	390	370	370	26190	26190	24440	24440	1.5	1.5
1984	390	377	525	508	30630	29610	29240	28270	1.3	1.8
1985	380	355	50	47	31130	29120	29570	27660	1.2	0.2

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars			
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	%	%
Kuwait										
1975	50	87	0	0	2390	4149	9184	15940	2.1	0.0
1976	80	131	0	0	3324	5430	9846	16080	2.4	0.0
1977	310	478	0	0	4840	7462	9754	15040	6.4	0.0
1978	300	428	0	0	4595	6551	10430	14870	6.5	0.0
1979	60	79	0	0	5200	6865	18400	24300	1.2	0.0
1980	40	48	0	0	6529	7901	19840	24010	0.6	0.0
1981	120	134	5	6	6978	7813	16300	18250	1.7	0.0
1982	110	115	0	0	8282	8663	10860	11360	1.3	0.0
1983	110	110	0	0	7373	7373	11540	11540	1.5	0.0
1984	390	377	0	0	7009	6776	10760	10400	5.6	0.0
1985	290	271	0	0	6614	6187	10130	9480	4.4	0.0
Laos										
1975	20	35	0	0	45	78	12	21	44.2	0.0
1976	20	33	0	0	45	74	12	20	44.4	0.0
1977	40	62	0	0	14	22	4	6	285.7	0.0
1978	20	29	0	0	16	23	3	4	125.0	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	20	26	5	7	50.0	0.0
1980	90	109	0	0	29	35	5	6	310.3	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	21	24	2	2	47.6	0.0
1982	40	42	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1983	40	40	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1984	60	58	0	0	22	22	NA	NA	269.1	NA
1985	20	19	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Lebanon										
1975	10	17	0	0	2048	3555	1121	1946	0.5	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	612	1000	496	810	1.6	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	1539	2373	691	1065	0.0	0.0
1978	20	29	0	0	1922	2740	755	1076	1.0	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	2700	3565	773	1021	0.7	0.0
1980	40	48	0	0	3650	4417	868	1050	1.1	0.0
1981	50	56	0	0	3499	3918	836	936	1.4	0.0
1982	50	52	0	0	3391	3547	727	760	1.5	0.0
1983	240	240	0	0	3661	3661	691	691	6.6	0.0
1984	250	242	0	0	2948	2850	582	563	8.5	0.0
1985	40	37	0	0	2203	2061	482	451	1.8	0.0
Lesotho										
1975	0	0	0	0	160	278	13	22	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	207	337	17	27	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	229	354	14	22	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	273	389	32	45	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	361	476	45	59	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	464	561	58	70	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	532	596	51	57	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	526	550	36	38	0.0	0.0
1983	5	5	0	0	587	587	23	23	0.9	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	504	487	28	27	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	377	353	21	20	0.0	0.0

TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Liberia										
1975	0	0	0	0	331	575	394	684	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	399	652	460	751	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	464	715	447	689	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	481	686	504	719	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	507	669	537	709	0.0	0.0
1980	5	6	0	0	535	647	600	726	0.9	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	449	503	529	592	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	409	428	477	499	0.0	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	412	412	429	429	2.4	0.0
1984	10	10	0	0	366	354	432	418	2.7	0.0
1985	10	9	0	0	321	300	NA	NA	3.1	NA
Libya										
1975	675	1172	5	9	3542	6148	6840	11870	19.1	0.1
1976	1000	1634	0	0	3212	5247	9562	15620	31.1	0.0
1977	1300	2004	20	31	3773	5817	11420	17610	34.5	0.2
1978	2100	2994	10	14	4603	6563	10210	14550	45.6	0.1
1979	2500	3301	90	119	5311	7012	16080	21240	47.1	0.6
1980	2200	2662	20	24	6777	8201	21920	26520	32.5	0.1
1981	2600	2911	60	67	8382	9385	15580	17440	31.0	0.4
1982	2900	3033	290	303	7175	7505	13950	14600	40.4	2.1
1983	1800	1800	70	70	7467	7467	11090	11090	24.1	0.6
1984	1800	1740	30	29	6800	6574	11140	10770	26.5	0.3
1985	1300	1216	40	37	5422	5072	10930	10220	24.0	0.4
Luxembourg										
1975	10	17	0	0	2007	3484	2497	4334	0.5	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	2060	3365	2722	4447	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	2281	3517	3028	4668	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	2833	4039	3653	5208	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	3110	4106	2926	3863	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	3611	4370	3005	3636	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	2998	3357	2385	2670	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	2727	2852	2230	2333	0.0	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	2664	2664	2180	2180	0.4	0.0
1984	5	5	0	0	2630	2542	2160	2088	0.2	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	2615	2446	2130	1993	0.0	0.0
Madagascar										
1975	0	0	0	0	366	635	301	522	0.0	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	285	466	275	449	3.5	0.0
1977	5	8	0	0	347	535	338	521	1.4	0.0
1978	20	29	0	0	443	632	388	553	4.5	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	641	846	394	520	3.1	0.0
1980	40	48	0	0	600	726	401	485	6.7	0.0
1981	50	56	0	0	545	610	317	355	9.2	0.0
1982	20	21	0	0	417	436	311	325	4.8	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	387	387	263	263	2.6	0.0
1984	10	10	0	0	370	358	334	323	2.7	0.0
1985	20	19	0	0	353	330	350	327	5.7	0.0

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Malawi										
1975	0	0	0	0	253	439	140	243	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	206	337	166	271	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	233	359	200	308	0.0	0.0
1978	5	7	0	0	338	482	185	264	1.5	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	398	525	223	294	5.0	0.0
1980	10	12	0	0	440	532	285	345	2.3	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	351	393	269	301	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	304	318	239	250	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	311	311	224	224	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	280	271	316	305	0.0	0.0
1985	5	5	0	0	287	268	296	277	1.7	0.0
Malaysia										
1975	70	122	0	0	3566	6190	3843	6671	2.0	0.0
1976	40	65	0	0	3824	6247	5295	8650	1.0	0.0
1977	100	154	0	0	4542	7003	6079	9372	2.2	0.0
1978	80	114	0	0	5909	8425	7404	10560	1.4	0.0
1979	170	224	0	0	7849	10360	11080	14630	2.2	0.0
1980	160	194	30	36	10780	13040	12940	15660	1.5	0.2
1981	80	90	0	0	11550	12930	11770	13180	0.7	0.0
1982	100	105	10	10	12420	12990	12030	12580	0.8	0.1
1983	260	260	0	0	13260	13260	14100	14100	2.0	0.0
1984	410	396	0	0	14050	13580	16480	15940	2.9	0.0
1985	450	421	0	0	12300	11510	15440	14440	3.7	0.0
Mali										
1975	10	17	0	0	176	306	53	92	5.7	0.0
1976	20	33	0	0	155	253	84	137	12.9	0.0
1977	30	46	0	0	159	245	125	193	18.9	0.0
1978	40	57	0	0	286	408	112	160	14.0	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	361	477	148	195	5.5	0.0
1980	20	24	0	0	439	531	205	248	4.6	0.0
1981	20	22	0	0	365	409	155	174	5.5	0.0
1982	20	21	0	0	332	347	146	153	6.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	344	344	167	167	0.0	0.0
1984	20	19	0	0	368	356	192	186	5.4	0.0
1985	10	9	0	0	420	393	175	164	2.4	0.0
Malta										
1975	0	0	0	0	375	651	166	288	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	423	691	228	372	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	516	796	289	446	0.0	0.0
1978	5	7	0	0	575	820	342	488	0.9	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	759	1002	424	560	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	938	1135	483	584	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	860	963	449	503	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	789	825	411	430	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	733	733	363	363	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	717	693	394	381	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	757	708	400	374	0.0	0.0

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Mauritania										
1975	0	0	0	0	161	279	176	306	0.0	0.0
1976	20	33	0	0	179	292	178	291	11.2	0.0
1977	30	46	0	0	207	319	157	242	14.5	0.0
1978	30	43	0	0	181	258	123	175	16.6	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	259	342	147	194	3.9	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	286	346	194	235	0.0	0.0
1981	5	6	0	0	265	297	258	289	1.9	0.0
1982	10	10	0	0	276	289	233	244	3.6	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	227	227	291	291	4.4	0.0
1984	20	19	0	0	189	183	289	279	10.6	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	231	216	375	351	0.0	0.0
Mauritius										
1975	0	0	0	0	332	576	298	517	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	360	588	265	433	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	447	689	310	478	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	500	713	324	462	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	574	758	381	503	0.0	0.0
1980	5	6	0	0	614	743	435	526	0.8	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	563	630	332	372	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	465	486	366	383	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	441	441	366	366	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	471	455	372	360	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	523	489	434	406	0.0	0.0
Mexico										
1975	20	35	0	0	6570	11400	2904	5041	0.3	0.0
1976	20	33	0	0	6028	9847	3417	5582	0.3	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	5883	9070	4518	6966	0.2	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	7555	10770	5958	8494	0.1	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	12090	15960	8982	11860	0.1	0.0
1980	20	24	0	0	19460	23550	15570	18840	0.1	0.0
1981	50	56	0	0	24070	26950	19650	22000	0.2	0.0
1982	200	209	0	0	15130	15820	21210	22190	1.3	0.0
1983	50	50	0	0	8023	8023	21820	21820	0.6	0.0
1984	30	29	0	0	11790	11400	24410	23590	0.3	0.0
1985	30	28	0	0	13990	13090	22110	20680	0.2	0.0
Mongolia										
1975	10	17	0	0	410	712	180	312	2.4	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1977	30	46	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1978	90	128	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1979	100	132	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1980	130	157	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1981	120	134	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1982	280	293	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1983	30	30	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1984	30	29	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Morocco										
1975	30	52	0	0	2568	4458	1543	2678	1.2	0.0
1976	230	376	5	8	2618	4277	1261	2060	8.8	0.4
1977	300	463	5	8	3199	4932	1302	2007	9.4	0.4
1978	440	627	0	0	2970	4234	1508	2150	14.8	0.0
1979	470	621	0	0	3678	4856	1959	2586	12.8	0.0
1980	350	424	5	6	4255	5149	2441	2954	8.2	0.2
1981	340	381	0	0	4400	4926	2386	2671	7.7	0.0
1982	270	282	0	0	4315	4513	2062	2157	6.3	0.0
1983	320	320	0	0	3592	3592	2006	2006	8.9	0.0
1984	190	184	0	0	3911	3781	2171	2099	4.9	0.0
1985	130	122	0	0	3820	3573	2187	2046	3.4	0.0
Mozambique										
1975	30	52	0	0	411	713	198	344	7.3	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	300	490	150	245	3.3	0.0
1977	30	46	0	0	321	495	149	230	9.3	0.0
1978	130	185	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1979	80	106	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1980	130	157	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1981	70	78	0	0	362	405	225	252	19.3	0.0
1982	130	136	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1983	260	260	5	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1984	260	251	0	0	539	521	95	92	48.2	0.0
1985	130	122	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nepal										
1975	5	9	0	0	171	297	100	174	2.9	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	163	266	98	160	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	168	259	81	125	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	221	315	91	130	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	254	335	109	144	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	342	414	80	97	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	369	413	140	157	0.0	0.0
1982	5	5	0	0	395	413	88	92	1.3	0.0
1983	5	5	0	0	464	464	94	94	1.1	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	416	402	129	125	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	459	429	161	151	0.0	0.0
Netherlands										
1975	70	122	70	122	33530	58200	35020	60790	0.2	0.2
1976	90	147	90	147	40130	65560	40010	65360	0.2	0.2
1977	160	247	60	93	45900	70770	43700	67380	0.3	0.1
1978	170	242	80	114	53830	76740	50120	71460	0.3	0.2
1979	260	343	120	158	68190	90020	63700	84100	0.4	0.2
1980	450	545	190	230	78040	94440	73940	89480	0.6	0.3
1981	400	448	270	302	67230	75270	68710	76940	0.6	0.4
1982	550	575	250	261	63770	66700	66280	69330	0.9	0.4
1983	675	675	120	120	61650	61650	64680	64680	1.1	0.2
1984	550	532	140	135	62290	60220	65860	63670	0.9	0.2
1985	410	384	60	56	65200	60990	68260	63850	0.6	0.1

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars			
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	%	%
New Zealand										
1975	10	17	0	0	3155	5476	2162	3753	0.3	0.0
1976	5	8	0	0	3254	5316	2795	4566	0.2	0.0
1977	20	31	0	0	3361	5182	3196	4927	0.6	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	3491	4977	3738	5329	0.3	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	4553	6011	4706	6213	0.2	0.0
1980	10	12	0	0	5472	6622	5421	6560	0.2	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	5734	6420	5622	6295	0.2	0.0
1982	20	21	5	5	5782	6048	5571	5827	0.3	0.1
1983	40	40	0	0	5333	5333	5414	5414	0.8	0.0
1984	50	48	0	0	6203	5996	5517	5333	0.8	0.0
1985	50	47	0	0	5992	5605	5720	5351	0.8	0.0
Nicaragua										
1975	0	0	0	0	517	897	375	651	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	532	869	542	885	0.0	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	762	1175	637	982	1.3	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	596	850	646	921	1.7	0.0
1979	5	7	0	0	360	475	567	749	1.4	0.0
1980	10	12	0	0	887	1073	451	546	1.1	0.0
1981	40	45	0	0	999	1119	508	569	4.0	0.0
1982	100	105	0	0	776	812	406	425	12.9	0.0
1983	140	140	0	0	772	772	414	414	18.1	0.0
1984	250	242	0	0	808	781	393	380	30.9	0.0
1985	120	112	0	0	850	795	320	299	14.1	0.0
Niger										
1975	0	0	0	0	101	175	91	158	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	126	206	134	219	0.0	0.0
1977	5	8	0	0	197	304	161	248	2.5	0.0
1978	5	7	0	0	305	435	282	402	1.6	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	461	609	448	591	4.3	0.0
1980	5	6	0	0	594	719	566	685	0.8	0.0
1981	10	11	0	0	510	571	455	509	2.0	0.0
1982	5	5	0	0	511	534	342	358	1.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1984	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nigeria										
1975	90	156	0	0	6041	10490	8001	13890	1.5	0.0
1976	50	82	0	0	8213	13420	10770	17600	0.6	0.0
1977	10	15	5	8	11090	17110	11840	18250	0.1	0.0
1978	50	71	0	0	12820	18280	9960	14200	0.4	0.0
1979	110	145	0	0	10230	13510	17210	22730	1.1	0.0
1980	70	85	0	0	16470	19930	25970	31420	0.4	0.0
1981	410	459	0	0	20880	23370	17860	20000	2.0	0.0
1982	230	241	0	0	16060	16800	12180	12750	1.4	0.0
1983	320	320	0	0	12250	12250	10360	10360	2.6	0.0
1984	480	464	0	0	9364	9052	11860	11460	5.1	0.0
1985	390	365	0	0	8877	8304	12550	11740	4.4	0.0

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars			
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	%	%
Norway										
1975	50	87	10	17	9705	16850	7232	12550	0.5	0.1
1976	60	98	30	49	11120	18170	7951	12990	0.5	0.4
1977	60	93	20	31	12880	19860	8880	13690	0.5	0.2
1978	70	100	30	43	11500	16390	10880	15510	0.6	0.3
1979	40	53	60	79	13710	18090	13550	17880	0.3	0.4
1980	240	290	80	97	16930	20480	18540	22440	1.4	0.4
1981	230	258	40	45	15650	17520	18220	20400	1.5	0.2
1982	290	303	20	21	15480	16190	17590	18400	1.9	0.1
1983	260	260	40	40	13500	13500	17980	17980	1.9	0.2
1984	240	232	10	10	13890	13420	18910	18290	1.7	0.1
1985	180	168	0	0	15560	14550	19850	18570	1.2	0.0
Oman										
1975	40	69	0	0	765	1328	1442	2503	5.2	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	725	1184	1566	2558	1.4	0.0
1977	50	77	0	0	875	1349	1573	2425	5.7	0.0
1978	270	385	0	0	947	1350	1512	2156	28.5	0.0
1979	30	40	0	0	1246	1645	2166	2860	2.4	0.0
1980	100	121	0	0	1732	2096	3295	3987	5.8	0.0
1981	60	67	0	0	2288	2562	4422	4951	2.6	0.0
1982	130	136	0	0	2682	2805	4121	4310	4.8	0.0
1983	350	350	0	0	2492	2492	4064	4064	14.0	0.0
1984	310	300	0	0	2748	2656	4500	4350	11.3	0.0
1985	100	94	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Pakistan										
1975	100	174	5	9	2158	3746	1052	1826	4.6	0.5
1976	190	310	0	0	2181	3563	1167	1906	8.7	0.0
1977	220	339	5	8	2446	3771	1188	1832	9.0	0.4
1978	210	299	30	43	3285	4683	1475	2103	6.4	2.0
1979	240	317	10	13	4056	5355	2056	2714	5.9	0.5
1980	400	484	10	12	5350	6474	2618	3168	7.5	0.4
1981	310	347	40	45	5631	6305	2883	3228	5.5	1.4
1982	480	502	20	21	5465	5716	2397	2507	8.8	0.8
1983	440	440	300	300	5329	5329	3077	3077	8.3	9.7
1984	550	532	300	290	5853	5658	2558	2473	9.4	11.7
1985	390	365	30	28	5890	5510	2739	2562	6.6	1.1
Panama										
1975	5	9	0	0	892	1548	286	496	0.6	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	848	1385	238	389	0.0	0.0
1977	5	8	0	0	861	1327	251	387	0.6	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	942	1343	256	365	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	1184	1563	303	400	0.0	0.0
1980	30	36	0	0	1449	1753	360	436	2.1	0.0
1981	5	6	0	0	1540	1724	328	367	0.3	0.0
1982	10	10	0	0	1569	1641	375	392	0.6	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	1412	1412	321	321	0.0	0.0
1984	5	5	0	0	1423	1376	276	267	0.4	0.0
1985	10	9	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country – continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		TOTAL IMPORTS	TOTAL EXPORTS
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	%	%
Papua New Guinea										
1975
1976	30	49	0	0	502	820	551	900	6.0	0.0
1977	20	31	0	0	642	990	683	1053	3.1	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	770	1098	714	1018	1.3	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	903	1192	883	1166	1.1	0.0
1980	30	36	0	0	1176	1423	1128	1365	2.6	0.0
1981	20	22	0	0	1261	1412	838	938	1.6	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	1170	1224	771	806	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	1120	1120	819	819	0.0	0.0
1984	30	29	0	0	1115	1078	889	859	2.7	0.0
1985	10	9	0	0	NA	NA	920	861	NA	0.0
Paraguay										
1975	0	0	0	0	206	358	177	307	0.0	0.0
1976	5	8	0	0	220	359	182	297	2.3	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	308	475	279	430	0.0	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	383	546	257	366	2.6	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	521	688	305	403	1.9	0.0
1980	40	48	0	0	615	744	310	375	6.5	0.0
1981	5	6	0	0	600	672	296	331	0.8	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	672	703	330	345	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	546	546	269	269	0.0	0.0
1984	30	29	0	0	675	653	381	368	4.4	0.0
1985	10	9	0	0	816	763	403	377	1.2	0.0
Peru										
1975	120	208	0	0	2551	4428	1291	2241	4.7	0.0
1976	260	425	0	0	2037	3328	1360	2222	12.8	0.0
1977	430	663	0	0	1911	2946	1726	2661	22.5	0.0
1978	310	442	0	0	1959	2793	1941	2767	15.8	0.0
1979	110	145	0	0	1820	2403	3491	4609	6.0	0.0
1980	260	315	0	0	2500	3025	3898	4717	10.4	0.0
1981	290	325	0	0	3447	3859	3255	3644	8.4	0.0
1982	370	387	60	63	3601	3767	3293	3444	10.3	1.8
1983	190	190	0	0	2548	2548	3015	3015	7.5	0.0
1984	210	203	0	0	2212	2138	3147	3042	9.5	0.0
1985	80	75	0	0	1835	1717	2966	2775	4.4	0.0
Philippines										
1975	40	69	0	0	3756	6520	2294	3982	1.1	0.0
1976	60	98	0	0	3942	6440	2555	4174	1.5	0.0
1977	50	77	0	0	4270	6583	3127	4821	1.2	0.0
1978	60	86	0	0	5144	7334	3401	4849	1.2	0.0
1979	50	66	0	0	6612	8729	4567	6029	0.8	0.0
1980	60	73	0	0	8295	10040	5741	6947	0.7	0.0
1981	60	67	0	0	8479	9493	5655	6332	0.7	0.0
1982	60	63	0	0	8263	8643	4968	5196	0.7	0.0
1983	30	30	20	20	7976	7976	4890	4890	0.4	0.4
1984	40	39	0	0	6432	6218	5274	5098	0.6	0.0
1985	30	28	0	0	5459	5107	4607	4310	0.5	0.0

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars			
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	%	%
Poland										
1975	350	608	260	451	12750	22140	10510	18240	2.7	2.5
1976	390	637	470	768	13820	22580	10970	17920	2.8	4.3
1977	370	570	500	771	14770	22770	14530	22400	2.5	3.4
1978	180	257	650	927	16490	23510	14490	20660	1.1	4.5
1979	200	264	550	726	18160	23980	16860	22260	1.1	3.3
1980	300	363	600	726	19700	23840	17540	21230	1.5	3.4
1981	625	700	825	924	15980	17890	13640	15280	3.9	6.0
1982	525	549	800	837	14610	15280	15260	15960	3.6	5.2
1983	600	600	775	775	15750	15750	16430	16430	3.8	4.7
1984	260	251	775	749	16540	15990	17270	16690	1.6	4.5
1985	550	514	700	655	17440	16320	17770	16630	3.2	3.9
Portugal										
1975	50	87	0	0	3839	6664	1939	3366	1.3	0.0
1976	40	65	30	49	4220	6894	1811	2958	0.9	1.7
1977	10	15	60	93	4744	7314	1970	3037	0.2	3.0
1978	50	71	70	100	5237	7466	2414	3442	1.0	2.9
1979	20	26	20	26	6534	8626	3479	4593	0.3	0.6
1980	50	61	50	61	9309	11260	4640	5615	0.5	1.1
1981	50	56	30	34	9800	10970	4148	4644	0.5	0.7
1982	90	94	110	115	9572	10010	4148	4339	0.9	2.7
1983	50	50	60	60	8240	8240	4164	4164	0.6	1.4
1984	40	39	110	106	7961	7696	4599	4446	0.5	2.4
1985	110	103	100	94	7652	7158	5201	4865	1.4	1.9
Qatar										
1975	10	17	0	0	413	717	1809	3140	2.4	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	817	1335	2209	3609	0.0	0.0
1977	40	62	0	0	1225	1889	2012	3102	3.3	0.0
1978	20	29	0	0	1185	1689	2320	3308	1.7	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	1424	1880	3744	4943	1.4	0.0
1980	90	109	0	0	1423	1722	5672	6864	6.3	0.0
1981	150	168	0	0	1526	1709	5691	6372	9.8	0.0
1982	270	282	0	0	1951	2041	4252	4447	13.8	0.0
1983	240	240	0	0	1456	1456	3384	3384	16.5	0.0
1984	200	193	0	0	1147	1109	4513	4363	17.4	0.0
1985	30	28	0	0	NA	NA	3543	3314	NA	0.0
Romania										
1975	170	295	30	52	5418	9405	5420	9408	3.1	0.6
1976	140	229	20	33	6062	9903	6175	10090	2.3	0.3
1977	160	247	40	62	7060	10880	7064	10890	2.3	0.6
1978	260	371	70	100	8926	12730	8093	11540	2.9	0.9
1979	170	224	100	132	11170	14740	9949	13130	1.5	1.0
1980	330	399	90	109	12810	15500	11210	13560	2.6	0.8
1981	120	134	440	493	12460	13950	12610	14120	1.0	3.5
1982	20	21	775	811	9745	10190	11560	12090	0.2	6.7
1983	50	50	320	320	9643	9643	11510	11510	0.5	2.8
1984	70	68	270	261	10330	9990	12650	12220	0.7	2.1
1985	20	19	340	318	10400	9729	12200	11410	0.2	2.8

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Rwanda										
1975	0	0	0	0	99	172	42	73	0.0	0.0
1976	5	8	0	0	106	173	80	131	4.7	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	123	190	92	142	0.0	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	188	268	72	103	5.3	0.0
1979	5	7	0	0	192	253	118	156	2.6	0.0
1980	10	12	0	0	243	294	75	91	4.1	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	283	317	82	92	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	286	299	90	94	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	279	279	78	78	0.0	0.0
1984	5	5	0	0	278	269	83	80	1.8	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sao Tome and Principe										
1975
1976	0	0	0	0	9	15	8	13	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	14	22	23	35	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	18	26	21	30	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	20	26	27	36	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	19	23	17	21	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	17	19	9	10	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1983	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1984	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Saudi Arabia f										
1975	250	434	10	17	4214	7315	27880	48390	5.9	0.0
1976	625	1021	0	0	8694	14200	36310	59320	7.2	0.0
1977	1100	1696	10	15	14660	22600	41120	63410	7.5	0.0
1978	1300	1853	20	29	20350	29010	37840	53950	6.4	0.1
1979	1200	1584	90	119	24260	32020	57510	75930	4.9	0.2
1980	1800	2178	0	0	30170	36500	102300	123700	6.0	0.0
1981	2900	3247	550	616	35270	39490	119900	134200	8.2	0.5
1982	3100	3243	0	0	40640	42510	79080	82710	7.6	0.0
1983	3600	3600	0	0	39200	39200	45860	45860	9.2	0.0
1984	2600	2513	40	39	33700	32570	36830	35610	7.7	0.1
1985	2500	2339	0	0	NA	NA	33900	31710	NA	0.0
Senegal										
1975	0	0	0	0	583	1012	461	800	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	636	1039	485	792	0.0	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	764	1178	624	962	1.3	0.0
1978	20	29	0	0	755	1076	449	640	2.6	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	931	1229	535	706	2.1	0.0
1980	10	12	0	0	1052	1273	477	577	1.0	0.0
1981	20	22	0	0	1076	1205	500	560	1.9	0.0
1982	5	5	0	0	992	1038	548	573	0.5	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	1039	1039	543	543	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	1000	967	535	517	0.0	0.0
1985	5	5	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars			
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	%	%
Sierra Leone										
1975	0	0	0	0	185	321	121	210	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	153	250	102	167	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	181	279	123	190	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	279	398	167	238	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	316	417	194	256	0.0	0.0
1980	5	6	0	0	427	517	207	250	1.2	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	312	349	135	151	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	298	312	111	116	0.0	0.0
1983	5	5	0	0	160	160	122	122	3.1	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	167	161	133	129	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	167	156	137	128	0.0	0.0
Singapore										
1975	60	104	10	17	8134	14120	5376	9332	0.7	0.2
1976	20	33	20	33	9070	14820	6585	10760	0.2	0.3
1977	50	77	10	15	10470	16140	8241	12710	0.5	0.1
1978	30	43	20	29	13050	18600	10130	14450	0.2	0.2
1979	90	119	20	26	17630	23280	14230	18790	0.5	0.1
1980	40	48	0	0	24000	29050	19370	23450	0.2	0.0
1981	90	101	40	45	27570	30870	20970	23480	0.3	0.2
1982	50	52	10	10	28170	29460	20790	21740	0.2	0.0
1983	210	210	20	20	28160	28160	21830	21830	0.7	0.1
1984	150	145	10	10	28670	27710	24070	23270	0.5	0.0
1985	70	65	10	9	26270	24580	22810	21340	0.3	0.0
Somalia										
1975	70	122	0	0	155	269	89	154	45.2	0.0
1976	90	147	0	0	156	255	94	154	57.7	0.0
1977	80	123	0	0	228	352	63	97	35.1	0.0
1978	240	342	0	0	244	348	107	153	98.4	0.0
1979	130	172	0	0	246	325	112	148	52.8	0.0
1980	200	242	0	0	348	421	133	161	57.5	0.0
1981	50	56	0	0	512	573	153	171	9.8	0.0
1982	130	136	0	0	264	276	187	196	49.2	0.0
1983	70	70	0	0	179	179	100	100	39.1	0.0
1984	70	68	0	0	108	104	45	44	64.8	0.0
1985	30	28	0	0	112	105	91	85	26.8	0.0
South Africa										
1975	130	226	0	0	8293	14400	8959	15550	1.6	0.0
1976	180	294	5	8	7285	11900	7975	13030	2.5	0.1
1977	130	200	120	185	6270	9667	9987	15400	2.1	1.2
1978	120	171	5	7	7615	10860	12870	18360	1.6	0.0
1979	20	26	60	79	8989	11870	18400	24290	0.2	0.3
1980	0	0	0	0	19250	23290	25680	31080	0.0	0.0
1981	5	6	20	22	22620	25320	20860	23350	0.0	0.1
1982	0	0	20	21	18570	19430	17730	18540	0.0	0.1
1983	10	10	0	0	15700	15700	18610	18610	0.1	0.0
1984	5	5	10	10	16230	15690	17350	16770	0.0	0.1
1985	0	0	10	9	11470	10730	16520	15460	0.0	0.1

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Soviet Union ^e										
1975	380	660	4000	6943	37070	64350	33410	57990	1.0	12.0
1976	625	1021	5300	8658	38210	62420	37270	60880	1.6	14.2
1977	825	1272	6600	10180	40930	63100	45230	69730	2.0	14.6
1978	1100	1568	8500	12120	50800	72420	52430	74760	2.2	16.2
1979	1000	1320	12900	17030	57960	76520	64910	85700	1.7	19.9
1980	950	1150	12200	14760	68470	82860	76440	92500	1.4	16.0
1981	750	840	12000	13440	73160	81910	79380	88870	1.0	15.1
1982	575	601	12700	13280	77850	81430	87170	91180	0.7	14.6
1983	1100	1100	11000	11000	80440	80440	91650	91650	1.4	12.0
1984	1000	967	11100	10730	80350	77680	91490	88450	1.2	12.1
1985	775	725	8900	8325	82920	77570	86960	81340	0.9	10.2
Spain										
1975	180	312	80	139	16260	28230	7690	13350	1.1	1.0
1976	240	392	90	147	17470	28550	8730	14260	1.4	1.0
1977	270	416	20	31	17840	27500	10220	15760	1.5	0.2
1978	150	214	60	86	18710	26680	13110	18700	0.8	0.5
1979	210	277	60	79	25440	33580	18210	24040	0.8	0.3
1980	250	303	60	73	34080	41240	20720	25070	0.7	0.3
1981	400	448	90	101	32150	36000	20330	22770	1.2	0.4
1982	420	439	575	601	31460	32910	20500	21440	1.3	2.8
1983	250	250	350	350	29190	29190	19730	19730	0.9	1.8
1984	150	145	1000	967	28830	27870	23560	22780	0.5	4.2
1985	130	122	340	318	29960	28030	24250	22680	0.4	1.4
Sri Lanka										
1975	0	0	0	0	757	1314	569	988	0.0	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	582	951	572	934	1.7	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	701	1081	761	1173	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	967	1379	845	1205	0.0	0.0
1979	10	13	0	0	1451	1916	981	1295	0.7	0.0
1980	5	6	0	0	2057	2489	1062	1285	0.2	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	1905	2133	1088	1218	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	2015	2108	1031	1078	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	1935	1935	1063	1063	0.0	0.0
1984	10	10	0	0	1869	1807	1467	1418	0.5	0.0
1985	30	28	0	0	1948	1822	1333	1247	1.5	0.0
Sudan										
1975	10	17	0	0	1034	1795	438	760	1.0	0.0
1976	80	131	0	0	980	1601	554	905	8.2	0.0
1977	100	154	0	0	1081	1667	661	1019	9.3	0.0
1978	120	171	0	0	1194	1702	518	739	10.1	0.0
1979	100	132	0	0	1109	1464	535	706	9.0	0.0
1980	100	121	0	0	1576	1907	543	657	6.3	0.0
1981	170	190	5	6	1505	1685	657	736	11.3	0.8
1982	180	188	0	0	1282	1341	498	521	14.0	0.0
1983	80	80	0	0	1354	1354	624	624	5.9	0.0
1984	110	106	0	0	1147	1109	629	608	9.6	0.0
1985	40	37	0	0	771	721	374	350	5.2	0.0

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Suriname										
1975	0	0	0	0	252	437	277	481	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	294	480	276	451	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	398	614	310	478	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	406	579	369	526	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	411	543	444	586	0.0	0.0
1980	5	6	0	0	504	610	514	622	1.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	568	636	474	531	0.0	0.0
1982	10	10	0	0	511	534	429	449	2.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	453	453	367	367	0.0	0.0
1984	20	19	0	0	346	334	356	344	5.8	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Swaziland										
1975	0	0	0	0	180	312	199	345	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	200	327	183	299	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	224	345	168	259	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	311	443	196	279	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	435	574	234	309	0.0	0.0
1980	0	0	0	0	602	728	369	447	0.0	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	596	667	391	438	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	520	544	341	357	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	547	547	283	283	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	443	428	246	238	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sweden										
1975	20	35	100	174	17450	30290	17380	30170	0.1	0.6
1976	40	65	50	82	19630	32060	18430	30120	0.2	0.3
1977	60	93	50	77	20140	31050	19080	29420	0.3	0.3
1978	60	86	110	157	20590	29350	21790	31060	0.3	0.5
1979	70	92	120	158	28740	37940	27600	36440	0.2	0.4
1980	140	169	120	145	33440	40460	30910	37400	0.4	0.4
1981	110	123	170	190	28840	32290	28660	32090	0.4	0.6
1982	80	84	260	272	27580	28850	26810	28040	0.3	1.0
1983	100	100	40	40	26100	26100	27450	27450	0.4	0.1
1984	100	97	100	97	26430	25550	29380	28400	0.4	0.3
1985	60	56	210	196	28530	26690	30460	28490	0.2	0.7
Switzerland										
1975	50	87	140	243	13300	23090	12950	22480	0.4	1.1
1976	80	131	270	441	14770	24140	14830	24230	0.5	1.8
1977	70	108	280	432	17940	27660	17610	27160	0.4	1.6
1978	80	114	290	413	23800	33940	23560	33590	0.3	1.2
1979	270	356	330	436	29360	38760	26540	35040	0.9	1.2
1980	40	48	675	817	36340	43980	29630	35860	0.1	2.3
1981	130	146	340	381	30680	34350	27050	30290	0.4	1.3
1982	110	115	360	377	28680	30000	26020	27220	0.4	1.4
1983	340	340	330	330	29190	29190	25590	25590	1.2	1.3
1984	220	213	240	232	29520	28540	25850	24990	0.7	0.9
1985	90	84	40	37	30700	28720	27450	25680	0.3	0.1

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country – continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Syria										
1975	380	660	5	9	1685	2925	930	1614	22.6	0.5
1976	625	1021	0	0	2383	3893	1074	1754	26.2	0.0
1977	650	1002	0	0	2674	4123	1070	1650	24.3	0.0
1978	900	1283	0	0	2461	3509	1060	1511	36.6	0.0
1979	2100	2772	0	0	3329	4395	1644	2170	63.1	0.0
1980	2700	3267	10	12	4118	4983	2108	2551	65.6	0.5
1981	2200	2463	0	0	5040	5643	2103	2355	43.7	0.0
1982	2300	2406	120	126	4014	4199	2026	2119	57.3	5.9
1983	2000	2000	30	30	4542	4542	1910	1910	44.0	1.6
1984	1500	1450	10	10	4116	3979	1854	1792	36.4	0.5
1985	925	865	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tanzania										
1975	10	17	0	0	778	1350	372	646	1.3	0.0
1976	50	82	0	0	638	1042	440	719	7.8	0.0
1977	60	93	0	0	744	1147	507	782	8.1	0.0
1978	110	157	0	0	1144	1631	476	679	9.6	0.0
1979	230	304	0	0	1105	1459	497	656	20.8	0.0
1980	80	97	0	0	1252	1515	511	618	6.4	0.0
1981	40	45	0	0	1214	1359	580	649	3.3	0.0
1982	20	21	0	0	1134	1186	458	479	1.8	0.0
1983	40	40	0	0	802	802	372	372	5.0	0.0
1984	20	19	0	0	847	819	377	364	2.4	0.0
1985	20	19	0	0	1017	951	255	239	2.0	0.0
Thailand										
1975	50	87	0	0	3280	5693	2208	3833	1.5	0.0
1976	110	180	0	0	3572	5835	2980	4868	3.1	0.0
1977	110	170	0	0	4616	7117	3490	5381	2.4	0.0
1978	120	171	0	0	5356	7636	4085	5824	2.2	0.0
1979	140	185	0	0	7158	9450	5298	6995	2.0	0.0
1980	350	424	0	0	9214	11150	6505	7872	3.8	0.0
1981	330	369	0	0	9955	11150	7031	7872	3.3	0.0
1982	180	188	5	5	8549	8942	6945	7264	2.1	0.1
1983	330	330	0	0	10290	10290	6368	6368	3.2	0.0
1984	240	232	0	0	10400	10050	7413	7166	2.3	0.0
1985	140	131	0	0	9242	8645	7121	6661	1.5	0.0
Togo										
1975	10	17	0	0	174	302	126	219	5.7	0.0
1976	30	49	0	0	185	302	105	172	16.2	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	284	438	159	245	3.5	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	447	637	240	342	2.2	0.0
1979	5	7	0	0	518	684	218	288	1.0	0.0
1980	5	6	0	0	550	666	335	405	0.9	0.0
1981	40	45	0	0	436	488	208	233	9.2	0.0
1982	5	5	0	0	391	409	177	185	1.3	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	283	283	163	163	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	271	262	191	185	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Trinidad and Tobago										
1975	0	0	0	0	1469	2550	1771	3074	0.0	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	2010	3283	2214	3617	0.0	0.0
1977	0	0	0	0	1819	2804	2180	3361	0.0	0.0
1978	0	0	0	0	1967	2804	2040	2908	0.0	0.0
1979	0	0	0	0	2105	2779	2610	3446	0.0	0.0
1980	20	24	0	0	3178	3846	4077	4934	0.6	0.0
1981	0	0	0	0	3089	3459	3761	4211	0.0	0.0
1982	0	0	0	0	3697	3867	3072	3213	0.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	2582	2582	2353	2353	0.0	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	1902	1839	2162	2090	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	1587	1485	2212	2069	0.0	0.0
Tunisia										
1975	10	17	0	0	1424	2472	856	1486	0.7	0.0
1976	10	16	0	0	1529	2498	788	1287	0.7	0.0
1977	50	77	0	0	1825	2814	929	1432	2.7	0.0
1978	10	14	0	0	2138	3048	1126	1605	0.5	0.0
1979	90	119	0	0	2849	3761	1791	2365	3.2	0.0
1980	140	169	0	0	3526	4267	2231	2700	4.0	0.0
1981	60	67	0	0	3791	4245	2500	2799	1.6	0.0
1982	60	63	0	0	3420	3577	1981	2072	1.8	0.0
1983	40	40	0	0	3107	3107	1850	1850	1.3	0.0
1984	140	135	0	0	3174	3068	1794	1734	4.4	0.0
1985	300	281	0	0	2757	2579	1738	1626	10.9	0.0
Turkey										
1975	260	451	5	9	4739	8226	1401	2432	5.5	0.4
1976	320	523	10	16	5129	8379	1960	3202	6.2	0.5
1977	140	216	0	0	5796	8936	1753	2703	2.4	0.0
1978	220	314	10	14	4599	6557	2288	3262	4.8	0.4
1979	170	224	10	13	5069	6692	2261	2985	3.4	0.4
1980	300	363	10	12	7909	9571	2910	3521	3.8	0.3
1981	310	347	10	11	8933	10000	4703	5266	3.5	0.2
1982	450	471	20	21	8843	9250	5746	6010	5.1	0.3
1983	500	500	90	90	9232	9232	5728	5728	5.4	1.6
1984	480	464	160	155	10730	10380	7134	6896	4.5	2.2
1985	390	365	90	84	11030	10320	7957	7443	3.5	1.1
Uganda										
1975	70	122	0	0	199	345	257	446	35.2	0.0
1976	30	49	0	0	171	279	364	595	17.5	0.0
1977	5	8	0	0	247	381	588	907	2.0	0.0
1978	20	29	0	0	254	362	348	496	7.9	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	197	260	435	574	10.2	0.0
1980	10	12	0	0	293	355	345	417	3.4	0.0
1981	40	45	0	0	388	434	243	272	10.3	0.0
1982	60	63	0	0	427	447	349	365	14.1	0.0
1983	30	30	0	0	428	428	372	372	7.0	0.0
1984	5	5	0	0	371	359	399	386	1.3	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
United Arab Emirates										
1975	40	69	5	9	2685	4661	6970	12100	1.5	0.1
1976	170	278	0	0	3327	5435	8689	14190	5.1	0.0
1977	180	278	0	0	5055	7794	9708	14970	3.6	0.0
1978	60	86	0	0	5371	7658	9154	13050	1.1	0.0
1979	150	198	0	0	6966	9197	13650	18020	2.2	0.0
1980	170	206	0	0	8746	10580	20680	25020	1.9	0.0
1981	240	269	0	0	9646	10800	20230	22650	2.5	0.0
1982	50	52	0	0	9440	9874	17330	18130	0.5	0.0
1983	40	40	10	10	8356	8356	15080	15080	0.5	0.1
1984	190	184	5	5	7634	7380	14170	13700	2.5	0.0
1985	60	56	0	0	7590	7100	14040	13130	0.8	0.0
United Kingdom										
1975	90	156	550	955	53340	92590	43420	75370	0.2	1.3
1976	240	392	700	1144	55740	91060	45360	74090	0.4	1.5
1977	150	231	1000	1542	63190	97430	55860	86120	0.2	1.8
1978	160	228	1300	1853	75810	108100	67890	96790	0.2	1.9
1979	280	370	1200	1584	99600	131500	86400	114100	0.3	1.4
1980	350	424	1900	2299	115500	139800	110200	133300	0.3	1.7
1981	480	537	2800	3135	102700	115000	102200	114500	0.5	2.7
1982	500	523	2000	2092	99710	104300	97020	101500	0.5	2.1
1983	650	650	1800	1800	100100	100100	91640	91640	0.6	2.0
1984	800	773	1500	1450	104700	101200	93880	90750	0.8	1.6
1985	470	440	575	538	109000	101900	101200	94710	0.4	0.6
United States										
1975	140	243	4900	8505	105900	183800	108100	187700	0.1	4.5
1976	110	180	5900	9638	132500	216400	115400	188500	0.1	5.1
1977	120	185	6700	10330	160400	247300	121200	186900	0.1	5.5
1978	120	171	6500	9267	186000	265200	143800	205000	0.1	4.5
1979	130	172	6100	8053	222200	293400	182000	240300	0.1	3.4
1980	140	169	6500	7866	257000	311000	220800	267200	0.1	2.9
1981	210	235	8600	9629	273400	306100	233700	261700	0.1	3.7
1982	430	450	9300	9728	254900	266600	212300	222000	0.2	4.4
1983	500	500	11800	11800	269900	269900	200500	200500	0.2	5.9
1984	480	464	10200	9860	341200	329800	217900	210600	0.1	4.7
1985	575	538	9400	8793	361600	338300	213100	199400	0.2	4.4
Upper Volta (see Burkina Faso)										
Uruguay										
1975	5	9	0	0	556	965	384	667	0.9	0.0
1976	5	8	0	0	587	959	546	892	0.9	0.0
1977	20	31	0	0	730	1125	608	937	2.7	0.0
1978	5	7	0	0	757	1079	686	978	0.7	0.0
1979	5	7	0	0	1206	1592	788	1040	0.4	0.0
1980	40	48	0	0	1680	2033	1059	1282	2.4	0.0
1981	60	67	0	0	1641	1837	1215	1360	3.7	0.0
1982	20	21	0	0	1110	1161	1023	1070	1.8	0.0
1983	10	10	0	0	788	788	1045	1045	1.3	0.0
1984	0	0	0	0	777	751	925	894	0.0	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	708	662	855	800	0.0	0.0

TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars			
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	%	%
Venezuela										
1975	90	156	0	0	6006	10430	8800	15280	1.5	0.0
1976	60	98	0	0	7663	12520	9299	15190	0.8	0.0
1977	100	154	0	0	10950	16880	9551	14730	0.9	0.0
1978	30	43	0	0	11790	16810	9188	13100	0.3	0.0
1979	40	53	0	0	10690	14110	14320	18900	0.4	0.0
1980	130	157	0	0	11840	14330	19220	23260	1.1	0.0
1981	290	325	0	0	13110	14680	20120	22530	2.2	0.0
1982	250	261	0	0	12950	13550	16500	17260	1.9	0.0
1983	50	50	0	0	8715	8715	15160	15160	0.6	0.0
1984	360	348	0	0	7373	7127	13420	12970	4.9	0.0
1985	330	309	0	0	8178	7650	12270	11480	4.0	0.0
Vietnam										
1975	80	139	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1976	40	65	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1977	20	31	5	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1978	70	100	0	0	900	1283	300	428	7.8	0.0
1979	1800	2376	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1980	1400	1694	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1981	575	644	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1982	800	837	10	10	1438	1504	595	622	55.6	1.7
1983	800	800	0	0	1550	1550	652	652	51.6	0.0
1984	800	773	0	0	1823	1762	763	738	43.9	0.0
1985	650	608	10	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Vietnam, South										
1975	875	1519	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Yemen (Aden)										
1975	40	69	0	0	323	561	172	299	12.4	0.0
1976	40	65	0	0	412	673	177	289	9.7	0.0
1977	120	185	0	0	544	839	181	279	22.1	0.0
1978	300	428	0	0	575	820	193	275	52.2	0.0
1979	460	607	0	0	925	1221	466	615	49.7	0.0
1980	400	484	0	0	1527	1848	777	941	26.2	0.0
1981	260	291	0	0	1419	1589	607	680	18.3	0.0
1982	130	136	0	0	1599	1673	795	832	8.1	0.0
1983	410	410	0	0	1483	1483	674	674	27.6	0.0
1984	100	97	0	0	1543	1491	645	624	6.5	0.0
1985	210	196	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Yemen (Sanaa)										
1975	20	35	0	0	294	510	11	19	6.8	0.0
1976	20	33	0	0	413	675	8	13	4.8	0.0
1977	30	46	0	0	1040	1603	11	17	2.9	0.0
1978	100	143	0	0	1284	1831	7	10	7.8	0.0
1979	440	581	0	0	1492	1970	14	18	29.5	0.0
1980	575	696	0	0	1853	2242	23	28	31.0	0.0
1981	900	1008	20	22	1758	1968	47	53	51.2	42.6
1982	300	314	0	0	1521	1591	39	41	19.7	0.0
1983	330	330	0	0	1593	1593	27	27	20.7	0.0
1984	80	77	0	0	1400	1353	NA	NA	5.7	NA
1985	90	84	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Yugoslavia										
1975	140	243	200	347	7697	13360	4072	7068	1.8	4.9
1976	150	245	170	278	7366	12030	4878	7969	2.0	3.5
1977	110	170	240	370	9634	14850	5254	8100	1.1	4.6
1978	90	128	410	585	9988	14240	5671	8085	0.9	7.2
1979	120	158	170	224	12860	16980	6491	8570	0.9	2.6
1980	180	218	250	303	15060	18230	8978	10860	1.2	2.8
1981	70	78	290	325	15830	17720	10940	12250	0.4	2.7
1982	180	188	300	314	13450	14070	10250	10720	1.3	2.9
1983	130	130	330	330	12160	12160	9914	9914	1.1	3.3
1984	60	58	575	556	12000	11600	10250	9913	0.5	5.6
1985	20	19	310	290	12210	11420	10700	10010	0.2	2.9
Zaire										
1975	40	69	0	0	905	1571	865	1501	4.4	0.0
1976	120	196	0	0	673	1099	903	1475	17.8	0.0
1977	30	46	0	0	609	939	988	1523	4.9	0.0
1978	40	57	0	0	589	840	925	1319	6.8	0.0
1979	30	40	0	0	597	788	1497	1976	5.0	0.0
1980	50	61	0	0	835	1010	1632	1975	6.0	0.0
1981	50	56	0	0	668	748	579	648	7.5	0.0
1982	40	42	0	0	480	502	400	418	8.3	0.0
1983	30	30	0	0	470	470	1131	1131	6.4	0.0
1984	10	10	0	0	676	653	1003	970	1.5	0.0
1985	20	19	0	0	788	737	947	886	2.5	0.0
Zambia										
1975	20	35	0	0	1138	1975	810	1406	1.8	0.0
1976	30	49	0	0	789	1289	1037	1694	3.8	0.0
1977	20	31	0	0	786	1212	896	1381	2.5	0.0
1978	60	86	0	0	741	1056	856	1220	8.1	0.0
1979	30	40	0	0	905	1195	1373	1813	3.3	0.0
1980	170	206	0	0	1307	1582	1298	1571	13.0	0.0
1981	40	45	0	0	1261	1412	1079	1208	3.2	0.0
1982	20	21	0	0	1000	1046	1024	1071	2.0	0.0
1983	0	0	0	0	816	816	836	836	0.0	0.0
1984	10	10	0	0	730	706	678	655	1.4	0.0
1985	10	9	0	0	654	612	785	734	1.5	0.0

**TABLE II. Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1975-1985
By Region, Organization, and Country — continued**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS ^a		ARMS EXPORTS ^a		TOTAL IMPORTS ^b		TOTAL EXPORTS ^b		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		Million dollars		%	%
	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983	Current	Constant 1983		
Zimbabwe										
1975	5	9	0	0	932	1618	932	1618	0.5	0.0
1976	0	0	0	0	703	1148	974	1591	0.0	0.0
1977	10	15	0	0	710	1095	877	1352	1.4	0.0
1978	20	29	0	0	685	977	900	1283	2.9	0.0
1979	20	26	0	0	929	1226	1053	1390	2.2	0.0
1980	50	61	0	0	1448	1752	1415	1712	3.5	0.0
1981	70	78	0	0	1696	1899	1408	1576	4.1	0.0
1982	90	94	0	0	1639	1714	1276	1335	5.5	0.0
1983	20	20	0	0	1205	1205	1135	1135	1.7	0.0
1984	60	58	0	0	1132	1094	1154	1116	5.3	0.0
1985	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
0 Nil or negligible. NA Not available. ... Pre-independence.										

^a To avoid the appearance of excessive accuracy, arms transfer data have been independently rounded, with greater severity for large numbers. Because of this rounding and the fact that they are obtained from different sources, world arms exports do not equal world arms imports.

^b Total imports and exports are as reported by individual countries. The extent to which arms trade data are included may differ from country to country. Country imports are reported "cif" (includes cost of shipping, insurance, and freight) and country exports are reported "fob" (excludes these costs). For these reasons and because of divergent sources, world totals for imports and exports are not equal.

^c In order to reduce distortions in trends caused by occasional data gaps, the totals for the world, regions, and organizations include rough approximations for those countries and years in which data are not available, and available data for years in which countries were not independent.

^d Includes transfers to NATO agencies as such which are not attributable to individual recipient countries.

^e Estimates of the Soviet Union's arms exports in value terms are currently under review and may be revised in future editions. See Statistical Notes, page 155.

^f Includes some purchases of equipment by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from indeterminable supplier countries for use in construction projects in Saudi Arabia and recorded in U.S. accounts as imports to the U.S.

**TABLE III. Value of Arms Transfers, Cumulative 1981-1985, By Major Supplier
and Recipient Country**

(Millions Current Dollars)

RECIPIENT \ SUPPLIER	TOTAL	SOVIET UNION ^a	UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	WEST GERMANY	CHINA	ITALY	POLAND	CZECHO-SLOVAKIA	OTHERS
WORLD TOTALS	188,230	55,790	49,270 ^b	19,265	8,765	7,610	5,470	4,925	3,905	3,255	29,975
DEVELOPED(*)	37,175	6,650	20,335 ^b	345	1,780	955	0	200	2,290	1,420	3,200
DEVELOPING	151,055	49,140	28,935	18,920	6,985	6,655	5,470	4,725	1,615	1,835	26,775
NATO	21,905	90	15,940 ^b	350	1,250	1,885	0	265	0	5	2,120
WARSAW PACT	13,670	8,250	0	20	90	20	0	0	2,440	1,420	1,430
OPEC(#)	66,995	15,740	7,690	12,225	3,015	2,075	3,995	3,145	945	1,110	17,055
AFRICA	27,515	13,875	1,350	2,710	890	880	505	1,500	300	915	4,590
Algeria#	3,890	3,200	170	100	160	160	0	40	0	10	50
Angola	2,975	2,600	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	5	360
Benin	65	50	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Botswana	15	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Burkina Faso	40	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	30
Burundi	50	30	0	10	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Cameroon	245	0	40	100	10	40	0	5	0	0	50
Cape Verde	30	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Central African Rep.	10	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad	65	0	10	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Congo	190	180	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Equatorial Guinea	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40
Ethiopia	2,100	2,000	0	0	0	0	0	30	0	20	50
Gabon#	200	0	0	160	0	0	0	0	0	0	40
Gambia, The	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ghana	30	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	20
Guinea	25	20	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	60	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ivory Coast	170	0	0	170	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenya	300	0	60	70	90	0	0	30	0	0	50
Lestho	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Liberia	30	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Libya#	10,455	4,600	0	725	5	180	320	850	300	875	2,600
Madagascar	115	90	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	5
Malawi	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mali	65	60	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
Mauritania	45	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	35
Mauritius	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Morocco	1,255	0	350	575	0	10	0	20	0	0	300
Mozambique	825	775	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50
Niger	20	0	0	10	0	10	0	0	0	0	0
Nigeria#	1,820	80	100	320	410	340	0	300	0	5	265
Rwanda	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sao Tome & Principe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal	30	0	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia	365	0	70	10	5	0	30	140	0	0	110
South Africa*	25	0	20	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sudan	560	0	140	30	10	120	80	10	0	0	170
Swaziland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tanzania	140	70	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	0	50

**TABLE III. Value of Arms Transfers, Cumulative 1981-1985, By Major Supplier
and Recipient Country — continued**

(Millions Current Dollars)

RECIPIENT \ SUPPLIER	TOTAL	SOVIET UNION ^a	UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	WEST GERMANY	CHINA	ITALY	POLAND	CZECHO-SLOVAKIA	OTHERS
Togo	50	0	0	40	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Tunisia	580	0	330	200	0	10	0	30	0	0	10
Uganda	135	0	0	20	20	0	5	0	0	0	90
Zaire	150	0	30	40	5	5	20	30	0	0	20
Zambia	75	10	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	60
Zimbabwe	255	5	0	0	140	0	10	10	0	0	90
EAST ASIA	18,975	4,950	9,840	375	375	505	220	405	210	30	2,065
Burma	140	0	10	0	10	30	0	0	0	0	90
Cambodia	360	350	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
China											
Mainland	385	80	30	80	0	5	0	0	0	0	190
Taiwan	2,750	0	2,300	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	440
Indonesia [#]	1,025	0	220	190	150	160	0	5	0	0	300
Japan [*]	3,750	0	3,700	0	0	40	0	0	0	0	10
Korea, North	990	390	0	20	0	0	210	0	100	0	270
Korea, South	1,960	0	1,900	10	10	0	0	0	0	0	40
Laos	170	160	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Malaysia	1,310	0	330	30	50	200	0	260	0	0	440
Mongolia	470	470	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philippines	225	0	150	0	5	10	0	0	0	0	60
Singapore	570	0	350	30	90	50	0	0	0	0	50
Thailand	1,225	0	850	5	60	10	10	140	0	0	150
Vietnam	3,645	3,500	0	0	0	0	0	0	110	30	5
EUROPE	35,005	8,710	15,740	870	900	1,585	0	205	2,440	1,425	3,130
— NATO EUROPE	17,510	90	13,790	340	390	1,505	0	135	0	5	1,255
Belgium [*]	1,725	0	1,600	110	0	5	0	0	0	0	10
Denmark [*]	700	0	650	20	10	0	0	10	0	0	10
France [*]	560	0	380	0	140	0	0	0	0	0	40
Germany, West [*]	2,745	0	2,400	30	60	0	0	5	0	0	250
Greece	1,925	90	825	50	5	250	0	100	0	5	600
Iceland [*]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy [*]	705	0	700	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg [*]	20	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands [*]	2,570	0	2,200	5	30	320	0	10	0	0	5
Norway [*]	1,195	0	925	0	30	30	0	0	0	0	210
Portugal [*]	355	0	190	20	5	100	0	0	0	0	40
Turkey	2,120	0	1,100	20	110	800	0	10	0	0	80
United Kingdom [*]	2,890	0	2,800	80	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
— WARSAW PACT	13,670	8,250	0	20	90	20	0	0	2,440	1,420	1,430
Bulgaria	1,880	1,700	0	0	0	20	0	0	150	0	10
Czechoslovakia [*]	1,800	1,700	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	0	80
Germany, East [*]	2,400	2,100	0	0	0	0	0	0	220	20	60
Hungary [*]	570	410	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	60	50
Poland [*]	2,530	2,200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	130
Romania [*]	290	140	0	20	90	0	0	0	0	40	0
Soviet Union [*]	4,200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,000	1,100	1,100

**TABLE III. Value of Arms Transfers, Cumulative 1981-1985, By Major Supplier
and Recipient Country — continued**
(Millions Current Dollars)

RECIPIENT \ SUPPLIER	TOTAL	SOVIET UNION ^a	UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	WEST GERMANY	CHINA	ITALY	POLAND	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	OTHERS
— OTHER EUROPE	3,825	370	1,950	510	420	60	0	70	0	0	445
Albania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Austria*	230	0	90	0	40	0	0	30	0	0	70
Finland*	425	100	30	0	250	0	0	5	0	0	40
Ireland*	30	0	10	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Spain	1,350	0	750	480	10	60	0	30	0	0	20
Sweden*	450	0	300	5	100	0	0	5	0	0	40
Switzerland*	880	0	700	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	160
Yugoslavia	455	270	70	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	110
 LATIN AMERICA	 13,530	 4,150	 1,325	 1,245	 255	 2,455	 0	 1,050	 40	 165	 2,845
Argentina	2,400	0	40	230	90	1,400	0	110	0	0	530
Barbados	10	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bolivia	85	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	80
Brazil	280	0	90	60	10	0	0	70	0	0	50
Chile	870	0	0	460	60	130	0	0	0	0	220
Colombia	865	0	70	0	10	675	0	0	0	0	110
Costa Rica	20	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cuba	4,010	3,500	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	160	310
Dominican Republic	30	0	10	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ecuador #	750	0	50	120	60	0	0	260	0	0	260
El Salvador	285	0	250	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	35
Guatemala	95	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	90
Guyana	20	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Haiti	25	0	5	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	10
Honduras	130	0	50	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	70
Jamaica	10	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	360	0	130	40	0	10	0	0	0	0	180
Nicaragua	645	250	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	5	380
Panama	35	0	10	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	15
Paraguay	45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	45
Peru	1,150	390	110	210	0	230	0	100	0	0	110
Suriname	35	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	30
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uruguay	100	0	5	50	0	5	0	0	0	0	40
Venezuela #	1,275	0	470	30	0	5	0	500	0	0	270
 MIDDLE EAST	 76,115	 18,375	 15,18	 13,140	 4,505	 1,565	 4,325	 1,570	 805	 570	 16,080
Bahrain	115	0	20	10	5	60	0	10	0	0	10
Cyprus	70	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	50
Egypt	7,120	40	2,900	1,200	460	5	525	350	0	0	1,640
Iran #	6,435	370	0	0	100	0	575	0	20	30	5,340
Iraq #	23,925	7,400	0	5,100	170	700	3,100	490	625	190	6,150
Israel	4,105	0	4,100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Jordan	3,805	525	850	1,100	1,200	0	10	0	0	0	120
Kuwait #	1,005	90	230	360	20	210	0	80	0	0	15
Lebanon	630	0	450	140	0	0	0	10	0	0	30
Oman	955	0	90	40	550	240	5	10	0	0	20
Qatar #	895	0	10	650	230	0	0	0	0	0	5

**TABLE III. Value of Arms Transfers, Cumulative 1981-1985, By Major Supplier
and Recipient Country — continued**
(Millions Current Dollars)

SUPPLIER RECIPIENT	TOTAL	SOVIET UNION ^a	UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	WEST GERMANY	CHINA	ITALY	POLAND	CZECHO- SLOVAKIA	OTHERS
Saudi Arabia [#]	14,760 ^c	0	6,400	4,300	1,400	190	0	170	0	0	2,300
Syria	8,950	8,000	0	50	60	20	110	0	10	350	350
United Arab Emirates	560	0	40	130	220	70	0	40	0	0	60
Yemen (Aden)	1,110	1,100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Yemen (Sanaa)	1,675	850	90	0	0	10	0	0	150	0	575
NORTH AMERICA	3,545	0	1,300	10	860	380	0	130	0	0	865
Canada*	1,340	0	1,300	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	30
United States*	2,205	0	0	10	850	380	0	130	0	0	835
OCEANIA	2,645	0	2,320	20	140	80	0	5	0	0	80
Australia*	2,415	0	2,200	20	100	70	0	5	0	0	20
Fiji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Zealand*	170	0	120	0	40	10	0	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60
SOUTH ASIA	10,050	5,730	1,365	895	840	160	420	60	110	150	320
Afghanistan	1,590	1,500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	70	20
Bangladesh	150	30	5	0	5	0	70	0	0	0	40
India	6,070	4,200	60	550	800	120	0	30	110	60	140
Nepal	10	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	2,190	0	1,300	340	20	40	350	30	0	20	90
Sri Lanka	40	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	30

0 Nil or negligible. * Developed country (all others are "developing"). # OPEC country.

NOTE:

To avoid the appearance of excessive accuracy, all numbers in this table are independently rounded, with greater severity for larger numbers. Therefore, components may not add to totals.

^a Estimates of the Soviet Union's arms exports in value terms are currently under review and may be revised in future editions. See Statistical Notes, page 155.

^b Includes transfers to NATO agencies as such and not attributed to any recipient country.

^c Includes some purchases of equipment by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from indeterminable supplier countries for use in construction projects in Saudi Arabia and recorded in U.S. accounts as imports to the U.S.

**TABLE IV. Arms Transfer Deliveries and Agreements, 1974-1985,
By Supplier and Recipient Region
(In Billions of Current Dollars)**

RECIPIENT	SUPPLIER	WORLD	NATO						OTHER NON-COMMUNIST		COMMUNIST		
			UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	WEST GERMANY	ITALY	OTHER NATO	OTHER DEVELOPED	DEVELOPING	WARSAW PACT		OTHER
											SOVIET UNION ^a	OTHER	
Deliveries													
WORLD													
1974-1977	63.3	22.5	4.4	2.8	2.3	1.2	1.3	1.7	1.4	20.0	4.1	1.5	
1978-1981	120.4	27.6	10.5	7.2	5.0	3.4	2.3	3.5	3.9	45.7	7.7	3.1	
1982-1985	150.5	40.7	15.0	5.9	6.1	3.8	3.4	3.8	8.6	43.7	10.8	8.2	
1982	40.0	9.3	3.7	2.0	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.9	3.1	12.7	2.8	2.1	
1983	40.0	11.8	4.3	1.8	1.8	0.9	0.8	1.3	1.6	11.0	2.4	2.3	
1984	41.5	10.2	3.6	1.5	2.8	1.0	1.0	1.2	3.1	11.1	3.1	2.9	
1985	28.9	9.4	3.3	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.8	8.9	2.6	0.9	
DEVELOPED													
1974-1977	16.1	4.7	0.9	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.7	0.1	5.4	2.8	--	
1978-1981	23.3	10.1	0.2	1.0	0.9	0.1	0.5	0.9	0.1	5.1	4.3	--	
1982-1985	30.8	17.2	0.3	1.4	0.8	0.2	0.8	1.3	0.3	5.1	3.4	--	
1982	6.8	3.6	0.1	0.5	0.2	--	0.2	0.1	0.1	1.3	0.7	0	
1983	8.6	4.7	0.1	0.5	0.3	0	0.2	0.5	0.1	1.2	1.0	--	
1984	8.3	5.0	--	0.2	0.2	--	0.2	0.5	0.1	1.3	0.8	--	
1985	7.1	4.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	1.3	0.9	0	
DEVELOPING													
1974-1977	47.2	17.8	3.5	2.3	2.0	1.2	0.8	1.0	1.3	14.7	1.3	1.5	
1978-1981	97.1	17.5	10.3	6.2	4.1	3.2	1.8	2.6	3.7	40.6	3.4	3.0	
1982-1985	119.7	23.5	14.7	4.5	5.3	3.6	2.6	2.5	8.3	38.6	7.4	8.1	
1982	33.2	5.8	3.7	1.5	0.8	1.1	0.7	0.7	3.0	11.4	2.1	2.1	
1983	31.4	7.1	4.2	1.3	1.5	0.9	0.6	0.8	1.5	9.8	1.4	2.2	
1984	33.2	5.2	3.6	1.3	2.6	1.0	0.9	0.7	3.0	9.8	2.3	2.9	
1985	21.8	5.4	3.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.7	7.6	1.6	0.9	
AFRICA													
1974-1977	8.7	0.3	1.0	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	4.4	0.5	0.5	
1978-1981	23.1	0.7	2.4	0.5	1.5	1.3	0.8	0.3	0.7	12.6	1.5	0.8	
1982-1985	21.1	1.2	2.1	0.7	0.3	1.2	0.2	0.3	1.0	10.6	2.3	1.2	
EAST ASIA													
1974-1977	7.1	5.2	--	0.3	0.1	--	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.8	--	0.3	
1978-1981	13.6	5.6	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.3	1.1	0.4	4.8	0.1	0.2	
1982-1985	15.1	7.9	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	4.1	0.2	0.3	
EUROPE, ALL													
1974-1977	18.1	5.1	1.0	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.8	0.1	6.6	2.9	--	
1978-1981	23.2	8.2	0.5	0.6	1.1	0.2	0.5	1.1	0.1	6.6	4.3	--	
1982-1985	28.2	13.0	0.6	0.7	1.3	0.1	0.3	1.5	0.2	6.8	3.6	--	

**TABLE IV. Arms Transfer Deliveries and Agreements, 1974-1985,
By Supplier and Recipient Region — continued
(In Billions of Current Dollars)**

RECIPIENT	SUPPLIER	WORLD	NATO						OTHER NON-COMMUNIST		COMMUNIST		
			UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	WEST GERMANY	ITALY	OTHER NATO	OTHER DEVELOPED	DEVELOPING	WARSAW PACT		OTHER
											SOVIET UNION ^a	OTHER	
— NATO EUROPE													
1974-1977	6.9	4.3	0.8	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.1	0	--	0	
1978-1981	9.7	7.0	0.2	0.3	1.0	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.1	0	0	0	
1982-1985	14.4	11.5	0.2	0.3	1.3	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0	
— WARSAW PACT													
1974-1977	9.1	0	--	0	0	0	0	--	0	6.1	2.9	--	
1978-1981	10.6	0	0.1	0.1	--	0	0	0.1	0	6.0	4.3	--	
1982-1985	10.9	0	--	0	--	0	0	0.8	--	6.4	3.6	--	
— OTHER EUROPE													
1974-1977	2.1	0.8	0.2	0.1	0.1	--	--	0.4	0	0.5	--	--	
1978-1981	3.0	1.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	--	0.6	0	0	
1982-1985	2.9	1.5	0.3	0.3	--	--	--	0.2	0.1	0.3	0	--	
LATIN AMERICA													
1974-1977	3.1	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	--	0.3	0.9	--	--	
1978-1981	8.0	0.4	1.6	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.2	0.4	1.0	2.6	--	--	
1982-1985	10.8	1.2	0.7	0.1	2.3	0.7	0.1	0.1	1.4	3.3	0.8	0.1	
MIDDLE EAST													
1974-1977	21.9	10.3	1.7	1.4	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.4	5.7	0.6	0.4	
1978-1981	43.3	10.0	5.2	4.0	1.3	0.9	0.2	0.5	1.6	15.6	1.7	1.7	
1982-1985	61.4	12.7	10.6	2.7	1.3	1.2	1.6	1.3	5.2	14.4	3.6	6.2	
NORTH AMERICA													
1974-1977	1.1	0.6	0	0.2	--	--	0.2	--	--	0	0	0	
1978-1981	1.9	1.0	--	0.2	0.3	--	0.2	--	--	0	0	0	
1982-1985	2.9	0.9	--	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.6	0.1	0.1	0	0	0	
OCEANIA													
1974-1977	0.6	0.3	--	0.1	0.1	0	--	0.2	0	0	0	0	
1978-1981	1.4	1.1	0	0.2	--	--	--	0.1	0	0	0	0	
1982-1985	2.1	1.8	--	0.1	0.1	--	--	--	--	0	0	0	
SOUTH ASIA													
1974-1977	2.6	0.1	0.2	0.1	--	0	--	--	0.1	1.7	0.1	0.2	
1978-1981	5.6	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.1	--	0.1	--	3.6	0.1	0.3	
1982-1985	8.1	1.3	0.8	0.6	0.1	0.1	--	0.1	0.1	4.5	0.2	0.3	

**TABLE IV. Arms Transfer Deliveries and Agreements, 1974-1985,
By Supplier and Recipient Region — continued
(In Billions of Current Dollars)**

SUPPLIER RECIPIENT	WORLD	NATO						OTHER NON-COMMUNIST		COMMUNIST		
		UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	WEST GERMANY	ITALY	OTHER NATO	OTHER DEVEL- OPED	DEVEL- OPING	WARSAW PACT		OTHER
										WARSAW PACT		
										SOVIET UNION ^a	OTHER	
Agreements												
WORLD												
1974-1977	97.5	30.2	9.7	4.1	4.4	3.2	1.9	2.1	1.9	33.1	5.0	2.0
1978-1981	145.7	33.5	15.7	8.6	8.3	5.4	3.1	5.5	6.9	41.7	9.2	7.0
1982-1985	184.1	59.3	19.6	10.9	6.1	5.0	4.6	4.9	9.8	46.2	11.4	5.7
1982	52.6	16.2	7.2	1.9	2.0	1.3	1.2	1.0	2.0	14.7	2.8	2.1
1983	41.6	16.3	1.9	1.1	3.1	1.7	0.9	1.5	4.9	5.7	2.7	1.7
1984	46.7	15.5	7.5	1.1	0.7	0.4	1.1	0.9	1.8	14.3	2.5	0.9
1985	43.2	11.3	3.0	6.7	0.3	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.1	11.5	3.5	1.0
DEVELOPED												
1974-1977	22.2	10.2	0.2	1.0	0.7	0.1	0.6	0.8	0.1	5.7	2.8	--
1978-1981	28.8	14.6	0.2	1.2	1.0	0.1	0.3	2.2	0.2	4.7	4.3	0
1982-1985	40.2	21.7	0.6	1.6	3.1	0.2	1.2	1.5	0.7	6.1	3.4	0.1
1982	9.3	5.5	--	0.5	0.4	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	1.4	0.7	--
1983	11.6	6.0	--	0.4	2.4	--	0.3	0.2	--	1.2	1.0	0
1984	8.8	5.2	0.1	0.4	0.1	--	0.4	0.3	--	1.4	0.8	0
1985	10.5	5.0	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.3	2.0	0.9	--
DEVELOPING												
1974-1977	75.3	20.0	9.5	3.1	3.7	3.1	1.2	1.3	1.8	27.4	2.2	2.0
1978-1981	116.9	18.9	15.5	7.4	7.3	5.4	2.8	3.3	6.8	37.1	5.0	7.0
1982-1985	143.9	37.6	19.0	9.3	3.0	4.8	3.5	3.4	9.1	40.2	8.0	5.6
1982	43.3	10.7	7.1	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.0	0.8	1.7	13.2	2.1	2.0
1983	30.0	10.3	1.8	0.8	0.7	1.7	0.6	1.2	4.9	4.9	1.7	1.7
1984	37.9	10.3	7.4	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.6	1.7	12.9	1.7	0.9
1985	32.7	6.4	2.6	6.4	0.2	1.5	1.1	0.7	0.8	9.5	2.6	1.0
AFRICA												
1974-1977	20.0	0.7	2.3	0.2	1.6	1.0	0.6	0.2	0.8	11.0	1.1	0.6
1978-1981	23.1	0.5	2.1	0.7	0.7	1.4	0.6	0.4	1.0	12.3	2.0	1.4
1982-1985	16.3	1.2	1.1	0.7	0.4	1.6	0.7	0.2	1.1	7.2	1.7	0.6
EAST ASIA												
1974-1977	5.9	3.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.9	0.1	0.3
1978-1981	15.5	6.8	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.6	1.0	0.5	4.5	--	0.1
1982-1985	19.0	9.9	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.6	1.6	4.4	0.2	0.3
EUROPE, ALL												
1974-1977	23.7	9.8	0.9	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.4	1.0	--	6.9	2.9	0.1
1978-1981	28.2	10.9	0.7	1.0	1.7	0.2	0.5	2.5	0.2	6.2	4.3	0
1982-1985	43.8	22.6	1.9	0.9	3.8	0.4	0.6	1.3	0.6	8.0	3.7	--

**TABLE IV. Arms Transfer Deliveries and Agreements, 1974-1985,
By Supplier and Recipient Region — continued
(In Billions of Current Dollars)**

SUPPLIER RECIPIENT	WORLD	NATO						OTHER NON-COMMUNIST		COMMUNIST		
		UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	WEST GERMANY	ITALY	OTHER NATO	OTHER DEVEL- OPED	DEVEL- OPING	WARSAW PACT		OTHER
										SOVIET UNION ^a	OTHER	
— NATO EUROPE												
1974-1977	11.4	8.7	0.5	0.3	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.5	--	0	--	0
1978-1981	13.0	9.4	0.2	0.3	1.6	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.1	0	0	0
1982-1985	24.5	18.9	1.7	0.6	1.5	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.1	0
— WARSAW PACT												
1974-1977	9.4	0	0.1	0	--	0	0	0.1	0	6.3	2.9	--
1978-1981	11.5	0	--	0.1	0	0	0	1.3	0	5.8	4.3	0
1982-1985	11.1	0	--	0	--	0	0	0.2	--	7.2	3.6	--
— OTHER EUROPE												
1974-1977	2.9	1.1	0.3	0.3	0	--	0.2	0.4	0	0.6	--	--
1978-1981	3.6	1.5	0.5	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.4	0	0
1982-1985	8.2	3.7	0.2	0.3	2.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.7	--	--
LATIN AMERICA												
1974-1977	4.0	0.6	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.1	--	--
1978-1981	10.6	0.5	1.6	0.2	2.7	0.6	0.2	0.3	1.8	2.6	--	--
1982-1985	9.0	1.4	1.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.2	1.0	3.4	0.8	0.1
MIDDLE EAST												
1974-1977	37.8	14.1	5.6	2.5	1.0	1.1	0.3	0.2	0.5	11.0	0.8	0.8
1978-1981	54.9	11.4	10.4	4.3	1.9	2.7	0.9	0.8	3.5	10.6	2.7	5.0
1982-1985	76.1	16.8	13.5	7.2	0.6	2.3	1.6	2.2	5.4	17.0	4.6	4.3
NORTH AMERICA												
1974-1977	1.3	0.6	0	0.2	0.2	--	0.2	--	--	0	0	0
1978-1981	1.7	1.1	--	0.2	0.1	--	0.2	--	--	0	0	0
1982-1985	3.5	1.3	--	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.6	0.1	0.1	0	0	0
OCEANIA												
1974-1977	1.4	0.8	0	0.2	0.1	--	--	0.2	0	0	0	0
1978-1981	1.5	1.3	0	--	0.1	0	--	0.1	0	0	0	0
1982-1985	4.4	3.9	--	0.2	0.1	--	--	0.2	--	0	0	0
SOUTH ASIA												
1974-1977	3.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	--	--	--	0.1	0.1	2.2	--	0.2
1978-1981	9.4	0.2	0.5	1.6	0.5	0.1	--	0.3	0.1	5.5	0.2	0.5
1982-1985	11.5	1.8	1.6	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	--	6.3	0.4	0.3

-- Rounds to less than \$100 million.

0 Nil or negligible

^aEstimates of the Soviet Union's arms exports in value terms are currently under review and may be revised in future editions. See Statistical Notes, page 155.

TABLE V. Number of Arms Delivered, Cumulative 1981-1985, By Selected Supplier^a, Recipient Developing Region^b, and Major Weapon Type

EQUIPMENT TYPE \ SUPPLIER	TOTAL	SOVIET UNION	OTHER WARSAW PACT	UNITED STATES ^c	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	OTHER NATO	CHINA	OTHER DEVELOPED	OTHER DEVELOPING
ALL DEVELOPING RECIPIENTS^b										
<u>LAND ARMAMENTS</u>										
Tanks	13,774	4,395	1,250	1,624	185	400	220	2,180	3,430	90
Anti-Air Artillery ^d	5,977	1,965	465	122	5	--	35	1,455	1,750	180
Field Artillery ^e	16,732	3,880	690	2,772	205	110	5,365	780	2,680	250
Armored Personnel Carriers	18,679	6,760	715	4,009	1,510	430	1,280	1,000	2,480	495
<u>NAVAL CRAFT</u>										
Major Surface Combatants ^f	154	33	2	17	19	12	55	2	14	--
Other Surface Combatants ^g	482	107	5	26	38	42	115	22	94	33
Submarines	26	8	--	--	--	--	10	4	4	--
Missile Attack Boats	99	26	--	--	13	6	10	22	22	--
<u>AIRCRAFT</u>										
Combat Aircraft: Supersonic	2,844	1,620	25	394	215	60	--	200	330	--
Combat Aircraft: Subsonic	597	100	15	272	70	90	--	--	50	--
Other Aircraft ^h	1,747	385	305	37	95	55	290	105	295	180
Helicopters	1,656	870	150	181	200	15	175	--	55	10
<u>MISSILES</u>										
Surface-To-Air	24,684	12,265	5,000	3,259	260	1,450	120	100	1,545	685
AFRICA										
<u>LAND ARMAMENTS</u>										
Tanks	2,115	1,070	5	80	120	100	100	140	500	--
Anti-Air Artillery ^d	1,508	1,095	5	3	5	--	10	115	235	40
Field Artillery ^e	3,188	1,750	120	173	40	30	425	80	530	40
Armored Personnel Carriers	4,254	1,915	40	209	800	50	230	5	510	495
<u>NAVAL CRAFT</u>										
Major Surface Combatants ^f	43	19	--	--	10	2	12	--	--	--
Other Surface Combatants ^g	143	17	3	--	18	10	77	--	18	--
Submarines	5	5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missile Attack Boats	19	9	--	--	10	--	--	--	--	--
<u>AIRCRAFT</u>										
Combat Aircraft: Supersonic	653	535	--	38	10	20	--	25	25	--
Combat Aircraft: Subsonic	116	15	15	6	40	30	--	--	10	--
Other Aircraft ^h	547	110	145	2	20	20	140	10	90	10
Helicopters	445	255	55	--	65	5	45	--	20	--
<u>MISSILES</u>										
Surface-To-Air	5,326	4,745	--	311	--	200	65	--	5	--

TABLE V. Number of Arms Delivered, Cumulative 1981-1985, By Selected Supplier^a, Recipient Developing Region^b, and Major Weapon Type — continued

EQUIPMENT TYPE	SUPPLIER	TOTAL	SOVIET UNION	OTHER WARSAW PACT	UNITED STATES ^c	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	OTHER NATO	CHINA	OTHER DEVELOPED	OTHER DEVELOPING
EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA											
<u>LAND ARMAMENTS</u>											
Tanks		1,283	485	270	193	--	--	70	--	230	35
Anti-Air Artillery ^d		290	180	--	45	--	--	10	--	--	55
Field Artillery ^e		1,425	295	--	670	--	--	295	55	100	10
Armored Personnel Carriers		1,372	450	--	427	20	165	285	--	25	--
<u>NAVAL CRAFT</u>											
Major Surface Combatants ^f		27	4	--	11	--	3	2	--	7	--
Other Surface Combatants ^g		58	31	--	3	13	--	11	--	--	--
Submarines		2	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--
Missile Attack Boats		10	2	--	--	--	--	--	4	4	--
<u>AIRCRAFT</u>											
Combat Aircraft: Supersonic		353	195	--	78	--	--	--	40	40	--
Combat Aircraft: Subsonic		241	--	--	206	--	15	--	--	20	--
Other Aircraft ^h		337	75	35	7	25	--	30	15	65	85
Helicopters		267	60	80	42	60	--	20	--	5	--
<u>MISSILES</u>											
Surface-To-Air		2,650	320	--	1,410	--	340	--	20	20	540
LATIN AMERICA											
<u>LAND ARMAMENTS</u>											
Tanks		828	445	115	23	20	--	20	--	150	55
Anti-Air Artillery ^d		425	220	55	--	--	--	5	--	60	85
Field Artillery ^e		1,278	555	110	388	--	--	--	--	225	--
Armored Personnel Carriers		1,170	185	165	--	105	90	250	--	375	--
<u>NAVAL CRAFT</u>											
Major Surface Combatants ^f		54	4	--	2	4	2	37	--	5	--
Other Surface Combatants ^g		89	36	2	6	4	10	9	--	22	--
Submarines		9	1	--	--	--	--	8	--	--	--
Missile Attack Boats		6	6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<u>AIRCRAFT</u>											
Combat Aircraft: Supersonic		188	100	--	33	--	--	--	--	55	--
Combat Aircraft: Subsonic		90	--	--	60	15	10	--	--	5	--
Other Aircraft ^h		333	40	30	18	40	15	90	--	40	60
Helicopters		308	85	5	113	45	--	30	--	30	--
<u>MISSILES</u>											
Surface-To-Air		1,865	1,295	--	--	40	490	--	--	40	--

TABLE V. Number of Arms Delivered, Cumulative 1981-1985, By Selected Supplier^a, Recipient Developing Region^b, and Major Weapon Type — continued

EQUIPMENT TYPE	SUPPLIER	TOTAL	SOVIET UNION	OTHER WARSAW PACT	UNITED STATES ^c	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	OTHER NATO	CHINA	OTHER DEVELOPED	OTHER DEVELOPING
MIDDLE EAST											
LAND ARMAMENTS											
Tanks		8,763	1,790	860	1,228	45	300	30	2,000	2,510	--
Anti-Air Artillery ^d		3,494	340	405	74	--	--	10	1,310	1,355	--
Field Artillery ^e		10,082	825	460	1,317	165	70	4,590	645	1,810	200
Armored Personnel Carriers		10,730	3,210	510	3,270	585	75	515	995	1,570	--
NAVAL CRAFT											
Major Surface Combatants ^f		20	4	--	--	5	3	4	2	2	--
Other Surface Combatants ^g		148	17	--	17	3	22	18	12	27	32
Submarines		10	2	--	--	--	--	--	4	4	--
Missile Attack Boats		40	9	--	--	3	6	10	6	6	--
AIRCRAFT											
Combat Aircraft: Supersonic		1,288	625	25	208	155	10	--	95	170	--
Combat Aircraft: Subsonic		140	85	--	--	15	25	--	--	15	--
Other Aircraft ^h		193	35	80	8	10	10	20	--	20	10
Helicopters		496	340	10	16	30	10	80	--	--	10
MISSILES											
Surface-To-Air		14,122	5,385	5,000	1,437	220	420	55	30	1,430	145
SOUTH ASIA											
LAND ARMAMENTS											
Tanks		785	605	--	100	--	--	--	40	40	--
Anti-Air Artillery ^d		260	130	--	--	--	--	--	30	100	--
Field Artillery ^e		759	455	--	224	--	10	55	--	15	--
Armored Personnel Carriers		1,153	1,000	--	103	--	50	--	--	--	--
NAVAL CRAFT											
Major Surface Combatants ^f		10	2	2	4	--	2	--	--	--	--
Other Surface Combatants ^g		44	6	--	--	--	--	--	10	27	1
Submarines		--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missile Attack Boats		24	--	--	--	--	--	--	12	12	--
AIRCRAFT											
Combat Aircraft: Supersonic		362	165	--	37	50	30	--	40	40	--
Combat Aircraft: Subsonic		10	--	--	--	--	10	--	--	--	--
Other Aircraft ^h		337	125	15	2	--	10	10	80	80	15
Helicopters		140	130	--	10	--	--	--	--	--	--
MISSILES											
Surface-To-Air		721	520	--	101	--	--	--	50	50	--

TABLE V. Number of Arms Delivered, Cumulative 1981-1985, By Selected Supplier^a, Recipient Developing Region^b, and Major Weapon Type — continued

^aSuppliers include the five largest single exporters of major weapons, as well as other major groups.

^bTotals include the "developing" countries, as previously listed in Table III, with the exception of Albania, Greece, Malta, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

^cU.S. data are by fiscal years 1981-1985, while other suppliers' data are by calendar years 1981-1985.

^dAir defense artillery includes weapons over 23 mm.

^eField artillery includes mobile rocket launchers, mortars, and recoilless rifles over 100mm.

^fMajor surface combatants include motor torpedo boats, subchasers, and minesweepers.

^hOther aircraft include reconnaissance aircraft, trainers, transports, and utility aircraft.

Statistical Notes

These notes are intended to define the various country groupings and variables employed in the Statistical Tables, to describe the sources of data, and to explain the methods used in handling the data. An effort is made here to alert the reader to the major qualifications that apply to the data, much of which is not as accurate and reliable as uniform presentation in statistical tables may imply. This is particularly true of the data on military expenditures and arms transfers, which in many countries are subject to severe limitations of incompleteness, ambiguity, or total secrecy.

Coverage and Groups of Countries

The statistical tables report data for 145 countries. These countries include most members of the United Nations as well as nonmembers North and South Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan. UN members not covered are generally small, not considered militarily significant and relevant data for them are frequently unavailable.¹

Of the reported countries, six became independent since 1973. Data for them are normally shown in the tables beginning with the first year in which they were independent for more than six months. However, estimates for pre-independence years are used, where appropriate, in calculating regional and group totals so that their trends are not distorted by the newly independent country series.

Countries are grouped into normally defined geographical regions except for the following: North America consists only of the United States and Canada; Mexico is included in Latin America together with Central and South American countries; Egypt is assigned to the Middle East rather than to Africa; and Oceania includes only Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji. A full listing of specific countries in each region may be found in Table III, page 143.

The following political and economic groups are included: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, OPEC, and OECD. *NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)* consists of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Spain joined in 1982, and its membership has since been affirmed, but because its participation is limited and still evolving, Spain is not

yet included. France also limits its military participation (since 1966), but is traditionally associated with NATO and is therefore here included.

The *Warsaw Pact* consists of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. *OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)* includes Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. *OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)* comprises the NATO countries and Australia, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

The 28 countries classed as *developed* in this publication are: the members of NATO except Greece and Turkey; all Warsaw Pact members except Bulgaria; Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland in Other Europe; and Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Africa. All other nations are classed as *developing*. For non-communist countries, assignment to one or the other category follows the practice employed by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. This assignment is based partly on gross national product (GNP) per capita, but also reflects factors such as literacy rates, mortality rates, and levels of industrialization.

A new grouping of *communist* countries is used in statistical Table IV and Figure 11. This group includes the Warsaw Pact countries, Albania, Cambodia, Mainland China, Cuba, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.

Most of the data are for calendar years. For some countries, however, expenditure data are available only for fiscal years which diverge from calendar years. In such cases, the fiscal year which contains the most months of a given calendar year is assigned to that year; e.g., data for the fiscal year April 1977 through March 1978 would be shown under 1977. Fiscal years ending on June 30 are normally listed in the calendar year in which they end.

Sources and Definitions

Military Expenditures

Military expenditure data are provided for some years of the decade for all countries and for most years of the decade for all but eight. Data on NATO country

¹ The UN member countries not covered are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Bhutan, Brunei, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, Grenada, Maldives, Montserrat, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. Also excluded are: nonmember countries Andorra, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru, San Marino, Tonga, and Vatican City; the territories with unresolved sovereignty of Namibia and Western Sahara; the dependencies and areas of special sovereignty of Bermuda, Hong Kong, Macau, Puerto Rico, and numerous others, many being very small islands in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

military expenditures were obtained from NATO publications and are based on NATO definitions. In summary, (a) civilian-type expenditures of each NATO defense ministry are excluded and military-type expenditures of other ministries are included; (b) grant military assistance is included in the expenditures of the donor country; and (c) purchases of military equipment for credit are included at the time the debt is incurred, not at the time of payment.

For other non-communist countries, data are generally the expenditures of the ministry of defense. When these are known to include the costs of internal security, an attempt is made to remove these expenditures. In view of the recent deemphasis of the collection of such data by the Agency for International Development (AID), a major source of data for these countries in the past, a number of other sources have also been consulted. These include the *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook*, issued by the International Monetary Fund, and the publications and files of other US government agencies.

It should be recognized by users of the statistical tables that the military expenditure data are of uneven accuracy and completeness. For example, there are indications or reasons to believe that the military expenditures reported by some countries consist mainly or entirely of recurring or operating expenditures and omit all or most capital expenditures, including arms purchases. In the case of several countries (Algeria, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Honduras, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria), special note of this possibility is made in Table I.

In some of these cases (as indicated in the footnotes of Table I), it is believed that a better estimate of total military expenditures is obtained by adding the value of arms imports shown in Table II (as converted to local currency by current exchange rates) to nominal military expenditures. It must be cautioned, however, that this method may over- or underestimate the actual expenditures in a given year due to the fact that payment for arms may not coincide in time with deliveries, which the data in Table II reflect. Also, in some cases arms acquisitions may be financed by, or grants from, other countries.

A feature of the statistical tables that was introduced recently is the use of the symbol "E" to denote these and other estimates made on the basis of such partial or uncertain data.

In subsequent editions of this report, we hope to be able to make further improvements in the quality of the military expenditure data presented for countries throughout the world. This will be difficult to achieve without better reporting by countries. As stated in a recent article examining the problems of accounting for such expenditures, "There is growing evidence that important amounts of security expenditures may not enter the accounts or the national budgets of many developing countries."² Among the common mecha-

nisms used to obscure such expenditures, according to this article, are: double-bookkeeping, use of extra-budgetary accounts, highly aggregated budget categories, military assistance, and manipulation of foreign exchange.

Particular problems arise in estimating the military expenditures of communist countries due to the exceptional scarcity and ambiguity of released information. As in the past nine editions of this publication, data on Soviet military expenditures are based on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates of what it would cost in the United States in dollars to develop, procure, staff and operate a military force similar to that of the Soviet Union.³ Estimates of this type—that is, those based entirely on one country's price pattern—generally overstate the relative size of the second country's expenditures in intercountry comparisons.⁴ Also, such estimates are not consistent with the methods used here for converting other countries' expenditures into dollars.⁵

Nevertheless, the basic CIA estimates are the best available for present purposes; in fact, there are no alternative estimates available that can inspire equal confidence and have the capability to detect relatively small changes over time, such as the recent slowdown in Soviet military spending that the CIA estimates have indicated.

For Warsaw Pact countries other than the Soviet Union, the estimates of military expenditures are from Thad P. Alton *et al.*⁶ The military expenditures shown

³ See CIA, *Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1971-80: A Dollar Cost Comparison*, January 1981. The CIA dollar estimates as shown in this source have been updated and augmented by estimated retirement pay at US rates in order to improve comparability with expenditures by NATO countries, which include retirement pay.

⁴ This tendency is widely recognized in both government and nongovernment circles. For recent commentaries by academic and government witnesses on this and other problems in estimating and comparing Soviet military expenditures, see the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, "Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1980," Part 6; "... 1981," Part 7; "... 1982," Part 8; and "... 1983," Part 9 (Ninety-Sixth through Ninety-Eighth Congresses). See also Hearing before the subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Congress of the United States, "CIA Estimates of Soviet Defense Spending," Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session; Donald F. Burton, "Estimating Soviet Defense Spending," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1983; and Richard F. Kaufman, "Causes of the Slowdown in Soviet Defense" (with comments by others), *Soviet Economy*, January-March 1985.

⁵ An alternative series employing the same basic data but reflecting both the US and Soviet price patterns was provided in previous editions of this publication. See table captioned "Alternative Estimates of Soviet Military Expenditures," *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1969-1978*, p. 27; and the essay, "Soviet Military Expenditures," *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-1967*, pp. 13-19.

⁶ The estimates are updates and substantial revisions of those in their article, "East European Military Expenditures, 1965-1978," (published in the Joint Economic Committee of Congress Compendium, *East European Economic Assessment*, Part 2, July 10, 1981, pp. 409-433) and particularly in their most recent Occasional Papers, Nos. 90-94 (published by the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe).

² Nicole Ball, "Measuring Third World Security Expenditure: A Research Note," *World Development*, February 1984, pp. 157-164 (Pergamon Press, London).

here refer only to the officially announced state budget expenditures on national defense. These figures understate total military expenditures in view of defense outlays by non-defense agencies of the central government, local governments, and economic enterprises. Possible subsidization of military procurement may also cause understatement. The dollar estimates were derived by calculating pay and allowance at the current full US average rates for officers and for lower ranks. After subtraction of pay and allowances, the remainder of the official defense budgets in national currencies was converted into dollars at overall rates based on comparisons of the various countries' GNPs expressed in dollars and in national currencies. The rates are based in part on the purchasing power parities estimated by the International Comparison Project of the United Nations. These conversion rates are not as specific as might be desired, and when the problems mentioned above are taken into account, the resulting estimates must be considered subject to limitations. Another omission in all Warsaw Pact data is that the nonpersonnel component of military assistance is not covered.

Data used here for China are based on US Government estimates of the yuan costs of Chinese forces, weapons, programs and activities.⁷ Costs in yuan are here converted to dollars using the same estimated conversion rate as used for GNP (see below). Due to the exceptional difficulties in both estimating yuan costs and converting them to dollars, comparisons of Chinese military spending with other data should be treated as having a wide margin of error.

Other sources include the *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook* issued by the International Monetary Fund, the *SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and Disarmament* issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Military Balance* issued by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and *The World Factbook*, produced annually by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Gross National Product (GNP)

GNP represents the total output of goods and services produced by residents of a country and valued at market prices. The source of GNP data for most non-communist countries is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).

For a number of countries whose GNP is dominated by oil exports, the World Bank's estimates of deflated (or constant-price) GNP in domestic currencies tend to understate the increase in the monetary value of oil exports, and thus of GNP, that resulted from oil price increases. These World Bank estimates are designed to

measure real (or physical) product. An alternative estimate of constant-price GNP was therefore obtained using the implicit deflator⁸ for USGNP (for lack of a good national deflator). This was considered appropriate because a large share of the GNP of these countries is realized in US dollars. These countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In the cases of Iraq and Iran, where oil exports are also large but constitute a smaller share of total GNP, oil exports in current dollars were deflated by the US GNP deflator while the remainder of GNP was deflated by the domestic consumer price index (for lack of a broader index). After reconverting the deflated oil export values into domestic currency, the two portions were summed to obtain total constant-price GNP.

GNP estimates of the Soviet Union are by the CIA, as published in its *Handbook of Economic Statistics 1986* and updated. GNP data for other Warsaw Pact countries are an updated and substantially revised version of estimates in "East European Military Expenditures, 1965-1978" by Thad P. Alton and others, *op cit*.

GNP data for China are based on World Bank estimates in yuan. These are in line with estimates of GDP in Western accounting terms made by Chinese authorities. Conversion to dollars is a highly uncertain matter, however. A careful survey of various recent estimates of yuan purchasing power parities concludes that even the selection of preferable estimates is not possible. However, this survey does report a kind of benchmark estimate for an overall yuan/dollar purchasing power parity, which serves as the basis for the conversion rate employed in this issue.⁹ This estimate is published in a Chinese source and is based on actual Chinese trade statistics. This new conversion rate is substantially higher than that used in *WMEAT 1985*, which was based on fragmentary World Bank estimates made for a different purpose. As a result, dollar value estimates for China in this issue of *WMEAT* are substantially lower than those in the previous issue.

GNP estimates for a few non-communist countries are from the CIA's *Handbook of Economic Statistics* cited above. Estimates for the other communist countries are rough approximations.

⁸ The implicit deflator is the ratio of GNP in current prices to GNP in constant prices.

⁹ Jeffrey Taylor, "China's Price Structure In International Perspective," Center for International Research Staff Paper No. 22, U.S. Bureau of the Census, June 1986. The new Chinese benchmark parity is said to be derived as the ratio of the sum of China's imports and exports in yuan at domestic prices to the sum of the same at world prices in dollars. The parity is calculated by the source for 1979 and 1980 and moved to 1981 to yield a parity of 2.23 yuan/dollar. This parity is here further moved to 1983 by the ratio of the implicit GNP deflator for China (per World Bank data) to the same for the United States. It is then used to produce dollar values in the same manner as the 1983 exchange rate for other countries. The new parity compares to that of 1.46 yuan/dollar for 1981 used in *WMEAT 1985*. For a review of Chinese GNP and related data, see Jeffrey R. Taylor, "National Income Accounts of the People's Republic of China," Center for International Research Staff Paper, U.S. Bureau of the Census, (forthcoming).

⁷ Edward P. Parris, *Chinese Estimated Expenditures, 1967-83*, (Defense Intelligence Agency), November 1984. See also the series of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, "Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China," 1975, Part 1, pp. 212-38; 1976, Part 2, pp. 17-25, 76-85; 1977, Part 3, pp. 16-27, 36-41, 74-81; 1979, Part 5, pp. 54-56, 66-72; 1980, part 6, pp. 75-80, 151-153; 1981, Part 7, pp. 185-187; Part 8, *passim*; Part 9 *passim* (Ninety-Fourth through Ninety-Eighth Congresses).

Military-Expenditure-to-GNP Ratio

It should be noted that the meaning of the ratio of military expenditures to GNP, shown in Table I, differs somewhat between most communist countries and non-communist countries. For non-communist countries, both military expenditures and GNP are converted from the national currency unit to dollars at the same exchange rate; consequently, the ratio of military expenditures to GNP is the same in dollars as in the national currency and reflects national relative prices. For Communist countries, however, military expenditures and GNP are converted differently. Soviet military expenditures, as already noted, are estimated in a way designed to show the cost of the Soviet armed forces in US prices, e.g., as if purchased in this country. On the other hand, the Soviet GNP estimates used here are designed to show average relative size when both US and Soviet GNP are valued and compared at both dollar and ruble prices. The Soviet ratio of military expenditures to GNP, as preferably measured in ruble terms, is estimated to have been about 15% in recent years.

For Eastern European countries, the ratios of military expenditures to GNP in dollars are about twice the ratios that would obtain in domestic currencies. (See Alton and others, *op. cit.*) However, since official military budgets in these countries probably substantially understate their actual military expenditures, the larger ratios based on dollar estimates are believed to be the better approximations of the actual ratios.

Central Government Expenditures (CGE)

These expenditures include current and capital (developmental) expenditures plus net lending to government enterprises, by central (or federal) governments. A major source is the International Monetary Fund's *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook*. The category used here is "Total Expenditures and Lending minus Repayment, Consolidated Central Government."

Other sources for these data are the International Monetary Fund monthly, *International Financial Statistics*; OECD, *Economic Surveys*; and CIA, *The World Factbook* (annual). Data for Warsaw Pact countries are from national publications and are supplied by Thad P. Alton and others. For all Warsaw Pact countries and China, conversion to dollars is at the implicit rates used for calculating dollar estimates of GNP.

For all countries, with the same exceptions as noted above for the military-expenditures-to-GNP ratio, military expenditures and central government expenditures are converted to dollars at the same rate; the ratio of the two variables in dollars thus remains the same as in national currency.

It should be noted that for the Soviet Union, China, Iran, Jordan, and possibly others, the ratio of military expenditures to central government expenditures may be overstated, inasmuch as the estimate for military expenditures is obtained at least in part independently of nominal budget or government expenditure data, and it is possible that all estimated military expendi-

tures do not pass through the nominal central government budget.

Population

Population estimates are for midyear and are made available to ACDA by the US Bureau of the Census.

Armed Forces

Armed forces refer to active-duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if those forces resemble regular units in their organization, equipment, training, or mission. Reserve forces are not included unless specifically noted.

Figures for the United States and all other NATO countries are as reported by NATO.

Estimates of the number of personnel under arms for other countries were provided by US Government sources. The armed forces series for the Soviet Union was revised for all years three editions ago. The new series includes all special forces judged to have national security missions (e.g., KGB border guards) and excludes uniformed forces primarily performing non-combatant services (construction, railroad, civil defense, and internal security troops).

Arms Transfers

Arms transfers (arms imports and exports) represent the international transfer (under terms of grant, credit, barter or cash) of military equipment, usually referred to as "conventional," including weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities designed for military use. Among the items included are tactical guided missiles and rockets, military aircraft, naval vessels, armored and nonarmored military vehicles, communications and electronic equipment, artillery, infantry weapons, small arms, ammunition, other ordnance, parachutes, and uniforms. Dual use equipment, which can have application in both military and civilian sectors, is included when its primary mission is identified as military. The building of defense production facilities and licensing fees paid as royalties for the production of military equipment are included when they are contained in military transfer agreements. There have been no international transfers of purely strategic weaponry. Excluded are foodstuffs, medical equipment, petroleum products, and other supplies. Military services such as construction, training, and technical support are not included for the United States, whose services consist mainly of construction (primarily for Saudi Arabia).¹⁰ Military services of other countries, which are normally of a much smaller magnitude, are included.

The statistics contained in Tables I and II are estimates of the value of goods actually delivered during the reference year, in contrast both to the value of programs, agreements, contracts, or orders which may result in future deliveries, and to payments made during the period. However, data on agreements are presented in the new Table IV. Also, the data represent arms transfers to governments and do not include the value of arms obtained by subnational groups.

Figures for the US are for fiscal years and are obtained from official trade statistics on military transfers compiled by US Departments of Defense and State. The data for 1976 include transfers during the transition quarter July-September 1976. The US data include commercial deliveries of items on the US Munitions Control List, some of which may be intended for civilian rather than military use. Data on US arms agreements shown here in Table IV have the same coverage (materiel) as deliveries data and, therefore, exclude an estimate of agreements for services. Commercial agreements are here taken to equal deliveries, since agreements data as such are not available and data on commercial licenses issued are not considered sufficiently indicative.

Data on countries other than the United States are estimates by US Government sources. Arms transfer data for the Soviet Union and other communist countries are approximations based on limited information.¹¹

The estimates of Soviet arms transfers in value terms used in this edition are currently under review. A

¹⁰US Foreign Military Sales deliveries of military construction and other services to various recipient groups in recent years, in billions of current dollars, were as follows:

(Fiscal Years)	Construction	Other Services	Total
WORLD			
1982	1.78	1.56	3.34
1983	2.16	3.21	5.37
1984	1.48	2.51	3.99
1985	0.92	2.36	3.28
DEVELOPED			
1982	Negl.	0.50	0.50
1983	Negl.	0.75	0.75
1984	Negl.	0.54	0.54
1985	Negl.	0.50	0.50
DEVELOPING			
1982	1.78	1.06	2.84
1983	2.16	2.45	4.61
1984	1.48	1.97	3.45
1985	0.92	1.86	2.78
Of Which: — Saudi Arabia			
1982	1.78	0.56	2.34
1983	2.15	1.88	4.03
1984	1.47	1.44	2.91
1985	0.90	1.26	2.16
— Other Developing			
1982	Negl.	0.50	0.50
1983	0.01	0.57	0.58
1984	0.01	0.53	0.54
1985	0.02	0.60	0.62

Source: Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1985*, Data Management Division, Comptroller, DSAA, (n.d.).

¹¹Soviet arms transfers and foreign trade data are taken from sources which present them directly in dollars; hence, particular caution should be used in comparing these statistics for arms transfers and foreign trade with other Soviet data.

preliminary finding of this review is that, while major changes are not needed in estimates of the numbers or types of major military equipment deliveries, dollar estimates of Soviet transfers of support materiel, particularly to countries engaged in hostilities, need to be substantially raised. This would mean an increase on the order of 40-50 percent in the estimated annual value of total Soviet arms transfers over a series of years in future editions.

Close comparisons between the estimated values shown for arms transfers and for GNP and military expenditures are not warranted. Frequently, weapons prices do not reflect true production costs. Furthermore, much of the international arms trade involves offset or barter arrangements, multiyear loans, discounted prices, third-party payments, and partial debt forgiveness. Acquisition of armaments thus may not impose the burden on an economy, in the same or in other years, that is implied by the estimated equivalent US dollar value of the shipment. Therefore, the value of arms imports should be compared to other categories of data with care.

Total Imports and Exports

The values for imports and exports cover merchandise transactions. Values for non-communist countries come from *International Financial Statistics* published by the IMF. The Communist trade figures are from the *CIA Handbook of Economic Statistics*, 1986 edition.

Computational Procedures for Value Data

All value data in this report are expressed in US dollars. Users of these data should keep in mind that international statistics have not yet reached a stage where currency conversion can be done with the accuracy that could be desired. The approach used in this series of reports for most countries consists essentially of three steps:

- Each country's data, expressed originally in the national currency and at current prices, are "deflated" or put into constant-price terms, usually by means of the country's implicit deflator for GNP as a whole. This GNP price index is used for other variables — military and central government expenditures — because more appropriate price indices for those sectors are not generally available. National currency data for all years are expressed in prices of the conversion base year (1983 in this issue).
- These data are then divided by the exchange rate for that year (1983) between the national currency and the US dollar and thus converted into constant base-year (1983) dollars. Exchange rates are provided by the World Bank and are usually the annual average par/market rate, (the "rf" rate as designated by the International Monetary Fund).
- Data in constant dollars are then expressed in current dollars by dividing the US implicit GNP deflator, and rebased to the constant-dollar base year (1983).

Thus, conversion of current-price national currency data for an entire series of years to current dollars involves two prices indices, one national and one U.S., and a single year's exchange rate. The calculation may be illustrated by an example, assuming the following data:

1975 national military expenditures, in national currency and at current (i.e., 1975) prices	4,600
1975 implicit GNP deflators (1983 = 100):	
National	55.5
US	77.7
1983 exchange rate, national currency units per dollar	15.92

Then, 1975 national military expenditures:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{In constant 1983 dollars} \\ &= 4,600 \div .555 \div 15.92 = 520.6 \\ \text{In current dollars} &= 520.6 \times .777 = 404.5 \end{aligned}$$

This method has the advantages that it takes into account national differences in the behavior of prices and avoids the distorting effect that can result from changes in exchange rates during the decade. It does not, however, allow for a number of other factors. One is that any within-country differences between the price indices for military or central government expenditures and for GNP are not taken into account. For example, indices for compensation of military personnel or prices of imported arms might behave differently from the overall index.

Another and probably more serious factor is that exchange rates in many cases do not adequately reflect the relative purchasing power of currencies. This has been demonstrated by a detailed study of purchasing power parities (PPPs) for the GNPs of a large number of countries.¹² This study found that the greater the disparity in the per capita income of countries, the greater the tendency for exchange rates to understate the value of the poorer country's product, and that the understatement can be very large, reaching as much as threefold in some cases. However, since this study did not estimate PPPs for military expenditures as such, it does not shed much light on how PPPs specific to military expenditures or arms purchases might differ from exchange rates or from either overall or other specific-sector PPPs.¹³

A disadvantage of the method used here is that the resulting conversion to current dollars for a given year

will vary from *WMEAT* edition to edition, despite the absence of any change in data for that year itself. The change is due solely to the rolling up of the exchange rate base year (e.g., 1982 to 1983), which usually means a change in the exchange rate used.

The use in this report of the same rate for converting all variables from national currencies to US dollars (with the exceptions noted above) has the virtue that the relationships among variables in national currency terms remain the same when those variables are expressed in dollars.

There are several exceptions to the general procedures outlined above. Data on arms transfers in value terms for all countries are obtained by this Agency already expressed in current dollars. (Original data in foreign currencies have generally been converted by the source at current exchange rates.) These current dollars are converted to constant 1983 dollars in the manner shown above. For the Soviet Union, GNP estimates in rubles are converted by the source into constant dollars at what is in effect an average US- and-Soviet-weighted PPP for GNP as a whole. This same conversion rate is also used for Soviet central government expenditures. Soviet military expenditures are in effect converted by the source at a military-sector PPP using only Soviet weights. (See also the discussion of Military Expenditures, above).

For other Warsaw Pact countries and China, the available estimates for GNP and military expenditures are also already in terms which accounted for domestic price changes and have been converted to constant dollars using estimated purchasing power parities, rather than official exchange rates.

It may be noted that in all cases the relationship between current and constant dollars in this report is determined entirely by the US GNP deflator index. To facilitate reconversion to other constant-dollar bases if desired, this index, rebased here to 1983 = 100, is as follows:

1974	52.6	1978	70.1	1982	95.6
1975	57.6	1979	75.7	1983	100.0
1976	61.2	1980	82.6	1984	103.4
1977	64.9	1981	89.3	1985	106.9

Estimates of 1985 World Military Expenditures and Gross National Product by Region and Group

Military expenditure and GNP data for major groupings of countries in 1985 are cited in the Highlights and shown in Figures 1 and 2, above, although Table I carries data only through 1984. These 1985 data were estimated in the following manner in the case of the military expenditures. Available data and estimates (sometimes very rough) were compiled for the largest-spending 61 countries which accounted for 99% of the world's military expenditures in 1984. Estimates for the remaining countries in 1985 were obtained by calculating growth rates for regional subgroupings of these countries in 1980-1984 and using these growth rates to estimate subgroup totals for 1985.

¹²These PPPs have been estimated by the United Nations International Comparisons Project, a cooperative undertaking of the United Nations, the World Bank and the University of Pennsylvania. See Irving Kravis, Alan Heston, and Robert Summers, *World Product and Income: International Comparisons of Real Gross Product*, published for the World Bank by the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1982.

¹³A United Nations expert group study of the feasibility of constructing purchasing power parities and price indices for military expenditures has recently been completed. (UN document A/40/421, 13 August 1985.) However, practical prospects for the future availability of usable military PPPs are poor due to the lack of underlying national data, especially on military prices.

GNP estimates for 1985 were based on available and estimated data for all countries in the world.

These 1985 estimates are as follows (in billions of dollars):

	Military Expenditures		GNP Constant (1983)	ME/GNP (percent)
	Current	Constant (1983)		
World	895.7	837.0	14001	5.98
Developed	719.2	672.8	11180	6.02
Developing	176.5	165.5	2821	5.87
Africa	16.7	15.6	419	3.72
East Asia	63.6	59.4	2058	2.89
Europe, All	438.3	410.0	5883	6.97
NATO Europe	101.8	95.2	2521	3.78
Warsaw Pact	323.1	302.2	2808	10.76
Other Europe	13.4	12.5	554	2.26
Latin America	11.9	11.1	671	1.66
Middle East	74.8	70.0	440	15.91
North America	274.2	256.5	4083	6.28
Oceania	5.5	5.1	188	2.71
South Asia	10.0	9.4	259	3.62
NATO, All	376.3	351.7	6603	5.33

Growth Rates

The average annual rates of real growth shown in Tables 1-4 of the Highlights are based on data in constant 1983 dollars in Tables I and II. The rates are calculated by a least-squares fit of the log form (to the base 10) of the following equation to all years of the decade:

$$Y = A(1 + r/100)^T, \text{ or}$$

$$\text{Log } Y = \text{Log } A + \text{Log } (1 + r/100) T,$$

where Y is military expenditures (etc.), A is the initial value, T is time in years, and r is the growth rate in percent. This formula was used in all cases to provide a consistent measure of change and is not necessarily the best fit for projection purposes.